Irrawaddy Online, Thursday, March 27, 2008
Time’s up, Gambari!
By MIN ZIN
The United Nation's mediation efforts in Burma have become snared in a trap. The special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is now caught between an unsuccessful mediation and his reluctance to admit failure.
Frustration abounds. Gambari appears to have become the target of mounting disappointments. Most Burmese opposition groups would say he deserves it.
During his briefing on Burma with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on March 18, Gambari seemed anxious to prove how important his role as special envoy really was. Though he admitted his efforts had yielded “no immediate tangible outcome,” he insisted the efforts of the UN good offices were “relevant” to both sides—the opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime. Gambari even said in his briefing that he had reason to believe that the Burmese government attaches importance to his mission and "continues to value the Secretary-General's good offices as the best prospect for further cooperation through mutual trust and confidence, and constructive suggestions."
Unfortunately, the facts do not allow the special envoy grounds for such optimism. According to highly publicized state media reports, Burmese Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan urged him to support the junta’s “Seven-step Road map” and stop pursuing alternatives suggested by Western democracies.
The regime's information czar added that if Gambari tried to force the country to meet Western calls for reform, “We would be concerned that your task of offering impartial advice may be undermined.” As a clear indication of the regime's lack of cooperation, military chief Than Shwe, the only true decision-maker in Burma, shunned Gambari on his last two visits.
In fact, the junta has already rejected the UN's key proposals. It turned down suggestions that Burma should set up a broad-based constitutional revising commission in order to ensure an inclusive political process, and establish a poverty alleviation commission. After the two proposals were rejected, Gambari, on his last trip to the country, put forward one more suggestion to the junta—that Burma invite international observers to the upcoming referendum.
Reportedly, the junta's information minister responded with a blunt “no.”
Additionally, senior Burmese military officials announced that the new constitution would bar Aung San Suu Kyi from running in future elections because she was previously married to a foreigner, a British scholar, who died of cancer nine years ago.
Gambari's failure has become so severe that he could not even manage to persuade the Security Council members to release a much-anticipated Presidential Statement after his briefing. However, the Council may release a Presidential Statement on Burma next week, thanks to the hard work of US-led Western democracies. Council members are now negotiating the language of the statement. However, no one should expect a strong statement from the UNSC, a diplomat warned. "It will be a statement with a very mild tone," said a source close to the UN.The faith of Burmese dissident groups in Gambari's mission is about to hit rock bottom.
"We hoped he (Gambari) would ask the Council to strengthen the mandate of the Secretary-General in pressuring the junta for an all party-inclusive, transparent and democratic process of national reconciliation in our country. However, to our surprise and sadness, he misled the Council," read a joint statement issued by the All Burma Monks Alliance and the 88 Generation Students group on March 26.
In fact, there may be a valid reason to consider broader factors for his ineffectiveness and do justice to Gambari.
"Mr Gambari's efforts should be understood in a larger context, instead of over-focusing on his diplomatic skill. The success of Gambari's mission depends on the readiness of key international players to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "At the same time, we also need to review how Gambari engages the junta; whether or not he adheres to the line of principled engagement."
UN officials maintain that "the role of the good offices is still very intact" and "very much a work in progress."
"I do understand there is the expression of frustration, but you can't expect miracles to happen to a situation that has been going years and years," said Choi Soung-ah, a UN spokeswoman. "Mr Gambari currently is the world's only tie into the government of Myanmar [Burma]. From the UN perspective, it is very important not to take drastic action immediately because we don't want to shut down the only channel."
This channel, however, can prompt disservice to genuine international mediation efforts on Burma. According to senior diplomats in Europe, the argument prevailing among Asian countries—including China and even some European nations—is that they support the UN special envoy's mediation. So long as Gambari says his mission is relevant and can yield positive results, they will not undermine him. They will support him—and wait and see.
"In fact, they justify their handoff policy by hiding behind Gambari's mission," a senior diplomat from the EU told The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. "Unless Gambari admits that he can't do anything with the present mandate, he is unwittingly dragging the mediation effort into the swamp. No better alternative will be found."
Aung Din, the executive director of the US Campaign for Burma, agrees."Burma is now being hijacked by Gambari," said Aung Din. "His effort has failed miserably again and again and again. Unless the mission is enhanced and strengthened by the UN Security Council, nothing positive can be expected. But instead of admitting that, he is still acting like he remains relevant and can do magic. It is a high disservice to international mediation efforts. For the people of Burma, we feel betrayed."
In fact, Gambari has already exhausted his capacity for persuasion, the principal source of leverage that a mediator wields. Instead of drowning himself further in quagmire, he may want to use another source of leverage—his own termination. As a mediator, he can say "I withdraw now. I can't make any progress with the current mandate. I need stronger Security Council support to deal with the Burmese generals."
Of course, his withdrawal will not have a direct impact on the military junta—the generals in Naypyidaw are not so sensitive to such threats. But it will make China and Asean feel more pressured to cooperate with Western democracies to resolve Burma's crisis.
At least, it will be easier for US-led Western democracies to compel China and Asean (especially two current Council members: Indonesia and Vietnam) to approve a stronger Council mandate for the UN special envoy. All in all, if Gambari uses the threat of withdrawal skillfully it could yield a greater opportunity to raise the Burma issue in the UN Security Council.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=11134
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Silencing the 'Saffron Revolution'
Silencing the 'Saffron Revolution'
by Min Zin
Posted March 25, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)
On Feb. 15, the military stormed the offices of the Myanmar Nation and took my brother, the weekly journal's editor in chief, to jail. His crime? Possession of a United Nation’s report on the ruling junta’s brutal crackdown on last September’s demonstrations by monks and democracy activists—the so-called Saffron Revolution.
My brother's name is Thet Zin, and he is one of hundreds of Burmese citizens who struggle to tell the truth about what is happening in their country—whether through traditional forms of journalism or through the Internet—under threat of arrest or worse by the military regime.
Indeed, even as the Burmese military promises the United Nations it will implement its "Roadmap to Democracy," the generals are stepping up their crackdown on the media. News of my brother's arrest was painful, but I should have been prepared for it. This kind of brutal repression and disregard for freedom of speech is the defining phenomenon of daily life in Burma.
The irony here is that my brother, who was a political prisoner in 1988, has not been involved in clandestine political activities or activist groups since he began working as a reporter and editor for several legally published weekly journals in the early 2000s. He founded Myanmar Nation Weekly, where he worked as editor in chief until his arrest, in 2006.
When the military raided the offices of Myanmar Nation, they discovered video footage of last September's Buddhist monk-led protests, a copy of the aforementioned report by U.N. Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, and a book about federalism written by a veteran Shan ethnic leader. Along with my brother, his office manager, Sein Win Maung, was also arrested. The authorities confiscated mobile phones and computer hard-drives during the raid.
In early March, both were charged under section 17/20 of the Printers and Publishers Registration Law. The court cited the U.N. report as evidence of possessing "illegal material" in order to set up a case against my brother. If found guilty, they could serve up to seven years' imprisonment. The publication of Myanmar Nation has also been suspended since their arrest.
Sadly, my brother's case is not uncommon. In the wake of last September's protests, the military has stepped up its crackdown on the media and severely curtailed freedom of expression. At least 20 journalists have been arrested in the past six months, although many were released after severe interrogations. According to Reporters Without Borders, 11 journalists are known to be imprisoned in Burma, including 78-year-old U Win Tin, who has been in jail since July 1989.
The exile-based Burmese Media Association (BMA), however, places the number of imprisoned writers—including journalists, poets, fiction writers, etc.—at 30. These journalists, writers and poets, who exercise their free speech as a birthright, add to the more than 1,800 political prisoners who, according to Human Rights Watch, are still behind bars.
Since the Buddhist monk-led protests of September last year, about a dozen publications in Burma have been banned or suspended for allegedly failing to follow the directives of the regime’s censorship board.
Burma, which enjoyed perhaps the liveliest free press in Southeast Asia until the 1962 military coup, is now facing some of the severest media repression in the nation’s history. The Burmese military launched a "fight media with media" campaign in 2005 in order to "rebuff the unfair and baseless news produced by the Western media." The junta's notorious censorship board has imposed ever more stringent restrictions on private publications. Journalists are pressured to write articles in line with the regime's views and policies. Journals and magazines are forced to print an increasing number of "planted" pro-junta articles.
"The situation is now getting worse and very rigid," says Zaw Thet Htwe, a well-known journalist inside Burma, who himself received the death penalty in 2003 for sending reports to the outside world, a sentence which was later reduced to three years imprisonment due to international pressure. "The news journals are increasingly facing a hard time due to the whimsical regulations. The atmosphere of fear and pressure for self-censorship has been growing."
Thankfully, the Burmese people's main sources of information remain free from the military's abuses. They are the daily Burmese language radio broadcasts from abroad by the BBC (Burmese Service), Voice of America (Burmese Service), Radio Free Asia, and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB).
At the height of the protests last year, large numbers of people (including military personnel) relied on these broadcasts for information. The regime’s anger was apparent in state-controlled newspapers and TV announcements that described the radio broadcasters as "killers on the airwaves" and "saboteurs" who were "airing a sky full of lies." In addition to radio, DVB launched a new Burmese language TV broadcast in May 2005 that can be received via satellite in Burma. The TV broadcast was a main source of news during the September protests.
Now, a new generation of Burmese has found another means of defying the junta's thought police: the Internet. Although less than 1% of the total population has access to the Internet in Burma, that 1% generally has access to cell phones, digital cameras and memory sticks and can disseminate information widely. During last September's protests, these "cyber dissidents"—citizen reporters and bloggers—posted hundreds of images and eyewitness accounts of the Saffron Revolution and the regime's brutality on the Internet.
