Min Zin

Burma at a Crossroads: An Analysis of State Structures

2011-07-29T11:32:00.000-07:00

THE IRRAWADDY

Monday, July 25, 2011

Burma at a Crossroads:

An Analysis of State Structures

MIN ZIN

It has been more than 100 days since President Thein Sein’s new government took office in Burma after a widely criticized “sham” election in November 2010. Many Burma analysts and opposition activists alike have examined the work of a new government by questioning whether the recent changes in Burma demonstrate the beginnings of a process of genuine democratic transition, or whether this is merely “old wine in a new bottle.”

Unfortunately, the question in itself is wrong and misleading. The changes that are likely to take place under the Thein Sein government represent neither democratic transition nor recorked wine.
I have consistently argued since 2008 on the pages of The Irrawaddy that the new constitution and the 2010 elections will not change incompatible goals and relations between military and civilian forces, broadly speaking state-society relations.
As result, the post-2010 regime will not change any salience of the issues including political prisoners, ethnic conflicts, and other rights violations that the country has been facing and which have earned it pariah status. However, I argued that November's election will contribute to changes in the format of governance—the transformation of the one-dimensional military junta into a hybrid form of government that includes both political and military elements. Regardless of who pulls the strings, this could lead to either a serious internal split or the utter inefficiency of the ruling body.
In brief, my argument noted that even after the elections, the state-society relations would remain more or less the same, but the intra-state relations or state structure could be changed. Now we can engage more in nuanced analysis of the part that I presume changing since the real situation on ground has begun unfolding.
First of all, it is remarkable that Snr-Gen Than Shwe managed to establish a pre-mortem succession arrangement by installing potential rivals as his heirs apparent in different institutional settings. Than Shwe put Thein Sein in the presidential seat but checked the move by installing Tin Aung Myint Oo as a vice president. In parliament, he positioned Shwe Mann, who had widely been speculated to become the first president of a hybrid government, as the chair of the Lower House.
Those who were second-tier in the lineup but reputed as hardliners, such as Htay Oo, Aung Thaung and Maung Oo, have been assigned to lead the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the ruling party.
Than Shwe left his commander-in-chief position to Min Aung Hlaing, who is very junior compared with the current leaders of the USDP-led government, but is known as disrespectful of his seniors whenever he has a chance of holding an ascendant position.
In brief, Than Shwe put them in stalemate against one another, and at the same time weakened the overall governance capacity so that these heirs apparent could not unite on the same ground and unsettle his days in retirement. This careful arrangement of inter-institutions and personality rivalries effectively undermines the possible consolidation of a new government’s power.
The generals-turned-civilian leaders, who used to live under the vertical command structure, appear to be clueless that who is now in the driver seat. It is still unclear where the real locus of power in this new arrangement lies. No one so far dares to cross the boundary of others, despite the increasing attempts at jostling and even trespassing.

Second, if governance could be defined in its minimalistic understanding as the tools, strategies and relationships used by governments to help govern, the pivotal focus for analysis would be the state institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the formal as well as the informal strategies and relationships that the new government in Naypyidaw is likely to employ.
In institutional terms, we await to see what office (or who in an initial period) evolves into the dominant mechanism (or figure) to address the challenges of governance—whether it be the administrative body led by Thein Sein who apparently tends to rely on technocrats, or the legislative body led by Shwe Mann, or the USDP led by Htay Oo et al, or even the emergence of a new autocrat, for instance Tin Aung Myint Oo.
As the country is undergoing a political transition, we can’t of course expect democratic check and balance in its state structure formations. One institution, either formal or informal, will turn out to be the dominant instrument in governing the country. Meanwhile, unless there is uncontrollable popular uprising or serious split within the ruling body, the military may remain in the background.
If the generals-turned-civilian leaders in the new government manage to appoint a new military chief every two or four years, it will further preempt another potential military dictator to take root in a military power base. Meanwhile, the most pressing challenge for the current ruling elites is to settle institutional (in some incidents personality) rivalries between different state structures. The observers must carefully detect which institution will come to dominate or all will end up in inefficient impasse—or even fall apart.
Although the inner workings of these institutional and personality rivalries remain a matter of black box, some educated guesses could be made to construct a possible scenario.
Careful analysis of biographical records shows that Thein Sein has always been an administrative person, not a decision-maker. He served as Colonel General Staff (now called Brigadier General of the General Staff at the Ministry of Defense) in 1992, a very powerful position in the army because the Brig-Gen's general staff oversees and coordinates the whole operation of the military establishment.
As an administrative officer, Thein Sein is known as a good listener and reportedly good at facilitating and coordinating policy. But he has never been an effective decision-maker. In his career, Thein Sein only took commander positions when he didn’t have to engage any hard-fought battles. For instance, he was the commanding officer of Infantry Battalion 89 in Chin State in the late 1980s; of Military Operation Command MOC 4 near Rangoon in mid-1990s; and of the newly formed Triangle Regional Military Command in 1996.
This professional record is clearly in contrast with the experience of his closest threat, Tin Aung Myint Oo, who checkmates him in administration. Tin Aung Myint Oo is known as a “fighter” in the army. Tin Aung Myint Oo served a deputy commander of Battalion 11 Infantry of LID 88 headed by Than Shwe in 1981-83, and later on won the Thiha Thura medal in combat against Communist rebels in the 1988.
Tin Aung Myint Oo became commanding officer of No 111 Light Infantry Battalion under LID 33, and of the Tactical Operations Command under the Northern Military Command in 1992. In 1995, he was a brigadier general with the Military Operation Command-1 based in Northern Shan State. Battle-hardened Tin Aung Myint Oo became commander of the Northeast Military Region in Lashio in 1997 before being promoted to Quartermaster General in 2001.
Military insiders observe that Tin Aung Myint Oo is decisive, micro-managing, rude and corrupt. He is a “jungle man, not a gentleman,” says defector ex-Maj Aung Lynn Htut.
Reports coming out of Naypyidaw confirm that the rivalries and tensions within administrative apparatus are worsening over time.
As mentioned above, Than Shwe appeared to design such an administrative set-up in order to preempt unified successors, and consequently it weakens the governance. It is not likely that we will see any political breakthrough—either with the opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi or with ethnic resistance groups—under such governance constraints. It seems that a breakthrough will take place only if Suu Kyi and the ethnic ceasefire groups agree to make game-changing concessions such as the former accepting the 2008 constitution, and the latter accepting the junta's Border Guard Force arrangement. However, this scenario is currently unthinkable.
It doesn’t mean that the observers should ignore the intentions of some leading members of the current leadership. President Thein Sein gave a noteworthy inaugural speech, in which he emphasized “good governance,” the fight against corruption, promotion of “democratic practices, not only among parliamentary representatives, but also among the people,” and the rule of law.
Likewise, Thura Shwe Mann, the speaker of the house at the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Lower House of Burma’s Parliament, gave a jaw-dropping speech to lawmakers, business people and even the media. He repeatedly noted the phrase, “No one is above the law,” and that “people’s power reigns in the parliament as it is formed with the people’s representatives,” invoking clause 228 of the constitution to elevate the role of parliament above the government.
Was it all too good to be true? In fact, the rhetoric of these speeches, which might reflect their genuine intents, are so far nothing more than a process of scoring points to promote their own institutions.
For instance, Maung Oo of the USDP emphasized in his speeches that power has been transferred from the State Peace and Development Council to the USDP, not to parliament, and the USDP will rule the country for at least 50 more years.
The rhetoric, therefore, mainly demonstrates the attempts of each group to consolidate their power bases and institutions.
So long as the struggle over the location of power is unresolved, the policy outcomes remain unstable and reversible (such as the recent decentralization experiment being revoked). Enthusiastic observers should step back and check the facts, instead of taking speeches at face value.
If the new regime’s institutional rivalry and power struggles turn out to be prolonged and result in inefficient governance or a split, the military’s renewed intervention or even a popular revolt should not be ruled out.
However, if the regime manages to entrust an institution (such as the technocrats or parliament or the USDP) to run the show, we will see a consolidation of power. It means that the regime will be able start the real process of much-needed institution-building in Burma.
This institution-building, however, must be understood in the context of state-building rather than democratization. As a result, one visible progress may be seen in more dynamic economic rationality because the rule of law—at least as far as business transactions are concerned—will be introduced.
It may help diversify the sources of the country’s revenue by promoting manufacturing industries, instead of almost total concentration on the natural resource extraction sector.
If stability and confidence in governance grow, an incremental progress in the direction of media and political liberalization may ensue, but the resolution of several critical issues, including the release of leading political prisoners (such as Khun Htun Oo, Min Ko Naing, Zarganar and U Gambira), and the peaceful settlement of ceasefire challenges, will not necessarily be guaranteed.
In summary, the recent changes in Burma do not support the argument that there is “no change at all” nor the optimism that “the beginning of a process of democratization” is dawning.
Recent events demonstrate that the structure of state has changed, and serious institutional rivalry is taking place within the new regime to compete for and seize the locus of power.
If this power struggle is settled successfully, an institution-building process will begin in Burma, and economic rationality will likely reign. If not, we will see one of the following: splits or purges, inefficient government, the emergence of another autocrat, military intervention or a popular uprising. Worse still, these scenarios are not mutually exclusive to one another.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile.

Escaping the Traps of the Past

2010-11-03T13:28:00.000-07:00

The Irrawaddy

NOVEMBER, 2010 - VOL.18, NO.11

Escaping the Traps of the Past

Min Zin

Although Burma’s upcoming Nov. 7 election will not resolve the country’s ongoing political crisis or provide much-needed reforms, one should not be blind to the fact that the election will have consequences—whether negative or positive. Political actors who either participate in or boycott the election will bear the aftershocks of this event. Political players will not be able to write their political plans on a blank slate. Instead, they have to work with what is at hand.

The 2010 election will contribute to changes in the format of governance—the transformation of the one-dimensional military junta into a hybrid form of government that includes both political and military elements. Regardless of who pulls the strings, this could lead to either a serious internal split or the utter inefficiency of the ruling body.

Leadership of the NDF, including chairman Khin Maung Swe. (Photo: MMM/The Irrawaddy)

A recent major reshuffle within the Burmese military reportedly included the appointment of the future commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief, although the top two generals who have long occupied these positions—Snr-Gen Than Shwe and Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, respectively—have retained their military titles. Interestingly, the junta’s third- and fourth-ranking generals, Gen Shwe Mann and Lt-Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo, both quit their military positions and adopted civilian titles, according to state media reports.

If this reshuffle indicates that Than Shwe has made a pre-mortem succession arrangement by installing an heir apparent and investing him with considerable power to manage the Tatmadaw, or armed forces, the opposition and its advocates should celebrate this development as good news for two reasons.

First, this transition is an inter-generational succession, unlike the intra-generational shift from Saw Maung to Than Shwe in 1992. For the departing Than Shwe to continue to control the political role of the Tatmadaw and call the shots for key policy decisions, he needs to create a formal position for himself and leave the army chief position to a successor who is not only loyal but also weak.

Temporarily, at least, this could mean a disruption of personalized power among the military top brass—something that the opposition could seize upon as an opportunity to reformulate a new and positive dynamic of civil-military relations. It is particularly significant that this will occur within the context of a transition from military to hybrid rule. Unlike one-party rule and the closed socialist economy under former dictator Ne Win, the new hybrid political arrangement and market economy will make it difficult for the departing leaders to control the military completely, especially when the role of Than Shwe fades away due to a decline in his health or other causes.

Second, if Than Shwe is confident enough to assume the role of president in the aftermath of the election and dedicates more of his energies to overseeing the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), it will give the military a chance to gradually detach itself from past wrongdoings and renew the integrity of the institution.

We have seen attempts by the military to break with the past before. For instance, as retired Lt-Gen Chit Swe revealed in his memoir, some senior officers who took part in the 1988 coup wanted to dissociate themselves from the failures of the defunct Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), noting that the massive popular uprising of that year was directed at ruling socialist party politicians, not the army.

Thus the military’s claims to a distinct corporate identity could allow it to distance itself even from soldiers-turned-politicians if the new government faces a crisis of legitimacy. If the Tatmadaw was able to part ways from the ruling party following the socialist era, when all soldiers were technically party members, it can certainly assume a distinct role from the USDP, which is set to become as ideologically vacuous and deeply hated as the BSPP.

Such a change in the Tatmadaw’s power dynamic in the post-election period could open the way for a new civil-military relationship. Thus the election could prove consequential for the opposition, particularly the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

In this context, it is important to note that although the NLD decision not to contest the election was probably the right one, the party was wrong not to diversify its pro-democracy struggle and avoid an internal split by setting up or at least allowing a proxy party to exist. Unfortunately, without Suu Kyi, the other NLD leaders seem incapable of articulating or implementing any political program or strategy. They often seem narrowly focused on party survival, merely biding their time until Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest without having any further agenda.

With Suu Kyi at the helm, the party appears to have some direction, but it is still prone to poor political timing. Since rising to prominence as the leader of the democratic opposition, Suu Kyi has made a number of unfortunate judgment calls that have had lasting consequences.

These include her direct confrontation with former dictator Ne Win in 1989, at a time when he still wielded considerable power behind the scenes; her premature public disclaimer that she was not making any secret deals with the regime soon after holding talks with Than Shwe in 1994; her announcement of plans to boycott the National Convention less than two months after a visit by then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1995, raising the regime’s suspicions of a conspiracy and hindering future trust-building efforts and possible negotiations; and her decision in 2003 to travel at night through hostile areas, including Depayin, despite warnings of possible violent attacks. Although Suu Kyi and her party are certainly not responsible for the regime’s subsequent actions on these occasions, these examples of past missteps do serve to illustrate the lack of strategic thinking on the part of the NLD and its leader.

Despite its history of misjudgments and recent forcible disbandment, however, the NLD remains a potent force in Burmese politics. For its part, the junta seems content to contain the party’s influence ahead of the election, while the NLD itself also appears to be in a holding pattern, waiting for Suu Kyi’s release, which is scheduled to take place less than a week after the election.

Thus both sides are strangely in synch, for the most part avoiding open confrontation while no doubt anticipating a future showdown.

Again, however, this approach betrays the NLD’s weakness at formulating plans of action that are likely to lead to real results. In this case, the price of losing sight of the potential for marginal gains, including additional opportunities to reach out to the public, recruit new members and mobilize resources, could be even greater than in the past.

By failing to offer an alternative to the regime’s relentless drive to legitimize itself under the guise of elections, the party risks losing its moral authority as the leading light of the democracy movement, without which it has precious little in the way of political capital. Although two decades of absolute military rule have been far from kind to the NLD, there’s no reason to believe that the messy post-election political scene, which will likely be fraught with political violence, corruption and political alliances between crooks, cronies and accused war criminals, will be any kinder. By taking a “purity-seeking” stance, the party could find itself in the wilderness of permanent opposition status for many more years to come.

Of course, the NLD is not alone in facing some hard choices at this juncture in Burmese history. The parties that have opted to contest the election are also going to have to navigate their way carefully around the many pitfalls that still await them. The ethnic parties are in a particularly precarious situation, as their efforts to win a place at the table come amid a deteriorating security situation that threatens to throw Burma back to the bad old days of life before the multitude of cease-fire agreements that have been in place for most of the past two decades. Even if these deals hold and the ethnic parties win a few seats in parliament, elected leaders will be hard-pressed to improve the lot of their constituents in an environment where military-owned businesses, junta cronies, foreign investors and ethnic drug lords and elites plunder natural resources without regard for the long-term needs of ordinary citizens.

The international community will also have to decide where it stands on the outcome of the election. At the moment, it looks like most countries will simply fall back on their established positions, with perhaps some softening of the stances of a few longstanding Western critics of the regime. Unless all countries concerned are somehow able to reach a consensus on where Burma should be heading after the election, however, continuing division will stand in the way of the sort of decisive action that will be needed to move things forward.

The Burmese political scene, in short, may be similar to a living museum, in which military domination, a hybrid parliamentary “talking shop,” thuggish political violence, kleptocracy, contained Balkanization, gulags and committed struggle by principled dissidents will exist and operate in multiple levels of conflict.

Under such circumstances, the possibility of a collapse of Burma’s polity due to implosion or explosion can’t be ruled out. Of course, it is not desirable, as the country will descend into a bloodbath and anarchy.

Ultimately, however, Burma’s future direction will remain, in the near term at least, largely in the hands of its current rulers. But if the generals believe that a USDP “victory” will give them a mandate to stifle real change indefinitely, they are seriously mistaken. Just as the past cannot be erased, the future is also not to be denied. And the future belongs to those who learn from their mistakes and adapt accordingly—not those who consider themselves permanently entitled to dictate the fate of an entire nation.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile.

The Irrawaddy

2010-08-11T18:51:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy

AUGUST, 2010 - VOL.18 NO.8

Can the Opposition Remain Relevant?

By Min Zin

The opposition in Burma should be measured both in terms of the public support it draws and its ability to achieve both its intermediate and ultimate goals

Since Burma won independence from Britain in 1948, the country has been fraught with a spectrum of contentious politics ranging from armed insurgencies to nonviolent movements against the state. The current political environment, however, marks the first time in Burmese history that the opposition is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant. And if they are going to remain relevant, the question is how?
There are two basic factors in determining the relevancy of an opposition group. The first is public support, or legitimacy. The second is the ability to achieve desired outcomes.

Legitimacy

In Burma’s contentious political environment, repression and the resulting grievances have inspired public action—and provided legitimacy to the opposition—whenever state interference with people’s everyday routines has been compounded by brutal and unjust events.

For example, the demonetization combined with police brutality against students in 1987, and the 500 percent fuel price hike combined with police brutality against Buddhist monks in 2007, each sparked political conflict and nonviolent movements that the public deemed legitimate. The endurance, commitment, courage and sacrifices of the activists strengthened the legitimacy of those movements in the public’s eyes, and the opposition was considered highly relevant despite the fact that activists could not operate in an open political system and faced a military government with a propensity for repression.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile.

Therefore, because in the past the Burmese regime created a political environment that compelled the public to support opposition movements, in examining whether opposition groups will remain relevant following the 2010 elections, it is important to consider whether the repressive nature of the state will continue.

The new Constitution and the 2010 election will not transform the incompatible goals of the military elite and the opposition, and therefore will not change their inherently conflicting relationship. In addition, the new, post-election government has little prospect of solving the issues facing the country, including human rights violations, corruption and economic mismanagement, all of which are associated with the military’s unchecked power, interests and behavior.

One change that will take place is the transformation of the one-dimensional military junta into a hybrid form of government—political and military. The new format, which the regime clearly intends to manipulate to maintain its grip on power, could ironically be viewed as a prospect for political realignment and therefore embolden the general public to rally behind the opposition groups.

But regardless of whether this takes place, the ongoing repressive nature of state-society relations will again legitimize the opposition groups and make them relevant by continuing to allow the opposition to rally the public against the military-backed hybrid regime.

However, as social scientist Doug McAdam says, “Movements may be largely born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions.” In other words, actions lead to outcomes, and in addition to its ability to achieve its ultimate goals, the opposition’s actions and its ability to achieve intermediate goals will in large part determine whether it remains relevant.

Achieving Desired Outcomes

The prevailing general impression is that since 1988 the opposition groups have failed to accomplish their professed goals. Following its decision not to re-register the party, the National League for Democracy even officially apologized to the public for its failed policies in the struggle for democracy. However, sweeping statements about the opposition’s relevance based on its inability to achieve its ultimate desired outcome should not be made without evaluating factors such as resilience, leverage and endgame strategy.

Resilience

Resilience consists of more than psychological qualities such as endurance, commitment and courage, all of which the opposition groups demonstrate admirably. Resilience is also about the strength of a movement’s repertoire (forms of struggles) and mobilizing structure.

Since 1988, the dominant forms of struggle employed by the opposition groups have been political parties (mainly the NLD), underground/clandestine movements, civil society organizations, armed insurgencies and international advocacy movements.

Due to the cease-fire agreements between the junta and the ethnic resistance groups since 1989, the armed insurgencies have mostly been contained. However, international advocacy movements have been strong thanks to the political-moral strength of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the increasingly large Burmese diaspora communities around the world.

Student protest in Rangoon during the 1988 mass uprising.(Photo: THE IRRAWADDY)

One key opposition weakness might be the movement’s unwillingness or incapacity to diversify its repertoire, or forms of struggle. For instance, the NLD leadership, instead of allowing (or even encouraging) those who would like to set up a political party to contest the 2010 election, tended to vilify the moderates within the group. It seems that the leadership was not strategic enough to be aware of the advantages the whole movement could gain by sanctioning different forms of struggle. In this case, their tendency to put all of their eggs in one basket has led to a strategic blunder that could have long-term consequences for the opposition.

Another element of Burmese opposition resilience is its mobilizing structure, which is in many cases hierarchical. However, whenever Suu Kyi was free, she traveled to provinces where she empowered and inspired local and grass-roots party members to mobilize. In fact, she sparked initiatives of civil society by encouraging youth and women leaders to set up volunteer groups on wide-ranging issues such as assisting HIV/AIDS patients and providing legal protection for child soldiers and the victims of forced labor.

In addition, when Min Ko Naing and other 88 generation student leaders were released from prison in 2004-05, they broadened the opposition’s civil society practice within its nonviolent repertoire by reaching out to Buddhist monks, human rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, local NGOs, intellectuals, writers, the artistic community and others to strengthen the informal connective tissue of the movement. Before the activists had sufficient time to organize, however, the 2007 protests broke out. Though their initiatives contributed to the emergence of the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007, their lack of leverage allowed the regime to crush the movement in a violent crackdown.

Leverage

Although leverage is not the ultimate outcome sought by the opposition, improved leverage is, like resilience, a positive outcome that can be a stepping stone to achieve the desired endgame of regime change or even a negotiated outcome.

Since 1988, Burma’s activists have relied to a large degree on marches, protest demonstrations and public statements making political demands or requests. As social scientist Kurt Schock notes, these methods may be effective in mobilizing members of the aggrieved population and the support of third parties, and thereby obtaining legitimacy, but they are less effective in directly undermining state power to achieve desired outcomes unless used in tandem with methods of non-cooperation.

This lack of tactical innovation by the opposition has been compounded by the fact that the social groups most prominent in the movement—students and Buddhist monks—while providing maximum symbolic value, provide weaker leverage than workers or peasants because the state is less dependent on students and monks to maintain its power and survive. Thus far, no organization has emerged in Burma that is capable of effectively forging ties between students, monks, workers and peasants.

The opposition should also take into account the crucial role a third party can play in improving opposition leverage. For example, China’s current diplomatic support and political protection of the junta in the international arena, as well as its economic and military support, are one of the most challenging constraints on the opposition movement.

However, China is increasingly aware of the risks of a purely opportunist policy toward Burma, and if the opposition movement manages to sustain its resilience and improve its leverage by broadening its active support base, China might be persuaded to change its unconditional support for the military regime and actively advocate the goal of national reconciliation in Burma, thereby exponentially increasing the opposition’s leverage.

Media access also plays a crucial role in strengthening the leverage of the opposition groups. Although Burma’s domestic media is subject to severe news blackouts and censorship, the people of Burma listen to foreign short-wave radio stations, upon which they rely heavily for information.

In the run-up to the 1988 uprising, the Burmese-language radio services of the BBC and VOA played a critical role, virtually coordinating public protests by disseminating information about the riot police’s brutality against students and the country’s economic crisis. In the 2007 Saffron Revolution, the protesters had the advantage of significantly increased media access and information technology, and thereby managed to broaden the protests. When the regime cracked down on the Buddhist monk-led protests, the pictures and video footage of the marching and killing were sent to the outside world via the Internet, increasing the protesters’ leverage both at the time and for the future.

In contrast, one way in which opposition activists lose leverage is by focusing too much on their own political demands—such as the transfer of power to the NLD due to its victory in the 1990 election—or on political dialogue that is not perceived to be directly related to the people’s daily struggle for survival. When the opposition becomes self-centered, leverage is diminished because the public becomes indifferent to politics and leaves the activists on their own to achieve their personal political demands.

Endgame Strategy

One of the crucial reasons the 8-8-88 mass uprising failed was that the opposition did not provide the strategic leadership necessary to achieve the endgame of regime change. When the street protests reached their peak in late August through September 18, government mechanisms collapsed. However, the opposition leaders did not unify and either create or seize the opportunity for regime change or negotiated transition in the power vacuum.

Burma’s opposition leadership has always been enthusiastic when it comes to mobilizing mass movements, but has failed to capitalize and achieve the intended results when protests have reached their crescendo. In other words, the opposition always tries hard to achieve the means (instigating a mass movement) as if that is the end in itself.

While public pressure alone can challenge the status quo, whether a public movement leads to a genuine political transition depends on whether the opposition employs an effective endgame strategy. Of course, mass movements will remain the sine qua non for Burma’s opposition so long as the intransigent regime refuses to initiate inclusive political reform.

In summary, the question of relevancy for Burmese opposition groups must be viewed from two perspectives: their legitimacy and the outcome of their effort. At this time, it appears that while the opposition groups will remain relevant in terms of public support and legitimacy, they will have to improve their performance with respect to their ability to maintain resilience, obtain leverage and formulate effective endgame strategies.

This will require opposition groups to diversify their repertoire, adopt tactical innovations, persuade influential third parties to support their cause, broaden their social base and balance between a principle-based and an interest-based approach. If able to do so, they will not only increase the likelihood of accomplishing their goals, they will increase their relevance far beyond their current moral legitimacy.

Hindsight might not be merciful, but it helps break the cycle of repeating the same thing over and over while expecting different results. Moreover, it helps in the process of exiting the mindset of nostalgia and entering the forward-looking strategic realm, which is exactly what the generation that lead Burma’s 1988 popular movement must do to make themselves relevant in the country’s current political landscape.

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, July 14, 2010

2010-07-14T10:57:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Burma’s Road to 3G Democracy

By MIN ZIN

Writing about the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the 19th century that “the most perilous moment for bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways.” As evidenced by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, his theory still proves correct two-hundred years later.

Today in Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe's military junta is superficially purporting to mend its ways by calling an election. Is this a potentially perilous moment for his regime? Or is it just another sign of resilient tyranny?
Burmese history instructs that the perceived prospect of an opening in the country's closed political system, or of a political realignment, emboldens the public to rally behind opposition movements and against the regime.
For example, in 1988, Ne Win’s unexpected resignation, and his support of a change from one-party rule to a multiparty system, greatly boosted the public’s expectation and confidence that meaningful reform could occur and helped the opposition groups rally public support behind their causes.
But the political environment surrounding the 2010 elections may not provide a similar strategic opening for opposition groups to expand their political space. This time around, Than Shwe has taken every possible measure to send a clear signal to the people of Burma that there will be no real change in power after the 2010 elections, and the public should not entertain any false hopes.
For one thing, Than Shwe is revealing his election plan step-by-step, including the yet-to-be-announced election date, in order to show both that he is in complete control of the pace of the campaign and that the election will not be a momentous event.
In addition, the 2008 constitution, the 2010 election laws, recent Election Commission directives and the press censorship board’s increased restrictions on election coverage by local journals have confirmed that the elections are not an opportunity for regime transition, let alone change. Instead, they are a sly attempt to achieve regime durability.
But election cheerleaders, including some diplomats, foreign experts, think-tank groups and, of course, domestic apologists, keep screaming that the 2010 elections could bring some form of political liberalization, and for that reason both the opposition parties and the general public should participate.
Their arguments follow three related lines of discourse: “The election is the only game in town”; “Something is better than nothing”; and “National League for Democracy (NLD) members are not the only democrats in Burma.”
The question we must ask with respect to each argument is: Will participation in the election for this reason lead to genuine political transition and economic development, or will it help provide the semblance of legitimacy the junta craves?