Unlike the 1988 pro-democracy uprising—when the killing of at least 3,000 unarmed demonstrators received little international attention—images of violence against last fall's protestors, including the killing of Japanese journalist Kenji Nagai, spread fast throughout the world and helped ignite international outrage.
The regime, of course, responded by hunting down and arresting those who posted the images, and by further limiting access to the Internet. Internet café owners are now reportedly forced to install spy software provided by military intelligence officials that take automatic screen shots of user activity every five minutes. The monitoring results then have to be delivered to the military for surveillance.
Meanwhile, the military promises the outside world that it is marching toward "democracy" with its constitutional referendum in May and new elections in 2010. But nearly all observers agree that the military’s constitution won't lead to legitimate political freedom or national reconciliation. Violations of human rights are expected to continue, as are repression and censorship of the media.
"Though the military promises reform by holding a constitutional referendum in May," says Maung Maung Myint, chairman of the Burmese Media Association, “the arrest of journalists and constraints on the free flow of information clearly demonstrate that the regime discourages any informed public debate on their draft constitution."
Clearly, my brother and other recently detained journalists are being held by the junta in an effort to spread fear among Burma’s defiant media in the run-up to the constitutional referendum. Without outside pressure, the sad fact is these tactics will likely succeed—and the Burmese people will continue to suffer under a repressive military dictatorship, and those brave journalists and writers willing to challenge Burma's censors will be silenced.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile in the United States.
http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/march/silencing-the-saffron-revolution
by Min Zin
Posted March 25, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)
On Feb. 15, the military stormed the offices of the Myanmar Nation and took my brother, the weekly journal's editor in chief, to jail. His crime? Possession of a United Nation’s report on the ruling junta’s brutal crackdown on last September’s demonstrations by monks and democracy activists—the so-called Saffron Revolution.
My brother's name is Thet Zin, and he is one of hundreds of Burmese citizens who struggle to tell the truth about what is happening in their country—whether through traditional forms of journalism or through the Internet—under threat of arrest or worse by the military regime.
Indeed, even as the Burmese military promises the United Nations it will implement its "Roadmap to Democracy," the generals are stepping up their crackdown on the media. News of my brother's arrest was painful, but I should have been prepared for it. This kind of brutal repression and disregard for freedom of speech is the defining phenomenon of daily life in Burma.
The irony here is that my brother, who was a political prisoner in 1988, has not been involved in clandestine political activities or activist groups since he began working as a reporter and editor for several legally published weekly journals in the early 2000s. He founded Myanmar Nation Weekly, where he worked as editor in chief until his arrest, in 2006.
When the military raided the offices of Myanmar Nation, they discovered video footage of last September's Buddhist monk-led protests, a copy of the aforementioned report by U.N. Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, and a book about federalism written by a veteran Shan ethnic leader. Along with my brother, his office manager, Sein Win Maung, was also arrested. The authorities confiscated mobile phones and computer hard-drives during the raid.
In early March, both were charged under section 17/20 of the Printers and Publishers Registration Law. The court cited the U.N. report as evidence of possessing "illegal material" in order to set up a case against my brother. If found guilty, they could serve up to seven years' imprisonment. The publication of Myanmar Nation has also been suspended since their arrest.
Sadly, my brother's case is not uncommon. In the wake of last September's protests, the military has stepped up its crackdown on the media and severely curtailed freedom of expression. At least 20 journalists have been arrested in the past six months, although many were released after severe interrogations. According to Reporters Without Borders, 11 journalists are known to be imprisoned in Burma, including 78-year-old U Win Tin, who has been in jail since July 1989.
The exile-based Burmese Media Association (BMA), however, places the number of imprisoned writers—including journalists, poets, fiction writers, etc.—at 30. These journalists, writers and poets, who exercise their free speech as a birthright, add to the more than 1,800 political prisoners who, according to Human Rights Watch, are still behind bars.
Since the Buddhist monk-led protests of September last year, about a dozen publications in Burma have been banned or suspended for allegedly failing to follow the directives of the regime’s censorship board.
Burma, which enjoyed perhaps the liveliest free press in Southeast Asia until the 1962 military coup, is now facing some of the severest media repression in the nation’s history. The Burmese military launched a "fight media with media" campaign in 2005 in order to "rebuff the unfair and baseless news produced by the Western media." The junta's notorious censorship board has imposed ever more stringent restrictions on private publications. Journalists are pressured to write articles in line with the regime's views and policies. Journals and magazines are forced to print an increasing number of "planted" pro-junta articles.
"The situation is now getting worse and very rigid," says Zaw Thet Htwe, a well-known journalist inside Burma, who himself received the death penalty in 2003 for sending reports to the outside world, a sentence which was later reduced to three years imprisonment due to international pressure. "The news journals are increasingly facing a hard time due to the whimsical regulations. The atmosphere of fear and pressure for self-censorship has been growing."
Thankfully, the Burmese people's main sources of information remain free from the military's abuses. They are the daily Burmese language radio broadcasts from abroad by the BBC (Burmese Service), Voice of America (Burmese Service), Radio Free Asia, and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB).
At the height of the protests last year, large numbers of people (including military personnel) relied on these broadcasts for information. The regime’s anger was apparent in state-controlled newspapers and TV announcements that described the radio broadcasters as "killers on the airwaves" and "saboteurs" who were "airing a sky full of lies." In addition to radio, DVB launched a new Burmese language TV broadcast in May 2005 that can be received via satellite in Burma. The TV broadcast was a main source of news during the September protests.
Now, a new generation of Burmese has found another means of defying the junta's thought police: the Internet. Although less than 1% of the total population has access to the Internet in Burma, that 1% generally has access to cell phones, digital cameras and memory sticks and can disseminate information widely. During last September's protests, these "cyber dissidents"—citizen reporters and bloggers—posted hundreds of images and eyewitness accounts of the Saffron Revolution and the regime's brutality on the Internet.
Unlike the 1988 pro-democracy uprising—when the killing of at least 3,000 unarmed demonstrators received little international attention—images of violence against last fall's protestors, including the killing of Japanese journalist Kenji Nagai, spread fast throughout the world and helped ignite international outrage.
The regime, of course, responded by hunting down and arresting those who posted the images, and by further limiting access to the Internet. Internet café owners are now reportedly forced to install spy software provided by military intelligence officials that take automatic screen shots of user activity every five minutes. The monitoring results then have to be delivered to the military for surveillance.
Meanwhile, the military promises the outside world that it is marching toward "democracy" with its constitutional referendum in May and new elections in 2010. But nearly all observers agree that the military’s constitution won't lead to legitimate political freedom or national reconciliation. Violations of human rights are expected to continue, as are repression and censorship of the media.
"Though the military promises reform by holding a constitutional referendum in May," says Maung Maung Myint, chairman of the Burmese Media Association, “the arrest of journalists and constraints on the free flow of information clearly demonstrate that the regime discourages any informed public debate on their draft constitution."
Clearly, my brother and other recently detained journalists are being held by the junta in an effort to spread fear among Burma’s defiant media in the run-up to the constitutional referendum. Without outside pressure, the sad fact is these tactics will likely succeed—and the Burmese people will continue to suffer under a repressive military dictatorship, and those brave journalists and writers willing to challenge Burma's censors will be silenced.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile in the United States.
http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/march/silencing-the-saffron-revolution
Monday, March 10, 2008
Min Zin: Let Lenin meet YouTube and set Burma free
Aktuálně.cz (Online Interview)
18:40 10.3.2008 Pavel Vondra
Min Zin: Let Lenin meet YouTube and set Burma free
Prague - Despite his young age, Min Zin can already be considered a veteran of pro-democracy struggle in his native Burma. He became involved in the movement at the age of 14, when he founded a nationwide high school student union.
By doing that he buried his parents´ hopes he would ever obtain a degree from a Burmese univeristy but at the same time he helped ressurect hopes of his nation to see the end of the hated military rule in the country.
Min Zin closely worked with Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. In 1989, he was forced into hiding. During this period he was dismissed from school and constantly chased by the military intelligence.
Following the 1996 December student demonstration he fled to the Thai-Burma border. Thereafter, he worked as a deputy editor for the exile magazine Irrawaddy.
Min Zin came to the United States in August 2001 as a visiting scholar at the School of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley. He later joined the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia.
Min Zin is a member of the Rudolf Vrba Jury at this year's One World Film Festival in Prague. He was also one of the speakers at last week's seminar titled Dissidents and Freedom, organized by the festival with the help of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Černínský Palace in Prague.
READ MORE: Havel sounds call for dissidents across world to unite
Today Min Zin was answering questions posed by the readers of Aktuálně.cz in an on-line interview:
Q: Would you recommend travelling to Burma? I was there last year and saw group tours of Spanish people who cared about nothing else but buying souvenirs and it really made me sick.
Bagan is listed as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. Its ancient pagodas and prefect sunsets attract a lot of touristsvětší obrázekAutor: Pavel Vondra
Min Zin writes: The opposition movement in Burma calls for travel boycott, not because they don't like travelling per se, but because military uses forced labor for building tourist infrastructure and etc. But to me, I don't mind individual travelling or responsible touring so long as you try your best not to spend money for military owned big hotels and other facilities. (It is hard but you can find some ways to do so).
I may have more reservation or reluctance for institution or groups tour because military can exploit it not only for financial reasons but also for public relation reasons by citing these big tour groups.
Q: Aren't you afraid of the possible ethnic violence and civil war in case of the current regime's fall?
Min Zin writes: Well, Burma has been already described as a failing or failed state. Civil war has been there for 50 years. The longest and being forgotten one! Forced labor, child soldier, human rights violations, severe violence in ethnic areas, about 2,000 political prisoners, corruption, humanitarian crisis, etc - you name it.
The country ranks at the bottom in all these categories - check the reports of UN, AI, HRW, RSF, CPJ, Freedom House, Transparency International, EU, US State Dept, etc. Check also the annual Failed State Index of Foreign Policy magazine for reference. I think it is not even time to rank Burma in failed state category, it is now time to act and stop more bloodshed and violence.
Infobox
Hit them where it hurts. China pressured over Burma
A call from Prague: Dictators of the world, go to hell
Snowball gets rolling. Havel calls for action on Burma
Machine gun rounds instead of democracy
Q: What is your worst experience from Burma? Have you ever witnessed torture, rape or killing of civilians which the Burmese military are often accused of?
Min Zin writes: I saw several killings (shooting events) in front of my very eyes when I took part in the public protests in August 1988 (08-08-88 Movement.) I was then a high school student of 14 years old. Then I have known many of my colleagues being tortured in prison (including my siblings) and died in prison (my uncle, close colleagues, childhood friends and etc). When arrived at the Thai - Burma border where I met many ethnic women who suffered from military's abuses including rape. These are well documented as well.
Q: How do people in Burma perceive Aung San Suu Kyi? Do they know her at all?
Min Zin writes: Of course, ASSK is the only hope for Burma if the country needs to proceed the transition. Let alone the people from the heartland who admire her father as a hero from the struggle for independence, but more importantly the ethnic minority groups, who fight for autonomy for 50 years, support her. Even ordinary soldiers supported her. When you look at 1990 elections results, military districts voted for her party. She has been perceived as the one who rally the whole country for reconciliation and nation-building.
Q: Can the current negotiations between opposition and government lead to anything?
Min Zin writes: There is no negotiation going on between the regime and opposition. They staged a few meetings with ASSK, in the wake of Saffron Revolution (protests) in September last year, in order to defuse international pressure. Now things go back to square one. They have excluded opposition led by ASSK once and for all from future elections and political process. That's where the real contention lies for now.
Min Zin sitting next to ex-president Václav Havel at a seminar Dissidents and Freedom held at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairsvětší obrázekAutor: Naďa Straková
Q: Good afternoon, I would like to know your opinion on how the current regime could be changed into a democratic one. Is there a way that world can help you with this? And do you agree with the guerilla war against the regime?
Min Zin writes: I don't think the violent resistance will help the situation in Burma. But coordinated international pressure will help the situation. In this regard, it is important to get China to play responsibly in Burma issue. The US and EU can't outsource Burma problem to China, which itself is authoritarian country. But the West must push China to do more on Burma.
At the same time, civil-disobedient and civil society movement inside the country will make things different. But it is hard that "People Power" will defeat the united military, which is still willing to kill its own citizens. So encouraging the emergence of moderates within the ruling military is another thing to consider. In any case, (domestic as well as international) public actions are always needed to make change faster in Burma.
Q: Do you have relatives in Burma? Are you in touch with them? If so, how do you stay in touch, if it's not a secret? How are they doing?
Min Zin writes: Yes, I have two brothers and one sister in Burma. Unfortunately, my eldest brother Thet Zin was arrested by military regime in Feb 15, 2008. He is the editor of a weekly journal in Burma. His office was raided for 3 times in a week. He was tortured during interrogation. Now he is being charged with possession of illegal materials. It means when they raided his office, the human rights report of UN Human Right Envoy to Burma was confiscated by military. Having a HR report is illegal in Burma.
He said to his wife that he might likely to face minimum 10 years imprisonment for this charge. He is a former political prisoner too. He was arrested in 1988 student protests. You can google the arrest of my brother and the case. US president also entioned his name in his recent public statement. The Amnesty Ineternational, HRW and etc also highlighted on his case. I fact, almost every members of my family got arrested in past 20 years for their non-violent political involvement.
Q: Do you believe that (UN special envoy for Myanmar Ibrahim) Gambari's visits can force the Burmese government to actually do something? Wouldn't it be better to put pressure on China, India or ASEAN?
UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari and Aung San Suu Kyi during his visit in Burma in the fall last yearvětší obrázekZdroj: Reuters
Min Zin writes: No. Gambari's mission is failure. Why? His mandate is basically coming from the UN General Assembly. Not from UN Security Council. So he doesn't have enforcement capacity. His mission is always at the mercy of Burmese regime and its key ally China. Unless his mission was strengthened by UNSC, he will be toothless. In order to get UNSC's official backing, the West needs to work on China.
Without China's coercive persuasion, junta will not make any positive move. But diplomacy alone will not work in pushing China. International public action is needed, especially Olympic is approaching and China has significant sensitivity to its image. For the time being, I don't see any strong/persistent or coordinated efforts in diplomacy and public actions regarding pressing China for acceptable Burmese political transition.
Q: Can I ask you for your opinion about the upcoming elections (in Burma)? And what do you think about Burmese government refusing to invite UN monitors for the ballot?
Q: Min Zin writes: Burmese junta rejected all proposals/suggestions made by UN - 1. To form constitutional review commission to make sure inclusive political process, 2. To form poverty alleviation commission to lessen the humanitarian and economic crisis, 3- (as the regime reused the first two, UN proposed the last one) to allow UN monitor. But the regime rejected all. They excuse that international observers will violate sovereignty. But it is absurd. Instead, the acceptance of international observers will make its standing strong, not weaken in terms o sovereignty.
Burmese soldiers during last September's violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Rangoon. Various sources put the number of victims of the crackdown between thirty and two hundredvětší obrázekZdroj: Reuters
The constitutional referendum will not be free and fair, and the new election will not be inclusive as Aung san Suu Kyi and the opposition activists will be not allowed to contest. The so-called political roadmap the junta is now implementing is not roadmap to democracy (even not to initial political transition) but to slavery because constitution allow military to stay above the law (e.g. military chief has right to take power legally if he thinks the country is under emergency situation. it means he has rights to stage coup legally.)
Q: Hello, did you see the latest Rambo movie, where the title hero is fighting the Burmese soldiers? What do you think about the movie? I wish you good luck.
Min Zin writes: Yes, I watched the movie. This movie raised considerable level of awareness in the world. But I don't think I am for the Rambo-typed fight. The opposition movement in Burma led by Aung San Suu Kyi is not calling for any violent actions domestically or from international community. They don't even call for the regime change. What they always call for (especially more clear in he Buddhist monks-led protests in last year) is national reconciliation. They call for a meaningful political dialogue in which the democratic opposition, ethnic minority groups and military will sit together for talk and negotiate for the compromise. The opposition always say that military is part of the problem as well as must be part of the solution. We need smooth political transition in Burma.
Road from Rangoon to Beijing is a bloody one, activists point outvětší obrázekAutor: Pavel Vondra
Q: Were you disappointed by the decision of IOC which granted Beijing the right to host this year's Olympic Games? If I'm not mistaken, Beijing is the closest ally the Burmese junta has. Do you believe that the free world should boycot the games, as some activists suggest?
Min Zin writes: Some activists have talked about boycott, but most realize this is not possible as you know that US President is even going to join the Beijing Olympics. But what many of Burmese democracy activists inside and abroad are now calling for is at least you can pledge not to view the opening ceremony of the game on the TV and not buying Olympic merchandise etc. as a demonstration of protest on part of free world against Chinese communist government who supported the regimes in Burma, Sudan and other dictatorial countries.
Burmese activists are now collecting at least 1 millions pledge from the world to make such pledge. Anyway, we will series of democracy and human rights and environmental related protests organized by international advocates and local people and media coverage in this multi-media world. As one journalist said, this Olympic Game is where Lenin will meet YouTube.
http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=523603
18:40 10.3.2008 Pavel Vondra
Min Zin: Let Lenin meet YouTube and set Burma free
Prague - Despite his young age, Min Zin can already be considered a veteran of pro-democracy struggle in his native Burma. He became involved in the movement at the age of 14, when he founded a nationwide high school student union.
By doing that he buried his parents´ hopes he would ever obtain a degree from a Burmese univeristy but at the same time he helped ressurect hopes of his nation to see the end of the hated military rule in the country.
Min Zin closely worked with Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. In 1989, he was forced into hiding. During this period he was dismissed from school and constantly chased by the military intelligence.
Following the 1996 December student demonstration he fled to the Thai-Burma border. Thereafter, he worked as a deputy editor for the exile magazine Irrawaddy.
Min Zin came to the United States in August 2001 as a visiting scholar at the School of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley. He later joined the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia.
Min Zin is a member of the Rudolf Vrba Jury at this year's One World Film Festival in Prague. He was also one of the speakers at last week's seminar titled Dissidents and Freedom, organized by the festival with the help of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Černínský Palace in Prague.
READ MORE: Havel sounds call for dissidents across world to unite
Today Min Zin was answering questions posed by the readers of Aktuálně.cz in an on-line interview:
Q: Would you recommend travelling to Burma? I was there last year and saw group tours of Spanish people who cared about nothing else but buying souvenirs and it really made me sick.
Bagan is listed as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. Its ancient pagodas and prefect sunsets attract a lot of touristsvětší obrázekAutor: Pavel Vondra
Min Zin writes: The opposition movement in Burma calls for travel boycott, not because they don't like travelling per se, but because military uses forced labor for building tourist infrastructure and etc. But to me, I don't mind individual travelling or responsible touring so long as you try your best not to spend money for military owned big hotels and other facilities. (It is hard but you can find some ways to do so).