The Election is the only Game in Town
Wrong. To begin with, it cannot be claimed that the election is the only game in town when most of the main opposition parties have chosen not to participate. Even if the 2010 elections, and the new government based on the 2008 Constitution, were the only game in town, they would not provide the path to meaningful reform in Burma because they would not bring about the required state-building effort, a process in which all key parties—democratic opposition groups as well as ethnic resistance groups—rally together and make their voices heard.
The NLD, who won the 1990 election by a landslide, decided not to renew its party registration under the regime’s “unjust election laws” and not to contest the elections. In addition, no less than ten ethnic ceasefire groups refused to disarm and join the elections.
Several of these ceasefire groups held a meeting in May at the headquarters of the United Wa State Army near the China-Burma border, during which the groups reportedly agreed, for their own reasons, to support the NLD’s decision not to compete in the election—saying that an election under the 2008 Constitution would offer no guarantee of ethnic rights in Burma.
As the intractable conflicts between the regime and the NLD and the armed ethnic groups linger on, the center of political gravity will not likely shift toward the regime’s election game plan. Especially given the fact that, according to several media reports, public interest in the 2010 election is very low.
If history serves as a guide, the 2010 elections could be compared to Burma's 1920s dyarchy elections, organized by the British colonial rulers in an unsuccessful attempt to pacify the country’s nationalistic surge. The opposition parties did not deem this election the only game in town, and some boycotted the polls. When the pro-independence conflicts continued following the election, the boycott did not cost its advocates, who had held their moral high ground.
A contrasting historical example is the 1947 election, which differed significantly from the dyarchy elections because two key players—the British colonizers and the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) led by Aung San—reached a prior agreement to hold the elections as a power-sharing step toward independence.
Under these circumstances, although the 1947 election may not have been the only game in town, it was a mainstream political game. Therefore, parties such as the Red-flag Communist Party of Burma, the Karen National Union and U Saw’s Myochit (Patriotic) Party that boycotted the election suffered the cost of being sidelined from mainstream politics.
Burma's history, therefore, appears to instruct that a consensus between key opposing players on the process and goal of transition is a prerequisite to making an election credible and its outcome legitimate. Only then will polls deescalate conflicts. And only then will they be “the only game in town.”
There is certainly no such consensus in 2010, nor does one appear to be on the horizon.
In an article that appeared in The Irrawaddy online in early 2008 (The 2010 Election Challenges ), this author argued that the incompatible goals of the military elite and the opposition, including ethnic minorities, will not be transformed by the new Constitution and the 2010 election. The regime's imposition of the one-sided 2008 Constitution and the unfair process being played out for the upcoming 2010 elections will not likely minimize the cost of conflict for the military. The most visible costs will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.
The opposition—democratic forces as well as ethnic groups—will continue to fight for the goal of national reconciliation and ethnic autonomy, but they understand that they are likely to find themselves ineffective within the new government's institutional procedures that favor the military's domination.
Therefore, the opposition groups will have to pursue alternative courses of action following the election, including public mobilization, international advocacy and possibly even renewal of guerrilla warfare in the borderlands. And the generals will use the same method of coercion against the people even after the 2010 election, so the existing grievances and public hostility towards the military will be compounded and antagonistic civil-military relations will continue.
In fact, political transition is not likely to take place within the framework of a military-imposed constitution. Even amendments made to the constitution in the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within military-dominated parliamentary debate and a new power arrangement. Such reform could happen only if the status-quo is challenged by public pressure from the outside and a negotiated settlement is reached with the military.
Thus, the NLD was right when it argued that the regime's proposed election is not the only game in town, and was right not to re-register and contest an election governed by unfair and unjust election laws that bar more than 2,000 political prisoners from the electoral process, including NLD party leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
However, although the election is clearly not the only game in town, it is one front being fought in the opposition's overall battle for democracy and human rights. Thus, as this author argued in The Irrawaddy more than one year ago (Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight ), the NLD was wrong in its unwillingness or incapacity to diversify its pro-democracy struggles and avoid a split within the party by setting up or at least allowing a proxy party to exist.
In this respect, the NLD itself could learn a lesson from the history of Burma's independence struggle.
In 1936, the radical group Dobama Asiayone (We Burman Association) formed the Komin Kochi (Our King, Our People) party as its proxy to contest that year's elections with the aim of fighting against the existing order from within parliament as well as from without. Although Komin Kochin won only three seats in the election, their formation of a proxy attempt demonstrates that even the most radical opposition elements realize that it is worthwhile to diversify one’s struggle, especially when it helps to hold an opposition party together.
But the NLD leadership, instead of allowing (or even encouraging) those who would like to set up a political party to contest the 2010 elections, vilified the moderates within the group and caused the split.
It seems that the NLD leadership is not strategic enough to be aware of the advantages the whole movement could gain by franchising the forms of its struggle, rather than centralizing them. Their tendency to put all of their eggs in one basket led to a strategic blunder that could have long-term consequences for the opposition.
Broadly speaking, however, it would not be fair to assume such a policy decision was solely the outcome of the NLD leadership’s independent choice. In Burma's political environment, responses are shaped not only by past repression and grievances, but also by political culture, and this illiberal environment strengthens value-loaded or principle-centric cultural norms that lead to inflexible decision making.
In addition, it should be cautioned that even if the NLD leaders were strategically savvy enough to diversify the forms of their struggle, positive results would not be guaranteed.
For instance, it is widely believed that Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)’s attempts to diversify their struggles by forming proxy Kachin parties such as the Kachin State Progressive Party, the Northern Shan State Progressive Party and the United Democracy Party (Kachin State), have thus far been unsuccessful because the regime’s election commission has delayed the approval of these parties.
A proxy party even informally blessed by the NLD leadership may have met the same fate. However, it should not have stopped the NLD from making a worthwhile attempt at strategic franchising, at least to avoid the split.
Something is better than nothing
That depends on how the election cheerleaders define “something.”
It is understandable that people living in the pluralistic Western world get excited when they hear the word “election.” However, the junta's election will not unleash a torrent of political changes and are not a panacea that will heal past wounds. They are a ploy to prolong and legalize the military regime's rule indefinitely.
The 2010 elections will, however, contribute to changes in the format of governance. The military regime has extensive experience with dictatorial, one-party rule, but the governing format following the election will be a new experiment for them. The new government will be a hybrid with two power centers—military and political. Regardless of who pulls the strings, this could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.
In other words, there will be tensions between the regime's desire for military supremacy and the new political procedures required by the hybrid parliamentary system. Will this be a crack in their power base that the opposition can take advantage of?
Although some advocates argue that the new hybrid system is in itself a trend towards liberalization, the nature of the power rivalry within the post-2010 ruling party will not necessarily lead to a new opening for the opposition groups in the short run, or democratization in the long run.
Even if it does eventually lead to democratic reforms, the question is how long will this process take? It may be too long to have any strategic relevance for opposition movements operating within the country and abroad, and for the long-suffering people of Burma.
Since the new Constitution has placed the military atop an untouchable altar, the tragic conditions that have led to extreme poverty, forced relocation, forced labor, child soldiers, political prisoners, internally displaced persons, refugees flooding into neighboring countries, rape and other human rights violations—all of which are associated with the military's unchecked power, interests and behavior—will remain unresolved.
The 2010 elections will not even bring meaningful economic reforms, because the military and its cronies will continue to disrupt and distort the country's market economy, such as it is.
And since the elected parliament’s legislative power will be restricted and because it will not be able to oversee the military or the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), no civilian mechanisms will be available to redress the continued corruption and economic mismanagement.
In addition, unless the military concedes the ceasefire status quo in ethnic areas, or makes some accommodations in its forced disarmament strategy, after the election the prospect of negotiated political resolution with major ethnic ceasefire groups will remain bleak, and therefore the risk of renewed civil war, or widespread guerrilla warfare, cannot be ruled out.
So what exactly is the “something” that is better than nothing that the election cheerleaders envision resulting from the election?
It seems obvious that these advocates (especially foreign observers) apply the O’Donnell/Schmitter textbook approach to Burma without understanding or considering Burmese history and political culture.
They claim that it is pragmatic to promote the theory that elections—no matter how flawed—have a slippery slope tendency toward democratization and therefore could be a path to change and liberalization. Then they mock the committed activists inside Burma as an irrelevant force.
But the cheerleaders’ overstatement of the election’s significance in the Burmese context, and their optimistic, linear view of liberalization and follow-up democratization, is theoretically simplistic and does not conform to Burmese history.
The pro-election advocates who believe that just getting a foot in the door is an important step should pay heed to Aleksandr Gelman’s warning that: “Liberalization is an unclenched fist, but the hand is the same and at any moment it could be clenched again into a fist.”
NLD members are not the only democrats in Burma
This is True. Not every democrat in Burma is or was an NLD member. And the emergence of political parties, no matter how limited the political space they have to operate, is something to encourage because it may lead to political competition.
But it does not necessarily follow that every new party that is not directly aligned with the regime represents the public interest and will positively influence the direction and power structure of the country.
In fact, advocating this position is tricky, because it is basically an extension of the “third force” argument.
The “third force” refers to an array of groups who claim to steer a neutral path between the NLD and the regime. Most of these groups, however, lean more toward the positions of the junta in their outspoken anti-sanction views and open support for the 2010 elections.
When the election laws were published, many old faces resurfaced and resumed their political activities. Excluding the junta-backed USDP party and its cronies-turned-candidates, most of the newly formed political parties under regime’s election laws are being founded by former activists, NLD splinters and small ethnic groups.
Any attempt at lumping them together and promoting them as the new opposition, however, is at best premature optimism and at worst an ill-conceived attempt to undermine the role of committed activists from the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy, the 88 Generation Students and the monks.
Unlike these groups, who have long struggled for democracy and human rights in Burma, the so-called “new players” do not speak out against injustices suffered by the citizens at the hands of junta, let alone represent and fight for the rights of the general public.
It is not the “emerging new players” who are struggling to combat forced relocation, forced labor, child soldiers or HIV/AIDS on the ground level. And it is not the third force parties who are calling for national reconciliation as a necessary goal for the country’s future direction. It is still the NLD and their supporters who are at the forefront in representing and fighting for the public.
In fact, third force advocates, both domestic and abroad, snipe at the NLD's grassroots struggles, claiming they are confrontational, failed stances. This is nothing more than elitist arrogance.
Moreover, the emergence of civilian players will not necessarily promote a liberal environment and values such as tolerance under the new hybrid system.
The most intimate example from Burmese history is that of the pre-war politicians, with whom the British shared power from the 1920s through the 1930s. It was U Saw, the native Burmese civilian premier, who called upon the British Governor in the early 1940s to take repressive actions against “extreme politicians” in order to avoid disorder, and later ended up assassinating Aung San and his cabinet members in 1947.
Paul Collier was dead right when he claimed that democratic politics as often practiced in the countries of “the bottom billion” (i.e. hybrid systems that allow elections with repression) tends to attract candidates with criminal records.
And those who promote the option of emerging third force players without stating clearly what it means to be a democrat confuse the moral clarity of people’s struggle against dictatorship.

Than Shwe's 3G Democracy
The debate about whether participation in the upcoming election is a legitimate means to accomplishing opposition goals is both healthy and necessary, but it should not be forgotten that while pro-democracy, human rights and ethnic rights advocates are arguing among themselves, Than Shwe is not wasting any time fueling his “disciplined-flourishing democracy” with the 3 Gs of of Guns, Goons and Gas.
From killing his own citizens when it suits his purposes to the pursuit of nuclear weapons that threaten neighboring countries; from the thugs of the Union Solidarity and Development Association and Swan Arr Shin to the ex-military candidates of the newly formed USDP; and from selling off the hydrocarbon and other natural resources of his country to promote his personal interests, Than Shwe is determined to utilize all means necessary to prove de Tocqueville’s theory wrong in 21st century Burma and hold onto power.
No matter if the regime is clenching or unclenching its fist, the dictator-in-chief is making sure that it is his hand at work. Some may see participation in the elections as an opportunity to sever that hand. But more likely they are simply playing into it, and they risk being crushed when the fist clenches once more.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile.

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Saturday, February 6, 2010

2010-02-06T19:43:00.000-08:00

The Case for China's Intervention in Burma

By Min Zin

In the aftermath of Burma's 2007 "Saffron Revolution" and the military's subsequent crackdown, China has been increasingly pressured to assume a larger role in helping to resolve Burma's crisis.

A gathering cloud of myth however, has formed with regard to Beijing's policy on Burma, indicating that China has limited sway with the military junta’s generals and that Burmese activists and their advocates in the West overestimated China's influence on the generals.

This view is simply wrong or, at worst, Chinese propaganda. Of course China has more power and influence on the generals than any other country. The question is whether the Chinese Communist government wants to use its leverage to facilitate change in Burma. It does not mean that China is the patron that pulls the strings, and the self-isolated, delusive Burmese regime is its puppet.

The generals are highly aware of China's overwhelming strategic weight over Burma and appear eager to diversify and reduce its dependence on China since the mid-1990s. The junta may manage to reduce its military and economic over-reliance on China, but China's political and diplomatic protection remains indispensable to the regime's survival. Moreover, China's influence over the ethnic cease-fire groups in northeastern Burma that borders China's southwestern province could complicate relations between two countries.

If Beijing chose an uncooperative policy toward Burma in the latter's handling of its ethnic groups, the regime's state-building effort would face a serious hurdle. Therefore, the regime has no choice (no matter whether its intentions indicate otherwise) but to rely on China for political and diplomatic protection and cooperation. In other words, Burma's dependency on China is the consequence––by default––of the junta's struggle for survival rather than its stated intentions, such as nationalism and Sinophobia.

Therefore, China has leverage not only in terms of its provision of carrots, but also in terms of the sticks it can wield to hurt the regime. But China has not used its stick to poke the generals toward change at least for two reasons: first, China does not want Western-style democratization on its southern flank; and second, Beijing does not want to be seen as a "threat" to its neighbors.

Although China wants to see economic reform taking place in Burma, China has almost no sympathy for Burma's democratic crusade and its advocates; Beijing considers them too close to the West. China does not have confidence in the opposition's capacity to maintain stability in the divisive nation. And more importantly, China has also gained unrivaled economic advantages by supporting the pariah regime.

The second reason for not using its leverage is related to China's geopolitical strategy that aims to undermine the feasibility and desirability of a US policy of containment mainly by forging solid working relations with its smaller neighbors and other major powers.

While China continued its program of economic and military modernization through the 1990s, it wants to minimize the risk that others, most notably the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (Asean), will view China as an unacceptably dangerous threat which must be parried or perhaps even forestalled.

If China continued to meddle in Burma's affairs in the 1990s the way it backed Burmese communist insurgents in the late 1960s and 1970s, it would stir grave concerns in Asean. China would be viewed as a bully.

These concerns would coincide with the current South China Sea dispute between China and some Asean members over territorial claims and resources. China's leaders have decided to follow Deng Xiaoping's cryptic instruction: "Hide our capacities and bide our time, but also get some things done." (tao guang yang hui you suo zuo hui). China has adopted an opportunistic foreign policy of maintaining relations with any government that would remain friendly to China and serve China's security and economic interests, irrespective of that government's propensity for reform.

However, this policy of self-serving pragmatism appears to be more and more untenable for at least two reasons. First, it puts China in a difficult dilemma whenever the Burmese regime faces serious vulnerability in domestic power shifts. For instance, Beijing found itself in policy confusion when the opposition National League for Democracy won a landslide victory in the 1990 multi-party elections.

During the Buddhist monk-led protests in 2007, China similarly faced an uneasy situation.

Since former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who China viewed as "Burma's Musharraf," was purged in 2004, China has felt itself losing its grip on the regime's power establishment and has become increasingly frustrated with Snr-Gen Than Shwe's manipulative foreign policy.

In the wake of Khin Nyunt's fall from grace, Than Shwe visited India and agreed to the latter's bid for a UN Security Council seat. He later backtracked on that policy. The junta chief also reached out to Russia and North Korea, another gesture that irritated the Chinese. To top it off, Burma recently chose to buy a fleet of Russian MiG-29 fighter jets, despite China's offer to sell its latest J-10 and FC-1 fighters at a bargain price.

While Beijing's communist bureaucrats may be able to remain indifferent to the casualties of Burma's "Saffron Revolution," they cannot underestimate the high stakes resulting from the Burmese army's attacks on ethnic cease-fire groups along its border. The Burmese junta's recent military offensive against the Han-blooded Kokang resulted in a massive influx of refugees into China.

Indeed, the policy of "contained Balkanization" in Burma could lead to a resumption of localized armed conflicts between certain ethnic cease-fire groups and the Burmese army. Since the most volatile areas are around the Sino-Burmese border, where formidable Wa and Kachin ethnic armies are based, China is likely to face increased instability in its southwest and consequential disruptions of its economic and strategic interests.

The risk is imminent and urgent because the regime has set 2010 as an election year and has to impose a deadline on cease-fire groups joining the Burmese army's Border Guard Forces.

The military's abusive dealings with the pro-democracy opposition and ethnic groups have also drawn China into the international spotlight; its opportunistic foreign policy toward Burma has been challenged in the international arena.

This is the second reason why the policy is increasingly unsustainable. Burma has become a source of embarrassment for the Chinese leadership who would prefer to avoid being constantly associated with the brutal dictators in neighboring Burma.

According to Chinese sources, after the “Saffron Revolution” erupted in September 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao contacted US President George W. Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown by phone to discuss the situation and which measures to take. China eventually agreed to the issuance of a UNSC Presidential Statement in October 2007, and its usage of the expression "strongly deplores the use of violence against peaceful demonstrations in Myanmar." China facilitated UN Envoy for Burma Ibrahim Gambari's first visit to Rangoon. In short, China's new role in the international system obliges the country to reexamine its purely opportunistic foreign policy.

While low-key foreign policy does not influence the events taking place a few kilometers across China's border, such as the junta's attack on the Kokang, Beijing has resolved to review its foreign policy. Sources confirm that China has now set up a "Fact-finding Commission" on last year's Kokang conflict and its impact on China.

If Beijing manages to facilitate a genuine reconciliation in Burma, it will serve China's interest.

Some may argue that there are two disincentives for China to modify its current policy. First, the junta may retaliate by disrupting economic cooperation with China (for instance, the gas pipeline deal). The second factor would be with respect to Washington's new policy toward the junta.

The first option would be suicidal for Than Shwe since his regime can't afford the return of a late 1960s scenario in Sino-Burmese relations. And the second factor is a grave concern among China's policy elites.

Dr. Jian Junbo from the influential Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, warned in his Asia Times' article in 2009 that "the US should recognize the fact that China is an important actor in Southeast Asia when it plans its engagement policy in Myanmar, and the US would face great difficulty if it tried to exclude China from its new Myanmar policy."

It is unlikely Asean will object to China's initiative for change in Burma, since the grouping has been disillusioned with its constructive engagement policy to tame the junta, while the relationship between Asean and China has been increasingly strengthened since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

Sen. Jim Webb's "China's threat" view and "containment approach" worry the Chinese.

In fact, Webb's alarmist view that states that China's increasing economic and political influence in Burma could further "a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region" has fallen neatly into the manipulative hands of Than Shwe; he now wants to use his US card to scare the Chinese.

If the highest level leaders of US and Asean make it clear to China that they will coordinate with Beijing to facilitate change in Burma, aiming for minimalist goals which do not radically upset the interests of Naypyidaw and Beijing, China would likely take on the role of working toward national reconciliation in Burma (in more concrete terms, the removal of Than Shwe if the latter resisted.)

If this goal cannot be achieved with persuasion, China may use sticks such as abstention in UNSC or support the status quo (i.e. encouraging ethnic cease-fire groups to resist the Burmese army) as the best fallback policy option. To that end, the US must make the first move: to liaise with China. It will perhaps best serve a common interest and workable task for both countries to refresh the tension-ridden Sino-US relationship which has spiked over the recent sale of US arms to Taiwan, friction over trade, the Dalai Lama and allegations of cyber-spying.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

Cracks in the Castle Wall

2009-09-17T18:35:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Cracks in the Castle Wall

By MIN ZIN

Loopholes in the new Burmese constitution could be exploited by opposition groups to win influence after next year’s election

In politics, a direct, frontal attack is rarely wise; co-opting the opponent’s game plan for one’s own purposes is a more powerful ploy. Opponents of Burma’s military junta should bear this in mind as they consider their strategy for dealing with next year’s election.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism. A longer version of this article is available onwww.irrawaddy.org

Most mainstream opposition groups, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced that they will not take part in the 2010 election unless the constitution is revised and the political process is made more inclusive. They say they can’t accept the constitution as it stands because it denies fundamental ethnic rights and allows the military to seize power again “if there arises a state of emergency.”

A closer examination of the junta’s constitution reveals, however, that it is not the impregnable fortress that it at first appears to be. There are a number of weaknesses in the castle battlements that opposition groups can exploit if they are prepared to take a multi-pronged approach.

The first vulnerability lies in the fact that after the 2010 election, there will be two power centers, the military and the government, which will inevitably be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. No matter who pulls the strings, this new power arrangement will lead to either a serious internal split or the inefficiency of the ruling body.

Another Achilles’ heel is the constitution’s de facto demotion of regional military commanders. Although the constitution enshrines ultimate power in the commander in chief of the military, it fails to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities. As key pillars in the military regime’s power structure, the regional commanders are like warlords in their domains. However, under the new constitution, they are under the control of the chief ministers of the regions or states, who in many cases may be civilians. This could result in a situation where regional commanders oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw’s control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the 75 percent of seats not reserved for the military, a non-military candidate could become president. Failing this, non-military parties could gain control of the legislative agenda, giving them influence over everything from defense and foreign affairs to the economic and social sectors. Thus Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who leads the ruling junta, appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party based upon the membership of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass organization formed by the junta in September 1993.

Snr-Gen Than Shwe votes in the referundum election on the new constitution.

However, this leads to the fourth problem facing the regime. As a political party, the USDA’s existing nationwide organizational structure (and its thuggish reputation, which could be used to intimidate voters) would give it a great advantage in the 2010 election. The problem is that the new constitution bars parliamentary candidates from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it would run afoul of the regime’s own constitution if it sought to field candidates in the election.

Therefore, if the military wants to create a new political party or parties, it must ensure that they do not bear any resemblance to the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or intimidating power.

Perhaps these concerns are the reason the regime keeps delaying the promulgation of the electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year: Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power. Meanwhile, however, the credibility of the election and the legitimacy of the new power arrangement it is intended to put in place have already been hurt by the likely non-participation of the NLD and the refusal of several ethnic ceasefire groups to disarm or participate.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage by remaining outside the regime’s election process while opening a new proxy front within the regime’s game plan. Even if opposition groups don’t take part in the election using their current organizational identities, they could set up proxy political parties to participate in the 2010 election. Through these proxy parties, the opposition could attempt to maximize civilian control of the post-election parliament.

At the same time, opposition groups such as the NLD, the New Mon State Party and others must stand strong in opposing the “illegitimate” constitution and election and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 election will help prevent a split within the opposition groups. Otherwise, policy disagreements between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. Proxy tactics could also help bring new recruits to the opposition movement.
However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxy parties in the 2010 election will spark a magical power shift to civilian control. That will happen only if there is sufficient public pressure to challenge the military-dominated status quo, forcing the military to negotiate with the opposition, which would then be in a position to push for a genuine transition to democratic rule.

Another factor that could determine the success or failure of the approach outlined here is the ability of non-military MPs to maintain a sense of common purpose. There is a danger that parochial interests will blind non-military MPs to broader issues, or that self-interest will lead them to compromise their reform agenda. Non-military MPs would not necessarily form a monolithic bloc or be unanimous in their approach to the military’s domination. Vote rigging and intimidation in the election could further undermine the chances of a genuine opposition presence in the parliament.

That said, however, the contradictions embedded in the constitution will provide unprecedented opportunities for those who seek to break the military’s hold on power. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. In the event of mass demonstrations on the streets, proxy parties will be well-placed to play a role.

The opposition should be creative in opening a new proxy front as part of a multi-pronged strategy to exploit the cracks in the junta’s fortress.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16678

Will Pressure Work in Suu Kyi Verdict?

2009-08-10T18:26:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Monday, August 10, 2009

Will Pressure Work in Suu Kyi Verdict?

By MIN ZIN

According to recent news reports, Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has reportedly told the court that her trial is a test of the military-run legal system. Some opposition figures and Burmese media—especially Burmese language foreign broadcasts—toe the line in making this legality issue a big deal.

They are wrong. It is by no means a test case for the rule of law in Burma, which is virtually non-existent.

Without any balance of power in the state institutions, putting faith in the rule of law and expecting justice are at best illusory. The opposition should not pick or prolong the battle within the junta's institutions, including the judicial system, which the regime effectively controls through the appointment of senior judges and direct interventions.

The legal system is one of the most corrupted institutions serving the perpetuation of the regime. As a serial liar and rule-breaker, the junta knows well how to manipulate its institutions against Suu Kyi and other opponents. Even if Suu Kyi were freed tomorrow, it would have nothing to do with judicial independence and rule of law in military-ruled Burma. It would be political calculation. This whole affair should be viewed from a political perspective, not through a legal lens.

Thus, the true test in the Suu Kyi trial is whether or not and to what extent the junta is susceptible to international pressure; in other words, whether or not the international pressure yields the intended result. If it does, a close examination should be made to understand when and how it worked.

Some influential Burma experts, foreign diplomats and even increasing numbers of journalists repeatedly claim that coercive diplomacy does not press the isolated and xenophobic Burmese military junta to make any changes. Pressure does not work. The regime is insular, claim these pundits.

The Burmese court that postponed its verdict on Suu Kyi until August 11 may tell a different story. Some sources inside Burma, however, suggest that the junta may delay the verdict again on Tuesday by citing the ill health and hospitalization of John Yettaw, the intruder who is also standing trial.

Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirajuda recently told the media that he hoped the postponement of the verdict was due to the Burmese government’s concern over international reaction, particularly from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).

In fact, before the expected decision on July 31, UN chief Ban Ki-moon had pressed for the immediate release of Suu Kyi during a meeting with Burma's UN ambassador, a UN spokesman said. Ban Ki-moon warned that by sentencing Suu Kyi to another prison term, the Burmese junta would "miss a very important opportunity to engage with the international community, and they will be betraying the expectations and wishes of all the international community who really want to see Myanmar [Burma] fully integrated as a member of the international community."

These pressures appear to have serious effects on the calculation of Sen-Gen Than Shwe, the paramount dictator of the regime, who has shown some indecisiveness in this final episode of the show trial.

However, it is not the first time that the military shows its susceptibility to international pressure. For instance, in 2005 the junta faced mounting pressure from the West and some Asean countries to give up the Asean chairmanship in 2006. The United States and the European Union openly declared that they would boycott all Asean meetings if Burma took chairmanship. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong travelled to Burma and expressed his deep concern about the possible implication of Burma's chairmanship on Asean.

The pressures then affected the regime. Despite the fact that the regime had already established a "Steering Committee for the Preparation of Holding the Asean Summit," chaired by the prime minister, to reap international PR gains, and also enjoyed China's backing to assume the chairmanship, the military eventually decided to give up its entitlement. It would be unthinkable for the presumptuous and overbearing Burmese military to give in to outside pressures and take diplomatic embarrassment. (In fact, the self-righteousness and uncompromising pride is a trait that many Burmese prone to share with the ruling generals.) Most interestingly, the generals who made such concessions were known as "hardliners," since "moderate" Gen Khin Nyunt had already been purged in 2004.

Similar observations could be made in other cases such as Burma's negotiation with the International Labor Organization (ILO) over a resolution of forced labor in Burma.

The tentative lesson could be drawn that when the pressure is employed first with focus— meaning a clear objective with single issue instead of vaguely designed "regime change"— second with coordination, especially getting regional powers such as Asean and China to get on board, and third with persistence.

However, it does not mean that the junta will clear all charges against Suu Kyi and set her free tomorrow or even postpone the verdict again. The military can still sentence Suu Kyi to up to five years. If it wants to pacify the anger of the international community, it could announce a suspended sentence or allow the opposition to make a big deal about an appeal process. At the same time, it can complicate the situation by freeing or being lenient on Yettaw as an act of clemency and a positive overture to the Unites States while anti-sanction US Sen Jim Webb is visiting in Rangoon.

If the Lady was given a prison sentence tomorrow, there will be at least two ways to look at the effectiveness of the pressure. First, the pressure failed. The only option for the international community should be to engage with Burmese junta. However, this prescription is not very convincing in resolving the crisis in Burma. Aside from providing whatever the regime wants— lifting the sanctions, giving aid without or with few conditions, endorsing the 2008 constitution and being quiet on violations of human rights and ethnic rights, and political crisis, the meaningful engagement—even the highest level of engagement from the UN secretary-general —does not seem to yield any sustainable result. In his last visit to Burma, Ban Ki-moon's request to meet Suu Kyi was rejected, and his specific proposal for the reform fell on deaf ears. It does not mean that international community should stop engaging the junta. But the engagement must be exercised with the backup of enforcement.

This leads to a second view. If Suu Kyi was given a prison sentence tomorrow, it indicates that the existing pressure is not high enough to influence the regime's behavior.

This view will argue that there are three factors shaping the focus, coordination and persistence of international pressure. They are consensus, mechanism and political will on the part of international community.

Regarding consensus, UN Security Council statements and Ban Ki-moon's specific proposal to Than Shwe such as the release of all political prisoners including Suu Kyi; resumption of dialogue between the government and opposition; and the need to create conditions conducive to credible elections planned in 2010 are the common framework. Recently, Ban announced that he won support from key nations for his proposal to the Burmese government after chairing a closed-door meeting of the Group of Friends on Myanmar that includes about 15 countries—Burmese neighbors, interested Asian and European nations, and the five permanent UN Security Council members. Ban also announced that a new summit will be held in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss the political crisis in Burma. These are very encouraging signs for the Burmese opposition in terms of consensus building. Of course, the priority has to be sorted out for a sharper focus and effectiveness.

A consensus itself, however, is not enough. It needs coordination. In other words, a mechanism is required to enforce consensus. This has also to do with the level of pressure. Then the question is whether or not the UNSC, the highest enforcement mechanism, is feasible in the Burma case, and when it will be achievable and how. Or, are there other mechanisms such as the Friends of Myanmar where the Burma issue could be effectively dealt with?

This leads to a third factor—the political will of international community. In fact, this could be boiled down to the issue of leadership. Who is going to take the lead in the Burma case? The United States under the Bush administration played a leading role in bringing the Burma issue into every international forum. The Obama team did not bother noting the word Burma even in the margin of his key foreign policy agenda when the president attended a US-EU summit in April, says an EU diplomat who was involved in preliminary preparation for the summit.

Ban Ki-moon's leadership is commendable. But bureaucratic leadership rarely facilitates persistency and the necessary resources for intractable conflicts unless it is backed by the political will of major powers. Otherwise, it will end up in an outsourcing and buck-passing policy.

When it comes to pressure, these are the issues (i.e. focus/consensus, coordination/mechanism and persistence/political will) that the opposition should pay attention to, strategize and advance, instead of expecting and pursuing the trial as legal test case.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=16521&page=2

Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

2009-07-24T18:17:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Friday, July 24, 2009

Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

By MIN ZIN

In politics, direct and frontal attack is rarely wise. Occupying the flank by co-opting the opponent's game plan for one's own purposes is a powerful ploy.

Co-option strategy, however, is a double-edged sword. It presents the risk of being swallowed by the dominant establishment, or at least having one’s reputation damaged, but it also conceals great power and maneuverability.

It depends on how one manages to play it right in a relatively conducive political environment. If well managed, it will become strength. In any case, never rule out this option in exchange for, or fixing solely on, the honor fight when the time is not ripe. To the advantage of oppositions in Burma, a multi-pronged strategy is always called for.

Mainstream oppositions, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the military allows a constitutional revision and inclusive political process. Instead of bringing about a much-needed state-building process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard, Burma's constitution conceded 25 percent of legislative seats to the armed forces and denied protection of fundamental ethnic rights in a multi-ethnic nation.

More importantly, the constitution allows the military virtually to run the country with the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), and even to stage a coup d’état "if there arises a state of emergency." The opposition's principled stance of refusing to endorse the military's constitution and contest the 2010 elections, therefore, deserves understanding and support.

However, it does not mean that there is no gap in the castle wall. The opposition should also look at the situation from a power perspective. By dissecting the junta’s constitution, the opposition will find the devil lies in the details over which Snr-Gen Than Shwe should lose sleep.

First of all, the new post-2010 election power arrangement will create two power centers—military and government. These two power centers will nonetheless be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. Even within the single power center, the Burmese military has repeatedly mired itself in purges resulting from battalion forces versus the intelligence faction, and other rivalries.

Now, after the elimination of the intelligence faction, various reports confirm that there are serious animosity and tension between the military personnel and the thuggish Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members regarding the latter's interference with the military's administrative mandate and other issues of self-interest.

The election, so long as it demonstrates a relatively competitive nature, can make elite rivalry become public issues. The government's operation with two centers of power—no matter who pull the strings—could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.

Secondly, the constitution carries destructive seed for the military to grow into a center-versus-periphery conflict. Though Than Shwe enshrined ultimate power for the commander-in-chief of the military in the constitution, he failed to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities, who are key pillars in the military regime's power structure.

The constitution requires the president to seek approval from the commander-in-chief in all major issues at least via NDSC procedure, but it does not guarantee any special power to regional commanders. Constitutionally, regional commanders are under the control of Chief Ministers of the Regions or States, who could well be civilians in most cases.

Even if the president appoints military Members of Parliament or retired army officials as Chief Minister of the Region or State, the regional commander who is so used to being a warlord in his domain will find it hard to accept constitutionally the prescribed power of the Chief Minister. This may in turn lead the regional commanders to oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw's control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the remaining seats (aside from the 25 percent reserved seats for the military), a non-military candidate can become president or at least non-military parties can control the legislative agendas. According to the constitution, parliament has the right to enact a long list of laws ranging from defense and foreign affairs to economic and social sectors. Thus, Than Shwe appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party.

However, this leads to the fourth problem—another self-defeating clause of the constitution.

Than Shwe may want to see his USDA members seizing most of the remaining seats. Transforming the USDA into a political party and contesting the 2010 election will give the junta a great advantage because this thuggish group can exploit the existing nationwide organizational structure and also presents a constant reminder that it’s a fearful power that can intimidate the public to vote for its members. But it is not likely to happen because the constitution clearly states that "Civil Services personnel shall be free from party politics." This clause will invalidate a majority of the 24 million USDA members, who are public servants, if the group turns itself into party.

The constitution also forbids political parties and candidates for parliament from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state, including the use of state property and money. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it runs afoul of the regime's own constitution. If the military wants to create a new political party or parties, they will not carry any resemblance of the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or and intimidating power.

These are some causes of grave concern for Than Shwe. Perhaps that's why he has kept delaying the promulgation of electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year. Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power.

The opposition, for its part, is not likely to take part in the 2010 election unless the regime concedes constitutional reform. However, it is not clear if a political party that does not contest the election will be deregistered. The constitution vaguely states that a party must "accept and practice a genuine and discipline-flourishing multi-party democracy." But if the election law forbids a party such as the NLD to have legal existence for its refusal to participate in the election, the same law will have to impact on ethnic ceasefire parties such as the United Wa State Party, Kachin Independence Organization and New Mon State Party. Most ethnic ceasefire groups have two wings—a political party and the army. It will be a tough choice for Than Shwe to make.

Aside from this principle stance, the practical power implication suggests that the credibility and legitimacy of an election and new power arrangement will be greatly hurt so long as ethnic ceasefire groups refuse to disarm and Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD does not take part in the election. With the new constitution and elections, the military thus cannot expect to minimize the cost of conflict. The most visible costs will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage not only by being outside the regime's election process, but also by opening a new proxy front within the regime's game plan. Constitutional reform is still the most important policy demand, but the opposition should not shut their eyes to the 2010 election.

While the opposition does not take part in the elections representing the NLD, UWSP and NMSP, they must set up proxy political parties to engage in the 2010 election. Through proxies, the opposition must attempt to seize the mainstream platform in order to maximize civilian control of the regime's game. At the same time, the opposition groups such as NLD, NMSP and etc must stand strong outside the reins of an "illegitimate" constitution and election, and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. If history were any guide, the total dissociation of the Communist Party of Burma and the Karen National Union from post-independence mainstream politics made the two strongest forces gradually recede from the center stage of politics, and the power of the both groups also dwindled over time. The opposition, including both democracy forces as well as ethnic groups, should not overlook the reality of basic maturity in politics—that you cannot always get your own way, especially when one group in the conflict maintains an asymmetric power advantage.

Thus far, the KIO, other Kachin ceasefire groups and some representatives of civil society set up the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) in June 2008 to contest the 2010 elections and has reportedly already begun campaigning, while the KIO remains determined not to surrender arms. This is a wise and proactive move since it will allow Kachin to control the Kachin State parliament and be represented in the national parliament. NLD and other ethnic groups should follow suit.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 elections will help preventing a split within the opposition groups.

Otherwise, the policy disagreement between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to actual and open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. By setting up proxies, the opposition can create dynamic and diverse tasks and responsibilities within its own leadership and the rank and file.

It could also help bring so-called "neutral," "politically non-engaged professionals," “intellectuals, retired civil/military officials and others who believe in Track Two diplomacy" into the given "legally viable" political arena. No matter whether one agrees or disagrees with the prevailing so-called "Third Force" who mostly opposes Western economic sanctions and criticizes Suu Kyi and her party, the best way to compete with them is to create one's own proxy.

However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxies in the 2010 election will spark a magic power shift to civilian control. It could happen only if the military-dominated status-quo is challenged by public pressure and a negotiated settlement is reached with the military.

The regime's constitution will not lead to a genuine political transition and democratization without broad-based public actions and reconciliation. The aforementioned loopholes in the constitution may not necessarily offer much maneuverability and leverage to the civilian MPs in the first term of the post-2010 power arrangement. Without any balance of power in the state institutions, the military can simply ignore or veto these loopholes.

Moreover, non-military MPs are not necessarily monolithic and unanimous in their approach to the military's domination. They may not necessarily be willing to view their control of majority seats in parliament as a means of determining winners and losers vis-à-vis the military. Parochial interest can also blind non-military MPs to appreciate a broader vision, and self-interest can even corrupt them to compromise their reform agenda. All in all, the election can also be marked by vote rigging, intimidation and bullying attacks orchestrated by the regime and its affiliates against opposing candidates.

However, the seeds of foundational contradiction are embedded in the constitution. The gaps in the castle are built-in. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. Or when mass action takes place on the streets, proxies in the given political process may play a role.

Than Shwe, reportedly a big fan of boxing, must know that strength does not lie in the punches the boxer throws but in the balance and support of the boxer. In other words, it is the legs that matter, the foundation that holds the boxer up can also make him fall. With this loophole-ridden constitution, Than Shwe knows that his opponents could weaken his legs and he could easily reel and stagger.

The opposition should be creative and devious in opening a new proxy front, as a part of their multi-pronged strategy, to exploit the crack in the fortress.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=16396

Choosing the Right Battle Strategy

2009-06-14T12:04:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Saturday, June 13, 2009

Choosing the Right Battle Strategy

by MIN ZIN

Aung San Suu Kyi should view her trial as a political battle and not a legal one, and take strategic advantage of it.

By picking the right battle strategy, David was able to strike down Goliath with a slingshot and use his powerful sword to slay the giant. The rule of thumb is to choose fighting strength against weakness, and not strength against strength.

The regime's weakness lies on its international flank, especially its regional neighbors. The junta is also sensitive to the opinions of military officers and rank and file. These are the targets the Lady must hit repeatedly and relentlessly.

Aung San Suu Kyi believes that political integrity (i.e. "plain honesty in politics") is one of the most important virtues. She and many others regard the political integrity she upholds persistently as her strength. Perfect armor!

However, she has to comprehend the strength of her captors, too. The Lady cannot pick or prolong the battle within the junta's institutions, including the legal system, which is one of the most corrupted instruments serving the perpetuation of the regime.

As a serial liar and rule-breaker, the junta knows well how to manipulate its institutions against Suu Kyi and other opponents. Force and fraud are their strength.

This strength must be continuously exposed internationally as well as to a domestic public, especially to the military rank and file. But it might not be the battle front the Lady wants to open.

Confronting the strength of the regime straight on, as the opposition has mostly done in past, will end up in another defeat. The asymmetrical power relationship is evidential.

Suu Kyi’s trial is another test of the opposition's strategic caliber. In fact, the trial is widely believed to be a sham. The verdict has already been reached in Snr-Gen Than Shwe's mind.

Although Suu Kyi’s latest, six-year term of house arrest ended in May, the regime's supremo is still afraid of freeing her to the embrace of her supporters and the public at large.

The 63-year-old Nobel laureate faces a maximum prison sentence of five years. She could be condemned to prison or sent home for a further term of house arrest.

Whatever the terms of her incarceration, it is clear that the regime’s aim is to confine her until it has secured victory in the 2010 general election.

This is a political battle ground. That's why the trial has drawn international condemnation, including from the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (Asean). The group warned the regime that "the honor and credibility of the Government of the Union of Myanmar are at stake".

Even Goh Chok Tong, a staunch ally of the regime and a former prime minister of Singapore, told Than Shwe during talks in Naypyidaw earlier this month that the trial has an international dimension.

Thus, the Lady must see the trial as a political battle. Instead of prolonging the trial, she must let the sham process get done and receive the prison sentence. That will intensify political battles in the international arena, including the UN Security Council and regional players.

The regime will no doubt face domestic challenges, too. The opposition National League for Democracy must also lead the political battle, instead of waiting for the result of the show trial.

If Suu Kyi allows the trial to drag on, she will give the regime a chance to project the impression of openness and due legal process. In fact, the junta has already derived advantage from Suu Kyi's appeal for four defense witnesses to be heard.

The lower District Court earlier disqualified all but one defense witness, but the Rangoon Divisional Court later ruled that a second witness could give testimony. With this concession, the junta might be quite satisfied in projecting the impression of a fair and independent legal process, though that will not have any effect on its final script.

More importantly, the protraction of the trial could reduce interest in the international media, as well as diplomatic pressures. Momentum always amasses two important sources of capital, which strategically-minded politicians should not squander—good timing and political good will.

That is why the court’s decision on Friday to postpone the trial until June 26 in order to hear the testimony of a Suu Kyi’s defense witness is not a good sign. In fact, Suu Kyi's lawyers requested the further adjournment since the defense witness has to come to court from southern Shan State, in the northeastern part of Burma.

Suu Kyi instructed her lawyers to continue the appeals process to allow more defense witnesses to be heard in the case as she wants "to see it through to the end as the ruling is legally wrong."

If the High Court upholds the lower courts' decision, the special court in Insein Prison may set a date sometime in July in which to deliver the verdict. The regime could still delay the verdict in order to ride out international pressure.

But the cause of any delay should not rest with the Lady.

If Suu Kyi and the NLD fail to distinguish between a political battle and a legal fight, and unless they focus more on the former, they will lose the momentum. Engaging in a lengthy legal battle will not yield any political outcome except the exhaustion of strategic capital.

In a clever move, Suu Kyi told diplomats who attended one session of her trial: "There could be many opportunities for national reconciliation if all parties so wished," according to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, whose ambassador was among those who met her on May 20.

The statement said that she also "expressed the view that it was not too late for something good to come out of this unfortunate incident," referring to her trial. "She did not wish to use the intrusion into her home as a way to get at the Burma authorities," read the statement.

The statement represented a political offensive and displayed her strength, something the NLD should exploit. The NLD party should, for instance, have released an official statement supporting Goh's recent comments and Asean's "grave concern," and citing Suu Kyi's words to demonstrate the opposition's readiness for national reconciliation.

The goal must be to amass international and domestic public support and materialize it in the UN Security Council, Asean, China, and on the streets of Burma.

Suu Kyi can, of course, continue her legal battle, even after she is sentenced. But the focus must be to reap political advantage. The momentum should not be diminished.

The political battle must be renewed and the regime’s Achilles' heel must be located and attacked.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=15967

Ethnic Minorities Hold the Key to Burma’s Future

2009-04-14T23:04:00.000-07:00

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Friday, January 23, 2009

Ethnic Minorities Hold the Key to Burma’s Future

by MIN ZIN

Ceasefires that cannot be transformed into political settlements and a lasting peace are typical examples of protracted deadlocks. When neither party seems willing or able to resolve this situation, the deadlocks have the potential to trigger an escalation strategy in conflict. This is the point that the Burmese military and ceasefire ethnic groups have now reached. The question is what strategy options are available for both parties.

The Burmese military has initiated ceasefire agreements with no less than 17 ethnic rebel groups since 1989 and has allowed the groups to retain their arms and control somewhat extensive blocks of territory over the past twenty years. This shows uncharacteristic tolerance on the part of the military, which, like the whole Burman population to some extent, has a chauvinistic and patronizing attitude toward ethnic minorities.

The Burmese junta has accepted this situation for at least three reasons. First, the ceasefire accords have allowed the military to avoid multiple enemy fronts in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and to focus mainly on suppressing political opposition in central Burma.

Secondly, the ceasefire condition that prevails in the border areas has enabled the Burmese military to make unprecedented advances in its relations with neighboring countries¬ especially China and Thailand ¬in both security and economic terms. The neighbors that once supported Burma’s ethnic rebels along their borders as a key part of their buffer policy or because of an ideological affinity have now shifted to the policy of full economic cooperation with the Burmese junta through massive investment and border trade.

Lastly, the ceasefire accords give the military regime the much-needed political legitimacy that they have lost since the bloody crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The regime constantly points to the ethnic ceasefire groups as the most defining feature of its “national reconsolidation” policy and as evidence of its claims to legitimacy.

However, the success of the military’s strategic tolerance is now about to be put to the test, as the regime must do two things before the 2010 elections to ensure that the progress it has made toward establishing a so-called “disciplined democracy” is meaningful.

First of all, the military needs to redraw the map of Burma under its new constitution. The basic state structure, consisting of seven centrally located regions surrounded by seven ethnic states, will remain the same. This favors the continuing dominance of the Burman majority, who live mostly in the seven regions. Some states, however, will see their maps being redrawn, with five Self-Administered Zones (for Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Pa Laung and Kokang ethnic groups) and one Self-Administered Division (for Wa ethnic group) designated by the military. The seventeen “special regions” established in the ethnic ceasefire areas are due to expire when the military redraws the map in accordance with the new constitution. Re-mapping must also be done soon so that the junta can establish new electoral constituencies in the country, especially in the ethnic areas. However, there is still no consensus among all parties concerned with regard to the drawing up of a new map, and this issue remains contentious.

Secondly, and more importantly, the military needs to disarm the ceasefire groups, reclaim territory from them, and push them to transform themselves into political parties ready to contest the 2010 election. This will be a major test of the military’s “contained Balkanization” of the ethnic areas; failure to achieve these goals could trigger an outright conflict and, in the worst case scenario, initiate another era of regional instability.

The question is how ethnic ceasefire groups will respond to the regime’s plans for their future. The indications so far suggest that ethnic groups will not likely give in to the junta’s demands. The United Wa State Party (UWSP), for example, now refers to itself as the “Government of Wa State, Special Autonomous Region, Union of Myanmar” in official documents. The UWSP, which has long pressed the regime to designate the Wa territory as a “state” in the constitution, has refused to call the area under its control “Shan State Special Region 2” in accordance with the terms of their ceasefire agreement or “Shan State Self-Administered Division” in accordance with the military’s new constitution.

Two other strong ceasefire groups, ¬the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP), ¬have already officially stated that they will not contest the 2010 election. The NMSP even went so far as to say that it does not accept the military’s constitution.

There are two things the ceasefire groups can and should do. The first would be to resist the regime’s forced disarmament under the current conditions.

Some groups may take part in the 2010 election through their proxy ethnic parties, but they must not give in to the regime’s demands for the disarmament of their troops or the loss of territories under their control.

Secondly, they should convey the message to neighboring countries, ¬particularly China and Thailand, and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations¬, that the 2010 election, which will be held under the military’s constitution, will in no way contribute to stability or a smooth political transition to democracy and ethnic autonomy.

Genuine national reconciliation and nation-building must precede the restructuring of the state. The neighboring countries and the regional group should, therefore, be reminded that the situation of “contained Balkanization” in Burma could easily lead to a resumption of localized arm conflicts between certain ethnic ceasefire groups and the Burmese army unless the latter negotiates an acceptable political resolution with fourteen major ceasefire groups whose strength reaches over 40,000 armed troops. Such a situation would particularly alarm China, since the most volatile areas are around the Sino-Burmese border, where formidable Wa and Kachin ethnic groups are based.

The aforementioned resistance and warnings should be accompanied by two political demands: a review of the constitution, and the release of political prisoners, including Shan ceasefire leader Hso Ten and Shan MP-elect Khun Htun Oo. These demands are largely in line with those of the mainstream opposition in central Burma and the international community.

However, the ceasefire groups must be strategic and coordinated in their action. Otherwise, they will face inter-group divisions¬ with some groups giving in and others resisting against disarmament ¬as well as intra-group splits ¬with one part of a group surrendering and another part resuming fighting.

Many ceasefire groups have, in fact, issued collective statements in the past to raise their political demands with the junta. When the military resumed the National Convention in 2004, collective demands were issued to the regime on two occasions ¬by eight groups the first time, and by 13 the second (with the KIO and the NMSP joining in both efforts). Their demands included the right to discuss and revise the undemocratic principles and procedures of the convention, the right of elected representatives from the 1990 election to participate in the convention, and the clear distribution of power to the states.

Similar collective efforts should now be used to achieve the two key political goals of a constitutional review and the release of political prisoners. A broad, well-coordinated effort must be strategically articulated not only to consolidate the domestic power bases of ethnic groups, but also to persuade neighboring countries to engage in and facilitate an acceptable political resolution in Burma.

If the ceasefire groups fail to stand together and be strategic at this critical historical juncture, they will lose their ground and eventually succumb to the junta’s “divide and conquer” tactics.

In the long run, ethnic minorities will be the ultimate losers under the military’s constitution. Burma will remain a highly centralized state in the post-2010 era. The undemocratic power of the president and the brooding presence of the military at every level of government in the ethnic states will not produce anything approaching the level of autonomy desired by ethnic minorities.

While military-owned businesses, junta cronies, foreign investors and traders, and ethnic drug lords and elites plunder the natural resources of the ethnic states, local ethnic populations will continue to be denied economic opportunities. This situation is already common in many areas. For example, logging companies from China bring their own cutters, drivers and laborers to work their concession in the Wa ethnic area, leaving locals impoverished and susceptible to social ills such as drug abuse, prostitution and diseases.

In the post-2010 era, ethnic states will also see their environment further destroyed by greedy businesses and bad governance.

The preservation of ethnic identity will be at serious risk as states or self-administered communities will have almost no authority over the issues of language or cultural and religious rights.

Moreover, since a military chief will independently administer military affairs in the post-2010 era, including the recruitment of troops and the deployment of military forces, the issues of child soldiers, forced relocations, forced labor, landmines, internally displaced persons, the flow of refugees to neighboring countries, and rape and other rights violations – all of which are associated with the military’s unchecked interests and behavior¬ – will remain unresolved, especially in ethnic minority areas.

Relentless repression and the darkest side of economic globalization will continue to cause lives in the ethnic states to be, as Hobbes described, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

It is now up to the leaders of ceasefire groups to decide whether they will betray the 60-year long struggle for their ethnic people or stand together with an effective strategy to fight for equal ethnic rights. The rest will be history.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=14979&page=1

New Year’s Resolutions for the NLD

2009-01-02T11:27:00.000-08:00

Op-ed, Irrawaddy Online, January 2, 2009

New Year’s Resolutions for the NLD

By MIN ZIN

Over the past 20 years, the opposition parties in Burma have shown an unyielding faith in the power of principles. Now it is time for them to learn the principles of power.

The Burmese military junta is at its happiest when history repeats itself. Under the leadership of Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the regime replays its old maneuvers—content that its strategy has for so long been unbreakable.
A recognizable play in the regime's game plan has long been the tactic of combining brute force and naked aggression through harsh crackdowns with political offensives aimed at weakening the opposition and defusing international pressure.
But if the regime’s policymakers are so predictable, surely the question is what the opposition will do to counter their plans and achieve the two most important results for political transition— constitutional reform and the release of political prisoners.
Take, for starters, the case of the 2,100 political prisoners languishing in Burma’s jails—234 of whom were arrested during or after the nationwide protests in September 2007 and have received sentences of up to 68 years imprisonment each since November 2008.
The goal of the harsh sentencing is clear—to eliminate potential opposition in the run-up to the 2010 election, which is the fifth step in the regime's master-plan known as the “Seven-Step Roadmap to Democracy.”
The intended effect of the brutality is a "shock and awe" campaign—terrorizing the public and creating an environment of fear ahead of the election. The junta hopes the Burmese population will become depoliticized and will meekly allow the military to steal the election.
International outcry has pronounced loud again. Sources in United Nations said that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is even considering the option for "temporary suspension of his good offices mission on Burma". Some sources close to Burmese Foreign Ministry confirmed that China and Russia are pressing the generals in Naypyidaw to cooperate with Secretary-General's good office and show a "positive gesture" to calm down mounting international criticism before the scheduled 2010 election in Burma.
As history has its proof, it is now time for Than Shwe to pull out a card and play magic with his international supporters. One possible prospect will be the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader and the only imprisoned Noble Peace Prize winner, in near future – as earliest as by May or as latest as November 2009 – which in itself presents what the junta considers to be several favorable conditions.
First, the junta knows that releasing Suu Kyi could be well enough to relieve the concerns of China, Russia, Asean and other apologists for the junta that have found it hard recently to defend the Burmese regime in the international arena.
If the military rulers were sublimely tactful, they could even invite either UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari or Secretary-General, and allow the Good Offices to take credit for Suu Kyi’s release.
In this manner, the junta could use the release of Suu Kyi to fend off international criticism against the systematic crackdowns, forcibly ratified constitution and scheduled election for 2010.
In fact, the military generals believe they can afford to release the opposition leader without compromising with her. Indeed, in accepting her freedom Suu Kyi could find herself in a Catch-22 situation where she cannot criticize the government without finding herself back in a cage.
No political transition is likely to take place within the framework of the current constitution. Even amendments made to the constitution in the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within a military-dominated parliament and the junta’s foreseeable power arrangement in a post-2010 Burma.
The question, therefore, is what the opposition can do to counter military's strategy and achieve two most important results needed for political transition—constitutional reform and the release of political prisoners.
Over the past 20 years, the opposition parties in Burma have shown an unyielding faith in the power of principles. Now it is time for them to learn the principles of power.
Paradoxically, the first principle of power that the opposition should pursue is a moral strategy.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) and other opposition parties should declare that they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the junta agrees to engage in political dialogue with the opposition to negotiate a constitutional review and to release the political prisoners.
This is not only a righteous strategy that will create a feel-good factor among opposition members, but it can be used as a playing card to achieve three concrete political gains.
First of all, it could motivate the opposition's own bases—NLD organizers throughout the country and its supporters, as well as legitimate ethnic political parties—most of whom have taken back seats in recent political debates due to the NLD's defensive, reactive and passive policy.
NLD Chairman Aung Shwe, who has always avoided public communication, should make himself available to Burmese-language shortwave radio stations abroad to address the public to articulate why the NLD has decided not to take part in the 2010 election and what the NLD demands are.
The party leadership should not take for granted that their cause is self-evident. They must publicize their agenda and promote it with clarity as a moral offensive.
Second, an election boycott could narrow the regime's bases—in particular, the full participation of ethnic minority groups that reached ceasefire deals with the military over the past 20 years.
All ethnic groups know the military's constitution is far below their acceptable thresholds.
Although groups such as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) may be planning to take part in the 2010 election through their proxy ethnic parties, they will be afforded the chance NOT to throw their weight behind the regime's terms and conditions, especially it involves the disarmament of their troops.
The opposition’s rejection of the 2010 election will, therefore, lend ceasefire groups political justification and strategic space (as the regime will be busy dealing with the NLD) to resist the regime's disarmament plan.
This will complicate the junta's political ploy or, in a worst case scenario, lead to a resumption of localized arm conflicts between certain ethnic ceasefire groups and the Burmese army. Such a situation would alarm China since the most volatile areas are around the Sino-Burmese border where formidable Wa and Kachin ethnic groups are based.
The third political gain the opposition could muster from a moral boycott strategy is that it will force the international community—particularly those who want to expedite the junta’s "road map"—to side with opposition's reasonable demands.
However, before all that comes into play, the opposition parties must show flexibility and articulate that it is not rejecting outright the regime's road map.
If the junta accepts a constitutional review and the release of political prisoners, the opposition can consider lending legitimacy to the road map. The opposition should also make it clear that it welcomes international humanitarian assistance to Burma, which is severely impoverished and falling into deeper humanitarian crises.
All in all, this is high time for the opposition to occupy the moral high ground and translate it into power and advantage. Of course, the route will not be an easy one as the regime will impose its nastiest crackdown on the opposition.
Some skeptics might also argue that it is nothing new for the Burmese opposition to take up a righteous policy and yet still lose the game.
However, what the opposition has so far adopted is a reflexive and ungainly position. What the opposition needs now to use the moral high ground wisely and publicly, and transform it into strategy, well-timed and coordinated toward achieving well-defined political gains.
This is the first principle of power the opposition should pursue and should constitute its New Year resolution for 2009.

Min Zin, a Burmese journalist in exile, is a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=14868

A Brother's Plea: Remember Burma

2008-12-26T11:44:00.000-08:00

Opinion, The Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2008

A Brother's Plea: Remember Burma
By Min Zin

The Saffron Revolution must not be forgotten.

On Nov. 28 my brother, Thet Zin, a Burmese journalist brave enough to remain in his country, was sentenced to seven years in prison by the military junta there. His crime? Possession of a U.N. report about the military's crackdown on demonstrations by monks and democracy activists in September 2007 -- known around the world as the "Saffron Revolution."
He's not alone. In the past two months the junta has sentenced more than 230 political detainees to lengthy prison sentences, some as long as 68 years. The total number of political prisoners in Burma is now more than 2,100, up sharply from nearly 1,200 in June 2007, before last year's protests, according to Amnesty International and other human-rights groups.
The terrible irony is that when I tell my Burmese friends and colleagues about my brother's sentence the typical response is, "Only seven years?" How far we've fallen that we consider anything less than decades in prison to be somehow a blessing.
My brother is the editor in chief of a weekly journal you've likely never heard of called the Myanmar Nation. On Feb. 15, the military raided his office and dragged him and his office manager, Sein Win Maung, away. They were eventually charged with crimes against the state under the regime's Printing and Publishing Law. All this for being in possession of a U.N. report widely available on the Internet.
Torture and interrogations followed. He was sent to Burma's notorious Insein prison. He nearly died there when Cyclone Nargis hit Burma in May, claiming more than 80,000 lives. Now he's facing a term in a filthy, disease-ridden prison that could result in his death.
The reality is that my brother did get a lighter sentence -- the maximum under the law which he was charged with violating. Nowadays, high-profile dissidents usually receive prison sentences from 20 to 70 years. Since November, the special courts held inside the Insein prison compound have rushed to complete the hearings against Burmese democracy activists, Buddhist monks, student leaders, ethnic minority youth, labor activists, journalists, poets, bloggers, and even comedians and musicians who were arrested during and after last year's peaceful protests.
These hearings and sentencing continue in the absence of their attorneys. Worse yet, three defense lawyers were imprisoned for between four and six months for contempt of court after transmitting their clients' complaints of an unfair trial. (Another defense lawyer convicted of contempt of court fled to the Thai border to evade arrest.) Four other defense lawyers were barred from representing their clients.
The military is immediately transferring those who receive sentences to prisons in remote areas. Earlier this month, my brother was sent to a prison in Kalay, 680 miles from his home in Rangoon in Burma's northwestern frontier -- far from all those who care about him.
The goal of such harsh punishments is clear: to eliminate potential opposition in the run-up to the 2010 election, which is the last step in the junta's "Seven-Point Roadmap to Democracy."
The junta is mocking the U.N. Security Council, which issued a statement in October 2007 calling for the release of all political prisoners, including Nobel Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house arrest. In response, 112 former presidents and prime ministers from more than 50 countries signed a letter this month urging U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to return to Burma for the first time since his visit after Cyclone Nargis and press for the release of political prisoners.
Indeed, Mr. Ban, who recently expressed his "disappointment" and "frustration" with progress in Burma, should go back and tell junta leader Gen. Than Shwe what he told the press not long ago -- that the "status quo ante is not acceptable and politically unsustainable," and that all political prisoners must be released by 2010.
Meanwhile, my brother and thousands of other political prisoners in Burma continue to languish behind bars. The world was watching during the "Saffron Revolution." Is it still?

Min Zin, a Burmese journalist in exile, is a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123025716276634733.html

Min Zin: Burmese activist crosses boundaries

2008-11-18T13:19:00.000-08:00

People

The Jakarta Post Fri, 10/31/2008

Min Zin:

Burmese activist crosses boundaries

Moch. N. Kurniawan

When applying for his masters degree at the University of California (UC) Berkeley this year, Min Zin, a 35-year-old Burmese dissident, encountered a big problem.

He had never finished high school.

Min Zin was kicked out of high school in Burma (now Myanmar) in 1988 for his political involvement against the military junta.

After this, Min Zin had gone into hiding to avoid arrest until 1997 before fleeing overseas where he worked as a journalist for years, voicing democracy for the Burmese people.

"So when I applied for a masters degree in Southeast Asian studies at UC Berkeley, I had no high school of undergraduate diplomas, and that caused headaches for the faculty," he said.

However, UC Berkeley showed its grace. Endorsed by five professors at the university, Min Zin was eventually accepted as a graduate student despite some concerns over the issue of favoritism.

"This might not have happen at other universities or in other countries. I was so grateful with UC's decision," Min Zin said in the courtyard of the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism.

The opportunity to study at UC Berkeley means a lot to Min Zin. It means he could gain access to tons of books and other material on his and other Southeast Asia countries, and regularly discuss it with experts on the region.

"I am always interested in Southeast Asian studies, particularly on Indonesia because it has a lot of similarities to Burma," Min said explained.

"As a neighbor, Indonesia is doing a good job managing the transition from an authoritarian rule to democracy. Indonesia is fighting hard against its deep-rooted corruption, and is dealing well with multi-ethnic and religious radicalism issues -- all of which could be studied by my home country."

It is not without good reason Min Zin suggested Indonesia was a good example of an authoritarian-turned-democratic country, since millions of Burmese people have been fed with news that "democracy will only lead to separatism and the collapse of a country, just like in the Balkans".

"Indonesia is really a good case study for us to examine, not the Balkans," he said, admitting that reading books about Indonesia had always thrilled him.

Min Zin's reflections on his country showed that his mind and heart remained their, despite the fact he is now living far away in the U.S..

"If I could return home today, I would go. I belong to Burma. My family is there. I want to dedicate myself to establish good journalism and education, because I realize that education is the key to developing Burma."

Min believes that journalism -- through radio, print and television -- could be a vital tool for the informal dissemination of educational material to the Burmese people, since the formal education system there is very limited.

"Even if there was a political change tomorrow, our formal education wouldn't be available for everyone in the country within 10 or 15 years. People will remain reliant on informal education. That's why the media people are very important," he said.

Min Zin may be far from home, but he is holding on to a message Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi sent him in early 2003, urging him to continue with his education and emphasizing that it would be a valuable investment for Burma.

The message was not given by chance, as Min Zin has known Suu Kyi since 1988 when he arranged for Burmese student unions to join peaceful democratic protests against the military junta. He witnessed the latter responding brutally with bullets, killing some 10,000 civilians.

Suu Kyi was put under house arrest later in 1989, as the military junta launched raids against democratic activists. Min Zin managed to escape, but his father, who passed away a few years ago, was imprisoned.

Ever since, Min Zin has moved from one place to another in Burma, hiding from the military searches, and after Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995, he has communicated with her regularly to exchange ideas.

In December 1996, Min Zin was one of the key organizers of massive student demonstrations, demanding better education and democratic reforms.

Instead of fulfilling the call, the military junta cracked down on the protests, arresting Min Zin's student activist colleagues, however they still could not find him.

As the military continued to hunt for him, Min Zin decided to leave the country, sneaking out to neighboring Thailand by trekking through the jungle for five days, in 1997.

In Thailand, he began his career as a journalist in Radio Free Asia (RFA Burmese Service) and the Irrawaddy English magazine.

Then Min Zin got an opportunity to be a visiting scholar at the Graduate School of Journalism, UC Berkeley, in 2001. He went back to the U.S. again in 2004, this time to work full-time at RFA, whose headquarters are located in Washington D.C.. Min once appeared in an MTV documentary celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela that allowed him to talk with the prominent world figure.

Since leaving RFA in late 2007, Min Zin is now working as a freelance journalist, contributing articles to the Thai-based Bangkok Post newspaper, Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review and The Irrawaddy online and magazine.

Min still maintains his status as a Carnegie teaching fellow at the Graduate School of Journalism, UC Berkeley, and is currently studying in the University's Southeast Asian studies program.

Those are the long and dynamic journeys Min Zin has made, his best assets to help rebuild Burma.

Min Zin believes that the only way to solve Burma's protracted crisis is that the military open a political dialog with the democratic opposition parties and ethnic groups.

Min says the military-drafted constitution and follow-up elections in 2010 would not bring about the much-needed state-building process, a process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard.

Instead of state-building, the country is now crumbling with repression, poverty and a humanitarian crisis, he said.

Min said the UN-led international community -- especially countries like Indonesia -- should not give up their attempts to enforce an inclusive political resolution in Burma by 2010.

"Of course, I am not optimistic," he said.

"But if the international community lets the generals in Burma continue their unilateral 'road map', the country will experience a crash landing."

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/10/31/min-zin-burmese-activist-crosses-boundaries.html

Reflections on Burma's Uprising

2008-08-20T18:08:00.000-07:00

August 2008

Reflections on Burma's Uprising

by Min Zin

Posted August 8, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)

Twenty years have now passed since Burma started its struggle for democracy in what is famously known as the “8-8-88 Movement.” It was a nationwide uprising calling for the removal of the military dictatorship and a restoration of the democratic government.

Back in 1988, I was a 14-year-old high school student. Two of my older siblings had been arrested and tortured for their involvement in the initial student protests and another brother was expelled from school. This shocked our whole family.

It was then that my political activism began. We distributed pamphlets and leaflets in our schools, staged hit-and-run protests in neighborhoods afterwards, and contacted other high schools and went together to universities to join their protests. Later on I became one of the founding leaders of the nation-wide high school student union in Burma, a place where unions are illegal and just being a member of one could result in long-term imprisonment.

It was these student-led protests that eventually snowballed into a nationwide popular uprising on August 8, 1988 (8-8-88).

However, the military staged a coup on September 18 and responded with bullets. When the troops started firing on protesters that night, I was with hundreds of fellow high-school students in Rangoon, participating in a hunger strike. In the following days, I found myself in the thick of the shootings and saw students killed before my very eyes. According to independent estimates, at least 10,000 people were killed in the August and September of 1988.

Even in the aftermath of the crackdown, I still felt awed and shocked. I reflected hard on what had happened. We had stood for principles of truth and justice and the whole population had supported us. So why hadn’t we succeeded? It was a question that took me a while to answer.

After the military coup, I continued to engage in clandestine political activities for reform with other political leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, who has become an icon of the Burmese democracy movement. Because of my activities, the military intelligence arrived at my house to arrest me on July 18, 1989. Since I was not at home, they arrested my father instead.

Despite being hunted by the military and threatened with the imprisonment, death and harassment of my family, I decided not to give up and went underground. This is where, despite moving from place to place, I remained for more than eight years.

As time passed, especially during my time on the run, evading arrest, I came to resolve my confusion and realize that though it is important to stand up for one's principles in politics, principle alone cannot guarantee political victory. Political activists need to understand what distinguishes the principled who succeed from the principled who fail. The common complacency about being on the ‘right’ side actually accomplishes little unless coupled with a sound strategy for achieving concrete goals. Our idealism even runs the risk of blinding activists from what is actually happening, and, when push comes to shove, may leave them stranded in irrelevance.

In this way, the central reason for the failure of 1988 uprising was that the opposition did not provide the leadership to “close the deal.” When the street protests reached their highest peak in late August through September 18, the government had become defunct. The opposition leadership, however, would fail to take advantage of the emerging power vacuum. Neither did they unify themselves to push for regime change, nor did they negotiate a transition of power.

After I fled to the Thai border in late 1997, I decided that journalism was the best way for me to support Burma’s pro-democracy movement, since it allowed me to reach people inside Burma as well a growing international audience which follows Burma's affairs. In time, my perspective has also broadened and I have been more and more convinced that the Burmese opposition has no “end game” strategy. They have often confused the means—mass movements—with the ends—victory itself—and in doing so failed to achieve the intended result when protests actually reached their peak. This lack of planning was shown again in last September’s demonstrations.

The fact that we are still unable to translate principle into victory is more than frustrating for me, since it always comes with unspeakable costs. More than ten thousand peaceful protesters have been killed since the 1988 uprising and about two thousand political prisoners, including my brother, remain in jail. Moreover, the plight of the ethnic minorities under the military's oppression has been immeasurable in its cruelty.