I may have more reservation or reluctance for institution or groups tour because military can exploit it not only for financial reasons but also for public relation reasons by citing these big tour groups.
Q: Aren't you afraid of the possible ethnic violence and civil war in case of the current regime's fall?
Min Zin writes: Well, Burma has been already described as a failing or failed state. Civil war has been there for 50 years. The longest and being forgotten one! Forced labor, child soldier, human rights violations, severe violence in ethnic areas, about 2,000 political prisoners, corruption, humanitarian crisis, etc - you name it.
The country ranks at the bottom in all these categories - check the reports of UN, AI, HRW, RSF, CPJ, Freedom House, Transparency International, EU, US State Dept, etc. Check also the annual Failed State Index of Foreign Policy magazine for reference. I think it is not even time to rank Burma in failed state category, it is now time to act and stop more bloodshed and violence.
Infobox
Hit them where it hurts. China pressured over Burma
A call from Prague: Dictators of the world, go to hell
Snowball gets rolling. Havel calls for action on Burma
Machine gun rounds instead of democracy
Q: What is your worst experience from Burma? Have you ever witnessed torture, rape or killing of civilians which the Burmese military are often accused of?
Min Zin writes: I saw several killings (shooting events) in front of my very eyes when I took part in the public protests in August 1988 (08-08-88 Movement.) I was then a high school student of 14 years old. Then I have known many of my colleagues being tortured in prison (including my siblings) and died in prison (my uncle, close colleagues, childhood friends and etc). When arrived at the Thai - Burma border where I met many ethnic women who suffered from military's abuses including rape. These are well documented as well.
Q: How do people in Burma perceive Aung San Suu Kyi? Do they know her at all?
Min Zin writes: Of course, ASSK is the only hope for Burma if the country needs to proceed the transition. Let alone the people from the heartland who admire her father as a hero from the struggle for independence, but more importantly the ethnic minority groups, who fight for autonomy for 50 years, support her. Even ordinary soldiers supported her. When you look at 1990 elections results, military districts voted for her party. She has been perceived as the one who rally the whole country for reconciliation and nation-building.
Q: Can the current negotiations between opposition and government lead to anything?
Min Zin writes: There is no negotiation going on between the regime and opposition. They staged a few meetings with ASSK, in the wake of Saffron Revolution (protests) in September last year, in order to defuse international pressure. Now things go back to square one. They have excluded opposition led by ASSK once and for all from future elections and political process. That's where the real contention lies for now.
Min Zin sitting next to ex-president Václav Havel at a seminar Dissidents and Freedom held at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairsvětší obrázekAutor: Naďa Straková
Q: Good afternoon, I would like to know your opinion on how the current regime could be changed into a democratic one. Is there a way that world can help you with this? And do you agree with the guerilla war against the regime?
Min Zin writes: I don't think the violent resistance will help the situation in Burma. But coordinated international pressure will help the situation. In this regard, it is important to get China to play responsibly in Burma issue. The US and EU can't outsource Burma problem to China, which itself is authoritarian country. But the West must push China to do more on Burma.
At the same time, civil-disobedient and civil society movement inside the country will make things different. But it is hard that "People Power" will defeat the united military, which is still willing to kill its own citizens. So encouraging the emergence of moderates within the ruling military is another thing to consider. In any case, (domestic as well as international) public actions are always needed to make change faster in Burma.
Q: Do you have relatives in Burma? Are you in touch with them? If so, how do you stay in touch, if it's not a secret? How are they doing?
Min Zin writes: Yes, I have two brothers and one sister in Burma. Unfortunately, my eldest brother Thet Zin was arrested by military regime in Feb 15, 2008. He is the editor of a weekly journal in Burma. His office was raided for 3 times in a week. He was tortured during interrogation. Now he is being charged with possession of illegal materials. It means when they raided his office, the human rights report of UN Human Right Envoy to Burma was confiscated by military. Having a HR report is illegal in Burma.
He said to his wife that he might likely to face minimum 10 years imprisonment for this charge. He is a former political prisoner too. He was arrested in 1988 student protests. You can google the arrest of my brother and the case. US president also entioned his name in his recent public statement. The Amnesty Ineternational, HRW and etc also highlighted on his case. I fact, almost every members of my family got arrested in past 20 years for their non-violent political involvement.
Q: Do you believe that (UN special envoy for Myanmar Ibrahim) Gambari's visits can force the Burmese government to actually do something? Wouldn't it be better to put pressure on China, India or ASEAN?
UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari and Aung San Suu Kyi during his visit in Burma in the fall last yearvětší obrázekZdroj: Reuters
Min Zin writes: No. Gambari's mission is failure. Why? His mandate is basically coming from the UN General Assembly. Not from UN Security Council. So he doesn't have enforcement capacity. His mission is always at the mercy of Burmese regime and its key ally China. Unless his mission was strengthened by UNSC, he will be toothless. In order to get UNSC's official backing, the West needs to work on China.
Without China's coercive persuasion, junta will not make any positive move. But diplomacy alone will not work in pushing China. International public action is needed, especially Olympic is approaching and China has significant sensitivity to its image. For the time being, I don't see any strong/persistent or coordinated efforts in diplomacy and public actions regarding pressing China for acceptable Burmese political transition.
Q: Can I ask you for your opinion about the upcoming elections (in Burma)? And what do you think about Burmese government refusing to invite UN monitors for the ballot?
Q: Min Zin writes: Burmese junta rejected all proposals/suggestions made by UN - 1. To form constitutional review commission to make sure inclusive political process, 2. To form poverty alleviation commission to lessen the humanitarian and economic crisis, 3- (as the regime reused the first two, UN proposed the last one) to allow UN monitor. But the regime rejected all. They excuse that international observers will violate sovereignty. But it is absurd. Instead, the acceptance of international observers will make its standing strong, not weaken in terms o sovereignty.
Burmese soldiers during last September's violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Rangoon. Various sources put the number of victims of the crackdown between thirty and two hundredvětší obrázekZdroj: Reuters
The constitutional referendum will not be free and fair, and the new election will not be inclusive as Aung san Suu Kyi and the opposition activists will be not allowed to contest. The so-called political roadmap the junta is now implementing is not roadmap to democracy (even not to initial political transition) but to slavery because constitution allow military to stay above the law (e.g. military chief has right to take power legally if he thinks the country is under emergency situation. it means he has rights to stage coup legally.)
Q: Hello, did you see the latest Rambo movie, where the title hero is fighting the Burmese soldiers? What do you think about the movie? I wish you good luck.
Min Zin writes: Yes, I watched the movie. This movie raised considerable level of awareness in the world. But I don't think I am for the Rambo-typed fight. The opposition movement in Burma led by Aung San Suu Kyi is not calling for any violent actions domestically or from international community. They don't even call for the regime change. What they always call for (especially more clear in he Buddhist monks-led protests in last year) is national reconciliation. They call for a meaningful political dialogue in which the democratic opposition, ethnic minority groups and military will sit together for talk and negotiate for the compromise. The opposition always say that military is part of the problem as well as must be part of the solution. We need smooth political transition in Burma.
Road from Rangoon to Beijing is a bloody one, activists point outvětší obrázekAutor: Pavel Vondra
Q: Were you disappointed by the decision of IOC which granted Beijing the right to host this year's Olympic Games? If I'm not mistaken, Beijing is the closest ally the Burmese junta has. Do you believe that the free world should boycot the games, as some activists suggest?
Min Zin writes: Some activists have talked about boycott, but most realize this is not possible as you know that US President is even going to join the Beijing Olympics. But what many of Burmese democracy activists inside and abroad are now calling for is at least you can pledge not to view the opening ceremony of the game on the TV and not buying Olympic merchandise etc. as a demonstration of protest on part of free world against Chinese communist government who supported the regimes in Burma, Sudan and other dictatorial countries.
Burmese activists are now collecting at least 1 millions pledge from the world to make such pledge. Anyway, we will series of democracy and human rights and environmental related protests organized by international advocates and local people and media coverage in this multi-media world. As one journalist said, this Olympic Game is where Lenin will meet YouTube.
http://aktualne.centrum.cz/czechnews/clanek.phtml?id=523603
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
Saturday, March 1, 2008
Compassionate Confrontation
CULTURE, Irrawaddy Magazine, MARCH, 2008 - VOLUME 16 NO.3
Compassionate Confrontation
By MIN ZIN
For the Buddhist principle of loving-kindness to work in the world of Burmese politics, it must be combined with skillful means
In “The Eight Victories of Buddha,” a Burmese song that extols the Enlightened one’s conquest of ill will and anger through metta, or loving-kindness, we learn how Angulimala, a legendary psychopath of Buddhist lore, was literally stopped in his tracks by compassion.
Angulimala was a ruthless killer who was about to slay his mother to complete his garland of 1,000 fingers (each one taken from a different victim), until the Buddha stepped in to prevent this act of matricide, which would have condemned Angulimala to millennia in hell. Enraged, the mass murderer turned his fury on the Buddha.
Even with his formidable speed, however, Angulimala could not overtake his new nemesis. He ran at him like the madman he was, but still could not catch the Buddha, who simply walked on, calm and serene.
Exhausted and furious at his failure, Angulimala screamed at the Buddha to stop. In a quiet voice, the Buddha told his would-be attacker that he had already stopped—he had stopped killing and harming living beings, and now it was time for him, Angulimala, to do likewise.