But, despite all this, a specific memory keeps me going, something from the 8-8-88 uprising. When we were marching during the 1988 democracy movement, most of us had nothing to eat. Yet some in the crowd would make rice bags for us so that we could keep marching. When we collected those rice bags, we would promise them, "you will get democracy one day".

Yet I have not kept my promise.

Whenever I feel dejected by the lack of progress, I tell myself that I must fulfill the promise that I gave to my people—I owe them for the rice bags I ate. This is a very simple thing, but it has kept those feelings of responsibility for all these years. The rice bags I received 20 years ago still give me power and energy to keep going on.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile.
http://feer.com/politics/2008/august/reflection-burmas-uprising

Was Burma's 1988 uprising worth it?

2008-08-06T18:08:00.000-07:00

BBC News

Was Burma's 1988 uprising worth it?

By Philippa Fogarty
BBC News

On 8 August 1988 cities across Burma were packed with demonstrators.

Hundreds of thousands of people marched through the then capital, Rangoon, calling for a transition to democracy and an end to military rule.

They were the largest mass protests in the country since independence in 1948 - and it looked for a while as though they might achieve results.

But six weeks later, at least 3,000 protesters were dead, thousands more were jailed and the military was firmly back in control.

Aung Din, then an engineering student at Rangoon Institute of Technology, was involved from the start.

Like many, he was angry about tight military control, economic crisis and nonsensical currency reforms that had wiped out most people's savings.

On 13 March 1988, he took part in a protest at his university. Riot police reacted with force. Three students were shot, and one, Phone Maw, was killed. Three days later, another student demonstration was brutally crushed.

Universities were shut, but the students were angry and determined. When they reopened in June, rallies gathered pace.

"We had to hide, but we had lots of meetings," said Aung Din. "We felt that there was no justice or freedom. So we decided we had to bring about an uprising that would end single-party rule."

A massive rally was planned - and 8/8/88, with its instantly recognisable numbers, emerged as the date to hold it.

"It was amazing," said Aung Din. "Columns of people came from all over, and where we met in downtown Rangoon, there were about 500,000 people. At the same time, in other townships, everywhere people were marching for the same things, for democracy and human rights."

Another of the marchers was 14-year-old Min Zin. His older brother and sister had been arrested after the March protests, his brother tortured.

"I was too young - I didn't know much about democracy and human rights. I only knew that this was really wrong, so it was really a spontaneous response," he said.

He helped organise a high school students' union and produced pamphlets calling for an uprising.

"We were so confident when we saw the people really took to the streets and joined the demonstration. It was quite wonderful," he said.

Crackdown

Then it turned bloody. Near midnight, troops opened fire on protesters at City Hall. The next day, they targeted crowds at Shwedagon Pagoda, where Min Zin was.

"It was the first time I saw my friends and colleagues - including some even younger than me - get killed in front of my eyes."

Hundreds of people are thought to have died - but protests continued. Civil servants and monks joined the demonstrators as the government floundered.

Then the movement found its public face in Aung San Suu Kyi.

On 26 August, the daughter of Burma's independence leader stood outside Shwedagon Pagoda and addressed a huge crowd on the need for democracy.

At that stage, said Aung Din, victory appeared possible.

But it was not to be. On 18 September the army struck back. Soldiers fired repeatedly at crowds. Hundreds more were killed. Some fled, others were arrested.

So began a crackdown on the protesters. Even as the military promised democratic elections, its agents hunted opponents.

They came for Min Zin, but he was not there, so they arrested his father. Min Zin went into hiding for nine years.

Aung Din, by then vice-chairman of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, was working to organise parties into a united front for the polls. He was arrested on 23 April 1989, tortured and jailed for four years and three months.

While he was in prison, the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy won a landslide victory in the elections - but the military ignored the result.

'Fulfil my promise'

Twenty years on, what has changed? The military remains firmly in control. Troops violently crushed anti-government protests in September 2007, with the loss of dozens of lives. Most of those who led the 1988 protests are either in overseas exile, in hiding or in prison.

Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest, while the military has just forced through a new constitution that further cements its grip on power. Despite Burma's natural resources, millions live in abject poverty.

But, said Aung Din, there is still reason to hope. He is still involved in the pro-democracy movement, as executive director of the US Campaign for Burma.

"Many thought that what happened in 1988 would stay in 1988. Nobody expected that it would continue, but it has survived to this day."

He was encouraged at the sight of young people on the streets in September last year.
Min Zin wants to see more strategy from the opposition

"We need a new generation of leaders to hold our flag - and 2007 created that generation of students inside the country. They are smarter than us and they are growing now."

Min Zin had to leave Burma in 1997. He was an activist and journalist for several years, but is now going to university in the US.

He wants the new generation of activists to learn from the past.

"You can expect spontaneous demonstrations against the military - but the problem is that you have to be organised. My concern is whether it can lead to a genuine political change."

Part of the reason the 8/8/88 uprising failed was because the opposition had no "end-game" strategy, he said. They lacked unity and so failed to seize their opportunity.

He worries that even today, many of the activists "do not try to translate principle into victory".

Sometimes, Min Zin says, he feels frustrated. "I spent all of my adult life in the democracy movement and I haven't seen any concrete results towards a transition to democracy."

But a specific memory keeps him going. On 8/8/88, despite their poverty, people gave rice to the demonstrators so that they could keep on marching.

"When we collected the rice bags, we always promised them: 'You will get democracy one day'. So I never met my promise."

"I need to fulfil my promise that I gave to my people."

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7543347.stm

THE 2010 ELECTION CHALLENGES

2008-07-27T18:13:00.000-07:00

GUEST COLUMN BURMA

THE 2010 ELECTION CHALLENGES

Instead of enforcing an inclusive political resolution, the international community appears set on urging the Burmese generals to conduct a 'credible and inclusive election' in 2010. If so, it would be a moral misery and strategic blunder

MIN ZIN

July 27, 2008 - Burma's conflict is moving into a new phase of intractability. In other words, the conflict will become institutionalised in 2010.

The military has unilaterally set the rules of the new game with the ratification of its constitution and is preparing to hold elections in 2010 as part of its seven-step "road map". But the new constitution will not bring about much-needed state-building, a process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard.

Instead of entering into the state-building process, Burma ranked 12th out of 177 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration in the 2008 "failed state" index, presented by Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace. In the 2007 index, Burma was designated 14th in failed state rankings. The country is crumbling.

"I can't really see anything happening that will be positive for the country's better future at this stage," said David Steinberg, a Burma expert from Georgetown University in Washington, DC.

The incompatible goals of the military elite and the opposition, including ethnic minorities, will not be transformed by the new constitution and the 2010 election.

The opposition will continue to fight for the goal of national reconciliation, but is likely to find itself ineffective within the new institutional procedures that favour the military's exclusive domination. As a result, the opposition will have to pursue an alternative course of action - such as public mobilisation and international advocacy.

On the other hand, since the military continues to impose its one-sided goal of exclusive domination with the new constitution and elections, it cannot expect to minimise the cost of conflict. The most visible costs of this approach will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.

"We do not accept the junta's unilateral solution," said Aung Din, a former political prisoner and executive director of the US Campaign for Burma. "Until and unless there is a negotiated political settlement, made by the military, the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic representatives together, the US-led western sanctions against the junta will not be lifted."

Sein Htay, a Burmese economist in exile, goes further, saying: "No matter whether there are western economic sanctions or not, the regime's policy failure and mismanagement will damage the prospect of development and public welfare. The country's economy will continue to worsen after 2010."

The threat of renewed public uprisings will still be present, since the military's intentions do not facilitate a reconciliation of interests. More repression will result, increasing existing grievances and public hostility towards the military.

"As the generals will use the same methods of coercion against the people even after 2010, the existing public anger that reached an unprecedented high level during the crackdown against monk-led protests last year and the regime's negligence of cyclone relief in May will be compounded," said Win Min, a researcher in civil-military relations in Burma. "Antagonistic civil-military relations will continue."

Military remains enshrined

Apart from being unable to transform incompatible goals and relations, the new, post-2010 regime will not change any salience of the issues that the country has been facing and which have earned it pariah status.

According to the military's new constitution, a military chief will independently administer military affairs, including recruitment and expansion of troops, promotions, troop deployment, budget, military-owned businesses, purchase and manufacture of weapons, etc.

Consequently, the issues of child soldiers, forced relocations, forced labour, landmines, internal displaced person, the flow of refugees to neighbouring countries, rape and other rights violations - all of which are associated with the military's unchecked interests and behaviour - will continue unresolved, especially in ethnic areas such as the eastern areas of Burma.

Since the elected parliament's legislative power will be restricted, and because it will not be able to oversee the military, no civilian mechanisms will be available to redress the military's excesses. Military personnel accused of crimes will be tried by a court-martial appointed by the head of the armed forces, the Tatmadaw - effectively allowing the military to continue its violations with impunity.

The 2010 elections could, however, contribute to leadership changes, at least on a nominal level during the initial stage. Two power centres will be created - military and government. Aside from the 25 percent of parliamentary seats reserved for the military, and its power to appoint the three most important cabinet ministers (Defence, Home and Border Area Affairs) in the Cabinet, the generals are determined to fill the remaining government portfolios and parliamentary seats with members of the military sponsored civilian thuggish movement, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).

The election is sure to be marked by vote rigging, intimidation and bullying attacks orchestrated by the USDA and its affiliates against opposing candidates. Given the record of USDA violence against Suu Kyi's entourage in 2003 and opposition activists in subsequent years, the world will witness an election model of goon-squad democracy - comparable to the travesty of recent elections in Zimbabwe.

The new post-election power arrangement will nonetheless create conflict between two power centres over the command structure and personal interests. Even now, various reports confirm that there is serious animosity and tension between military personnel and USDA members regarding the latter's interference with the military's administrative mandate and other issues of self-interest.

Given the military's lack of experience of sharing power, it will be harder for the generals to accept being outshone by the USDA.

"Many officers in the military hate the USDA and believe it will go down when Than Shwe goes," said a source close to the military establishment.

The government's operation with two centres of power - no matter who pull the strings - could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.

Evolutionary shift?

Some advocates expect it will take an evolutionary shift toward liberalisation. They believe the military's constitution, although flawed, can give reform options to a new generation of military officers. They suggest "using the generals' flawed model of democracy as a starting point from which to pursue a more acceptable long-term solution."

However, the nature of the power rivalry within a post-2010 regime will not necessarily lead to a new opening and democratisation in the long run. Even if it does so, the question is: how long is the long run? It may be too long to have any strategic relevancy for the opposition movement, within the country as well as abroad.

In fact, political transition is not likely to take place within the framework of a military-imposed constitution. Even amendments made to the constitution in the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within military-dominated parliamentary debate and a new power arrangement. It could happen only if the status-quo is challenged by public pressure and a negotiated settlement is reached with the military. Otherwise, the post-2010 prospect remains bleak.

The UN-led international community, therefore, must double its efforts to push for an inclusive political resolution in Burma before 2010, mediating for meaningful political dialogue among all key stake holders by using coercive diplomacy, rather than pleading to the regime to conduct elections that are just "credible and inclusive."

The international community must be fully aware that the result of the election will be in accordance with the military's constitution. Otherwise, it will make the same major mistake committed by EU leaders at their July 19 summit in Brussels when they called on the military junta "to ensure that the elections announced for 2010 will be prepared and conducted in a way that contributes to a credible and fully participative transition to democracy." Without considering contextual and consequential dangers, the EU leaders just pushed for the 2010 election and perhaps felt they were serving the cause of Burmese democracy. Moral misery and strategic blunder!

UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari, who is planning to return to Burma soon, should be especially cautioned not to lend legitimacy to the regime's constitution and elections in 2010. The UN, which once supported the junta's seven-step "roadmap" as a potential for an inclusive transition, must now say clearly that the map is no longer relevant since it has failed to incorporate key stakeholders. In brief, the UN-led international community should not give up its attempt to enforce an inclusive political resolution in Burma before 2010.

Min Zin is a freelance journalist.

American Federation of Teachers convention

2008-07-12T21:12:00.000-07:00

American Federation of Teachers convention, Chicago (July 10-14, 2008)

http://www.aft.org/presscenter/releases/2008/070708.htm

Keep up the pressure on Burma
Activist Min Zin honored at human rights luncheon

They are called the “88 generation,” and
for the past 20 years they have helped lead
the fight for democracy in Burma. At the AFT
Human Rights Luncheon on Saturday,
Burmese activist Min Zin accepted our
union’s first Presidential International
Freedom and Democracy Award on behalf of
those Burmese students who launched their
struggle for democracy on Aug. 8, 1988.
We must continue to “call attention to
the atrocities still being committed in
Burma” by the military junta, Min Zin said
in accepting the award.
Min Zin, who was a 14-year-old high
school student at the time of the 1988
protest, said he was accepting the award on
behalf of “all of those who continue to risk
their lives for democracy in Burma.”
AFT president Edward J. McElroy, who
introduced Min Zin, noted that, as educators,
AFT members are familiar with guiding
young people. At key moments in history,
however, he said, “those roles have been
reversed, and young people have really
been the ones reminding us about the need
to speak out against injustice.”
Youth in Burma, McElroy added, “are
serving as the conscience of the nation,
risking their lives and safety to break the
reign of terror their parents have endured
and construct a new reality based on
human rights and respect for liberty.”
Teachers in Burma, Min Zin said, are
under the thumb of the repressive regime,
which forces them to wear military
uniforms and sing military songs. “Teachers
are punished if they fail to prevent their
students from taking part in the protests.”
Min Zin was expelled
from school after participating
in the student protests
and spent the next nine
years hiding inside his own
country. During that period,
he continued to work with the Buddhist
monks, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung
San Suu Kyi and other student leaders to
“keep the democracy movement going
forward.”
He eventually fled Burma following the
December 1996 student demonstrations
there and, after several years in Thailand,
came to the United States. Today, he is a
student at the University of California,
Berkeley.
The importance of collective strength
and solidarity is something that those in the
trade union movement understand well,
Min Zin told the packed luncheon. “I am so
proud to be here today on behalf of my
friends and family who are still in the
struggle. I hope that you will all do what you
can to link arms with the democratic
movement in Burma and lend your strength
to our cause.”

http://www.aft.org/convention/downloads/SAT_SUM.pdf

All of Burma Is a Prison

2008-06-29T11:35:00.000-07:00

All of Burma Is a Prison

by Min Zin

Posted June 29, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)

Much has been written about Cyclone Nargis and the failure of Burma’s military junta to respond adequately. But what of the hundreds of political prisoners held in Burma, many in areas devastated by the storm? When Cyclone Nargis ravaged Burma in the late night hours of May 2, it did not spare political prisoners. The notorious Insein prison, where hundreds of political prisoners (including my brother) are locked up, was one of the hardest hit places in Rangoon.

Why is my brother in Insein? On Feb. 15, the military raided the offices of the Myanmar Nation and took my brother, the weekly journal’s editor in chief, to jail. His crime? Possession of a U.N. report on the military’s brutal crackdown on last September’s demonstrations by monks and democracy activists—known around the world as the “Saffron Revolution.”

My brother’s name is Thet Zin, and he is one of hundreds of Burmese citizens who struggle to tell the truth about what is happening in their country—whether through traditional forms of journalism or through the Internet—under threat of arrest or worse by the military regime. Along with my brother, his office manager, Sein Win Maung, was also arrested.

When Cyclone Nargis hit, it uprooted trees; rain flooded the prison cells and the power was cut. A fire broke out in one of the prison wards, filling the prison with smoke. The flames triggered a riot. The guards started shooting.

Suffering from asthma, my brother was choking with smoke. His former office manager and fellow inmate, Sein Win Maung, passed out. Some sympathetic prison guards rushed to the cells and managed to push aside fallen trees and move the political prisoners to a prison hospital.

“Many political prisoners in the cells could have died from smoke if the rescue was delayed one more hour,” said Bo Kyi, a former political prisoner who now works with Thailand-based Assistant Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP-Burma).

It is still hard to know how many died or were injured during the havoc. But according to AAPP at least 36 prisoners at Insein were shot to death when the cylcone hit. Some prisoners, like many of their countrymen, lost their entire family to the cyclone. Thiha Thet Zin, a political prisoner in Insein, was informed that eight out of nine of his family members—including his son, his parents, his grandmother, and all his siblings—were swept away by the storm. His wife was the only survivor.

This is hell on earth. Still, Insein prison and the injustices that take place there are but a microcosm of what’s taking place throughout Burma. To paraphrase Shakespeare, all of Burma is a prison.

Cyclone Nargis claimed more than 138,000 lives and left millions homeless. Still, the junta denied millions of Burmese people the basic right to food by blocking foreign aid workers and supplies in the weeks immediately following the storm.

Indeed, the misuse of international aid is by now well documented. Aid supplies ended up in military warehouses, local markets and the homes of police officers and members of pro-government civilian groups instead of reaching starving and disease-stricken survivors. Soldiers even looted jewelries from dead bodies.

Moreover, the junta forced survivors to take part in the reconstruction of military sites and conscripted male orphans into the army, which before the storm was already notorious for its tens of thousands of child soldiers. All of these reports have been confirmed by sources both inside and outside Burma.

Clearly, the junta’s inability and unwillingness to care for the Burmese people is tantamount to “crimes against humanity.” Cyclone Nargis has exposed the failures of the regime and brought forth a defining moment in Burmese history with inevitable, if yet unpredictable, political consequences.

“Things will not return to status quo ante,” says Priscilla Clapp, a U.S. diplomat who served as Chief of Mission in Burma from 1999-2002. Post-cyclone Burmese politics will be a humanitarian politics—pressuring and arguing about mobilizing aid and its delivery. Political goals will be set aside at least for the medium-term, and more consideration will be given to humanitarian works.
The junta continues to ensure that the cyclone will not have an effect on its “Road Map to discipline flourishing democracy.” But there are pressures within the junta itself that could eventually lead to change. “We have heard that there are considerable tensions within the military,” said David Steinberg, a Burma expert from Georgetown University. “But I don’t know whether the tension is strong enough to split the military and at what level it exists, and whether it is at a high enough level to threaten present leadership.”

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has approved millions in aid for Burma and now has hundreds of aid workers from member countries in storm-stricken areas. This could serve to expose to the outside world the prison state that is Burma. Still, despite a visit last month by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and the demands of dozens of heads of state, Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader of Burma’s opposition Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest—long after the May 24 deadline for her release.

What’s most important here is to assure the aid money is not used by the junta to retrench and tighten its grip on the Burmese people. Foreign aid runs the risk of being a “jackpot for the military junta, who will be the sole beneficiary of the international donation in the name of the cyclone victims” says Aung Din, a former political prisoner and director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma.

The outside world must demand more transparency and accountability when it comes to aid money and how it is distributed. So long as the world allows itself to be co-opted and outfoxed by the junta, political prisoners—including Aung San Suu Kyi and those in cyclone-ravaged Insein prison—will continue to languish in Burma’s gulags, and the Burmese people will remain shackled.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile.
http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/june/All-of-Burma-Is-a-Prison

Renew Focus on Burma

2008-06-17T17:09:00.000-07:00

NEWS ANALYSIS, Irrawaddy Online, Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Renew Focus on Burma

By MIN ZIN

As Aung San Suu Kyi quietly spends another birthday under house arrest on Thursday, the UN Security Council will sit down to a debate on women’s rights, while the European Council is scheduled to examine the role of the European Union (EU) in international affairs. Perhaps the conjunction of events on June 19 will mark a perfect date to start refocusing on Burma’s political crisis.

At her home on the banks of Inya Lake in Rangoon, the only imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate in the world, Suu Kyi, will turn 63 on Thursday, having spent almost 13 of the last 19 years under detention.

On the same date on the other side of the world, in New York, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will sit to examine the global progress on Resolution 1325, which was passed unanimously in October 2000. The resolution specifically addresses the impact of war on women by protecting them from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and addresses women's contributions to conflict resolution and creating sustainable peace.

“There is no more opportune and timely an international gathering to raise the issue of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's unlawful detention and the plight of women in Burma than at this significant occasion,” said Nyan Win, a spokesperson for the National League for Democracy.

United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will chair the debate, as the US holds the presidency of the UNSC for June 2008. According to sources close to the US state department, Rice is expected to highlight the situation of Suu Kyi, as well as the plight of women political prisoners and ethnic women in Burma.

There are about 154 imprisoned women activists languishing in Burma's jails, out of almost 2,000 political prisoners. Last week, at least three women volunteers distributing relief supplies to cyclone victims were arrested by Burmese authorities.

Meanwhile, the situation for women and girls in many ethnic areas in Burma is critically serious. In conflict areas such as Karen, Karenni and Shan states, ethnic women and girls, some reportedly as young as 10 years old, are raped by Burmese soldiers during military operations in these areas.

This issue commands not only debate, but urgent action from the Security Council. Also on June 19, the European Council will meet in Brussels and the 27 heads of state will discuss the role of the EU in international affairs. The issue of Burma should be high the agenda of EU leaders.

In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, many analysts observe that the regime's handling of the humanitarian crisis in the country was tantamount to a “crime against humanity.” France, one of the leading members of the EU, correctly invoked the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine to intervene in Burma on humanitarian grounds.

“We demand the EU's heads of state bring Than Shwe before the International Criminal Court to be tried for his crimes against humanity, as recommended by the European parliament,” said Aung Din, the director of the US Campaign for Burma.

Of course, such a demand may not find an immediately positive reception in the halls of the parliament in Brussels. However, the bottom line is that the international community must renew its focus and prioritize Burma's underlying political crisis.

To this end, the date of Suu Kyi's birthday in conjunction with two major international meetings would be a symbolically good start. One of the key obstacles in reorienting the international community's focus on the political crisis in Burma is the UN principle of keeping humanitarian aspects totally separate from political aspect.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said: “Issues of assistance and aid in Myanmar [Burma] should not be politicized,” he said before his first meeting with the regime’s leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, to plead for international access to the cyclone-ravaged Irrawaddy delta.

“While the UN secretary-general, the Burmese regime and allies of the junta have urged that the question of humanitarian aid not be 'politicized,' the regime itself is taking every advantage of the cyclone to cement its grip on power to the exclusion of helping its own people,” said Jared Genser, attorney for Suu Kyi. “As is often the case, distraction and delay in discussing the fundamental issues in Burma only serve the interests of the regime.”

Some sources close to the UN said that Ban is considering a proposal to the Burmese military government that a political solution in Burma be implemented as an integral part in the coordinated reconstruction phase of the cyclone disaster.

However, the prevailing attitude and insistence among some key officials from the UN and INGOs is that even any tough talk from the international community could upset the generals and make the continuation of current access to the country impossible.

During last week's panel discussion in New York convened by the Asia Society and the Open Society Institute, Holmes said that further international sanctions or the threat of force would only have kept aid from the people who so desperately need it.

However, many Burmese opposition groups say such an attitude is appeasement. “How inhumane are they?” asked Aung Din. “They are trying to reward Than Shwe and his clique in the name of humanitarian access. Actually, they have become complicit in allowing Than Shwe to commit crimes against humanity.”NLD spokesperson Nyan Win said that the party always views the issues of politics and humanitarian crises as interrelated."A softly-softly policy has never yielded any solution in the past,” he said. “Nor will it in the future.”

Several UN officials expect the Burmese military may be more confident in dealing with the UN when they come to realize that the UN avoids politicizing humanitarian issues. It could create a better mutual understanding and ultimately lead the junta to become more receptive in cooperating with the UN, even in a political area, said a UN source in New York.

If there were an implicit expectation behind such a jealously guarded humanitarian attitude, it would be dead wrong.

The mentality of the Burmese generals will not allow such tactical optimism feasible. Recently, the junta's top leaders—especially Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye—declared war on UN and INGO officials during the regime's relief-related meetings in the delta area.

According to sources close to the military, Maung Aye said that the foreigners are attempting to enslave the country. He also noted that it was China and Russia, not the UN, that helped convince the US and France to withdraw their naval vessels from international waters off the coast of Burma. The general also gave instructions to stamp out local NGOs and volunteer groups who, in his words, were “like slaves” receiving support from international donors.

Nonetheless, it should always be welcomed that the international community uses persuasion, not force, to achieve its goals, in this case opening up the delta in the aftermath of a devastating cyclone.

However, the tactic of persuasion should not undermine the strategic goal—that of facilitating an acceptable political transition in Burma. Engaging in humanitarian work and pushing for genuine political transition should not be mutually exclusive. Avoiding tough talk and action against a brutal regime out of a fear of upsetting that regime is morally unacceptable and politically unsustainable.

The international community must renew its attention on Burma’s political crisis. Otherwise, Suu Kyi will be blowing out the candles on her birthday cake alone in her house for many more years to come.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=12796

Post-cyclone Politics

2008-05-30T18:38:00.000-07:00

Post-cyclone Politics

By MIN ZIN

Friday, May 30, 2008

When Cyclone Nargis ravaged Burma, it did not spare political prisoners. The notorious Insein Prison, where hundreds of political prisoners are locked up, was one of the hardest-hit sites in Rangoon.

The wind uprooted trees, rain flooded prison cells, and electricity was cut. Many prisoners, wet and cold, began screaming in the dark. The storm’s wrath triggered a riot and guards started shooting. Criminal prisoners in one ward set the building on fire, causing smoke to fill neighboring prison cells.

Suffering from an eye-infection, the most prominent jailed student leader, Min Ko Naing, was choking from the smoke and his eyes were burning. Some of his fellow inmates had passed out. A few sympathetic prison guards managed to push aside fallen trees that blocked the entrances to the cells and moved the political prisoners to the prison’s hospital.

"Min Ko Naing and many other political prisoners in the cells could have died from smoke if the rescue had been delayed," said Bo Kyi, a former political prisoner who heads the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Burma (AAPP).

There are no official figures for how many prisoners died and were injured during the havoc, but the AAPP believes at least 36 prisoners were shot to death.

In the cyclone’s aftermath, many political prisoners who had family living in the storm-stricken areas learned they had lost family members. One political prisoner, Thiha Thet Zin, was told that eight of nine family members, including his parents, grandmother, a son and siblings, were swept away with the storm. His wife was the only survivor.

In fact, what happened in Insein Prison during the killer storm could be seen as a microcosm of Burma's political landscape.Since Cyclone Nargis, which claimed 134,000 deaths and at least 1 million homeless, the world has seen that the unwillingness of the Burmese junta’s disaster response is antamount to a “crime against humanity."

The cyclone has placed the country in a defining moment with inevitable political consequences, but just how events may play out is anybody’s guess.

"Things will not return to a status quo," said Priscilla Clapp, a US diplomat who served as Chief of Mission in Burma from 1999-2002.While the military tries to exploit the world's generosity, it will also ensure that the cyclone will not have any effect on its "road map to a discipline-flourishing democracy.""The rush to complete the referendum and declare victory was a defensive move, in recognition that the whole scheme could be derailed by the storm if it was not wrapped up immediately," said Clapp.

Unbelievably, the junta claimed that the constitutional referendum was approved by 92 percent of the voters. "I think the whole business of the ‘road map’ is no longer relevant in Burmese politics after the cyclone," said Moe Thee Zun, a well-known former student leader. "The most important thing we need to watch is how Nargis will test the army's loyalty to the leadership and expose dissension within army."

Some observers, perhaps wishfully, believe that the regime's failed response could weaken the junta, especially Snr-Gen Than Shwe. Significantly, the junta’s current public failure follows its ruthless crackdown on the "Saffron Revolution" last September.

"We have heard that there are considerable tensions within the military," said David Steinberg, a Burma expert at Georgetown University. "But I don't know whether the tension is strong enough to split the military and at what level it exists, and whether it is a high enough level to threaten the present leadership. If change comes, it has to come from within the military itself."

Many military observers doubt that Than Shwe would be challenged by his immediate subordinates. Change after his death is a more likely scenario, they say. However, many opposition leaders prefer to place their hopes for change on public actions. They say that unless a mass movement challenges the corrupt military leadership, divisions in the military will not surface.

"Whether or not the military will take sides with the public is the defining issue in Burmese politics," said Po Than Gyaung, a spokesman for the Communist Party of Burma. "A mass movement is the most likely trigger for change within the military."

However, there are few public signs that the junta has been weakened by either the people’s uprising or the cyclone’s aftermath. The regime sits on more than $4 billion in foreign exchange reserves and earns more than $150 million a month in natural gas sales. Observers say it is unlikely any government money will be used for humanitarian aid or reconstruction. The regime donated US $ 4.5 million immediately after the cyclone, but the money largely came from donations by regime supporters.

On the other hand, Burmese civil society clearly has been weakened, both physically and psychologically. The economy will suffer for an extended period of time. On the Cyclone Nargis frontlines, many ordinary citizens responded to the call for aid, but their efforts cannot replace the need for a professionally organized, long-term relief effort. A significant portion of the country could experience food shortages, say UN agencies.

Though people are angry with the junta, the grip of fear appears to be stronger than anger and any attempt at mass action in the near future most likely would end up in abortive protests and violence. In addition, the role of the opposition will continue to be marginalized as long as leading figures such as Aung San Suu Kyi and Min Ko Naing remain in detention or unless a new community-based leadership emerges out of the cyclone relief efforts.

The prospect of growing community-based leadership is a possibility, but it is not likely to yield any immediate political impact. More importantly, such new initiatives can be nipped in the bud by the regime's repression and intimidation.

At the same time, the UN has proven to be unresponsive to the idea of its "responsibility to protect" principle.

The West will continue to champion the cause of democracy in Burma in moral and rhetorical terms, but it is likely to act only in the most practical terms, relying largely on cooperation and pressure from China and Asean.

Meanwhile, the regime clearly sees the likelihood of international humanitarian aid as a "jackpot,” and will try to include only enough relief workers to keep the flow of aid and reconstruction money coming.

The fate of the Burmese people and the political prisoners in Insein Prison remain in limbo. While there are no immediate signs of political storms brewing, we know the water is always rough and there are few safe harbors in Burma.

POLITICS OF RESCUE

2008-05-18T13:11:00.000-07:00

Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday May 18, 2008

POLITICS OF RESCUE

In the history of humanitarian intervention, unilateralism is far more common than UN-led multilateral action. US-led Western countries must act now to save lives in Burma, writes MIN ZIN

Since security is all about preventing any major threat to human life, the effect of the deadly cyclone that hit Burma on May 3 must be seen from a serious human security perspective. However, the Burmese military junta is far from comprehending such a humane concept.

The tragic toll exacted by Cyclone Nargis could exceed 100,000 deaths and a million homeless, according to aid agencies. There has been nothing like it in Burmese history, neither during colonial rule nor in the country's civil war.
However, the country's ruling junta has blocked foreign relief workers from bringing much-needed aid to survivors.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon clearly said that "Myanmar cannot do it alone" in setting up major logistics operations to deliver supplies to the most affected areas. Ban said much needs to be done, immediately.

However, the head of the Burmese Navy, Rear Adm Soe Thein, told Adm Timothy Keating, commander of the US Pacific fleet, that the basic needs of storm victims were being met and that "skillful humanitarian workers are not necessary."

According to several reliable sources in Rangoon, Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein, told a meeting of business people on May 12 that no foreigners were being allowed into the hardest-hit Irrawaddy delta region.

"Thein Sein said 'No foreigners, no cameras!"' said a well-known journalist in Rangoon.

Many foreign aid workers, including volunteers from "friendly" Asian countries, are being asked to stay away from actual aid distribution.

"We can't go to Pathein (Bassein), capital of the delta region," said a Thai non-governmental organisation aid worker. "Even relief trucks were stopped on the way down to the delta and had to drive back to Rangoon."

Moreover, several reports confirmed misuse of international aid. Supplies were reportedly ending up in military warehouses, local markets and the homes of police and members of pro-government civilian groups, instead of reaching starving and disease-stricken survivors.

As another storm front heads towards Burma's already devastated coastal areas, bringing heavy rain and strong winds to add to the misery of cyclone survivors, the regime's increasing restrictions on international aid workers are now tantamount to a "crime against humanity."

A humanitarian catastrophe is escalating for 2.5 million survivors who live in Burma's "rice bowl", and for whom aid must be viewed in the perspective of long-term rehabilitation and rebuilding.

However, the inability of the regime to respond to the cyclone crisis is now self-evident and clearly demonstrates that Burma is a failed state.

The devastation caused by the cyclone will very likely have immense social and political consequences. The limited or inequitable distribution of assistance and outright bullying by government "thugs" could outrage discontented victims and lead to social unrest and even violence.

Responsibility to Protect

Whether or not the cyclone disaster could lead to political change in Burma depends on intermediary linkages - the leadership of opposition activists and public influences such as Buddhist monks - that could connect the disaster to mobilisation of discontented groups.

Meanwhile, the international community has shown its generosity in helping the people of Burma.

France suggested invoking a UN "Responsibility to Protect" provision to deliver aid to the country without the regime's approval, although that possibility was rejected in the Security Council by China, Vietnam, South Africa and Russia.
However, in the history of humanitarian intervention, examples of unilateralism such as Kosovo in 1999 are far more common than UN-led multilateral action. Burma should now be added to this history.

Since the ideal scenario of UNSC-endorsed intervention was not possible, US, France, Britain and other like-minded countries should take the lead as the situation in Burma is extreme enough to justify international humanitarian intervention.

Even Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group, an organisation that usually promotes a policy of engagement with the junta, recently wrote that "if the intransigence of the Burmese generals continues, it is a very real issue whether in the name of humanity some international action should be taken against their will - like military air drops, or supplies being landed from ships offshore - to get aid to the huge numbers who desperately need it right now, in the inaccessible coastal area in particular."

However, a few top UN humanitarian officials including John Holmes, under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief, still place their hopes on negotiations with the junta.

The military, which is well experienced in defusing international pressures, will, of course, make nominal gestures and on-and-off concessions in order to divide international public opinion and strategy.

The most demonstrative example is the regime's "selective opening up to international staff" as the junta invited its immediate neighbours - China, Bangladesh, Thailand and India - to send 160 international workers to join the relief effort.

Although the invitation has yet to yield results, the message itself could create ultra-optimism among the regime's international cheerleaders, including Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, who went to Burma on a mission to persuade the generals to allow international relief workers but returned empty-handed.

Samak said on his return: "From what I have seen I am impressed with their (Burmese military's) management."
The UN secretary-general, at least, appears to grasp the gravity of the situation.

"Even though the Myanmar government has shown some sense of flexibility, at this time, it's far, far too short," Ban said. "The magnitude of this situation requires much more mobilisation of resources and aid workers."

Use 'all means' to aid

Junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who has sole responsibility to make any decision in autocratic Burma, remains indifferent to international concern, and even ignored attempts by Ban to contact him. He also snubbed Samak, who met only Burma's prime minister, and is likely to ignore an upcoming "coalition of mercy' from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and a visit by the UN humanitarian chief.

Although the junta will continue to refuse to open up the country to a full-scale relief effort, this doesn't mean that all diplomatic efforts should be set aside. It is a reminder, however, that the international community must use "all means" to get aid through to cyclone victims, as EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana has advocated.

Meanwhile, some US congressional leaders are organising a letter to President Bush urging him to "work with the British, French, German, Danish and other supportive and regional governments to immediately intervene in the Irrawaddy delta region to provide urgent life-saving humanitarian aid to the survivors of Cyclone Nargis". However, initial enthusiasm of the White House interventionist approach appeared to dwindle after the junta authorised entry of five US Air Force C-130 flights but still restricted foreign aid workers' involvement in actual delivery.

In the aftermath of the cyclone, Burmese exiles in the United States staged a demonstration outside UN headquarters in New York, chanting: "UN waits. Burma lies. How many people have to die?" The chanting expressed the desperate frustration of cyclone survivors in their home country. Good intentions and endless calls to do something must be supported by concrete actions to stem the rising death toll. The time is way overdue. Although the road ahead is rocky and the White House may be wavering to make a moral decision, US-led Western countries must take action now to save lives.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.

Further Stormy Prospects for Burma

2008-05-10T17:18:00.000-07:00

News Analysis, Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, May 10, 2008

Further Stormy Prospects for Burma

By MIN ZIN

Since security is all about preventing any major threat to human life, the effect of the deadly cyclone that hit Burma last Saturday must be seen from a serious human security perspective. However, the Burmese military junta is far from comprehending such a humane concept.

The tragic toll exacted by Cyclone Nargis could exceed 100,000 deaths and a million homeless, according to a US diplomat. There has been nothing like it in Burmese history, neither during colonial rule nor in the country’s civil war. Some older residents of Rangoon say they have seen nothing like it since the city was severely bombed in World War II.

Many aid agencies worry that disease and starvation will claim thousands more lives in the next few days. World Food Program spokesman Paul Risley said aid agencies normally expect to fly in experts and supplies within 48 hours of a disaster, but nearly a week after the cyclone the Burmese authorities are still refusing to let foreign relief workers in.

Although the regime says it welcomes all forms of international help, in reality it only accepts donations of cash or emergency aid such as medical supplies, food, clothing, generators and shelters. A foreign ministry statement on Friday said: "Myanmar (Burma) is not ready to receive search and rescue teams as well as media teams from foreign countries." The military even deported some aid workers on Wednesday.

The junta said it can deliver foreign aid "by its own labors to the affected areas."According to a reliable source, it was junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe who decided to bar international aid workers, although there had been a signs of initial flexibility from Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and the foreign ministry.

The source added that Than Shwe believes he has already distributed 5 billion kyat (4.5 million dollars), which he mostly extorted from Burmese businessmen as "donations", and he also has more than US $30 million from international assistance pledges. He then decided to use his own Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and army to distribute aid.

"What Than Shwe doesn’t understand is that his $4.5 million can only be used for food for 12 days, and all the promised dollars from the world may not come if the international experts are not allowed into the country," said Win Min, a Burmese analyst in Thailand.

Moreover, Burmese businessmen cannot afford to donate much more cash, and overworked Burmese doctors have run out of resources.

Non-government organizations (NGOs) and international non-government organizations (INGOs) within Burma, who had to sign memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the regime to begin their projects, defining the nature of their work and their areas of operation, have now found themselves restricted by those same MOUs.

Since many NGOs do not have projects in the Irrawaddy delta, they are not allowed to do any aid work in the devastated region since they were not authorized to do so in their MOUs.

According to inside sources, NGOs are now trying to work under the UN's umbrella in order to reach into the delta.
Meanwhile, the military and its thuggish USDA members are intimidating private donors who provide rice and clothing to cyclone victims in the suburban townships of Rangoon. Many donors are reportedly being asked to hand over their relief supplies to local USDA members for them to supervise distribution.

"Instead of protecting the people, the military and its thugs are looting from us," said one businesswoman.
Some sources closed to the military suggest that world leaders—particularly those from China, India and Thailand, and even US President George W Bush—should tackle Than Shwe directly as the junta leader’s subordinates might not be giving him a full picture of the crisis.

This approach appears to be based on a false assumption, however—namely, that dictators allow themselves to be manipulated by their subordinates.

Nor could this approach work in practice. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently spoke directly to Than Shwe and called on him to postpone the constitutional referendum and "focus instead on mobilizing all available resources and capacity for the emergency response efforts."

Than Shwe ignored him and decided to go ahead with the referendum to approve a constitution that will allow the perpetuation of military rule in the country. For Than Shwe, regime security is more vital than human security, although people are dying in massive numbers.

One military source said that Than Shwe stopped the planned dispatch of troops to the disaster zones in the wake of Cyclone Nargis because he wanted them to guarantee the security of the referendum.

The inability of the regime to respond to the cyclone crisis is now self-evident and clearly demonstrates that Burma is a failed state.

The devastation caused by the cyclone will very likely have immense social and political consequences. The limited or inequitable distribution of assistance and outright bullying by government "thugs" could outrage discontented victims and lead to social unrest and even violence.

Whether or not the cyclone disaster could lead to political change in Burma depends on intermediary linkages—the leadership of opposition activists and public influencers such as Buddhist monks— that could connect the disaster to mobilization of discontented groups.

Meanwhile, the international community has done its best to help the people of Burma.

France suggested invoking a UN "responsibility to protect" provision to deliver aid to the country without the regime's approval, although that possibility was rejected in the Security Council by China, Vietnam, South Africa and Russia.
A top US aid official said the US may consider air-dropping supplies for survivors even without permission from the junta, though geopolitical considerations make such action difficult. The junta agreed to allow a single US cargo aircraft to bring in relief supplies, but it isn’t clear how the aid will be distributed.

Eventually, Than Shwe may negotiate with UN aid agencies to conduct limited distribution work inside Burma in order to prevent direct intervention by the US and other western countries. Some inside sources indicate that a few top brass officials, including Gen Thura Shwe Mann, the third most powerful man in the military hierarchy and a former regional commander of the Irrawaddy delta, persuaded Than Shwe to cooperate with the international community.

Of course, Than Shwe will delay permission as long as possible since he likes to show who’s in charge. Meanwhile, people will continue to perish hourly.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=11910

Burma's Political Transition Needs People Power

2008-05-01T17:25:00.000-07:00

Irrawaddy Online, Thursday, May 1, 2008

Burma's Political Transition Needs People Power

By MIN ZIN

The notion of political transition initiated by a country’s elite has been a dominant discourse in Burmese politics since the late 1990s. The model advocates that a peaceful transition can be facilitated by negotiations between the regime’s “doves” and opposition moderates. It would involve the opposition initiating a concrete proposal to the military in order to persuade the latter to sit at the negotiating table.

This political strategy gained currency in the early 2000s since it coincided with the political ascendancy of former Intelligence Chief Gen Khin Nyunt. At the time, talks between opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta seemed to offer a glimmer of hope. However, simultaneously, the opposition movement was losing its strength in "people power" campaigns, such as the unsuccessful Four Nines (September 9, 1999) Mass Movement, and in armed struggles due to ethnic armies signing ceasefire agreements and the fall of the Karen National Union stronghold in 1992.

Any optimism in Burmese politics is never sustained for long. However, the transitional model remained popular as the only way out for the Burmese people. Proponents claimed there was "No alternative!"

"Many diplomats who we met always encouraged and even pressured us to initiate a proposal to the regime," said Nyan Win, a spokesperson for the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD). "In fact the party has always called for dialogue and has always been ready to negotiate."

In early 2006, the NLD proposed a transitional plan urging the junta to convene parliament with the winners of the 1990 elections in return for giving the regime recognition as an interim executive power holder. Though the party's call for a negotiated transition was rejected by the regime, the opposition forces—including the 92 MP-elects from the 1990 election and notable veteran politicians—continued to offer flexible transitional packages to the junta. None of them worked.

The proponents of the transition model often downplay the role of public action and mass movement. Some believe it will not happen because more than 20 percent of the population has been born since the uprising in 1988 and are therefore much less affected by the people’s power movement of those times. Others worry that mass movement could be counterproductive to a possible negotiated transition—often the momentum of a protesting crowd will spiral out of control and threaten the careful process of negotiation. They all conclude that the army doesn't respond to public pressure.

Then, all of the sudden, the September protests broke out. The so-called “experts” and “policymakers” failed to see it coming. In the wake of the crackdown, UN-led mediation efforts were revived and Snr-Gen Than Shwe and his generals, once again, were called on to sit at the negotiating table. And once again they declined.

The question now to the advocates of the elite-driven transition model is what to do when the regime refuses to negotiate with the opposition? What it is to be done when the military insist on a referendum to approve a constitution that will allow the perpetuation of military rule in the country?

Almost all supporters of the model say the people of Burma must accept whatever offer the junta makes. They say "something is better than nothing." Some suggested using the generals’ flawed model of democracy as a starting point from which to pursue a more acceptable long-term solution.

"We must give consideration to possible generation change within the military," said Harn Yawnghwe, a well-know lobbyist and director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma office. "The new blood of the army must have options available on the table when their time comes. This constitution and referendum, though they are flawed, can give reform options to a new generation of military officers. It will create a new dynamic for the country to get out of the current deadlock."

That’s why many advocates of the elite-initiated transition advise the Burmese public to accept the constitution and hope it will lead to amendments with the objective of the military's gradual withdrawal from politics at a later period.
Tun Myint Aung, a leader of 88 Generation Students group, disagrees.

"It is such disgraceful advice. The so-called experts and policy makers are pushing our people to live in slavery," he said from his hideout in Burma. "We do not accept the military's constitution; not because we don't want gradual transition, but because the constitution is too rigid to make any change possible. The military holds a veto over any amendments."

Critics said it is now clear—after a series of rejected proposals from oppositions groups and the UN—that rather than political carrots, it is much more likely that effective public action will compel the new military generation to choose the path to reform.

"Unless a mass movement challenges the corrupted military leadership, divisions within the military will not surface," said Kyaw Kyaw, head of the Political Defiant Committee under the National Council of Union of Burma, the umbrella opposition group in exile. "Besides lacking local and international legitimacy, the corrupt leadership is now losing its loyalty from within military ranks since the September protest. In a historical Burmese context, public action, or mass movement, has played a decisive role ever since the struggle for independence to the 1988 democracy uprising to the monk-led protests last September. It will continue to do so until we gain a genuine resolution."

In fact, only when mass movement with strategic leadership rises up against the current military top brass, then the elite’s calculations, regime defection and international pressure will become relevant issues in facilitating a negotiated transition. In other words, political transition is not likely to take place within a framework of proposed constitutional means. Even amendments to the constitution with the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within a military-dominated parliamentary debate. It will happen only when the people challenge the status quo with public pressure.
However, although mass action is believed to be necessary to bring about change in Burma, its inherent dangers mean the possibility of its success remains a big question.

"The calls for public action are getting louder since the prospect of elite-initiated negotiation became impossible," said Nyan Win. "If the regime rigs the referendum result, it could spark mass protests."

A recent history of democratization shows that vote-rigging and stealing elections create favorable conditions and the opportunity for the outbreak of a democratic uprising or, in a worst case scenario, violence.

In fact, vote rigging might not only trigger public outrage in Burma, but also test the loyalty of the regime's staff. It could create divisions and weaken the standing of Than Shwe, who is solely responsible for the decision to move ahead with the unilateral implementation of the current political process by ignoring the UN's call for inclusiveness.
Whether or not public action leads to a negotiated transition depends on the opposition's leadership. No process of democratization has evolved purely and solely from a civil movement or people’s uprising.

It would nevertheless be shortsighted to exclude the role and power of the people in a Burmese political context where elite-driven transition is no longer relevant.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=11695

Time’s up, Gambari

2008-03-27T17:34:00.000-07:00

Irrawaddy Online, Thursday, March 27, 2008

Time’s up, Gambari!

By MIN ZIN

The United Nation's mediation efforts in Burma have become snared in a trap. The special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is now caught between an unsuccessful mediation and his reluctance to admit failure.

Frustration abounds. Gambari appears to have become the target of mounting disappointments. Most Burmese opposition groups would say he deserves it.

During his briefing on Burma with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on March 18, Gambari seemed anxious to prove how important his role as special envoy really was. Though he admitted his efforts had yielded “no immediate tangible outcome,” he insisted the efforts of the UN good offices were “relevant” to both sides—the opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime. Gambari even said in his briefing that he had reason to believe that the Burmese government attaches importance to his mission and "continues to value the Secretary-General's good offices as the best prospect for further cooperation through mutual trust and confidence, and constructive suggestions."

Unfortunately, the facts do not allow the special envoy grounds for such optimism. According to highly publicized state media reports, Burmese Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan urged him to support the junta’s “Seven-step Road map” and stop pursuing alternatives suggested by Western democracies.

The regime's information czar added that if Gambari tried to force the country to meet Western calls for reform, “We would be concerned that your task of offering impartial advice may be undermined.” As a clear indication of the regime's lack of cooperation, military chief Than Shwe, the only true decision-maker in Burma, shunned Gambari on his last two visits.

In fact, the junta has already rejected the UN's key proposals. It turned down suggestions that Burma should set up a broad-based constitutional revising commission in order to ensure an inclusive political process, and establish a poverty alleviation commission. After the two proposals were rejected, Gambari, on his last trip to the country, put forward one more suggestion to the junta—that Burma invite international observers to the upcoming referendum.

Reportedly, the junta's information minister responded with a blunt “no.”

Additionally, senior Burmese military officials announced that the new constitution would bar Aung San Suu Kyi from running in future elections because she was previously married to a foreigner, a British scholar, who died of cancer nine years ago.

Gambari's failure has become so severe that he could not even manage to persuade the Security Council members to release a much-anticipated Presidential Statement after his briefing. However, the Council may release a Presidential Statement on Burma next week, thanks to the hard work of US-led Western democracies. Council members are now negotiating the language of the statement. However, no one should expect a strong statement from the UNSC, a diplomat warned. "It will be a statement with a very mild tone," said a source close to the UN.The faith of Burmese dissident groups in Gambari's mission is about to hit rock bottom.

"We hoped he (Gambari) would ask the Council to strengthen the mandate of the Secretary-General in pressuring the junta for an all party-inclusive, transparent and democratic process of national reconciliation in our country. However, to our surprise and sadness, he misled the Council," read a joint statement issued by the All Burma Monks Alliance and the 88 Generation Students group on March 26.

In fact, there may be a valid reason to consider broader factors for his ineffectiveness and do justice to Gambari.

"Mr Gambari's efforts should be understood in a larger context, instead of over-focusing on his diplomatic skill. The success of Gambari's mission depends on the readiness of key international players to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "At the same time, we also need to review how Gambari engages the junta; whether or not he adheres to the line of principled engagement."

UN officials maintain that "the role of the good offices is still very intact" and "very much a work in progress."

"I do understand there is the expression of frustration, but you can't expect miracles to happen to a situation that has been going years and years," said Choi Soung-ah, a UN spokeswoman. "Mr Gambari currently is the world's only tie into the government of Myanmar [Burma]. From the UN perspective, it is very important not to take drastic action immediately because we don't want to shut down the only channel."

This channel, however, can prompt disservice to genuine international mediation efforts on Burma. According to senior diplomats in Europe, the argument prevailing among Asian countries—including China and even some European nations—is that they support the UN special envoy's mediation. So long as Gambari says his mission is relevant and can yield positive results, they will not undermine him. They will support him—and wait and see.

"In fact, they justify their handoff policy by hiding behind Gambari's mission," a senior diplomat from the EU told The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. "Unless Gambari admits that he can't do anything with the present mandate, he is unwittingly dragging the mediation effort into the swamp. No better alternative will be found."

Aung Din, the executive director of the US Campaign for Burma, agrees."Burma is now being hijacked by Gambari," said Aung Din. "His effort has failed miserably again and again and again. Unless the mission is enhanced and strengthened by the UN Security Council, nothing positive can be expected. But instead of admitting that, he is still acting like he remains relevant and can do magic. It is a high disservice to international mediation efforts. For the people of Burma, we feel betrayed."

In fact, Gambari has already exhausted his capacity for persuasion, the principal source of leverage that a mediator wields. Instead of drowning himself further in quagmire, he may want to use another source of leverage—his own termination. As a mediator, he can say "I withdraw now. I can't make any progress with the current mandate. I need stronger Security Council support to deal with the Burmese generals."

Of course, his withdrawal will not have a direct impact on the military junta—the generals in Naypyidaw are not so sensitive to such threats. But it will make China and Asean feel more pressured to cooperate with Western democracies to resolve Burma's crisis.

At least, it will be easier for US-led Western democracies to compel China and Asean (especially two current Council members: Indonesia and Vietnam) to approve a stronger Council mandate for the UN special envoy. All in all, if Gambari uses the threat of withdrawal skillfully it could yield a greater opportunity to raise the Burma issue in the UN Security Council.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=11134

Silencing the 'Saffron Revolution'

2008-03-25T11:54:00.000-07:00

Silencing the 'Saffron Revolution'

by Min Zin

Posted March 25, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)

On Feb. 15, the military stormed the offices of the Myanmar Nation and took my brother, the weekly journal's editor in chief, to jail. His crime? Possession of a United Nation’s report on the ruling junta’s brutal crackdown on last September’s demonstrations by monks and democracy activists—the so-called Saffron Revolution.

My brother's name is Thet Zin, and he is one of hundreds of Burmese citizens who struggle to tell the truth about what is happening in their country—whether through traditional forms of journalism or through the Internet—under threat of arrest or worse by the military regime.

Indeed, even as the Burmese military promises the United Nations it will implement its "Roadmap to Democracy," the generals are stepping up their crackdown on the media. News of my brother's arrest was painful, but I should have been prepared for it. This kind of brutal repression and disregard for freedom of speech is the defining phenomenon of daily life in Burma.

The irony here is that my brother, who was a political prisoner in 1988, has not been involved in clandestine political activities or activist groups since he began working as a reporter and editor for several legally published weekly journals in the early 2000s. He founded Myanmar Nation Weekly, where he worked as editor in chief until his arrest, in 2006.

When the military raided the offices of Myanmar Nation, they discovered video footage of last September's Buddhist monk-led protests, a copy of the aforementioned report by U.N. Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, and a book about federalism written by a veteran Shan ethnic leader. Along with my brother, his office manager, Sein Win Maung, was also arrested. The authorities confiscated mobile phones and computer hard-drives during the raid.
In early March, both were charged under section 17/20 of the Printers and Publishers Registration Law. The court cited the U.N. report as evidence of possessing "illegal material" in order to set up a case against my brother. If found guilty, they could serve up to seven years' imprisonment. The publication of Myanmar Nation has also been suspended since their arrest.

Sadly, my brother's case is not uncommon. In the wake of last September's protests, the military has stepped up its crackdown on the media and severely curtailed freedom of expression. At least 20 journalists have been arrested in the past six months, although many were released after severe interrogations. According to Reporters Without Borders, 11 journalists are known to be imprisoned in Burma, including 78-year-old U Win Tin, who has been in jail since July 1989.

The exile-based Burmese Media Association (BMA), however, places the number of imprisoned writers—including journalists, poets, fiction writers, etc.—at 30. These journalists, writers and poets, who exercise their free speech as a birthright, add to the more than 1,800 political prisoners who, according to Human Rights Watch, are still behind bars.

Since the Buddhist monk-led protests of September last year, about a dozen publications in Burma have been banned or suspended for allegedly failing to follow the directives of the regime’s censorship board.

Burma, which enjoyed perhaps the liveliest free press in Southeast Asia until the 1962 military coup, is now facing some of the severest media repression in the nation’s history. The Burmese military launched a "fight media with media" campaign in 2005 in order to "rebuff the unfair and baseless news produced by the Western media." The junta's notorious censorship board has imposed ever more stringent restrictions on private publications. Journalists are pressured to write articles in line with the regime's views and policies. Journals and magazines are forced to print an increasing number of "planted" pro-junta articles.

"The situation is now getting worse and very rigid," says Zaw Thet Htwe, a well-known journalist inside Burma, who himself received the death penalty in 2003 for sending reports to the outside world, a sentence which was later reduced to three years imprisonment due to international pressure. "The news journals are increasingly facing a hard time due to the whimsical regulations. The atmosphere of fear and pressure for self-censorship has been growing."
Thankfully, the Burmese people's main sources of information remain free from the military's abuses. They are the daily Burmese language radio broadcasts from abroad by the BBC (Burmese Service), Voice of America (Burmese Service), Radio Free Asia, and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB).

At the height of the protests last year, large numbers of people (including military personnel) relied on these broadcasts for information. The regime’s anger was apparent in state-controlled newspapers and TV announcements that described the radio broadcasters as "killers on the airwaves" and "saboteurs" who were "airing a sky full of lies." In addition to radio, DVB launched a new Burmese language TV broadcast in May 2005 that can be received via satellite in Burma. The TV broadcast was a main source of news during the September protests.

Now, a new generation of Burmese has found another means of defying the junta's thought police: the Internet. Although less than 1% of the total population has access to the Internet in Burma, that 1% generally has access to cell phones, digital cameras and memory sticks and can disseminate information widely. During last September's protests, these "cyber dissidents"—citizen reporters and bloggers—posted hundreds of images and eyewitness accounts of the Saffron Revolution and the regime's brutality on the Internet.

Unlike the 1988 pro-democracy uprising—when the killing of at least 3,000 unarmed demonstrators received little international attention—images of violence against last fall's protestors, including the killing of Japanese journalist Kenji Nagai, spread fast throughout the world and helped ignite international outrage.

The regime, of course, responded by hunting down and arresting those who posted the images, and by further limiting access to the Internet. Internet café owners are now reportedly forced to install spy software provided by military intelligence officials that take automatic screen shots of user activity every five minutes. The monitoring results then have to be delivered to the military for surveillance.

Meanwhile, the military promises the outside world that it is marching toward "democracy" with its constitutional referendum in May and new elections in 2010. But nearly all observers agree that the military’s constitution won't lead to legitimate political freedom or national reconciliation. Violations of human rights are expected to continue, as are repression and censorship of the media.

"Though the military promises reform by holding a constitutional referendum in May," says Maung Maung Myint, chairman of the Burmese Media Association, “the arrest of journalists and constraints on the free flow of information clearly demonstrate that the regime discourages any informed public debate on their draft constitution."

Clearly, my brother and other recently detained journalists are being held by the junta in an effort to spread fear among Burma’s defiant media in the run-up to the constitutional referendum. Without outside pressure, the sad fact is these tactics will likely succeed—and the Burmese people will continue to suffer under a repressive military dictatorship, and those brave journalists and writers willing to challenge Burma's censors will be silenced.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile in the United States.

http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/march/silencing-the-saffron-revolution

Min Zin: Let Lenin meet YouTube and set Burma free

2008-03-10T23:21:00.000-07:00

Aktuálně.cz (Online Interview)
18:40 10.3.2008 Pavel Vondra

Min Zin: Let Lenin meet YouTube and set Burma free

Prague - Despite his young age, Min Zin can already be considered a veteran of pro-democracy struggle in his native Burma. He became involved in the movement at the age of 14, when he founded a nationwide high school student union.
By doing that he buried his parents´ hopes he would ever obtain a degree from a Burmese univeristy but at the same time he helped ressurect hopes of his nation to see the end of the hated military rule in the country.
Min Zin closely worked with Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. In 1989, he was forced into hiding. During this period he was dismissed from school and constantly chased by the military intelligence.
Following the 1996 December student demonstration he fled to the Thai-Burma border. Thereafter, he worked as a deputy editor for the exile magazine Irrawaddy.
Min Zin came to the United States in August 2001 as a visiting scholar at the School of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley. He later joined the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia.
Min Zin is a member of the Rudolf Vrba Jury at this year's One World Film Festival in Prague. He was also one of the speakers at last week's seminar titled Dissidents and Freedom, organized by the festival with the help of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Černínský Palace in Prague.
READ MORE: Havel sounds call for dissidents across world to unite
Today Min Zin was answering questions posed by the readers of Aktuálně.cz in an on-line interview:
Q: Would you recommend travelling to Burma? I was there last year and saw group tours of Spanish people who cared about nothing else but buying souvenirs and it really made me sick.
Bagan is listed as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. Its ancient pagodas and prefect sunsets attract a lot of touristsvětší obrázekAutor: Pavel Vondra
Min Zin writes: The opposition movement in Burma calls for travel boycott, not because they don't like travelling per se, but because military uses forced labor for building tourist infrastructure and etc. But to me, I don't mind individual travelling or responsible touring so long as you try your best not to spend money for military owned big hotels and other facilities. (It is hard but you can find some ways to do so).
I may have more reservation or reluctance for institution or groups tour because military can exploit it not only for financial reasons but also for public relation reasons by citing these big tour groups.
Q: Aren't you afraid of the possible ethnic violence and civil war in case of the current regime's fall?
Min Zin writes: Well, Burma has been already described as a failing or failed state. Civil war has been there for 50 years. The longest and being forgotten one! Forced labor, child soldier, human rights violations, severe violence in ethnic areas, about 2,000 political prisoners, corruption, humanitarian crisis, etc - you name it.
The country ranks at the bottom in all these categories - check the reports of UN, AI, HRW, RSF, CPJ, Freedom House, Transparency International, EU, US State Dept, etc. Check also the annual Failed State Index of Foreign Policy magazine for reference. I think it is not even time to rank Burma in failed state category, it is now time to act and stop more bloodshed and violence.
Infobox
Hit them where it hurts. China pressured over Burma
A call from Prague: Dictators of the world, go to hell
Snowball gets rolling. Havel calls for action on Burma
Machine gun rounds instead of democracy
Q: What is your worst experience from Burma? Have you ever witnessed torture, rape or killing of civilians which the Burmese military are often accused of?
Min Zin writes: I saw several killings (shooting events) in front of my very eyes when I took part in the public protests in August 1988 (08-08-88 Movement.) I was then a high school student of 14 years old. Then I have known many of my colleagues being tortured in prison (including my siblings) and died in prison (my uncle, close colleagues, childhood friends and etc). When arrived at the Thai - Burma border where I met many ethnic women who suffered from military's abuses including rape. These are well documented as well.
Q: How do people in Burma perceive Aung San Suu Kyi? Do they know her at all?
Min Zin writes: Of course, ASSK is the only hope for Burma if the country needs to proceed the transition. Let alone the people from the heartland who admire her father as a hero from the struggle for independence, but more importantly the ethnic minority groups, who fight for autonomy for 50 years, support her. Even ordinary soldiers supported her. When you look at 1990 elections results, military districts voted for her party. She has been perceived as the one who rally the whole country for reconciliation and nation-building.
Q: Can the current negotiations between opposition and government lead to anything?
Min Zin writes: There is no negotiation going on between the regime and opposition. They staged a few meetings with ASSK, in the wake of Saffron Revolution (protests) in September last year, in order to defuse international pressure. Now things go back to square one. They have excluded opposition led by ASSK once and for all from future elections and political process. That's where the real contention lies for now.
Min Zin sitting next to ex-president Václav Havel at a seminar Dissidents and Freedom held at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairsvětší obrázekAutor: Naďa Straková
Q: Good afternoon, I would like to know your opinion on how the current regime could be changed into a democratic one. Is there a way that world can help you with this? And do you agree with the guerilla war against the regime?
Min Zin writes: I don't think the violent resistance will help the situation in Burma. But coordinated international pressure will help the situation. In this regard, it is important to get China to play responsibly in Burma issue. The US and EU can't outsource Burma problem to China, which itself is authoritarian country. But the West must push China to do more on Burma.
At the same time, civil-disobedient and civil society movement inside the country will make things different. But it is hard that "People Power" will defeat the united military, which is still willing to kill its own citizens. So encouraging the emergence of moderates within the ruling military is another thing to consider. In any case, (domestic as well as international) public actions are always needed to make change faster in Burma.
Q: Do you have relatives in Burma? Are you in touch with them? If so, how do you stay in touch, if it's not a secret? How are they doing?
Min Zin writes: Yes, I have two brothers and one sister in Burma. Unfortunately, my eldest brother Thet Zin was arrested by military regime in Feb 15, 2008. He is the editor of a weekly journal in Burma. His office was raided for 3 times in a week. He was tortured during interrogation. Now he is being charged with possession of illegal materials. It means when they raided his office, the human rights report of UN Human Right Envoy to Burma was confiscated by military. Having a HR report is illegal in Burma.
He said to his wife that he might likely to face minimum 10 years imprisonment for this charge. He is a former political prisoner too. He was arrested in 1988 student protests. You can google the arrest of my brother and the case. US president also entioned his name in his recent public statement. The Amnesty Ineternational, HRW and etc also highlighted on his case. I fact, almost every members of my family got arrested in past 20 years for their non-violent political involvement.
Q: Do you believe that (UN special envoy for Myanmar Ibrahim) Gambari's visits can force the Burmese government to actually do something? Wouldn't it be better to put pressure on China, India or ASEAN?
UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari and Aung San Suu Kyi during his visit in Burma in the fall last yearvětší obrázekZdroj: Reuters
Min Zin writes: No. Gambari's mission is failure. Why? His mandate is basically coming from the UN General Assembly. Not from UN Security Council. So he doesn't have enforcement capacity. His mission is always at the mercy of Burmese regime and its key ally China. Unless his mission was strengthened by UNSC, he will be toothless. In order to get UNSC's official backing, the West needs to work on China.
Without China's coercive persuasion, junta will not make any positive move. But diplomacy alone will not work in pushing China. International public action is needed, especially Olympic is approaching and China has significant sensitivity to its image. For the time being, I don't see any strong/persistent or coordinated efforts in diplomacy and public actions regarding pressing China for acceptable Burmese political transition.
Q: Can I ask you for your opinion about the upcoming elections (in Burma)? And what do you think about Burmese government refusing to invite UN monitors for the ballot?
Q: Min Zin writes: Burmese junta rejected all proposals/suggestions made by UN - 1. To form constitutional review commission to make sure inclusive political process, 2. To form poverty alleviation commission to lessen the humanitarian and economic crisis, 3- (as the regime reused the first two, UN proposed the last one) to allow UN monitor. But the regime rejected all. They excuse that international observers will violate sovereignty. But it is absurd. Instead, the acceptance of international observers will make its standing strong, not weaken in terms o sovereignty.
Burmese soldiers during last September's violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Rangoon. Various sources put the number of victims of the crackdown between thirty and two hundredvětší obrázekZdroj: Reuters
The constitutional referendum will not be free and fair, and the new election will not be inclusive as Aung san Suu Kyi and the opposition activists will be not allowed to contest. The so-called political roadmap the junta is now implementing is not roadmap to democracy (even not to initial political transition) but to slavery because constitution allow military to stay above the law (e.g. military chief has right to take power legally if he thinks the country is under emergency situation. it means he has rights to stage coup legally.)
Q: Hello, did you see the latest Rambo movie, where the title hero is fighting the Burmese soldiers? What do you think about the movie? I wish you good luck.
Min Zin writes: Yes, I watched the movie. This movie raised considerable level of awareness in the world. But I don't think I am for the Rambo-typed fight. The opposition movement in Burma led by Aung San Suu Kyi is not calling for any violent actions domestically or from international community. They don't even call for the regime change. What they always call for (especially more clear in he Buddhist monks-led protests in last year) is national reconciliation. They call for a meaningful political dialogue in which the democratic opposition, ethnic minority groups and military will sit together for talk and negotiate for the compromise. The opposition always say that military is part of the problem as well as must be part of the solution. We need smooth political transition in Burma.
Road from Rangoon to Beijing is a bloody one, activists point outvětší obrázekAutor: Pavel Vondra
Q: Were you disappointed by the decision of IOC which granted Beijing the right to host this year's Olympic Games? If I'm not mistaken, Beijing is the closest ally the Burmese junta has. Do you believe that the free world should boycot the games, as some activists suggest?
Min Zin writes: Some activists have talked about boycott, but most realize this is not possible as you know that US President is even going to join the Beijing Olympics. But what many of Burmese democracy activists inside and abroad are now calling for is at least you can pledge not to view the opening ceremony of the game on the TV and not buying Olympic merchandise etc. as a demonstration of protest on part of free world against Chinese communist government who supported the regimes in Burma, Sudan and other dictatorial countries.