Angulimala was so struck by these words that there and then he threw away his weapons and became a disciple of the Buddha.
This dramatic tale is familiar to almost every Burmese Buddhist as an illustration of the power of metta, the first of the four brahma vihara (byama so in Burmese), the “heavenly abodes” or divine states of mind. It is also the most powerful, since it supports the other three—compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity.
Metta, usually rendered as “loving-kindness” in English, is a strong wish for the well-being and happiness of all living things. A mind with metta is inclusive and nondiscriminatory and has the power to transform any situation. This is what the Buddha taught and exemplified.
As the Burmese monks who participated in last September’s protests demonstrated, metta is not an attitude of passive acquiescence. Metta does not accept evil, but confronts it directly with a force that is its exact opposite.
In times of trouble, the revered Sangha, or community of monks, cannot merely insulate itself from the suffering of ordinary people. The monks who protested in Burma showed that they are not just peace lovers, but peacemakers. They did not stop at praying for the benefit of the Burmese people, but took to the streets to oppose the malice manifested in the exclusionary politics of military domination.
Monks—from Kachin State in the north to Mon State in the south, and from Arakan State in the west to Karen State in the east—chanted the “Metta Sutta”, the discourse on loving-kindness, as they marched through the streets in the thousands. As growing numbers of ordinary citizens joined them, they invoked the words of the Buddha: “May you be free from all danger. May your anger cease. May your heart and mind enjoy peace and serenity.”
Aung San Suu Kyi once observed that without metta, it can be difficult to achieve freedom from fear: “If there is a lack of metta, it may be a lack in yourself or in those around you, so you feel insecure. And insecurity leads to fear.”
And fear, all too often, leads to violence. The regime clearly saw the “metta movement” as a threat to their hold on power and reacted with deadly force, killing dozens of protestors and imprisoning hundreds of others. They even raided several monasteries in their efforts to eradicate the movement.
But the leaders of the movement remain unbowed in spirit. U Gambira, one of the monks who spearheaded last September’s uprising, once told this author that Burma’s monks would continue their struggle to uphold the Dhamma for the sake of the people, no matter what the consequences for themselves. Since then, U Gambira has joined countless others in Burma’s gulag.
Other monks inside Burma have vowed to honor U Gambira’s pledge. Although they realize their movement has lost much of its momentum since the regime’s crackdown, they insist that it remains their duty to bring the ethics of metta back into Burmese politics. Failing to do so, they say, would be a betrayal of the truth of the Dhamma propounded by the Buddha.
Of course, conviction alone will not achieve victory in the struggle between metta and military might. Wisdom is also needed.
The Buddha’s teachings emphasize the need to balance metta with wisdom. Both are essential qualities in a leader, who must make decisions for the benefit of all.
While wisdom identifies the ultimate good towards which we must strive, as well as the means of achieving this goal, metta provides the energizing strength needed to help us realize our highest aspirations.
Buddhists sometimes refer to upaya, or skillful means, when considering which actions to take. This concept is more closely associated with Mahayana Buddhism than with the Theravada tradition which prevails in Burma, but it is also a part of the Burmese cultural lexicon. Under the principle of upaya, a Buddhist practitioner may use any means necessary to help ease people’s suffering and introduce them to the Dhamma.
Although the politics of compassionate confrontation is based on persuasion rather than coercion, the Burmese metta movement may want to apply this principle of upaya, so that when they say to the modern Angulimalas in the military regime, “It is time for you to stop,” they will listen.
Min Zin is a US-based Burmese journalist.
Compassionate Confrontation
By MIN ZIN
For the Buddhist principle of loving-kindness to work in the world of Burmese politics, it must be combined with skillful means
In “The Eight Victories of Buddha,” a Burmese song that extols the Enlightened one’s conquest of ill will and anger through metta, or loving-kindness, we learn how Angulimala, a legendary psychopath of Buddhist lore, was literally stopped in his tracks by compassion.
Angulimala was a ruthless killer who was about to slay his mother to complete his garland of 1,000 fingers (each one taken from a different victim), until the Buddha stepped in to prevent this act of matricide, which would have condemned Angulimala to millennia in hell. Enraged, the mass murderer turned his fury on the Buddha.
Even with his formidable speed, however, Angulimala could not overtake his new nemesis. He ran at him like the madman he was, but still could not catch the Buddha, who simply walked on, calm and serene.
Exhausted and furious at his failure, Angulimala screamed at the Buddha to stop. In a quiet voice, the Buddha told his would-be attacker that he had already stopped—he had stopped killing and harming living beings, and now it was time for him, Angulimala, to do likewise.
Angulimala was so struck by these words that there and then he threw away his weapons and became a disciple of the Buddha.
This dramatic tale is familiar to almost every Burmese Buddhist as an illustration of the power of metta, the first of the four brahma vihara (byama so in Burmese), the “heavenly abodes” or divine states of mind. It is also the most powerful, since it supports the other three—compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity.
Metta, usually rendered as “loving-kindness” in English, is a strong wish for the well-being and happiness of all living things. A mind with metta is inclusive and nondiscriminatory and has the power to transform any situation. This is what the Buddha taught and exemplified.
As the Burmese monks who participated in last September’s protests demonstrated, metta is not an attitude of passive acquiescence. Metta does not accept evil, but confronts it directly with a force that is its exact opposite.
In times of trouble, the revered Sangha, or community of monks, cannot merely insulate itself from the suffering of ordinary people. The monks who protested in Burma showed that they are not just peace lovers, but peacemakers. They did not stop at praying for the benefit of the Burmese people, but took to the streets to oppose the malice manifested in the exclusionary politics of military domination.
Monks—from Kachin State in the north to Mon State in the south, and from Arakan State in the west to Karen State in the east—chanted the “Metta Sutta”, the discourse on loving-kindness, as they marched through the streets in the thousands. As growing numbers of ordinary citizens joined them, they invoked the words of the Buddha: “May you be free from all danger. May your anger cease. May your heart and mind enjoy peace and serenity.”
Aung San Suu Kyi once observed that without metta, it can be difficult to achieve freedom from fear: “If there is a lack of metta, it may be a lack in yourself or in those around you, so you feel insecure. And insecurity leads to fear.”
And fear, all too often, leads to violence. The regime clearly saw the “metta movement” as a threat to their hold on power and reacted with deadly force, killing dozens of protestors and imprisoning hundreds of others. They even raided several monasteries in their efforts to eradicate the movement.
But the leaders of the movement remain unbowed in spirit. U Gambira, one of the monks who spearheaded last September’s uprising, once told this author that Burma’s monks would continue their struggle to uphold the Dhamma for the sake of the people, no matter what the consequences for themselves. Since then, U Gambira has joined countless others in Burma’s gulag.
Other monks inside Burma have vowed to honor U Gambira’s pledge. Although they realize their movement has lost much of its momentum since the regime’s crackdown, they insist that it remains their duty to bring the ethics of metta back into Burmese politics. Failing to do so, they say, would be a betrayal of the truth of the Dhamma propounded by the Buddha.
Of course, conviction alone will not achieve victory in the struggle between metta and military might. Wisdom is also needed.
The Buddha’s teachings emphasize the need to balance metta with wisdom. Both are essential qualities in a leader, who must make decisions for the benefit of all.
While wisdom identifies the ultimate good towards which we must strive, as well as the means of achieving this goal, metta provides the energizing strength needed to help us realize our highest aspirations.
Buddhists sometimes refer to upaya, or skillful means, when considering which actions to take. This concept is more closely associated with Mahayana Buddhism than with the Theravada tradition which prevails in Burma, but it is also a part of the Burmese cultural lexicon. Under the principle of upaya, a Buddhist practitioner may use any means necessary to help ease people’s suffering and introduce them to the Dhamma.
Although the politics of compassionate confrontation is based on persuasion rather than coercion, the Burmese metta movement may want to apply this principle of upaya, so that when they say to the modern Angulimalas in the military regime, “It is time for you to stop,” they will listen.
Min Zin is a US-based Burmese journalist.
Saturday, February 16, 2008
Don't Push NLD into a Corner
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, February 16, 2008
Don't Push NLD into a Corner
By MIN ZIN
The present political crisis in Burma could be a model from William L. Ury and Richard Smoke’s political science thesis, “Anatomy of a Crisis”—a situation of “high stakes, short time, high uncertainty and narrowing options.”
In the pragmatic world of realpolitik, it means the opposition movement in Burma is now facing a serious predicament. When the military regime made the surprise announcement to set a timeline for a referendum in May and a general election in 2010, the opposition groups were caught off guard.
The junta decisively moved ahead with its own “Road Map” and ignored the persistent calls of opposition groups and the UN-led international community to modify the draft constitution and make the political process inclusive.
The political moral ground of the opposition movement, inside the country as well as in exile, has been based on the legitimacy of the 1990 election results in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory that has never been honored.
The opposition activists are now forced to prove the victory of 1990 election remains relevant in upcoming months. The stakes rise, indeed.
Several grassroots opposition groups, including the influential 88 Generation Students group and the Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks, recently vowed to launch a "Vote No” campaign against the regime's constitution. But many activists privately admit that the time crunch makes it difficult for them to mobilize a nationwide movement.
The military government's statement regarding the referendum and subsequent elections was vague and shrouded with uncertainties.
Furthermore, the regime has not revoked Law 5/96 of 1996, which provides for up to 20 years imprisonment for anyone who criticizes the government’s national convention and its constitution drafting effort.