Burmese activists are now collecting at least 1 millions pledge from the world to make such pledge. Anyway, we will series of democracy and human rights and environmental related protests organized by international advocates and local people and media coverage in this multi-media world. As one journalist said, this Olympic Game is where Lenin will meet YouTube.

http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=523603

One World Film Festival

2008-03-05T21:19:00.000-08:00

One World Film Festival

http://www.jedensvet.cz/ow/2008/index_en.php?id=91

Compassionate Confrontation

2008-03-01T12:57:00.000-08:00

CULTURE, Irrawaddy Magazine, MARCH, 2008 - VOLUME 16 NO.3

Compassionate Confrontation

By MIN ZIN

For the Buddhist principle of loving-kindness to work in the world of Burmese politics, it must be combined with skillful means

In “The Eight Victories of Buddha,” a Burmese song that extols the Enlightened one’s conquest of ill will and anger through metta, or loving-kindness, we learn how Angulimala, a legendary psychopath of Buddhist lore, was literally stopped in his tracks by compassion.

Angulimala was a ruthless killer who was about to slay his mother to complete his garland of 1,000 fingers (each one taken from a different victim), until the Buddha stepped in to prevent this act of matricide, which would have condemned Angulimala to millennia in hell. Enraged, the mass murderer turned his fury on the Buddha.

Even with his formidable speed, however, Angulimala could not overtake his new nemesis. He ran at him like the madman he was, but still could not catch the Buddha, who simply walked on, calm and serene.

Exhausted and furious at his failure, Angulimala screamed at the Buddha to stop. In a quiet voice, the Buddha told his would-be attacker that he had already stopped—he had stopped killing and harming living beings, and now it was time for him, Angulimala, to do likewise.

Angulimala was so struck by these words that there and then he threw away his weapons and became a disciple of the Buddha.

This dramatic tale is familiar to almost every Burmese Buddhist as an illustration of the power of metta, the first of the four brahma vihara (byama so in Burmese), the “heavenly abodes” or divine states of mind. It is also the most powerful, since it supports the other three—compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity.

Metta, usually rendered as “loving-kindness” in English, is a strong wish for the well-being and happiness of all living things. A mind with metta is inclusive and nondiscriminatory and has the power to transform any situation. This is what the Buddha taught and exemplified.

As the Burmese monks who participated in last September’s protests demonstrated, metta is not an attitude of passive acquiescence. Metta does not accept evil, but confronts it directly with a force that is its exact opposite.

In times of trouble, the revered Sangha, or community of monks, cannot merely insulate itself from the suffering of ordinary people. The monks who protested in Burma showed that they are not just peace lovers, but peacemakers. They did not stop at praying for the benefit of the Burmese people, but took to the streets to oppose the malice manifested in the exclusionary politics of military domination.

Monks—from Kachin State in the north to Mon State in the south, and from Arakan State in the west to Karen State in the east—chanted the “Metta Sutta”, the discourse on loving-kindness, as they marched through the streets in the thousands. As growing numbers of ordinary citizens joined them, they invoked the words of the Buddha: “May you be free from all danger. May your anger cease. May your heart and mind enjoy peace and serenity.”

Aung San Suu Kyi once observed that without metta, it can be difficult to achieve freedom from fear: “If there is a lack of metta, it may be a lack in yourself or in those around you, so you feel insecure. And insecurity leads to fear.”

And fear, all too often, leads to violence. The regime clearly saw the “metta movement” as a threat to their hold on power and reacted with deadly force, killing dozens of protestors and imprisoning hundreds of others. They even raided several monasteries in their efforts to eradicate the movement.

But the leaders of the movement remain unbowed in spirit. U Gambira, one of the monks who spearheaded last September’s uprising, once told this author that Burma’s monks would continue their struggle to uphold the Dhamma for the sake of the people, no matter what the consequences for themselves. Since then, U Gambira has joined countless others in Burma’s gulag.

Other monks inside Burma have vowed to honor U Gambira’s pledge. Although they realize their movement has lost much of its momentum since the regime’s crackdown, they insist that it remains their duty to bring the ethics of metta back into Burmese politics. Failing to do so, they say, would be a betrayal of the truth of the Dhamma propounded by the Buddha.

Of course, conviction alone will not achieve victory in the struggle between metta and military might. Wisdom is also needed.

The Buddha’s teachings emphasize the need to balance metta with wisdom. Both are essential qualities in a leader, who must make decisions for the benefit of all.

While wisdom identifies the ultimate good towards which we must strive, as well as the means of achieving this goal, metta provides the energizing strength needed to help us realize our highest aspirations.

Buddhists sometimes refer to upaya, or skillful means, when considering which actions to take. This concept is more closely associated with Mahayana Buddhism than with the Theravada tradition which prevails in Burma, but it is also a part of the Burmese cultural lexicon. Under the principle of upaya, a Buddhist practitioner may use any means necessary to help ease people’s suffering and introduce them to the Dhamma.

Although the politics of compassionate confrontation is based on persuasion rather than coercion, the Burmese metta movement may want to apply this principle of upaya, so that when they say to the modern Angulimalas in the military regime, “It is time for you to stop,” they will listen.

Min Zin is a US-based Burmese journalist.

Don't Push NLD into a Corner

2008-02-16T17:42:00.000-08:00

Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, February 16, 2008

Don't Push NLD into a Corner

By MIN ZIN

The present political crisis in Burma could be a model from William L. Ury and Richard Smoke’s political science thesis, “Anatomy of a Crisis”—a situation of “high stakes, short time, high uncertainty and narrowing options.”

In the pragmatic world of realpolitik, it means the opposition movement in Burma is now facing a serious predicament. When the military regime made the surprise announcement to set a timeline for a referendum in May and a general election in 2010, the opposition groups were caught off guard.

The junta decisively moved ahead with its own “Road Map” and ignored the persistent calls of opposition groups and the UN-led international community to modify the draft constitution and make the political process inclusive.

The political moral ground of the opposition movement, inside the country as well as in exile, has been based on the legitimacy of the 1990 election results in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory that has never been honored.

The opposition activists are now forced to prove the victory of 1990 election remains relevant in upcoming months. The stakes rise, indeed.

Several grassroots opposition groups, including the influential 88 Generation Students group and the Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks, recently vowed to launch a "Vote No” campaign against the regime's constitution. But many activists privately admit that the time crunch makes it difficult for them to mobilize a nationwide movement.
The military government's statement regarding the referendum and subsequent elections was vague and shrouded with uncertainties.

Furthermore, the regime has not revoked Law 5/96 of 1996, which provides for up to 20 years imprisonment for anyone who criticizes the government’s national convention and its constitution drafting effort.

To add to the dilemma, many ordinary people do not understand what a “Vote No” campaign really means—whether they are expected to boycott the referendum by shunning the poll stations or they have to physically vote against the constitution.

At the end of the day, no one knows what the regime will do if the public votes against their draft constitution.
"Will they spend another 20 years rewriting another constitution?” questioned a private tutor in Rangoon. "If so, enough is enough. I would rather just go for the flawed constitution."

The high level of uncertainty appears to weaken the opposition's message and game plan.
Even with such high stakes, the time crunch and all the uncertainties, the crisis would be less severe if the opposition had options.

"People must stand up against the referendum and say no to the regime's constitution," said Aung Thu Nyein, a Burmese analyst in exile. "I support the actions of the grassroots organizations, but they must make it clear that it is not a boycott against the referendum. The public must go to the polling stations and vote ‘No.’”

Several opposition activists and journalists have taken it a step further. They have called on the NLD to announce a clear policy to direct the public on the referendum issue and to take the initiative in the "Vote No” campaign.

Aung Thu Nyein disagrees. “It is not feasible to urge the NLD to lead the public in mobilizing a Vote No” campaign. The NLD must be flexible,” he said.

However, as long as the opposition activists and media view the NLD as the vanguard of the democracy movement, they will continually push the party to lead with a resolution at every turn.

But whether or not the NLD's current leadership—not forgetting the implications of Aung San Suu Kyi's long absence—remains at the forefront of the democracy movement will be called into question. The nature of the September uprising indicated that the NLD was not playing a leading role.

More importantly, it is a time for different political forces to play significant positions with a mature understanding of one another. The NLD should not run the risk of staking their political future on viewing the referendum—step four of the seven-step “Road Map”—as the final battleground.

“We have stated clearly from the beginning that we are against the undemocratic nature of the national convention and the draft constitution," Nyan Win, the NLD spokesman, announced in the wake of the government’s statement. “We will probably release our policy by the end of this month. But we don't think the referendum is the final fight for us.”

The NLD will continue to condemn the regime's draft constitution as unacceptable and to demand a free and fair referendum, but at the same time they want to appear to keep all options open, instead of totally rejecting the government’s Road Map or openly advocating a “Vote No” campaign.

Short of a better alternative, it seems to be the most pragmatic policy the party can adopt.

If the NLD sees the referendum as a final showdown and walks away from the Road Map, the party will very likely be sidelined from mainstream politics in future. If the NLD decide to engage in a “do or die” fight, the regime will gladly get into the ring and work at putting the opposition party out of action for good.

In truth, the NLD seems to be aware of this scenario and are determined to remain on legal ground.

"If the public approves the draft constitution in a credible referendum, we will respect the public's decision," said Nyan Win.

The NLD spokesman even hinted that the party does not reject the possibility of running for a fresh election in 2010, if the public decides to go ahead with the Road Map.

“Burma's road to democracy would be long term, independent of our activists' wishes for radical change," said Tin Maung Than, a well-known Burmese writer and analyst in exile. "The military, as a whole and as an institution, is not in a position to accept such a change. Burma needs some structural adjustment to lure a significant part of the military to cooperate with the people."

Naturally, the public—led by grassroots activists—must push in that direction. A mass movement will always be needed to bring about that change.

The people of Burma should support the “Vote No” campaign against the draft constitution. If the fight is won, it may prompt a shake up in Naypyidaw. The military government would be forced to reconfigure their options. Combined with international pressure, a new opportunity for dialogue might present itself.

Whether this particular fight is won or not, the NLD must prepare to go on. In politics, a crisis can be cleverly managed with a well calculated strategic move.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10427

Ban Kimoon Must Go to Burma

2008-02-13T12:07:00.000-08:00

Ban Ki-moon Must Go to Burma

by Min Zin

Posted February 13, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)

Burma's military junta is testing the response of the international community. When world leaders say they are “concerned” about the situation in Burma, then “increasingly concerned,” then “gravely concerned,” and then—inexplicably—just “concerned” again, the generals in the Naypyidaw jungle smile and push forward with their hard-line stance.

It is hardly surprising that the junta is refusing an immediate return of United Nation's Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and defying the U.N.'s calls for an inclusive national reconciliation process, now that the regime feels confident it is bringing the country back under control after its deadly crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations last September.

The generals even rejected the U.N.'s proposal to establish a poverty alleviation commission to address the country's humanitarian crisis, clearly demonstrating the regime's criminal disregard for the Burmese people's welfare.

Indeed, despite U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's repeated warnings that return to the status quo in Burma is not acceptable, that is precisely what is happening. The U.N. and other key international players realize the momentum for international mediation in Burma is fading and are trying to regain it with a swift return visit by Special Envoy Gambari. The Burmese authorities, however, say they will not approve the special envoy's itinerary until mid-April.

Each time the international community bends to the junta's will, the generals are emboldened. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations caved in to the junta's demands by not allowing Special Envoy Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Burma celebrated their victory by stepping up oppression at home and canceling a scheduled visit by Mr. Gambari.

Some Burma lobbyists blame the failure of the special envoy's mission on the weakness of the secretary-general's mandate. “The Burma mandate of Ban Ki-moon, which has now been given by the U.N. General Assembly, must be enhanced and strengthened by the U.N. Security Council,” says Aung Din, executive director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma. But the chances of such an initiative are slim, given China's permanent seat on the Security Council. In other words, the secretary-general may not want to risk a China veto.

Another possible mechanism, apart from a stronger U.N. Security Council mandate, is the “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,” a group of 14 nations—Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Secretary-General Ban convened the first meeting of the group last Dec. 19 to assist him in his efforts to spur change in Burma. The Group is officially described as “a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in support of the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate,” and meets informally as needed.

Many analysts wonder if the Group could evolve into multiparty talks on the North Korea model. Some Burma advocates in the U.S. have suggested that the secretary-general convene the next meeting of the Group in an Asian capital such as Jakarta or Beijing, thus drawing regional leaders into the mediation efforts.

In any event, Secretary-General Ban needs to make a decisive move to strengthen his office's role. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group called for the direct involvement of Mr. Ban, saying: “It would be useful for Ban Ki-moon to get more personally involved, particularly at times when negotiations may appear to be deadlocked.” It even urged the secretary-general to pay a personal visit to Naypyidaw in the near future.

Burma's National League for Democracy said it would like to see such a visit. “If Gambari's attempt continues to fail in bringing results,” says NLD spokesman Nyan Win, “Ban Ki-moon himself should visit Burma and let the military generals know clearly that the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable.”

Diplomatic sources in New York say U.N. officials are concerned about possible embarrassment for the secretary-general if the Burmese junta publicly rejects his entreaties. This week, as NLD members bravely protested outside their headquarters in Yangon, the secretary-general once again urged the junta to allow Special Envoy Gambari to return and move forward with talks with the NLD leadership.

Clearly, this isn't enough. It's time for Ban Ki-moon to call for a new U.N. Security Council mandate on Burma, to mobilize the “Friends of Myanmar,” and lastly to make a personal visit to Naypyidaw. The Burmese people's suffering under the military boot is far greater than any possible discomfiture the secretary-general may experience by being rejected by either the regime or its closest ally, China.

Unless the international community, led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, compels the Burmese junta to feel the cost of rejecting the U.N.'s mediation efforts in Burma, the prospect for reform in the country will remain hopeless.The secretary-general must try his best for Burma.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.

http://www.feer.com/international-relations/2008/february/Ban-Ki-moon-Must-Go-to-Burma

The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma

2008-02-02T17:29:00.000-08:00

Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, February 2, 2008

The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma

By MIN ZIN

When Indonesian dictator Suharto died last Sunday, Burmese-language short-wave radio stations and other Burmese media based abroad gave the news extensive coverage and offered comparative analyses. They attempted to draw similarities and contrasts between Suharto and Burma’s late tyrant Ne Win, and between the different directions the two countries have taken in their development.

Many experts noted that although Suharto was a vicious dictator, he raised the Indonesian economy to “Asian Tiger” status in the 1980s. Ne Win and his successors, on the other hand, have turned Burma into a failed state. All lamented Burma’s slide into its current condition of economic deprivation.

In fact, Burma introduced economic reforms after the military staged a coup in 1988. According to reports, cumulative foreign investment in the period from 1988 through early 1997 reached $6.1 billion. Some optimists even said that investors seeking the next “tiger” economy should set their sights on Burma.

However, despite the country’s opening of its economy to foreign investors, overall economic progress remained slow. Economist David Dapice attributed this to the government’s reluctance to undertake comprehensive reforms, choosing instead to implement reforms in a “half-hearted way”.

Then the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck. At first, Rangoon was unconcerned, as the country was not directly impacted by the plummeting value of a number of key Asian currencies. But when investors from other Asian countries began to shift away from high-risk ventures and started reneging on their investment promises in order to limit their losses in the crisis, Burma also got hit hard. The military regime made matters worse by failing to come up with sound economic policies in response to the crisis. The unreal economic boom went bust.

In fact, the junta has neither the capacity nor the political will to carry out far-reaching economic reforms, because they are afraid that any such move would threaten the interests of military elites, forcing them to turn their economic playground into a level playing field. They worry that allowing technocratic participation, much less public involvement, in the policymaking process would weaken their grip on power and deprive them of the prerogatives they currently enjoy. “Technocrats and experts such as economists and respected bureaucrats need to be viewed as important human resources and [their role should be] enhanced in Myanmar (Burma),” said Khin Maung Nyo, a well-known economist and writer in Burma. “They serve to help formulate economic policies, and the availability of policy choices makes it easy for government to implement reforms to build a modern, developed nation,” the economist added.
However, military involvement in political and economic affairs has from the outset been much deeper in Burma than in Indonesia and other countries in the region, where technocrats have long played a key role in formulating economic policies and guiding subsequent growth.

Broadly speaking, the junta has failed to form a growth coalition involving the military, opposition elites, ethnic ceasefire groups, technocrats, business groups, and the bureaucracy—all of whom need to work together to shape meaningful economic reforms.

In fact, several Burmese economists abroad and inside Burma have attempted to persuade the generals to secure such broad domestic support for economic reforms. In early 2007, a well-known economist inside Burma approached late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win to set up a consultative forum. Although Soe Win was said to have supported the idea, the junta’s supremo, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, shot it down.

Business sources note that other reform plans have stalled or been aborted because of Than Shwe’s preoccupation with ensuring his own survival.

“Than Shwe calls the shots on everything,” said Sein Htay, an economist in exile. “No one dares to initiate major reforms unless Than Shwe gives the final order.”

Since 2005, dozens of business people and economists have reportedly been consulted for their input into the drafting of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law, which will designate six main commercial cities as free-trade zones, with the aim of bringing more foreign investment into the country to revitalize its crippled economy. The much-anticipated and hyped SEZ Law, which was supposed to be enacted in 2007, has yet to come into effect, as Than Shwe continues to drag his heels.

“Than Shwe is afraid of the emergence of the Thilawa SEZ in Rangoon,” said a businessman in Rangoon. “He does not even want to bring limited liberalization to a limited zone. He is too concerned with security issues, especially after the September protests.”

Several economists suggest that the state urgently needs to readjust its role in economic policy formulation and implementation. They say that if the state reduced its over-dominant role and allowed the private sector to play a greater part in the economy, the authoritarian regime would be able to undertake economic reforms.

“Centralization must be relaxed,” said Maw Than, a former vice chancellor of Institute of Economics in Rangoon. “A pro-business attitude should be nurtured and broader consultation should be sought after. Advice must be given serious consideration for the benefit of society.”

However, the strongman who leads the ruling junta with an iron fist cares little about what the experts have to say. The military mindset of the regime means that its decision-making process is strictly top-down. Under the leadership of Than Shwe, the Burmese economy will continue going to dogs.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10128

The China Factor

2008-01-27T12:38:00.000-08:00

Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday January 27, 2008

The China Factor

Diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role in resolving the situation in Burma - action from the global public is needed, writes MIN ZIN

A few weeks after the protests last year in Burma, a Chinese diplomat approached an influential Burmese advocate in New York and asked why the Burmese dubbed their protest the "Saffron Revolution."

"The diplomat was obviously quite uncomfortable with this particular name, which he whispered to me," said the Burmese advocate, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Chinese are very sensitive to the 'colour revolutions'," she added.

In the wake of successful "colour revolutions" such as Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution - victories of nonviolent democracy movements in post-communist countries - Beijing is anxious to prevent similar occurrences at home or among its neighbours.

Then a country in its own backyard triggered the "Saffron Revolution", and the military's subsequent crackdown captured the world's attention. Along with the crisis in Burma, China was drawn into the spotlight with unflattering coverage in international media, and diplomatic pressure increased to withdraw its support of one of the world's most odious regimes. Public outcry across the globe called on China to assume a larger role in helping to resolve the crisis.
However, contrary to common perceptions, China is not a patron that pulls the strings, and the self-isolated, delusive Burmese regime is not a puppet. In fact, China has limited sway with the junta's generals. The relationship runs in both directions. This complicates Burma's problems and their resolution.

Of course, China has more power and influence on the generals than any other country. It also intends to use that leverage to its own benefit.

According to Chinese diplomats, Beijing has been gradually changing its Burma policy since the removal of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2004, and this has accelerated since the recent deadly crackdown in Burma. However, the diplomats warn that the policy shift should not be expected to be quick or dramatic. It will be slow and well-calculated.

"Than Shwe and Maung Aye are more intransigent than former dictator Ne Win, and they often do incredibly silly things," said a Chinese official during a meeting with a Burmese opposition activist. "China knows that Burma will not prosper under their leadership."

China's special envoy, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, was sent to Burma in November. He met with the junta's top leader, Senior-General Than Shwe, and asked the military "to resolve the pending issues through consultation, so as to speed up the democratisation process."

However, the regime responded that it will go at its own pace in the unilateral implementation of its "Seven-Step Road Map," according to a Western diplomat.

"The Chinese keep telling us that the international community is overstating their influence with the Burmese generals," said the diplomat. "Beijing says they don't have ability to tell the regime what to do."

Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese analyst living on the China-Burma border, disagrees with that interpretation.
"Persuasion, without power backup, will not work. The soft-soft approach should be changed. China must show the stick part of its diplomacy," said Aung Kyaw Zaw.

Tipping Toward Responsibility

At the present time, Beijing is clearly not ready to apply real pressure to the junta. It still believes that working to resolve Burma's problems is secondary to pursuing its principal economic and strategic interests.

But simultaneously, China would like to solidify an international role as "a responsible stakeholder."

The time has come for concerted international diplomatic pressure on China to tip the balance toward responsibility. China must consider the sentiments of Thucydides: An amoral foreign policy is neither practical nor prudent.

Protesters in Bangkok calling for an end to the brutal use of force by the Burmese military junta against its people during the crackdown last year.

At the same time, it should be obvious that the United States and the European Union cannot outsource Burma's transition to democracy to China, which itself lacks democracy.

The West's most powerful countries should coordinate with China to facilitate a real transition in conflict-ridden Burma.

However, diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role. Public action on a global scale is needed.

"China was very annoyed to see the wave of protests taking place outside its embassies in major cities around the world in the wake of the September protests," said Aung Kyaw Zaw. "More importantly, they were really worried when demonstrators linked Burma's cause with a 2008 Olympic boycott."

China is very anxious to prevent any negative effect on the Olympic games. The vice mayor of Beijing warned in October 2007 that any move to link China's role in Burma to a boycott of the 2008 Olympics would be "inappropriate and unpopular."

China's leadership might even accommodate its Burma policy and give more support to the UN's Burma mediation role if they sensed a possibility of real damage to the much-hyped gala this summer, even though it might be a tactical and temporal accommodation.

However, the Burmese opposition has so far failed to seize and exploit this opportunity effectively. During the peak of Burma 's "Saffron Revolution", The Washington Post labelled one of its editorials the "Saffron Olympics", highlighting the dynamics of an international campaign against the summer Olympics. But that effort has run out of steam.

"The Burmese opposition in exile cannot accelerate the campaign in a consistent manner," said Nyo Ohn Myint, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area). "Our campaigners are going after ad hoc protests without a focus. We fail to form a wider coalition with other Olympic detractors. Unless we can launch a coordinated international grassroots action, China will not be swayed to our direction."

Beijing plans to start its Olympic festivities on 8/8/08, a date that is surprisingly similar to the 20th anniversary of Burma's "Four Eight ( 8/8/88 ) Democracy Movement."

Whether or not the heirs to the movement can make the most out of this coincidence remains to be seen.

Min Zin is a freelance journalist.

Burma Under Siege

2008-01-26T17:47:00.000-08:00

Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, January 26, 2008

Burma Under Siege

By MIN ZIN

After the September uprising, the Burmese junta regained control over opposition groups and activists, but whether it achieved a stronger strategic position remains doubtful.

A series of bomb blasts in the past two weeks demonstrates one of two things: the security issue is still potentially troublesome for the military or, if opposition charges are true, the junta itself was the source of the bomb blasts, which can be used to blame powerful, disruptive organizations.

There were four explosions within one week, killing at least three civilians and injuring five others. The first blast occurred on January 11 at the railway station serving the country's capital, Naypyidaw. It was the first incident of a bombing in the new capital.

As the bombs were going off, the regime and ethnic, armed opposition groups traded allegations.

The junta accused the Karen National Union (KNU) and an unspecified "foreign organization" of sending "terrorist saboteurs with explosives across the border to perpetrate destructive acts inside the country." Many observers believe the "foreign organization" was a reference to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

"They are not making this allegation lightly," said a well-informed source inside Burma. "No matter whether the allegation is true or not, it’s a well-calculated charge that is being interpreted within the military establishment in the context of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman's recent call for the US to use its military capabilities in Burma."

The influential senator wrote an opinion piece in October 2007, suggesting the Bush administration should actively investigate US military and intelligence capabilities could be used to put additional pressure on the regime. Lieberman said, "We should be examining how the junta's ability to command and control its forces throughout the country might itself be disrupted."

But opposition groups and the media dismissed the accusation of a "foreign organization" involvement as a ridiculous charge. The KNU also denied carrying out any attacks targeting civilians.

The opposition speculated that the regime itself could be behind the bombings in the hope of raising a perception of threat against the military, offering an excuse to continue its crack down against known democracy activists and the KNU.

Some exiled Burmese analysts even point to bitter military intelligence members who were purged in 2004 for orchestrating the bombings. Theories abound.

Meanwhile, security has been increased in Rangoon, Pegu and other major cities. Local authorities in some cities even reportedly detained and questioned residents who had recently returned from Thailand after working there as migrants.

In fact, the bombings underscore the vulnerability of the junta's leadership, no matter the source.

Even if the regime uses the bombings as a justification to continue its crackdown against opposition groups, it underscores its fear of the opposition. If the bombings were self-inflicted and meant to shore up unity within the Tatmadaw (armed forces), it’s a sign the junta is unsure of the loyalty of officers and soldiers.

"It is less likely that the junta orchestrated the recent explosions," said Win Min, a Burmese analyst who studies civil-military relations in Burma. "I don't think the military would stage an attack in Naypyidaw, the capital they extol and take pride in. In fact, it is not necessary for them to use bombings to justify their crackdowns on the oppositions."

In fact, since 1988 the military’s image, in the eyes of the domestic public as well as abroad, has descended to rock bottom, while the opposition, including the armed ethnic groups, is seen as democratic freedom fighters.

The September demonstrations again allowed Burmese society to witness mindless killing and brutality directed against Buddhist monks and civilians. As result, the morale of the military, including some senior officers, is at its lowest ebb in years.

Moreover, the generals have pushed the limit of the international community including their regional supporters.
Under the current circumstances, the last thing the generals want is to be seen as weak.

An unfortunate consequence of this deep sense of vulnerability is that it hardens Snr-Gen Than Shwe's thinking. Under the spell of a bunker mentality, the military leadership will continue to dig in their heels and new reforms are less likely.

Than Shwe's regime is now determined to entrench its power in non-negotiable terms.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10044

Naming the Name

2008-01-13T12:26:00.000-08:00

Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday January 13, 2008

Naming the Name

Strategic use of due process will help prompt political transition in Burma, writes MIN ZIN

The political conflict in Burma has long been noted for its intractability. It is intractable not because it is irresolvable, but because it is resisting resolution. Of course, conflict in itself does not resist anything - people do. And the people of Burma know very well who the culprit is.

Buddhist monks and their supporters take part in a protest march in Rangoon on Sept 25, 2007, before the military regime's brutal crackdown.

"In Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe is an autocrat," said a well-known lawyer in Rangoon, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for her safety. "He is not responsible to anyone else for what he does. He alone calls the shots."
Her view is shared by Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) and a human rights activist. "Many foreigners I have met are not sufficiently aware of the real face of Burma's dictatorship," he said. "Than Shwe deserves a name that is loathed in international politics and media."

In this regard, the US government seems to have taken the initiative. A closer reading of the US State Department's latest press statement on Burma revealed a new trend of "naming the name."

"The Burmese regime, led by Than Shwe, continues cracking down on democracy activists for peacefully expressing their political beliefs," opened the statement dated December 21, 2007, regarding the regime's arrest of six 88 Generation Students group activists.

Instead of speaking about Burma's dictatorship in vague and faceless terms, the statement pinpointed the villain: "We deplore the regime's actions and call on Than Shwe to release all political prisoners."

Sources close to the US State Department said that the three-sentence statement was well crafted to isolate Than Shwe as the person solely responsible for what happens in Burma.

It was probably the first time that the State Department has pointed to Than Shwe as a culprit, said a lobbyist in Washington.

Several military analysts in Rangoon as well as abroad have said that there is growing resentment within the military toward the erratic behavior of Than Shwe and his family ever since the uncovering of his daughter's lavish wedding, and the harsh crackdown on the peaceful protests led by Buddhist monks in September.

Meanwhile, some experts have started floating the idea of going a step further- isolating Than Shwe and using the language of "justice and accountability" against him. They estimate that holding Than Shwe personally accountable for the regime's crimes against humanity may have a strategic impact in Burma's political transition. It might even help create a power balance between the junta and other potential partners in dialogue.

"Raising the prospect of justice and accountability for mass violations of human rights, along with corruption, can help to balance out the power difference and weaken the regime ..." said Patrick Pierce, a senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice. "The international community- the UN and Asean in particular- seems to be all carrot and no stick. There needs to be a balance."

However, the validity of the whole calculation will rest mainly on whether or not such strategic moves will encourage other generals to distance themselves from the aging Than Shwe, and facilitate some basic political and economic reforms.

Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst living along the Sino-Burmese border, dismisses such prospects. "It will be counterproductive," he said. "Instead of being a positive incentive to other generals, these moves will give Than Shwe a chance to rally his hardliners by pointing out the common threat."

A Rangoon-based lawyer also noted that although Than Shwe is an autocratic supremo, he has plenty of hardline people around him. Any talk of a prosecution against him will deter potential political transition in Burma. Moreover, it will remind the generals of late opposition party leader Kyi Maung's reference to the "Nuremberg-style trial" against former military intelligence chief Khin Nyunt.

However, some activists argue that if there is no chance of political thaw under Than Shwe's autocratic leadership, why bother waiting in vain without accumulating pressure to remove him? They advocate any action that will target Than Shwe and his family.

Jared Genser, president of Freedom Now and co-author of the 2005 "Havel-Tutu Report" that calls for UN Security Council action on Burma, doubts the effectiveness of this strategy.

"Anyone can press for justice and accountability against Than Shwe under international law," said Genser. "But the problem is how seriously he will take such a threat. Ultimately it will only impact his behaviour if he believes there is a risk of being investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Unless that risk is real, we would be issuing an idle threat."
The effectiveness of the threat must be weighed not only in terms of the message, but also in terms of the agent who attempts to speak the language of justice to Than Shwe.