To add to the dilemma, many ordinary people do not understand what a “Vote No” campaign really means—whether they are expected to boycott the referendum by shunning the poll stations or they have to physically vote against the constitution.
At the end of the day, no one knows what the regime will do if the public votes against their draft constitution.
"Will they spend another 20 years rewriting another constitution?” questioned a private tutor in Rangoon. "If so, enough is enough. I would rather just go for the flawed constitution."
The high level of uncertainty appears to weaken the opposition's message and game plan.
Even with such high stakes, the time crunch and all the uncertainties, the crisis would be less severe if the opposition had options.
"People must stand up against the referendum and say no to the regime's constitution," said Aung Thu Nyein, a Burmese analyst in exile. "I support the actions of the grassroots organizations, but they must make it clear that it is not a boycott against the referendum. The public must go to the polling stations and vote ‘No.’”
Several opposition activists and journalists have taken it a step further. They have called on the NLD to announce a clear policy to direct the public on the referendum issue and to take the initiative in the "Vote No” campaign.
Aung Thu Nyein disagrees. “It is not feasible to urge the NLD to lead the public in mobilizing a Vote No” campaign. The NLD must be flexible,” he said.
However, as long as the opposition activists and media view the NLD as the vanguard of the democracy movement, they will continually push the party to lead with a resolution at every turn.
But whether or not the NLD's current leadership—not forgetting the implications of Aung San Suu Kyi's long absence—remains at the forefront of the democracy movement will be called into question. The nature of the September uprising indicated that the NLD was not playing a leading role.
More importantly, it is a time for different political forces to play significant positions with a mature understanding of one another. The NLD should not run the risk of staking their political future on viewing the referendum—step four of the seven-step “Road Map”—as the final battleground.
“We have stated clearly from the beginning that we are against the undemocratic nature of the national convention and the draft constitution," Nyan Win, the NLD spokesman, announced in the wake of the government’s statement. “We will probably release our policy by the end of this month. But we don't think the referendum is the final fight for us.”
The NLD will continue to condemn the regime's draft constitution as unacceptable and to demand a free and fair referendum, but at the same time they want to appear to keep all options open, instead of totally rejecting the government’s Road Map or openly advocating a “Vote No” campaign.
Short of a better alternative, it seems to be the most pragmatic policy the party can adopt.
If the NLD sees the referendum as a final showdown and walks away from the Road Map, the party will very likely be sidelined from mainstream politics in future. If the NLD decide to engage in a “do or die” fight, the regime will gladly get into the ring and work at putting the opposition party out of action for good.
In truth, the NLD seems to be aware of this scenario and are determined to remain on legal ground.
"If the public approves the draft constitution in a credible referendum, we will respect the public's decision," said Nyan Win.
The NLD spokesman even hinted that the party does not reject the possibility of running for a fresh election in 2010, if the public decides to go ahead with the Road Map.
“Burma's road to democracy would be long term, independent of our activists' wishes for radical change," said Tin Maung Than, a well-known Burmese writer and analyst in exile. "The military, as a whole and as an institution, is not in a position to accept such a change. Burma needs some structural adjustment to lure a significant part of the military to cooperate with the people."
Naturally, the public—led by grassroots activists—must push in that direction. A mass movement will always be needed to bring about that change.
The people of Burma should support the “Vote No” campaign against the draft constitution. If the fight is won, it may prompt a shake up in Naypyidaw. The military government would be forced to reconfigure their options. Combined with international pressure, a new opportunity for dialogue might present itself.
Whether this particular fight is won or not, the NLD must prepare to go on. In politics, a crisis can be cleverly managed with a well calculated strategic move.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10427
Don't Push NLD into a Corner
By MIN ZIN
The present political crisis in Burma could be a model from William L. Ury and Richard Smoke’s political science thesis, “Anatomy of a Crisis”—a situation of “high stakes, short time, high uncertainty and narrowing options.”
In the pragmatic world of realpolitik, it means the opposition movement in Burma is now facing a serious predicament. When the military regime made the surprise announcement to set a timeline for a referendum in May and a general election in 2010, the opposition groups were caught off guard.
The junta decisively moved ahead with its own “Road Map” and ignored the persistent calls of opposition groups and the UN-led international community to modify the draft constitution and make the political process inclusive.
The political moral ground of the opposition movement, inside the country as well as in exile, has been based on the legitimacy of the 1990 election results in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory that has never been honored.
The opposition activists are now forced to prove the victory of 1990 election remains relevant in upcoming months. The stakes rise, indeed.
Several grassroots opposition groups, including the influential 88 Generation Students group and the Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks, recently vowed to launch a "Vote No” campaign against the regime's constitution. But many activists privately admit that the time crunch makes it difficult for them to mobilize a nationwide movement.
The military government's statement regarding the referendum and subsequent elections was vague and shrouded with uncertainties.
Furthermore, the regime has not revoked Law 5/96 of 1996, which provides for up to 20 years imprisonment for anyone who criticizes the government’s national convention and its constitution drafting effort.
To add to the dilemma, many ordinary people do not understand what a “Vote No” campaign really means—whether they are expected to boycott the referendum by shunning the poll stations or they have to physically vote against the constitution.
At the end of the day, no one knows what the regime will do if the public votes against their draft constitution.
"Will they spend another 20 years rewriting another constitution?” questioned a private tutor in Rangoon. "If so, enough is enough. I would rather just go for the flawed constitution."
The high level of uncertainty appears to weaken the opposition's message and game plan.
Even with such high stakes, the time crunch and all the uncertainties, the crisis would be less severe if the opposition had options.
"People must stand up against the referendum and say no to the regime's constitution," said Aung Thu Nyein, a Burmese analyst in exile. "I support the actions of the grassroots organizations, but they must make it clear that it is not a boycott against the referendum. The public must go to the polling stations and vote ‘No.’”
Several opposition activists and journalists have taken it a step further. They have called on the NLD to announce a clear policy to direct the public on the referendum issue and to take the initiative in the "Vote No” campaign.
Aung Thu Nyein disagrees. “It is not feasible to urge the NLD to lead the public in mobilizing a Vote No” campaign. The NLD must be flexible,” he said.
However, as long as the opposition activists and media view the NLD as the vanguard of the democracy movement, they will continually push the party to lead with a resolution at every turn.
But whether or not the NLD's current leadership—not forgetting the implications of Aung San Suu Kyi's long absence—remains at the forefront of the democracy movement will be called into question. The nature of the September uprising indicated that the NLD was not playing a leading role.
More importantly, it is a time for different political forces to play significant positions with a mature understanding of one another. The NLD should not run the risk of staking their political future on viewing the referendum—step four of the seven-step “Road Map”—as the final battleground.
“We have stated clearly from the beginning that we are against the undemocratic nature of the national convention and the draft constitution," Nyan Win, the NLD spokesman, announced in the wake of the government’s statement. “We will probably release our policy by the end of this month. But we don't think the referendum is the final fight for us.”
The NLD will continue to condemn the regime's draft constitution as unacceptable and to demand a free and fair referendum, but at the same time they want to appear to keep all options open, instead of totally rejecting the government’s Road Map or openly advocating a “Vote No” campaign.
Short of a better alternative, it seems to be the most pragmatic policy the party can adopt.
If the NLD sees the referendum as a final showdown and walks away from the Road Map, the party will very likely be sidelined from mainstream politics in future. If the NLD decide to engage in a “do or die” fight, the regime will gladly get into the ring and work at putting the opposition party out of action for good.
In truth, the NLD seems to be aware of this scenario and are determined to remain on legal ground.
"If the public approves the draft constitution in a credible referendum, we will respect the public's decision," said Nyan Win.
The NLD spokesman even hinted that the party does not reject the possibility of running for a fresh election in 2010, if the public decides to go ahead with the Road Map.
“Burma's road to democracy would be long term, independent of our activists' wishes for radical change," said Tin Maung Than, a well-known Burmese writer and analyst in exile. "The military, as a whole and as an institution, is not in a position to accept such a change. Burma needs some structural adjustment to lure a significant part of the military to cooperate with the people."
Naturally, the public—led by grassroots activists—must push in that direction. A mass movement will always be needed to bring about that change.
The people of Burma should support the “Vote No” campaign against the draft constitution. If the fight is won, it may prompt a shake up in Naypyidaw. The military government would be forced to reconfigure their options. Combined with international pressure, a new opportunity for dialogue might present itself.
Whether this particular fight is won or not, the NLD must prepare to go on. In politics, a crisis can be cleverly managed with a well calculated strategic move.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10427
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Ban Kimoon Must Go to Burma
Ban Ki-moon Must Go to Burma
by Min Zin
Posted February 13, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)
Burma's military junta is testing the response of the international community. When world leaders say they are “concerned” about the situation in Burma, then “increasingly concerned,” then “gravely concerned,” and then—inexplicably—just “concerned” again, the generals in the Naypyidaw jungle smile and push forward with their hard-line stance.
It is hardly surprising that the junta is refusing an immediate return of United Nation's Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and defying the U.N.'s calls for an inclusive national reconciliation process, now that the regime feels confident it is bringing the country back under control after its deadly crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations last September.
The generals even rejected the U.N.'s proposal to establish a poverty alleviation commission to address the country's humanitarian crisis, clearly demonstrating the regime's criminal disregard for the Burmese people's welfare.
Indeed, despite U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's repeated warnings that return to the status quo in Burma is not acceptable, that is precisely what is happening. The U.N. and other key international players realize the momentum for international mediation in Burma is fading and are trying to regain it with a swift return visit by Special Envoy Gambari. The Burmese authorities, however, say they will not approve the special envoy's itinerary until mid-April.
Each time the international community bends to the junta's will, the generals are emboldened. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations caved in to the junta's demands by not allowing Special Envoy Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Burma celebrated their victory by stepping up oppression at home and canceling a scheduled visit by Mr. Gambari.
Some Burma lobbyists blame the failure of the special envoy's mission on the weakness of the secretary-general's mandate. “The Burma mandate of Ban Ki-moon, which has now been given by the U.N. General Assembly, must be enhanced and strengthened by the U.N. Security Council,” says Aung Din, executive director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma. But the chances of such an initiative are slim, given China's permanent seat on the Security Council. In other words, the secretary-general may not want to risk a China veto.
Another possible mechanism, apart from a stronger U.N. Security Council mandate, is the “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,” a group of 14 nations—Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Secretary-General Ban convened the first meeting of the group last Dec. 19 to assist him in his efforts to spur change in Burma. The Group is officially described as “a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in support of the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate,” and meets informally as needed.
Many analysts wonder if the Group could evolve into multiparty talks on the North Korea model. Some Burma advocates in the U.S. have suggested that the secretary-general convene the next meeting of the Group in an Asian capital such as Jakarta or Beijing, thus drawing regional leaders into the mediation efforts.
In any event, Secretary-General Ban needs to make a decisive move to strengthen his office's role. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group called for the direct involvement of Mr. Ban, saying: “It would be useful for Ban Ki-moon to get more personally involved, particularly at times when negotiations may appear to be deadlocked.” It even urged the secretary-general to pay a personal visit to Naypyidaw in the near future.
Burma's National League for Democracy said it would like to see such a visit. “If Gambari's attempt continues to fail in bringing results,” says NLD spokesman Nyan Win, “Ban Ki-moon himself should visit Burma and let the military generals know clearly that the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable.”
Diplomatic sources in New York say U.N. officials are concerned about possible embarrassment for the secretary-general if the Burmese junta publicly rejects his entreaties. This week, as NLD members bravely protested outside their headquarters in Yangon, the secretary-general once again urged the junta to allow Special Envoy Gambari to return and move forward with talks with the NLD leadership.
Clearly, this isn't enough. It's time for Ban Ki-moon to call for a new U.N. Security Council mandate on Burma, to mobilize the “Friends of Myanmar,” and lastly to make a personal visit to Naypyidaw. The Burmese people's suffering under the military boot is far greater than any possible discomfiture the secretary-general may experience by being rejected by either the regime or its closest ally, China.
Unless the international community, led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, compels the Burmese junta to feel the cost of rejecting the U.N.'s mediation efforts in Burma, the prospect for reform in the country will remain hopeless.The secretary-general must try his best for Burma.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/2008/february/Ban-Ki-moon-Must-Go-to-Burma
by Min Zin
Posted February 13, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)
Burma's military junta is testing the response of the international community. When world leaders say they are “concerned” about the situation in Burma, then “increasingly concerned,” then “gravely concerned,” and then—inexplicably—just “concerned” again, the generals in the Naypyidaw jungle smile and push forward with their hard-line stance.
It is hardly surprising that the junta is refusing an immediate return of United Nation's Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and defying the U.N.'s calls for an inclusive national reconciliation process, now that the regime feels confident it is bringing the country back under control after its deadly crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations last September.
The generals even rejected the U.N.'s proposal to establish a poverty alleviation commission to address the country's humanitarian crisis, clearly demonstrating the regime's criminal disregard for the Burmese people's welfare.
Indeed, despite U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's repeated warnings that return to the status quo in Burma is not acceptable, that is precisely what is happening. The U.N. and other key international players realize the momentum for international mediation in Burma is fading and are trying to regain it with a swift return visit by Special Envoy Gambari. The Burmese authorities, however, say they will not approve the special envoy's itinerary until mid-April.
Each time the international community bends to the junta's will, the generals are emboldened. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations caved in to the junta's demands by not allowing Special Envoy Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Burma celebrated their victory by stepping up oppression at home and canceling a scheduled visit by Mr. Gambari.
Some Burma lobbyists blame the failure of the special envoy's mission on the weakness of the secretary-general's mandate. “The Burma mandate of Ban Ki-moon, which has now been given by the U.N. General Assembly, must be enhanced and strengthened by the U.N. Security Council,” says Aung Din, executive director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma. But the chances of such an initiative are slim, given China's permanent seat on the Security Council. In other words, the secretary-general may not want to risk a China veto.
Another possible mechanism, apart from a stronger U.N. Security Council mandate, is the “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,” a group of 14 nations—Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Secretary-General Ban convened the first meeting of the group last Dec. 19 to assist him in his efforts to spur change in Burma. The Group is officially described as “a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in support of the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate,” and meets informally as needed.
Many analysts wonder if the Group could evolve into multiparty talks on the North Korea model. Some Burma advocates in the U.S. have suggested that the secretary-general convene the next meeting of the Group in an Asian capital such as Jakarta or Beijing, thus drawing regional leaders into the mediation efforts.
In any event, Secretary-General Ban needs to make a decisive move to strengthen his office's role. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group called for the direct involvement of Mr. Ban, saying: “It would be useful for Ban Ki-moon to get more personally involved, particularly at times when negotiations may appear to be deadlocked.” It even urged the secretary-general to pay a personal visit to Naypyidaw in the near future.
Burma's National League for Democracy said it would like to see such a visit. “If Gambari's attempt continues to fail in bringing results,” says NLD spokesman Nyan Win, “Ban Ki-moon himself should visit Burma and let the military generals know clearly that the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable.”
Diplomatic sources in New York say U.N. officials are concerned about possible embarrassment for the secretary-general if the Burmese junta publicly rejects his entreaties. This week, as NLD members bravely protested outside their headquarters in Yangon, the secretary-general once again urged the junta to allow Special Envoy Gambari to return and move forward with talks with the NLD leadership.
Clearly, this isn't enough. It's time for Ban Ki-moon to call for a new U.N. Security Council mandate on Burma, to mobilize the “Friends of Myanmar,” and lastly to make a personal visit to Naypyidaw. The Burmese people's suffering under the military boot is far greater than any possible discomfiture the secretary-general may experience by being rejected by either the regime or its closest ally, China.
Unless the international community, led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, compels the Burmese junta to feel the cost of rejecting the U.N.'s mediation efforts in Burma, the prospect for reform in the country will remain hopeless.The secretary-general must try his best for Burma.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/2008/february/Ban-Ki-moon-Must-Go-to-Burma
Saturday, February 2, 2008
The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, February 2, 2008
The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma
By MIN ZIN
When Indonesian dictator Suharto died last Sunday, Burmese-language short-wave radio stations and other Burmese media based abroad gave the news extensive coverage and offered comparative analyses. They attempted to draw similarities and contrasts between Suharto and Burma’s late tyrant Ne Win, and between the different directions the two countries have taken in their development.
Many experts noted that although Suharto was a vicious dictator, he raised the Indonesian economy to “Asian Tiger” status in the 1980s. Ne Win and his successors, on the other hand, have turned Burma into a failed state. All lamented Burma’s slide into its current condition of economic deprivation.
In fact, Burma introduced economic reforms after the military staged a coup in 1988. According to reports, cumulative foreign investment in the period from 1988 through early 1997 reached $6.1 billion. Some optimists even said that investors seeking the next “tiger” economy should set their sights on Burma.
However, despite the country’s opening of its economy to foreign investors, overall economic progress remained slow. Economist David Dapice attributed this to the government’s reluctance to undertake comprehensive reforms, choosing instead to implement reforms in a “half-hearted way”.
Then the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck. At first, Rangoon was unconcerned, as the country was not directly impacted by the plummeting value of a number of key Asian currencies. But when investors from other Asian countries began to shift away from high-risk ventures and started reneging on their investment promises in order to limit their losses in the crisis, Burma also got hit hard. The military regime made matters worse by failing to come up with sound economic policies in response to the crisis. The unreal economic boom went bust.
In fact, the junta has neither the capacity nor the political will to carry out far-reaching economic reforms, because they are afraid that any such move would threaten the interests of military elites, forcing them to turn their economic playground into a level playing field. They worry that allowing technocratic participation, much less public involvement, in the policymaking process would weaken their grip on power and deprive them of the prerogatives they currently enjoy. “Technocrats and experts such as economists and respected bureaucrats need to be viewed as important human resources and [their role should be] enhanced in Myanmar (Burma),” said Khin Maung Nyo, a well-known economist and writer in Burma. “They serve to help formulate economic policies, and the availability of policy choices makes it easy for government to implement reforms to build a modern, developed nation,” the economist added.
However, military involvement in political and economic affairs has from the outset been much deeper in Burma than in Indonesia and other countries in the region, where technocrats have long played a key role in formulating economic policies and guiding subsequent growth.
Broadly speaking, the junta has failed to form a growth coalition involving the military, opposition elites, ethnic ceasefire groups, technocrats, business groups, and the bureaucracy—all of whom need to work together to shape meaningful economic reforms.
In fact, several Burmese economists abroad and inside Burma have attempted to persuade the generals to secure such broad domestic support for economic reforms. In early 2007, a well-known economist inside Burma approached late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win to set up a consultative forum. Although Soe Win was said to have supported the idea, the junta’s supremo, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, shot it down.
Business sources note that other reform plans have stalled or been aborted because of Than Shwe’s preoccupation with ensuring his own survival.
“Than Shwe calls the shots on everything,” said Sein Htay, an economist in exile. “No one dares to initiate major reforms unless Than Shwe gives the final order.”