"Right now, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's special envoy to Burma, is the only UN representative getting an ear - if that - and he is a political broker," said Pierce. "We need multivocality in the UN and in the international community. Others can and should play an effective role in raising the issues of justice and accountability if Mr Gambari deems it inappropriate for his role as a negotiator."

Some advocates suggest that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour could bring such messages of justice to the regime. In her recent statements on Burma, the UN human rights chief frequently cited international law and urged the military junta to abide by it. In her statement on Burma dated October 2, 2007, Arbour recalled the international community's "responsibility to protect civilians against serious international crimes," according to the agreement of world leaders at their 2005 summit. She also pressurised the Burmese government "to account publicly for past and on-going violations."

Of course, if a person of high stature such as Louise Arbour was able to engage in a justice and accountability dialogue, it would give more weight and leverage to other UN organs, including Gambari, in dealing with the junta. However, it would still be an uphill struggle in transforming these aspirations of justice into practice within the UN mechanism.

"Unfortunately, in the short to medium term, without any rapid deterioration of the situation in Burma,it is highly unlikely we will see the UN Security Council willing to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court," said Genser. "Beyond China and Russia's opposition, even the US does not currently support the ICC. I do not see any government on the Security Council with the political will and persuasive ability capable of making this happen any time soon."

Some observers are concerned that pressure will offer the Burmese regime an excuse to disengage from the UN. "Than Shwe would even be thinking about stopping all political cooperation with the UN if he felt like he was under siege," said a military source inside Burma.

However, the Burma Lawyers' Council, an exiled group which has persistently called on the international community to hold the military regime's leaders criminally accountable before the ICC for their past atrocities and recent crackdowns, refutes the notion that one may not have both criminal accountability and active engagement with the regime.

In their statement released on October 10, BLC cited the case of Sudan as an example and said "there is no dichotomy between active engagement with the principal parties and seeking accountability for the crimes committed by one or more of those principals."

Of course, any strategy needs to be carefully balanced with the domestic realities of Burma so that it will not become counterproductive. However, as all victims of oppression demand, truth must be sought and justice must be done.
"If justice could be achieved through a strategic ploy to facilitate transition, it would be better," said Bo Kyi.

At a minimum, the international community must make sure that nothing should foreclose the efforts to ensure accountability for gross violations of human rights.

Min Zin is a freelance journalist.

Mission Impossible

2008-01-12T17:52:00.000-08:00

Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, January 12, 2008

Mission Impossible

By MIN ZIN

To the Burmese generals, accepting international mediation has become just another means of conducting the conflict as opposed to an option for settling it. In other words, it is a tactical maneuver.

In the wake of the protests in September last year, the regime accepted the mediation efforts of the United Nations simply because rejecting them would cause greater harm in the international arena. More importantly, the junta might not have wanted to upset relations with its staunch regional supporters.

It is hardly surprising that the Burmese government is defying the UN's attempts at mediation—it feels confident that it is successfully bringing the country back under control. Despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon repeatedly warning that a return to the status quo that existed before the September crisis is not sustainable, the present situation is heading all the way back to square one.

Ban is trying to revive his Good Offices’ mediation efforts and to dispatch Ibrahim Gambari to China and India before the end of January "to continue further consultations with Burma's neighbors," according to UN officials. At the moment however, the Burmese authorities have not even approved Gambari’s itinerary for Burma.

"As for Myanmar (Burma) itself, we don't have an exact date for Mr Gambari to go back there, although he does have an open invitation to visit the country," said Farhan Haq, a UN spokesman. "The question is about developing the right arrangements. We are keeping in touch with the authorities in Myanmar (Burma) to discuss when Mr Gambari may be able to return."

Burmese opposition party National League for Democracy sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General recently, expressing a readiness to accept Gambari's mediation efforts toward political dialogue and national reconciliation. "Though we cannot ascertain if Mr Gambari will be able to visit Burma during his trip to Asia, we urge the [Burmese] government to accept his visit and the resumption of the stalled political dialogue," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the party.

However, some diplomatic sources within the UN spoke recently to The Irrawaddy and expressed doubts about the possibility of Gambari visiting Burma on this particular trip.

"He is more likely to come back to New York after visiting China and India," said a foreign diplomat at the UN who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Mr Gambari may not be able to give another Burma briefing at the UN Security Council after this trip, even though some council members will be expecting such a briefing in order to keep the Burma issue on board."

In fact, the UN envoy and other key international players realize that the momentum of the international mediation efforts toward Burma is now fading. They must try to reactivate the momentum and to prioritize a return visit by Gambari to Burma as soon as possible.

"The success of Mr Gambari's efforts largely depend on the readiness of China and India to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "China retreated when they really needed to apply pressure on Burma, even though they said they supported Gambari's mission."

After the September uprising and the subsequent military crackdowns, Gambari managed to garner regional consensus on Burma. Those who had kept saying that the Burmese issue was an internal matter—China, India and Asean—came to the consensus that the country really did have a problem, and that the ruling junta should cooperate with UN for the benefit of national reconciliation and democratization. "Mr Gambari has been dealing with a number of neighboring countries to see what contribution they can make in the process toward normalcy and democratization in Myanmar (Burma)," Haq told The Irrawaddy. "In his upcoming Asia trip, he will simply try to continue that process".

Of course, Gambari must hold China and India to their promise that they would ensure the Burmese regime’s full cooperation with the UN Envoy, especially given the situation that his access to the country is so uncertain. Otherwise, Gambari may face a similar fate to his predecessor, Razali Ismail, who ended his mission denied entry to Burma indefinitely.

The international community needs to be "more insistent with the junta that a special representative of the UN Secretary-General cannot be treated the way that the junta has treated Mr. Gambari,'' United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said late last month. "It's simply unacceptable," Rice added, referring to the way the Burmese authorities had undermined his entry to and movements around Burma last time round.

The outgoing US administration must surely realize its diplomatic constraints in pushing Burma at the Security Council in the face of harsh resistance from China. Contrary to a common misconception, Gambari's current mission is a non-binding mediation effort and he does not have any enforcement capacity. From the very beginning, the leverage he has wielded has largely lain at the mercy of military junta and, to a lesser extent, its key ally, China.

There is no other country in the region or within the Security Council that can initiate a credible alternative Burma policy to the current mechanism of the Good Offices’ role. Sadly, Chinese checkers is the only game in town.

The US Secretary of State recently said that Gambari's mission "needs more profile; it needs to have more vigor." However, she did not articulate how this could be done effectively. Unless the international community compels the Burmese junta to feel that the cost of rejecting the mission, the UN envoy will remain toothless.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9916

60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?

2008-01-04T13:46:00.000-08:00

Irrawaddy Online

60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?

By MIN ZIN

Friday, January 4, 2008

During the struggle against British colonial rule, a young nationalist, Thakin Nu, once told his colleague, Than Tun: "You will be the Lenin of Burma and I'll be your Maxim Gorky."

When Burma achieved independence in January 1948, Thakin Nu (later known as “U Nu”) became prime minister while Than Tun was general secretary of the Communist Party of Burma. Unfortunately, Burma's Lenin and Gorky fell out and became arch-enemies. Then, civil war broke out. The irony of Burma's independence politics is that it started with a failed dream.

"We were all young and passionate then," said Thakin Chan Tun, a veteran politician who knew both U Nu and Than Tun. "As result, many of our key leaders took extreme stances in post-independence politics and, at the same time, weapons were easily available in the wake of WWII."

The CPB leadership declared independence to be a sham and “under cover of this sham, British imperialism would work a stranglehold on the defense and economic life of the country." Consequently, the CPB decided to launch an armed rebellion in March 1948 to achieve "genuine" independence.

"Dichotomous perspectives, such as genuine-versus-sham and right-versus-wrong is a dominant paradigm among the political oppositions of Burma throughout history," said Tin Maung Than, a famous Burmese writer and political analyst. "When they waged arm struggle, the CPB looked at politics not from a power dimension, but from an ideological perspective. They decided to disengage from the political mainstream."

It wasn’t only the communists—some of the ethnic elite also neglected power politics. They overlooked the reality of basic maturity in politics that you cannot always get your own way, especially in fragile and uncertain post-independence Burma.

A series of negotiations took place between Burman leaders and ethnic representatives some time before independence. The general consensus was to create four ethnic states: Shan, Karenni, Karen and Kachin. In the drafted constitution for the new union, a provision was also included for the possible formation of new states in the future. The Shan and Karenni were granted the right to secede after ten years if they were not happy with their status. The hardest nut to crack was the Karen issue. The designation and status of the Karen state boundary remained unresolved as Karen nationalists demanded Tenasserim, Irrawaddy and parts of Pegu Division.

In October 1947, U Nu's cabinet offered the Karen a state that would have included the Karenni State, the substate of Mongpai, Salween District and some of the Thaton, Toungoo and Pyinmana hill tracts. However, the Karen National Union demanded much of the delta as well, including the whole of the Irrawaddy Division and Insein and Hanthawaddy districts. From the perspective of U Nu's government, the controversial demands made further negotiations impossible.

"U Nu failed to carry out Aung San's promises for the Karen people," said David Tharkapaw, a senior Karen leader and chief of the Information Department in the KNU. "U Nu was a Burman chauvinist. While trust between the KNU and U Nu's government was then weakened due to the mutual propagandas and vilifications, Gen Ne Win's private militias started attacking Karen villages. Then the Karen's revolution became inevitable."

As a result, the KNU launched an insurrection in January 1949. The Karen nationalist movement gradually receded from the center stage of Burmese mainstream politics, and the power of the KNU also dwindled over time. Some observers believe that the KNU should have pursued a more careful strategy than opting to compel the Karen people to an armed struggle for greater autonomy.

"The government's offer could then have been considered very generous by today's standards, but the KNU was not willing to compromise, and [became] increasingly militant," said Thakin Chan Tun. "It was a tragic story of missed opportunity."

In fact, idealism compounded with militancy—whether violent or non-violent—has been a major trait of Burmese politics. The concept of legal opposition, in terms of making compromises and enjoying inclusive participation, has never rooted itself in the country. Post-colonial conflicts in Burma proved that when the opposition tended to resort to violent means to achieve their absolute goals, the government moved to eliminate them.

U Nu's government was also unable to resolve the country's multiple crises and was even disparagingly called the "Six-Mile Rangoon Government" because various rebel groups controlled the suburbs of the capital, Rangoon.

U Nu, modeling himself after Burmese kings of the past, attempted to establish himself as a patron of Buddhism, but he never managed to make his ideal compatible with the daily realities of politics. His authoritarian and capricious leadership failed to lay the foundation for sustainable democracy.

"The appreciation and practice of parliamentary democracy in U Nu's era was superficial," said Dr Aung Kin, a Burmese historian and well-known radio pundit. "U Nu's willingness to give up the parliamentary government to Ne Win's caretaker regime in 1958 paved the way for the military to usurp political power forever."

When the military staged a coup in 1962, it nullified parliamentary democracy and vowed "to transform the society to socialism." However, Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party simply fueled an already faltering situation. His idea of mixing Marxist, Buddhist and nationalist principles was an idiosyncratic mess, forcing the country to retreat into international isolation. The abject poverty and political repression of the BSPP eventually broke the tolerance of the Burmese public and a popular uprising calling for democracy broke out in 1988. The army responded with a massive slaughter of protesters and staged another coup d’etat. Gross violations of human rights have continued unabated ever since.

However, democracy as a renewed ideal was born. The opposition National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in 1990’s multi-party elections. The opposition elite aimed for the absolute maximum—the full transfer of power to the elected party. However, perhaps similar to the CPB and KNU before them, they walked away with the absolute minimum of gains—and the continuation of military rule in a failing state.

Instead of treating elections in a post-conflict society as a guide to power-sharing, the opposition leaders, who held lofty confidence in their public support and democratic ideals in the immediate aftermath of the election victory, viewed it as a means of determining winners and losers.

"Political immaturity within the Burmese opposition derives from a lack of appreciation for power asymmetry," said Tin Maung Than. "We could not strike a balance between power and principle."

All these crises—starting with independence and the ethnic autonomy issue—remain unresolved. The socio-economic condition of the country is at its lowest ebb in its post-1948 history. A humanitarian crisis is looming and public discontent is at an all-time high. The prospect of national reconciliation or even a breakthrough in the political deadlock remains unlikely.

Following the 1988 military coup, U Nu—once the hero of independence and first prime minister of the union—cynically voiced his regrets over fighting for Burmese independence. Those bitter words he might have uttered out of frustration and despair, but it in many ways they reflect the 60-year history of post-independence Burma.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9814

Facing the end-game

2007-12-30T12:43:00.000-08:00

Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday December 30, 2007

Facing the end-game

Unless the international community pushes for modification of the junta's political roadmap, a continuation of the conflict in Burma is a certainty, writes MIN ZIN

Recent weeks have been frustrating for Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's democracy icon. Hope of starting political dialogue with the regime's supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, is now dim.

Although there was an agreement to hold weekly meetings every Monday between Suu Kyi and government liaison minister Aung Kyi, the regime has gone back on its word. No meeting has taken place between Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi since November 19. Moreover, the military's promise of allowing two liaison officials from her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to see her regularly has yet to be realised.

"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been trying very hard to keep the communication channel open," said a senior party official on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media. "She even plans to give a positive response to the preconditions of junta leader Senior General Than Shwe. But the regime has simply ignored her."

The frustration is now spreading within the international community. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned Burma during his recent trip to Asia that the international community expects to see some productive developments. "I know the international community is very much impatient, and our patience is running out," Ban said in Bangkok.

Meanwhile, the junta is sending mixed signals to the international community. In his official briefing on November 6, Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, a staunch junta hardliner, told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari that the government's cooperation with the UN could be jeopardised if his performance were viewed to be "unfair and one-sided." Kyaw Hsan told Gambari straight that "your opportunity to play a constructive role in the matter may be in harm's way."

However, when Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein received Gambari on the following day, the general reiterated his government's full confidence in and support for the secretary-general's good offices.

"The prime minister invited me to return to Myanmar - in his words - 'again, again and again'," Gambari said at a briefing to the UN Security Council on November 13.

Moreover, as a gesture in response to the UN's persistent demand for an inclusive constitutional process, Thein Sein told Gambari that the government would allow him to meet with its Constitutional Drafting Commission to discuss ways of broadening the constitutional process.

On the other hand, at his press conference on December 3, Kyaw Hsan said that the government's 54-member commission for drafting the new constitution is sufficient for the task.

"No assistance or advice from other persons is required," he said, adding that "it is not reasonable or fair to amend those principles adopted by the delegates (of the National Convention)." Kyaw Hsan ruled out the possibility of a role for the opposition to play in the constitutional drafting process, which constitutes the highly important first three stages of the regime's "Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy".

In fact, the military is testing the response of the international community by sending out such mixed messages. If the international community, especially China and Asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), takes a passive stand or backs down, the regime will push forward with a hardline stance. When Asean caved in to the demands of the regime by not allowing Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Rangoon celebrated their victory and started scratching the regular scheduled meetings with Suu Kyi.

"Burma's military leadership is just trying to do the absolute minimum transition and reconciliation possible," Priscilla Clapp, a US diplomat who served as chief of mission in Burma from 1999-2002, told this writer. "They will continue with their seven step plan, moving very slowly, and wait for the international community to lose interest and turn the other way."

'Not too late'

However, some analysts and activists believe that the junta's roadmap' could still be a viable option for Burma's transition if it were modified to become inclusive and time-bound. They think that the junta is resisting, not rejecting, the possibility of accommodation.

"It is not too late yet. If the international community could push the regime to open up the constitutional drafting process before a national referendum, the fourth stage of the seven-step plan, we still have time to find common ground for negotiation for Burma's political transition," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Burmese government in exile. In fact, this is just what 92 elected members of Parliament from inside Burma called for in August 2007. They urged the regime to modify the roadmap, which is now aimed at legalising military supremacy in Burma's future.

The elected MPs said that if the regime made it inclusive, they would like to cooperate and find a political solution within the roadmap framework. Almost all major political and ethnic groups in Burma have agreed with the political proposal of the 92 elected MPs.

This is also in line with the UN's persistent demand as Gambari made clear when he said: "The Secretary-General did not reject the seven step roadmap and what he would like to suggest were inclusiveness and a time frame."

However, if the regime refused to modify the roadmap and continued its unilateral plan, the nature of Burma's conflict would become zero-sum. The 92 elected MPs have vowed to oppose the junta's sham constitution and to educate and organise the people of Burma to vote against it in the referendum.

Pro-democracy grassroot activists inside Burma as well as abroad also declare that the regime's planned referendum will be showdown time for Burma if the military fails to modify the roadmap. They say there will be almost no chance to reverse legalisation of military domination after a referendum, since the next three steps will be to "(5) hold free and fair elections; (6) convene elected bodies and (7) create government organs instituted by the legislative body."

"The principles of the constitution drafted by the military are laid out with the premise and concept that the 'military is the master and civilians are slaves',"said Tun Myint Aung, a leader of the 88 Generation Students Group, speaking from his hideout inside Burma. "We are now preparing to educate the people and launch a 'No Vote Campaign' against the referendum."

Some analysts even argue that another mass protest against the junta may break out before the referendum, as a combination of poverty and repression fuels the public's anger. No matter whether or not the opposition activists succeed in derailing the military's roadmap with mass protests, the nature and consequences of the conflict in Burma will be devastating, with more violent crackdowns and human suffering. The international community must be aware of this grim scenario and act resolutely to prevent it.

Min Zin is an independent Burmese journalist.

"Dissidents and the Fight for Freedom"

2007-02-20T22:59:00.000-08:00

"Dissidents and the Fight for Freedom"
Featuring Václav Havel, Former President of the Czech Republic
Library of Congress, February 20, 2007

Bio: Min Zin has been involved in Burma's prodemocracy movement since 1988. He joined the movement as a fourteen-year-old high school activist and founded a nationwide high school students union. During his time in the prodemocracy movement, he worked closely with National League for Democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, including delivering speeches with Suu Kyi in various townships around Burma's capital Rangoon. In 1989, Min Zin was forced into hiding and began what was to be a nine-year existence inside Burma's underground movement. Following the December 1996 student demonstrations in Burma, Min Zin's security situation deteriorated to the point where he finally decided it was too dangerous to continue living in Burma and subsequently fled to the Thai-Burma border in September 1997. After working in Thailand for a number of years, including serving as deputy editor of The Irrawaddy magazine, he came to the United States, where he now works as an International Radio Broadcaster in the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia.

Remarks: First, I would like to thank the event organizers for giving me this wonderful opportunity. It is my great honored to be invited to talk about Burma and its democratic struggle-especially its moral connection to President Havel.

Actually, Mr. Havel has been familiar to Burmese people since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK) in her speeches repeatedly elaborated Mr. Havel's teachings-the idea of the power of powerless. But I would say that Mr. Havel has gained nationwide respect in Burma, not because of DASSK, but- ironically -because of military dictators.

It happened when Mr. Havel and Bishop Desmond Tutu jointly published a report entitled "Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma". The report provided a powerful new direction in international effort to bring democracy in Burma.

We all know that there have been 16 consecutive resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and 13 consecutive resolutions by the Commission on Human Rights on Burma, as well as several UN Special Envoys calling for national reconciliation in Burma. Moreover, Secretary General Kofi Annan has said he was "concerned," then "increasingly concerned," then "gravely concerned" about the situation in Burma. But these efforts and voices fell on the regime's deaf ear. The military regime continues its catalogue of crimes against humanity: imprisonments of over 1,200 political prisoners including DASSK, thousands of civilians being pushed into forced labor, more child soldiers than any other country in the world, about 3,000 villages destroyed in ethnic minority areas of eastern Burma since 1996, the use of rape as a weapon in the ethnic conflicts throughout the country, millions of refugees and internally displaced people within the country and across the borders of neighboring countries-to name but a few.

That's why the Havel-Tutu report proposed a UN Security Council resolution that would compel the regime to work with the Secretary General towards national reconciliation - beginning with the release of political prisoners, stop atrocities in ethnic minority areas and start political dialogue with democratic oppositions. Havel and Tutu did not call for sanctions and just called for the effective multi-lateral engagement to be applied through the council. In one word, the report proposes a practical alternative between inaction and sanctions.

When the report came out in Sept 2005, the regime made a series of desperate reactions. You can imagine that the State-run media was flooded with government statements, speeches, articles denouncing the report of Mr. Havel and Bishop Tutu. But when the government made these statements public, they also made public almost all of the details of the report. In other words, the public had the opportunity to read and listen to a translation of the report. That's why I said the regime has made Mr. Havel highly respected and popular among Burmese people.

We, the outside media such as Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and BBC, broadcast the news about how DASSK's election winning party, ethnic minority parties, and ethnic resistance groups all welcome the Havel-Tutu initiative. We run stories of how ordinary people inside Burma would like to see the UN Security Council (UNSC)'s constructive involvement in Burma.
As we all know, the U.S. translated the Havel-Tutu report into action. The U.S. managed to put Burma in the UNSC's agenda in September 2006. But when it called for a vote in January 2007 on a non-punitive Burma resolution, China and Russia vetoed against it. This setback has shattered the hopes of Burmese people for a smooth, and over due, democratic transition in their country with the help of the UNSC. Recently, the leader of the Karen ethnic women group, which has just issued a report about widespread rape in their villages committed by the Burmese military, told us (the media) that the Chinese and Russian vetoes encourage the regime to rape more women in their villages. One prominent activist also says that the vetoes grant the regime "a license to kill" people of Burma.

But don't get them wrong-they don't dwell on being victimized. They have shown tremendous courage and unyielding determination to fight for their freedom. DASSK is a shinning example. And not only DASSK, but also Min Ko Naing and other student leaders who, having spent over 16 years in military gulags, were released in the past two years and have re-engaged in nonviolent resistance against the regime inside Burma. There are also labor activists, lawyers, and Buddhist monks working together to fight against enormous injustice and to bring a political solution to the country's crisis. They all have done these things facing the threat of imprisonment, torture, and the loss of their livelihoods.

Burmese people know that they have to rely on themselves to free their country. But they also appreciate the importance of international solidarity. They feel gratitude to people like Mr. Havel for their moral leadership in the struggle for freedom, and they are also very thankful to countries like the U.S. for mobilizing international consensus and action to bring democracy in Burma. They expect that with the leadership of U.S. and the persistent moral support from Mr. Havel, Burma's resolution will be passed by the UNSC. This would give the Burmese people a great moral boost as well as political space for their courageous drive for democracy.
Before I came here for this speech, I contacted several political leaders as well as ordinary people alike asking what message they want to convey to this respectful audience. They answered by repeating what DASSK has said:

Please use your liberty to promote ours.

Thank you!

http://www.ned.org/events/feb2007.html
http://www.ned.org/events/feb2007/zin.html

Meeting Mandela (July 2003)

2004-07-01T20:55:00.000-07:00

Meeting Mandela (July 2003)

A special programme produced in honor of Nelson Mandela’s 85th birthday, celebrating his life and moral leadership. Offering viewers a historical look at Mr. Mandela’s life, the special also profiles four young people from diverse backgrounds, who traveled to Johannesburg to meet Mr. Mandela and discuss topical issues such as HIV/AIDS, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the fight for democracy in Burma.

Hosted by Beyoncé Knowles, Meeting Mandela showcases not only the impact Nelson Mandela has on our world, it also provides inspiration for future generations to raise their voices and become actively involved in the issues they care. In 2008 the program has been updated and introduced by Kelly Rowland to honor Mandela 90th birthday.

http://www.staying-alive.org/video_player/player_uk.php?id=023

Min Zin : "BURMESE OPPOSITION DOES NOT HAVE WINNING STRATEGY"

2004-04-09T20:34:00.000-07:00

New Era Journal, April 2004
Interview

MIN ZIN “BURMESE OPPOSITION DOES NOT HAVE WINNING STRATEGY”
Maxmilian Wechsler

Min Zin is a well-known and well-respected Burmese pro-democracy activist and also a freedom fighter who spends most of his exile life in Thailand.His opinions, ideas and views on problems and solutions in Burma are highly regarded, not only by Burmese, but also by the international community.Min Zin wrote a number of articles on various subjects, including how to achieve democracy in Burma and gave “Khit Pyiang” the following interview:

· Give us yours background.

I was born and raised in Rangoon, the capital of Burma. Yes, my family does have a political background, since my dad was a student union activist in 1950s and 60s. He and his colleagues, who were like my extended family members when I was young, were life-long dissidents against the ruling military and for that they suffered tremendous persecution from the military. Then my childhood years were filled with all these thrilling stories of dissident heroes. I vaguely realized then that there was always something larger than oneself in life. When I did (or even had the intention of doing) something good to my siblings or friends or society at large, I could be certain that my parents would appreciate me. When I finished reading something, whether children’s poems or longer tales, and talked to them about my readings, I knew my dad and his friends would love me.

As for politics, the greatest lesson I learned from my parent was about standing on principle. I would say that this theme of my upbringing was quite strong and powerful, so much so that it has become “second nature” for me, when it comes to politics.

· When and why did you join the anti-government movement?

When the 1988 pro-democracy uprising broke out, I was 14 years old and attending 10th standard (final year in high school). During the March 1988 students’ movement against the government, my eldest brother and sister were arrested on their university campus for their political activities. Another brother was expelled from school. That is when I started my political activism as a high school student. Later on I became one of the founding members of the nation-wide high school student union. Then, I was also on the Central Executive Committee of the All Burma Federation of Students’ Union (ABFSU), an umbrella organization comprised of high school and university student unions.

· When and why did you decide to leave Burma?

In July 1989, the military came to my house and tried to arrest me, but I was not at home, and they arrested my Dad instead of me. So, I was forced to go into hiding and began a nearly nine-year existence in Burma’s underground. During that period I managed to develop an activist-cum-writer life, although I was dismissed from school and constantly chased by military intelligence. Because of my political activism, almost every member of my family and most of my colleagues would endure arrest and detention. Following the December 1996 student demonstration, my security situation deteriorated more seriously than ever before and I finally decided it was too dangerous to continue living in Burma. I subsequently fled to the Thai-Burma border in August 1997.

· What are your present activities?

Since I have arrived Thailand, I have mainly devoted myself to writing. I am currently a deputy editor of the Irrawaddy magazine (www.irrawaddy.org) where, aside from editorial duties, I have done several political writings as well as stories that examine the relationship between culture and power in Burmese society. Of course, I have written on ethnic identity issues from this perspective. Now I also write two weekly programs for Radio Free Asia (RFA) Burmese Service. One is on youth and education, and the other about questions of ethic in politics. Occasionally, I travel abroad for conferences and seminars. I also spent one year as a visiting scholar at the Journalism School of the University of California Berkeley in 2001.

· What is the current status of the opposition movement inside and outside Burma?

The opposition movement is now in deep water, I would say. The junta has recovered from the outcry or public relation fiasco following the May 30 nightmare in Depayin and managed to launch a counterattack against the pro-democracy movement. To me, the regime’s moves ring of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.

The Burmese opposition movement is always being weakened and divided, not by naked military power (i.e. harsh crackdowns) but by political offensives that the junta throws into the battle field. In other words, the regime has perfected the art of combining naked force with political maneuvers to defeat the opposition movement.

The regime has now succeeded in persuading almost all the ethnic groups—ceasefire and non-ceasefire – to climb aboard the road map bandwagon. With the legitimacy these groups will add to the National Convention, the junta can undermine Aung San Suu Kyi’s election-winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party, since the opposition also depends on its alliance with ethnic groups.Moreover, in this most recent push for legitimacy the regime has been trying to market its scheme to regional powers (such as Thailand, China …), particularly to so-called “Bangkok Process”. If successful, the maneuvers could sideline the opposition movement’s international allies, such as the U.S. and U.N.

· Are you satisfied with the activities of the Burmese opposition?

I said that I learned from my father’s generation, who were mostly left-leaning activists, that it is important to stand up for one’s principles in politics. However, from my own experiences during these many years in the opposition movement, I realized that principle alone doesn’t guarantee political victory. Political activists need to understand what distinguishes those who succeed by standing on principle from those who fail. Then you have to think about the importance of strategy. Without having a sound and pragmatic strategy, sticking to principle alone will make you quixotic and leave you stranded in irrelevance.

To my eyes, the Burmese opposition does not have a winning strategy. Or their strategic approach is linear.

· You have been closely associated with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Give us some insight on your relationship.

I met her several times in 1988 and ‘89. Alongside her, I gave public speeches on some occasions. She was the first person I met in our hierarchically structured society who treats younger people with respect. She listened to, argued against, and laughed with a fifteen-year-old high school activist, who was the same age of her son. She did all these things with wise observations and of course authenticity. As a citizen of Burma, I always feel that the country is very lucky to have such leader.

· Certain people describe ASSK as “stubborn, not flexible and uncompromising.” What do you think?

It often sounds sexist to my ears. When a man is tough, people praise him as a hero. But about a woman, some tend to say she is “stubborn, not flexible and uncompromising”. I don’t think it would be fair to take her out of the context, in which she faces tremendous pressures and repressions, altering from moment to moment. Under the given situation, A person like her who values integrity and wants to uphold it as ultimately important in politics can have a tendency to get stuck in moral paradigm. While she doesn’t need to devote herself to manipulative “warrior politics” (if I could borrow Robert Kaplan’s concept), she can be more proactive in her strategy.

· Do you support armed or political struggle to achieve the regime-change in Burma?

The rhetoric of “regime change” carries a scary weight these days, whether or not it implies military intervention. But I doubt this goal is realistic. The superpower has no compelling strategic interest when it comes to Burma. And China cannot allow a radical power shift to take place on its southern flank.This doesn’t mean that the oppressed people should give up their struggle and pin their hopes on the military’s good will. More importantly, we should always keep in mind that those who play hardball dominate the political game in Burma.

· Your view on the peace talks between the Karen National Union Defense Minister, Gen. Bo Mya, and the Burmese government?

I think the truce deal is a good start. But the KNU should understand that the talk or dialogue is in itself an “art of war” or political gamesmanship, and this requires A sophisticated approach. You cannot enter it with the attitude of, “Okay, if it works out, we’ll go ahead. If not, we resume fighting.)” As I said earlier, you cannot succeed in political war with a linear strategy.I want to point out another important thing with ethnic politics. Since learning about the recent Kachin purge and seeing obvious power plays among KNU leaders regarding the truce, I am getting more worried about the lack of democratization and decentralized processes in ethnic armed groups. When those who hold arms are not accountable to their people or become dictatorial, it can be devastating, wherever it happens.

· If Bo Mya finally agrees to the cease-fire, how will it affect the opposition movement, since many of which depend on the KNU?

Alliance politics has its limits since self-interest dominates politics, in the final analysis. Political graveyards are filled with the people as well as movements who do not learn this lesson.

· There has not been any reaction from the international community on the cease-fire talks between the KNU and the SPDC. Do you think it is supporting the idea of peaceful solution to the conflict?

I think Rangoon really wants the international community to appreciate its cease-fire deals with several ethnic groups including the latest one with the KNU. This is what the regime hopes to put at the center of attention in Burmese politics or “national reconciliation”. In principle, the world would agree with a peaceful solution. But I think the West does not want to let the regime to win another cheap victory at democracy’s expense.

· You met with Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel. On what occasions? And what is their suggestion to solve the conflict in Burma?

I met Havel in 2001 and Mandela in 2003. I had wonderful opportunities to talk to them individually. Both struck me as great strategists who define politics and policy not just by their excellence but by their outcomes.

· Do you support the economic sanction against Burma imposed by the international community?

There is a myth that surrounds the sanctions debate on Burma. People talk about the country as if a wall of comprehensive sanctions has been imposed on it. In fact, economic sanctions are, so far, not multi-lateral. The U.S. alone has imposed sanctions on Burma. Regional countries and the E.U remain a big loophole, allowing Rangoon to go around U.S. sanctions and re-channel its exports to these countries. We also should remember that sanctions alone can’t resolve the problem. It is just one option or form of international intervention to make change.

We can’t hide the fact that sanctions do hurt people as in every other case around the world, in addition to hurting the regime. Here the question is whether the ends justify the means. That again depends on what are the ends. Then it will be a long debate.Now some countries have started talking about targeted economic sanctions against military-owned or joint-venture companies in Burma. Some would call them “smart sanctions.” All in all, I think the sanctions tactic is a ”necessary evil” regarding Burmese politics.

· Some Burmese dissidents criticize the Thai government the way the refugees, illegal workers and the exiles are treated in Thailand. Any comment?

Not only Burmese dissidents but also watch-groups have raised concerns about the way Thailand treats downtrodden people from neighboring countries. I share their concerns.· Is there any chance that the Burmese people will rise-up against the government on their-own?Frustration among ordinary public is mounting. No doubt, economic problems can trigger people’s anger. But what kind of street movement will ensue is a matter of concern.The most likely scenario is spontaneous and possibly sporadic uprisings out of sheer frustration and desperation. This can turn into an outraged crowd unless the political leadership takes quick initiative. The masses can easily be swayed by the junta’s incitement or even by the provocative nature of the crowd mentality, and they can become chaotic, violent and bloody. Then, the regime will subdue any assemblage harshly, with its usual justification of a Leviathan call.

The scenario many activists are inclined to fancy, on the other hand, is a well-organized mass demonstration calling for peaceful change in the country or overthrowing the regime. However, unless NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in particular come up with leadership for such street protests, none of the inside or outside-based political groups has the capacity to initiate it.Even if the NLD took the initiative, the chances for victory are not yet secure. Activists must account for the vital role of the regime’s population control mechanisms such as armies, spies, etc. All in all, the positive prospects for a peaceful mass mobilization are dim.Under the current situation, I’m worried that Burma is heading toward a repetition of the 1967 rice lootings and communal riots, instead of the 8888 movement, which activists are nostalgic for.I wish my insight was wrong and an unexpectedly handsome solution popped up, as is characteristic of Burmese politics.

· What do the “silent majority” of the Burmese people think about the government, the NLD, and the exiles?

I think the late President Doctor Maung Maung said he wants to hear the voice of “silent majority” including housewives in the kitchens (as the only educated senior leader of the regime, he borrowed it from Richard Nixon) during the peak of the 1988 mass demonstration. The next day, housewives, elementary school kids and gays took to the streets and showed that they, too, did not like the government and wanted democracy. I believe that those voices of our “moral majority” (let me use Jerry Falwell’s term) remain more or less the same (perhaps, even stronger) with regard to military rule and pro-democracy supporters.

· With such diversity of ethnic groups, some of them armed, demanding for independence or autonomy, and most of them generally distrust the Burmans, do you think Burma can have a civilian government?

I am not sure about a radical change. But we can start political liberalization that will gradually develop political infrastructures, institutional capacity and social capital. The resulting environment will be conducive to a smooth transition. But at the current speed of no-reform-at-all, or an unrealistic speed of change-everything-overnight, the outcome will be a crash landing.

Life in limbo for a Myanmar exile

2003-11-26T17:59:00.000-08:00

Asia Time Southeast Asia, Nov 26, 2003

Life in limbo for a Myanmar exile

By A Lin Neumann

CHIANG MAI, Thailand - When Min Zin was 14, he and his friends were making newspapers by hand, literally. They etched characters into inked wax paper and rolled fluorescent-light tubes over the impressions in a crude homemade duplicating process. The results, distributed free of charge on the streets of Rangoon (now Yangon), were the only independent publications in the country.

This was not a school handicraft project. The year was 1988 and Min Zin was involved in the deadly serious business of revolution against a dictatorship in Burma. As one of the youngest and most prominent leaders of the pro-democracy rebellion, Min Zin was making speeches, organizing students, printing underground political broadsheets and risking his life for democratic change.

"Of course, we were naive," Min Zin says now of his days as a street-corner propagandist. "All we knew was that these were bad guys and we wanted new leaders."

During those heady months of the 1988 uprising, the country was shaken to its foundations by students, some even younger than Min Zin, who took to the streets daily bringing dictator Ne Win's tottering regime to the point of collapse. But the broadly popular movement was brutally suppressed in September of that year when a military junta took power and thousands of people were killed.

Fast-forward to 2003 and Min Zin is still at it, only he is anything but naive.

Now a veteran journalist, the lanky, good-humored Min Zin is one of a handful of exiled Myanmar (Burma was officially renamed in 1989) journalists pointing the way toward an eventual future in which the press might one day thrive again in his home country.

He is a regular correspondent for Radio Free Asia and a staff editor for The Irrawaddy, a respected exile publication and website (www.Irrawaddy.org) covering Myanmar issues from Chiang Mai, Thailand. He has been a visiting fellow at the journalism school at the University of California at Berkeley and his essays on topics ranging from political strategy to popular culture in his homeland are thoughtful, independent and influential.

His work as a writer, scholar and journalist is an inspiration to many. Christina Fink, an American expert on Myanmar affairs, credits Min Zin with being a key strategist of the student movement during his years in exile and says that his commentaries and articles are followed closely inside Myanmar through Radio Free Asia and through smuggled copies of his writing. "Min Zin focuses on the role of youth in society and seeks to inspire young people to develop themselves outside the regime's tightly controlled, top-down education," Fink wrote recently.

The path that Min Zin took to become a journalist has been arduous and threatening, sad and inspiring. After the suppression of 1988, Min Zin left school and went underground for nine years, dodging the efforts of the military regime to track him down and toss him into prison, along with thousands of others.

Throughout his years of hiding and exile - he narrowly escaped from Myanmar to seek refuge in neighboring Thailand in 1997 - he was never sure what would happen to him. "I saw friends, girls and boys 12 years old and even younger, killed by soldiers in front of my eyes," he said. His immediate family members were all arrested at one time or another, usually on suspicion that they were aiding Min Zin.

During his odyssey, he taught himself to speak and read English fluently and even contributed essays on political issues to underground samizdat journals that circulated among students and dissidents.

"I had a lot of time to read, in those days," he said with a laugh. While hiding in Myanmar, friends brought him books from the libraries of the US and British embassies in Yangon, and he began expanding the horizons of his political thinking. "At first, we had no idea what was democracy, he said. "In our schools we were only taught about Marxist thinking" during the regime of Ne Win, whose peculiar brand of "Burmese socialism" brought the country isolation and ruin.

It was life on the run, oddly enough, that gave Min Zin the time to deepen his thinking and begin writing seriously about change, even contributing scholarly non-political articles under a pen name to the few legal magazines published in Yangon.

His exposure to fresh ideas has not diminished his outrage at the junta that rules his country, but he jealously guards his independence and his credibility as a journalist. Neither Min Zin nor any of the staff of The Irrawaddy are members of any political organization.

"We are independent and free to think and criticize anyone," said the magazine's founder and editor, Aung Zaw, himself a political dissident in exile. "It is important for our future that we develop independent journalism for Burma."

When asked if he is an activist or a journalist, Min Zin bristles and insists that it is not an either/or proposition. "We need to define, first, the word 'activist'," he told Asia Times Online at The Irrawaddy office on a quiet street in Chiang Mai. "In the West you can take for granted that your rights are established. But here, the immediate goal is to remove the repression. So in terms of our values you can say we are activists. But in terms of affiliation, I am not an activist. I have never joined any political party."

Min Zin and his Irrawaddy colleagues constantly work the phones and networks of sources and friends inside Myanmar, searching for information on one of the most closed regimes in the world. When pro-government thugs, for example, attacked opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters in a remote part of the country on May 30, The Irrawaddy was among the first to get the news.

Using sources inside Myanmar, they pieced together the events that most observers say were staged by the ruling State Peace and Development Council to tarnish Suu Kyi's image and justify her arrest and continuing detention.

Min Zin, however, does not confine himself to writing about the intricate twists and turns of Myanmar's long struggle for change. He is equally at home writing about popular singers in his homeland or discussing the country's literature. He has interviewed by phone one of Myanmar's few hip-hop stars for the magazine and recently wrote about a popular film actress who is also a devout Buddhist. "It is not all about politics," he explained. "The society is changing and I want to see how our culture can adapt to new realities."

His work is noticed in seemingly odd places. This year, Min Zin appeared on an MTV-produced documentary celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela. The music channel sent him to South Africa for a taped dialogue with Mandela, an experience of a lifetime, he said, even though he admits that friends kidded him about appearing on MTV. Pop idol Beyonce Knowles hosted the special.

He was deeply impressed by Mandela and compared his effectiveness with that of Suu Kyi, a fellow Nobel laureate and Myanmar's roughly comparable leader. "Suu Kyi is a moral figure, she is a saint, a moral person in an immoral society," he said. "But she appeals too much to the conscience, on telling people to do the right thing. Unlike Mandela and Vaclav Havel [whom Min Zin also met and interviewed on a trip to the Czech Republic] - these guys knew how to maneuver. She is not pragmatic," he said. "Suu Kyi doesn't believe in maneuvering."

He is realistic about what it may take to change Myanmar's dictatorship, which has been in power in one form or another since 1962. He praises US efforts to boycott the regime and bring sanctions against Myanmar. "The United States is the hegemonic power in the world," he said. "They can make things happen if they will be serious about change." Min Zin wants to see the US twist the arms of China, Japan and Thailand - regional powers that have all done business with the dictatorship for decades - to force change on the generals in Yangon.

Eventually, he believes, change will come and his long sojourn will end. "Being in exile builds a rift between reality and your own life," he said. "Literally my dreams are still confined to my neighborhood in Rangoon." His father, a political activist and teacher from an earlier generation who also suffered and was jailed for his beliefs, died a few years ago, he said, but he cannot accept the reality because he cannot go home.

His dream is to return home and help establish The Irrawaddy as an independent newsmagazine in a free country. "We are not immigrants - we are refugees, forced to resettle somewhere foreign. I think about my life in Burma because I lost it all when I was 14. My mind is always back home."

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EK26Ae01.html

Ludu Daw Amar: Speaking Truth to Power

2002-10-01T22:09:00.000-07:00

Culture, The Irrawaddy Magazine, OCTOBER, 2002 - VOLUME 10 NO.8

Ludu Daw Amar: Speaking Truth to Power

by Min Zin

A brief look into the life of Ludu Daw Amar, Burma’s best known female journalist and social critic.

The Burmese word amar translates as "the strong" or "the hard". It is an apt description of one of Burma’s most respected female figures, Ludu Daw Amar (she prefers the spelling, Amah), who turned 87 in November. An energetic political dissenter and left-leaning journalist with a faculty for articulating messages to and for the public, Ludu Daw Amar and her family have had more than their fair share of troubles with the authorities. Even now, Daw Amar is under constant surveillance, but she has never been one to bow down to power. As the prefix of her name Ludu or "the people" suggests, Daw Amar’s raison d’etre is to speak truth to power on behalf of the people without compromise.

"I’ll never forget my first impression," recalls Dutch journalist Minka Nijhuis, who has met Daw Amar four times since 1995. "At first she looked so fragile that even her wristwatch seemed too heavy for her arm. But that impression disappeared as soon as she started speaking."

When asked to comment on her unwavering commitment and strength, Daw Amar told The Irrawaddy: "I do not give up easily. Besides, I cannot tolerate injustice. This is my mindset."

An anecdote about her childhood in her autobiography reveals the roots of this strong-mindedness and illustrates her oft-overlooked humble side as well: "When our mother would cane us, she would say, ‘stop crying’, and all the siblings would stop except me. I cried because I felt hurt, but the more I cried the more whippings I received. How can she force me not to feel pain? Actually it was stubbornness; my mother and I were engaged in a conflict of endurance."

This tough personality was first drawn into politics after she enrolled at Rangoon University in 1936. During the independence movement against the British, she was applauded by the daily papers for her courage and beauty, and by 1938 she made her first and lasting mark on Burma’s literary landscape. U Razart, then the headmaster of the National School and later assassinated alongside Burma’s independence hero Aung San in 1947, suggested that Daw Amar translate Maurice Collis’s book, "Trial in Burma", into Burmese. The publisher was U Hla, who ran the monthly youth magazine Kyipwa Yay (Progress for Youth) as well as a publishing house in Rangoon. With the assistance of U Hla, who became Daw Amar’s husband the following year, the translation became an instant success and quickly required multiple printing runs as the first edition of three thousand copies sold out within two months.

After U Hla relocated to Mandalay to be with his wife, Daw Amar’s literary output accelerated. Most of these works were translations of English language novels, but her real passion was journalism. After the conclusion of the Second World War, U Hla launched the fortnightly journal, Ludu ("The People"), with Daw Amar as assistant editor. By 1946, the couple had founded the Ludu Daily News; its political commentaries and analyses became a significant voice for the aspirations and struggles against colonial rule. Thus, Daw Amar earned the name Ludu Daw Amar.

But only a year after Burma gained independence in 1948, the Ludu publication house in Mandalay was reduced to rubble by bombs. "Mandalay was under frequent regime changes at that time," Daw Amar explains. "The army saw the Ludu paper as sympathetic to the Communists so government troops blew up the building." They also surrounded her residence and forced the entire household—including children and two pregnant women—out into the street. Then the soldiers raised their guns. "It was in the morning. They aimed their machine guns at us threatening to kill us all," Daw Amar recalls. Bravely, she stood firm and demanded an explanation from the soldiers. Local monks and others lobbied for their release and the troops left without inflicting any harm.

The civil war that broke out in the wake of independence intensified rapidly and abuse of power became rampant. Ludu re-opened in a new office and Daw Amar resumed her active opposition to injustices. Her articles calling for internal peace and analyses on world affairs were well received, particularly with young progressives. Nyi Se Min, a writer in his fifties, remembers: "Daw Amar’s robust analyses on international politics opened our eyes and ears. Her political views earned our admiration."

In 1953, she took her political activism to the international stage, attending the World Democratic Women’s Conference in Copenhagen, the World Peace Conference in Budapest, and the International Youth Festival in Bucharest. In the same year, shortly after the birth of the youngest of her five children, her husband was detained and imprisoned by the government for three and a half years. With Daw Amar’s editorial responsibilities now doubled, she was forced to leave the children with an aunt.Though unable to raise her children personally, Daw Amar still managed to fundamentally influence their lives. "The Autobiography of Charlie Chaplin", "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", and the seminal work that heightened environmental consciousness internationally, "Silent Spring", were among the selections on the recommended reading lists she gave to her children. She also included Burmese classics such as the works of Thakin Kodawhmaing and the innovations of Khitsan (the modernization of Burmese literature in the first half of the 20th century).

"She rarely said, ‘you must do this’, or ‘you must not do that’, but let her actions do the talking," says Daw Amar’s second son Po Than Joung. "None of the three brothers drink or smoke; not because our parents told us not to, but rather because their own deeds convinced us that these things are not good."

By the late 1950s, her eldest son, Soe Win, began to follow his mother’s example by becoming politically active in the students’ union, and by 1963 he went underground to take up armed struggle with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). And after Po Than Joung was expelled from Mandalay University for his political activities the military regime set their sights on the entire family, each member now deemed a political subversive. Naturally, with her sons’ welfare in jeopardy Daw Amar became worried but not regretful.

"My parents never questioned our beliefs. They only told us to be careful when they learned of the government agents’ plans," says Po Than Joung, who began serving a six-year jail sentence in 1966 for his clandestine political involvement. In 1967, the government closed the Ludu newspaper for good and another year later, while Po Than Joung was imprisoned, Soe Win was killed during the CPB purges in the jungle. These internecine purges were used as the military’s most powerful propaganda offensive against the CPB and its sympathizers. After Po Than Joung was released, he received a letter from a CPB leader for Daw Amar explaining what happened to Soe Win and apologizing for the purge. "When I handed the letter to my mother, tears fell from her eyes," he says. "She said to me, ‘Your father and I have never discussed this matter. We just pretended it never happened.’" A few years later, Po Than Joung followed in his brother’s footsteps and joined the CPB. The military responded by arresting his parents and youngest brother, Ko Nyein Chan, in 1978, but Daw Amar’s defiant spirit remained unshaken.

But even throughout the family’s political turbulence, Daw Amar produced a prolific literary output, devoting most of her time researching the biographies of author Thakin Kodawhmaing, cartoonist Shwe Yo Ba Kalay, performance artist Shwe Mahn Tin Maung and others for "The Artists who People Love", her award-winning book that is now celebrated as a modern classic. She also penned "Burmese Non-dramatic Performance (Anyein)", "Contemporary Dramatic Art (Thabin)", and other books about Burmese classical music and painting that address issues of cultural identity.

But Daw Amar is not merely a nostalgic traditionalist. Although she enjoys cooking and has a fondness for flowers and countryside markets, she also likes Hollywood films and Disney cartoons. And not all of her writings chronicle the achievements of Burma’s historical cultural treasures; she was a forerunner of the innovative spoken style that distinguished modern Burmese literature from its predecessors. She was also a pioneer for advocating sex education and for voicing complaints against the unpaid labor contributions of women in modern Burmese society.

Although Ludu U Hla passed away in 1982, Daw Amar was not left a lonely widow. Her friends and admirers gathered around her unwavering integrity and inspiring writings. Beginning with her 70th birthday in 1985, writers and supporters from all over the country have traveled to Mandalay each year to assemble and pay their respects. Despite, or probably because of, Daw Amar’s popularity, her family endured continual political hardship. Ko Nyein Chan, a famous short story author who wrote under the pen name Nyi Pu Lay, was arrested and given a ten-year jail term by the regime. Though charged for having alleged contact with illegal organizations, many believe his family’s political pedigree and his satirical writings led to his detention.

Since 1994, Daw Amar’s writings turned to the disintegration of community cohesion, social responsibilities, and the negative impact of cultural decadence in Burma—something she attributes to the distorted economy and massive Chinese migration to the cities after the military coup in 1988. Her series of articles, Amay Shay Sagaa ("Mother’s Old Sayings"), criticized the changing lifestyles of young people who discarded their traditional attire, adopted heavy drinking habits and a taste for gambling, and chased the latest trends promoted by advertising.

"We proudly publish Daw Amar’s pieces regularly in our magazine since her well-intended writings represent the essence of Burmese culture," says Daw Kalaya, publisher of Kalaya magazine. Daw Amar also tried to stimulate progressive public debate on sensitive issues such as HIV/AIDS, but Daw Kalaya laments, "The censorship board didn’t allow her AIDS articles to appear in print." Nonetheless, her later writings, which mourn the loosening of traditional social and cultural values, are tinged with a conservative slant, particularly when reiterating Victorian moral teachings for Burmese women.

"We admire her as a great woman of Burma," says Ma Sue Pwint, leader of the exile-based Women’s League of Burma. "But as a woman activist working for the women’s rights movement, sometimes we have a few complaints about her strict dictums."

Daw Amar’s responses to the repressive regime and ruthless market iniquities are generally framed in a nationalistic, ethno- and religious-centric perspective. In her calls for the restoration of traditional cultural identities, she often fails to acknowledge the citizen-based politics and civic responsibilities that are essential for fostering a democratic polity in multi-ethnic Burma.

To interpret Daw Amar’s recent writings only in a context of progressive politics and contemporary liberal trends, however, can be misleading. Since she first put pen to paper more than 60 years ago, she has worked tirelessly in an environment of steadily declining socio-economic conditions and constant political repression. She is a defender of the history and culture of the former royal capital and symbol of Burmese independence, Mandalay. In broader terms, according to the veteran journalist in his sixties, Ludu U Sein Win, Daw Amar is a staunch defender of traditional Burmese cultural identity and sovereignty. Above all, Daw Amar’s lifetime commitment to fighting injustice and her refusal to be cowed into silence have made her a living symbol of resistance.

"Don’t Dance to the Tune of the Authorities"
An Interview with Ludu Daw Amar

The Irrawaddy's Assistant Editor Min Zin recently spoke to Ludu Daw Amar, 87, about her life experiences and her perspective on the current situation of the Burmese press. She also discussed social and political issues such as Chinese migration, women’s rights and the entitlements of ethnic nationalities. Below are some excerpts:

QUESTION: You have said that you prefer life as a journalist, but since you have been disallowed from working in that capacity your focus has turned to biographical works and other articles. Young people today see you as a social critic or a moral leader. How do you prefer to identify yourself?

ANSWER: When I was writing for the newspaper I could focus my proper attention on socio-political matters. Then the ban on newspapers was imposed [1967] and I had to stop after working in the business for 20 years. Though I can no longer write for newspapers, when particular social ills and news stories catch my eye I still write about them. My news instincts have influenced my work elsewhere. But I was much more contented as a newspaper journalist because we were able to write freely then.

Q: As an experienced newspaper editor, what is your evaluation of the current situation of the Burmese press?

A: The situation is like this: we cannot write anything the way we did before, there is no press freedom, and the Press Scrutiny Board is very restrictive. This means we cannot write what we want. That’s why I have begun writing about national culture—something that will not incriminate me.

Q: As journal publications are mushrooming in Burma right now, what do you think of the prospects for encouraging good journalism in the long run?

A: The prospects are not good. Journalism’s edge in Burma has become blunted. I believe that a new corps of good journalists will emerge only when we can publish newspapers freely. Right now, I don’t think any of the journalists are genuine newspaper journalists.

Q: You have translated several Thai and African short stories with the intention of fostering friendship between nations. The recent war of words between Thailand and Burma was attributed by many to the anti-Thai monarchy articles from irresponsible writers in the state-run Burmese newspapers. As a writer who has worked to facilitate goodwill among nations, what are your thoughts?

A: This is a breach of obligation for a journalist. Not only that, this group of journalists is at the beck and call of the generals; however, this is only one breed of journalists in Burma today. There is also another group who writes freely and expresses original ideas and opinions. But nowadays, journalists cannot write their opinions freely. For those of us who don’t dance to the tune of the authorities we must be creative in what we write to get the message across. It is very difficult.

Q: In one of your articles, you termed the present the Lawpang [wealthy Chinese businessmen] era. What do you think about the extensive Chinese migration in recent years in Mandalay?

A: I feel as if we are an undeclared colony of Yunnan [Province], not the People’s Republic of China. Yunnan is right on our doorstep and as soon as we opened that door, people from Yunnan started pouring in as if Mandalay was their own country.

Q: Women’s rights movements are gaining strength around the world. In some countries, governments implement Affirmative Action policies to redress the imbalances of unjust social systems and to support and empower women. Is such a model relevant for Burma?

A: We, the women of Burma have not gotten that far. We cannot even aim that far. There is no such thing as human rights in our country let alone women’s rights. That is the real situation.

Q: You have previously written some articles about Burma’s ethnic nationalities, so what are your concerns about their current situation.

A: They should enjoy equality with us.

Q: You think that the ethnic nationalities have not enjoyed equal status since Burma gained independence?

A: No. There has never been any equality [between ethnic nationalities and Burmans].

Q: All of your sons have been involved in politics, have made great sacrifices, and continue to pay a heavy price for expressing what they believe. Have you ever discouraged them from taking part in politics, or felt any regrets for not doing so?

A: I have no regrets. People get involved in politics as the situation of the country demands. My children got involved during their time because they thought they should. We had to fight for our independence and have endured civil war for more than half a century. Under these circumstances, it is the response to the government that produces politicians and political activists. Humans are humans and when they see injustice, they react by speaking out against it. So when they are beaten or arrested for speaking out they become politicians or political activists. This is how I see it. The government has forced you to become a political activist in your time as well—I saw it happen. Therefore, I neither feel remorse nor happiness for my children, but have accepted it as something that was bound to happen.

Q: On a personal note, I have heard that Gen Khin Nyunt once sent you a ballpoint pen for as a birthday present and that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also paid her respects to you. Are these rumors true?

A: Yes. Khin Nyunt has given me presents such as money and ballpoint pens to pay respect. I think he has done it a few times. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also sends her emissaries.

Q: How do you feel about the admiration shown to you from all corners of the country?

A: I don’t feel anything out of the ordinary. This interview was conducted in Burmese and translated into English.

http://www.irrawaddymedia.com/article.php?art_id=2739&page=1

Democracy Now!

2002-02-01T21:04:00.000-08:00

Democracy Now!

Margarita Rossi finds out why Burmese activist Min Zin has been wanted for arrest since age 15.

By Margarita Rossi

Before I met Min Zin, I was totally unaware of the horrific political situation that the people of Burma (now called Myanmar) are living in today. I had never heard about it on the news, never read about it in a newspaper and never discussed it with anyone. Oh sure, I was somewhat aware that there were unjust and criminal governments in power around the globe, and that millions of people still have to fight for basic human rights. But it's completely different to hear someone's personal experience of fighting an inhumane dictatorship at the risk of losing their own life.

Min Zin is a Burmese pro-democracy activist who has been on the run from his government since he was 15 years old. In 1988, at age 14, he joined the pro-democracy movement that was trying to bring about change in the Burmese government. For over 40 years, Burma has been under a military dictatorship whose control includes the government, economy, education, and media. Because of the corrupt and unethical manner in which the country is run, the living situation for the vast majority of Burmese citizens is abysmal.

Hearing Min Zin's story changed me. I don't think that I can ignore the political problems of another country just because they don't affect me directly. Min Zin is a remarkable example of what a young person can accomplish.

Youth Radio: How would you describe the situation in Burma to a young person living in the US?

Min Zin: Burma has been under military dictatorship for more than 40 years… the military took total control not only over the politics, but also economic and cultural issues. In terms of political rights, freedom of expression, religious rights, educational rights — all these things end up being low ranking. The Burmese military government spends more than 50 percent of their government budget on military expenditures.

Burma is not a homogenous society. It is comprised of several different ethnic minority groups. The Burman dominated military violated not only its Burman majority, but also seriously violated the human rights of ethnic minority people.

YR: And I read on the Internet that Burma prided itself before on its education and it had one of the highest levels of education in Asia.

MZ: Exactly. Burmese education was the best in Southeast Asia... but now the whole thing is degrading mainly because of the Burmese military. The Burmese military government sees the student as a threat. So they closed off the university as a weapon to disperse the student movement… they imprisoned many students, they torture students, they kill thousands and thousands of students.

But while they shut down all civilian schools, they opened the military medical institute, military engineering institute, military computer science institute only for the military children. So the point is not just discrimination against the civilian population, but also they channel all the international assistance and aid to military sponsored schools and institutes.

YR: That's almost exactly like what happens in Argentina which is where my parents came from. They just saw the students and the young people as a threat. What is it like for children and young people living in Burma? What is their daily life like?

MZ: Well recently the WHO [World Health Organization] reported that three out of five children suffer from malnutrition. And also there has been widespread use of child labor and forced labor in Burma for the construction of tourist sites or the constructions of gas pipelines, which have been invested by U.S. and Europe corporations such as Unocal and Total. [The Burmese] government works with the international corporations to build all this construction [and] they conscript young people. Its like forced labor to build all these projects.

YR: And you also said there was a really big drug problem?

MZ: According to latest State Department report, Burma is the largest drug producer in the world. Previously, Afghanistan was the largest producer. Now Burma is the largest heroin producer… in addition Burma produces more than 800 million speed pills.

Since 1988, the universities have been shut down for nine years because the government worries that the students will get together and stage a protest against the government. So to go back to your question, all these young people and children suffer from powerlessness and aimlessness because there is no education but drugs are very available.

Also, in Burma if you are a member of a student union, you can be arrested and sentenced to seven years imprisonment, minimum. This is a law… student unions are illegal. They have been banned by the military government since 1962. They literally demolished the student union building. You are not allowed to gather more than five people for political purposes. That's why many students tend to use drugs.

YR: You became an activist and started risking your life when you were 14. Why did you become an activist?

MZ: I became involved in the [pro democracy] movement because my eldest brother and sister were both university students. And one day they went to school and they didn't come home because both of them were arrested and thrown into jail. And my other brother got dismissed from school because of his involvement. My eldest brother was in prison for four months and he was seriously tortured. He was almost paralyzed. So that kind of experience and bitterness drove me to be involved in the student movement, even though I was in high school at that time.

YR: What kind of activism do you engage in?

MZ: Well, first I tried to organize township level high school student unions. And then I tried to expand the high school student unions to the national and state level. And then I managed to found a nation wide student union and I was elected as chairman.

When I was deeply involved in the student union movement, the military came to my house and tried to arrest me, but I was not there. This was in 1989. So they arrested my father instead of me. And since then I was on the run. So I was away from my family, I was dismissed from school. And during my time on the run, I managed to write many articles, not only for underground journals, but for legally published magazines under different pen names. That's how I got involved with writing.

YR: How old were you when you were on the run and then in exile?

MZ: I was on the run inside Burma for nine years. It was in 1989 and I was 15. And then in late 1997 I could not stay inside Burma anymore because my security was really under threat. Every single member of my family was arrested because of me. And the military intelligence opened a tea shop to monitor my home and my family's movements. So I couldn't do very much inside Burma. So I decided to leave the country in late 1997 after nine years of being underground. So at that time I was 23. And I arrived at the Thai/Burma border. And I was based there for four years before coming here [to the U.S.].

YR: What was it like being underground?

MZ: At first I didn't expect I would have to be underground for nine years. I thought I would be reunited with my family after one or two years. I feel really sad because I could not go to school… I lost my teenage life.

It was pretty hard to stay in sympathizer's houses because the military intelligence, twice a month, they knock door to door and they ask the whole family to get out of the house and they search the whole house. When they did this, I had to hide in the rafters or I had to sneak out the back door. It was so harsh. Sometimes I had to stay in the rafters from 9 pm to 2 am. I was so worried, not just for me, but for the sympathizer because if I got arrested for seven years, then they would get double — 14 years.

But even under such harsh conditions, I managed to continue my activism. I kept doing publication and circulation of pamphlets and organizing demonstrations. That's what happened in 1996. A huge student demonstration took place in Rangoon to protest against the military.

YR: Why do you continue to fight when there are so many risks? You would be sentenced to the death penalty if you were caught in your homeland of Burma. I have been engaged in activism, but I don't know if I would risk my life to fight.

MZ: Well this is a personal choice. The more you understand that your own people suffer from tremendous misery, how can you neglect such suffering? These are your own people, your own brother and sister. Also, my close colleagues who have been in prison, who have been in solitary confinement for more than 13 years in shackles, their health is deteriorating. When I fled to the Thai/Burma border, I crossed the jungle for five days. Four of my friends accompanied me. Two of those friends went back to Burma. They both got arrested. One got the death penalty, the other got 60 years in prison. They are both the same age as me. How can I be ignorant, how can I be indifferent to such suffering of my fellow colleagues? You have to commit yourself to the cause because it is something that is larger than you.

YR: What do you want to accomplish with your activism?

MZ: We want to restore democracy and human rights in Burma. The whole society has been destroyed under the military dictatorship. We want to build our society. We must recognize and respect ethnic minority rights.

YR: Young people in the USA have no idea that there are such strict fascist regimes in the world now. It's so mind boggling. Here we are so protected from all of that. How can an American understand, but also take another step to get involved?

MZ: The US government, under the Clinton administration, did a good job. They imposed economic sanctions against Burma because of the human rights violations and drug involvement. It's really effective.

Also in the U.S., many students in colleges and universities got involved with local groups like the Free Burma Coalition which is the largest group of Burmese and American students working together to restore democracy in Burma by engaging in the boycott campaign against corporations that have investments in Burma. These companies support Burmese military regimes by purchasing products from Burma.

The other thing Americans can do is to write or call their local representatives to support legislation to ban imports from Burma and tighten sanctions against Burma. In this way they can effectively be involved and help the pro-democracy movement. I will say what Aung San Suu Kyi [1991 Noble Peace Prize recipient and Burmese pro-democracy leader] said, "You can use your liberty to promote ours."

YR: Do you see yourself going back to Burma? Do you hope to go back to Burma?

MZ: Yeah, I'm very hopeful. I'm always wanting to go back to my country, but not under the military dictatorship. I'm definitely going back to my country… also I miss my mom.

YR: What state is the Burmese pro-democracy movement in right now? Are you making progress?

MZ: Sure, we are making progress, but it depends on several factors. Most importantly is international pressure, to what extent the international community can coordinate with each other and put more concerted pressure on the Burmese government. On the part of the Burmese movement, we are trying our best — we've been trying our best for more than 14 years. We need the international community's assistance to move our democracy movement.

YR: Speaking of international commitment, what has the Bush administration done?

MZ: Well the Burmese government recently hired lobbyists from DCI, which is very close to the Bush administration. And they have been lobbying the Bush administration to relax its economic sanctions against Burma… this is something we should monitor.

YR: You'll be going back to Asia soon. What are your future projects and plans?

MZ: I'm going back to Thailand soon and I'll resume my magazine work. I'm also working for a radio station based in Washington DC. I'm also thinking about studying ethnic languages. I'm from the Burman majority group. If we want to envision a future federal union, we need to study the ethnic minority plight and struggle so that we can reach a mutual understanding.

YR: What's the name of your magazine?

MZ: Irrawaddy. You can visit it at http://www.irrawaddy.org/. You can also visit the Free Burma Coalition website at http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/.

— Margarita Rossi is political and proud.

http://www.youthradio.org/politics/020812_burma.shtml