Since 2005, dozens of business people and economists have reportedly been consulted for their input into the drafting of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law, which will designate six main commercial cities as free-trade zones, with the aim of bringing more foreign investment into the country to revitalize its crippled economy. The much-anticipated and hyped SEZ Law, which was supposed to be enacted in 2007, has yet to come into effect, as Than Shwe continues to drag his heels.
“Than Shwe is afraid of the emergence of the Thilawa SEZ in Rangoon,” said a businessman in Rangoon. “He does not even want to bring limited liberalization to a limited zone. He is too concerned with security issues, especially after the September protests.”
Several economists suggest that the state urgently needs to readjust its role in economic policy formulation and implementation. They say that if the state reduced its over-dominant role and allowed the private sector to play a greater part in the economy, the authoritarian regime would be able to undertake economic reforms.
“Centralization must be relaxed,” said Maw Than, a former vice chancellor of Institute of Economics in Rangoon. “A pro-business attitude should be nurtured and broader consultation should be sought after. Advice must be given serious consideration for the benefit of society.”
However, the strongman who leads the ruling junta with an iron fist cares little about what the experts have to say. The military mindset of the regime means that its decision-making process is strictly top-down. Under the leadership of Than Shwe, the Burmese economy will continue going to dogs.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10128
The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma
By MIN ZIN
When Indonesian dictator Suharto died last Sunday, Burmese-language short-wave radio stations and other Burmese media based abroad gave the news extensive coverage and offered comparative analyses. They attempted to draw similarities and contrasts between Suharto and Burma’s late tyrant Ne Win, and between the different directions the two countries have taken in their development.
Many experts noted that although Suharto was a vicious dictator, he raised the Indonesian economy to “Asian Tiger” status in the 1980s. Ne Win and his successors, on the other hand, have turned Burma into a failed state. All lamented Burma’s slide into its current condition of economic deprivation.
In fact, Burma introduced economic reforms after the military staged a coup in 1988. According to reports, cumulative foreign investment in the period from 1988 through early 1997 reached $6.1 billion. Some optimists even said that investors seeking the next “tiger” economy should set their sights on Burma.
However, despite the country’s opening of its economy to foreign investors, overall economic progress remained slow. Economist David Dapice attributed this to the government’s reluctance to undertake comprehensive reforms, choosing instead to implement reforms in a “half-hearted way”.
Then the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck. At first, Rangoon was unconcerned, as the country was not directly impacted by the plummeting value of a number of key Asian currencies. But when investors from other Asian countries began to shift away from high-risk ventures and started reneging on their investment promises in order to limit their losses in the crisis, Burma also got hit hard. The military regime made matters worse by failing to come up with sound economic policies in response to the crisis. The unreal economic boom went bust.
In fact, the junta has neither the capacity nor the political will to carry out far-reaching economic reforms, because they are afraid that any such move would threaten the interests of military elites, forcing them to turn their economic playground into a level playing field. They worry that allowing technocratic participation, much less public involvement, in the policymaking process would weaken their grip on power and deprive them of the prerogatives they currently enjoy. “Technocrats and experts such as economists and respected bureaucrats need to be viewed as important human resources and [their role should be] enhanced in Myanmar (Burma),” said Khin Maung Nyo, a well-known economist and writer in Burma. “They serve to help formulate economic policies, and the availability of policy choices makes it easy for government to implement reforms to build a modern, developed nation,” the economist added.
However, military involvement in political and economic affairs has from the outset been much deeper in Burma than in Indonesia and other countries in the region, where technocrats have long played a key role in formulating economic policies and guiding subsequent growth.
Broadly speaking, the junta has failed to form a growth coalition involving the military, opposition elites, ethnic ceasefire groups, technocrats, business groups, and the bureaucracy—all of whom need to work together to shape meaningful economic reforms.
In fact, several Burmese economists abroad and inside Burma have attempted to persuade the generals to secure such broad domestic support for economic reforms. In early 2007, a well-known economist inside Burma approached late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win to set up a consultative forum. Although Soe Win was said to have supported the idea, the junta’s supremo, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, shot it down.
Business sources note that other reform plans have stalled or been aborted because of Than Shwe’s preoccupation with ensuring his own survival.
“Than Shwe calls the shots on everything,” said Sein Htay, an economist in exile. “No one dares to initiate major reforms unless Than Shwe gives the final order.”
Since 2005, dozens of business people and economists have reportedly been consulted for their input into the drafting of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law, which will designate six main commercial cities as free-trade zones, with the aim of bringing more foreign investment into the country to revitalize its crippled economy. The much-anticipated and hyped SEZ Law, which was supposed to be enacted in 2007, has yet to come into effect, as Than Shwe continues to drag his heels.
“Than Shwe is afraid of the emergence of the Thilawa SEZ in Rangoon,” said a businessman in Rangoon. “He does not even want to bring limited liberalization to a limited zone. He is too concerned with security issues, especially after the September protests.”
Several economists suggest that the state urgently needs to readjust its role in economic policy formulation and implementation. They say that if the state reduced its over-dominant role and allowed the private sector to play a greater part in the economy, the authoritarian regime would be able to undertake economic reforms.
“Centralization must be relaxed,” said Maw Than, a former vice chancellor of Institute of Economics in Rangoon. “A pro-business attitude should be nurtured and broader consultation should be sought after. Advice must be given serious consideration for the benefit of society.”
However, the strongman who leads the ruling junta with an iron fist cares little about what the experts have to say. The military mindset of the regime means that its decision-making process is strictly top-down. Under the leadership of Than Shwe, the Burmese economy will continue going to dogs.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10128
Sunday, January 27, 2008
The China Factor
Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday January 27, 2008
The China Factor
Diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role in resolving the situation in Burma - action from the global public is needed, writes MIN ZIN
A few weeks after the protests last year in Burma, a Chinese diplomat approached an influential Burmese advocate in New York and asked why the Burmese dubbed their protest the "Saffron Revolution."
"The diplomat was obviously quite uncomfortable with this particular name, which he whispered to me," said the Burmese advocate, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Chinese are very sensitive to the 'colour revolutions'," she added.
In the wake of successful "colour revolutions" such as Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution - victories of nonviolent democracy movements in post-communist countries - Beijing is anxious to prevent similar occurrences at home or among its neighbours.
Then a country in its own backyard triggered the "Saffron Revolution", and the military's subsequent crackdown captured the world's attention. Along with the crisis in Burma, China was drawn into the spotlight with unflattering coverage in international media, and diplomatic pressure increased to withdraw its support of one of the world's most odious regimes. Public outcry across the globe called on China to assume a larger role in helping to resolve the crisis.
However, contrary to common perceptions, China is not a patron that pulls the strings, and the self-isolated, delusive Burmese regime is not a puppet. In fact, China has limited sway with the junta's generals. The relationship runs in both directions. This complicates Burma's problems and their resolution.
Of course, China has more power and influence on the generals than any other country. It also intends to use that leverage to its own benefit.
According to Chinese diplomats, Beijing has been gradually changing its Burma policy since the removal of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2004, and this has accelerated since the recent deadly crackdown in Burma. However, the diplomats warn that the policy shift should not be expected to be quick or dramatic. It will be slow and well-calculated.
"Than Shwe and Maung Aye are more intransigent than former dictator Ne Win, and they often do incredibly silly things," said a Chinese official during a meeting with a Burmese opposition activist. "China knows that Burma will not prosper under their leadership."
China's special envoy, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, was sent to Burma in November. He met with the junta's top leader, Senior-General Than Shwe, and asked the military "to resolve the pending issues through consultation, so as to speed up the democratisation process."
However, the regime responded that it will go at its own pace in the unilateral implementation of its "Seven-Step Road Map," according to a Western diplomat.
"The Chinese keep telling us that the international community is overstating their influence with the Burmese generals," said the diplomat. "Beijing says they don't have ability to tell the regime what to do."
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese analyst living on the China-Burma border, disagrees with that interpretation.
"Persuasion, without power backup, will not work. The soft-soft approach should be changed. China must show the stick part of its diplomacy," said Aung Kyaw Zaw.
Tipping Toward Responsibility
At the present time, Beijing is clearly not ready to apply real pressure to the junta. It still believes that working to resolve Burma's problems is secondary to pursuing its principal economic and strategic interests.
But simultaneously, China would like to solidify an international role as "a responsible stakeholder."
The time has come for concerted international diplomatic pressure on China to tip the balance toward responsibility. China must consider the sentiments of Thucydides: An amoral foreign policy is neither practical nor prudent.
Protesters in Bangkok calling for an end to the brutal use of force by the Burmese military junta against its people during the crackdown last year.
At the same time, it should be obvious that the United States and the European Union cannot outsource Burma's transition to democracy to China, which itself lacks democracy.
The West's most powerful countries should coordinate with China to facilitate a real transition in conflict-ridden Burma.
However, diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role. Public action on a global scale is needed.
"China was very annoyed to see the wave of protests taking place outside its embassies in major cities around the world in the wake of the September protests," said Aung Kyaw Zaw. "More importantly, they were really worried when demonstrators linked Burma's cause with a 2008 Olympic boycott."
China is very anxious to prevent any negative effect on the Olympic games. The vice mayor of Beijing warned in October 2007 that any move to link China's role in Burma to a boycott of the 2008 Olympics would be "inappropriate and unpopular."
China's leadership might even accommodate its Burma policy and give more support to the UN's Burma mediation role if they sensed a possibility of real damage to the much-hyped gala this summer, even though it might be a tactical and temporal accommodation.
However, the Burmese opposition has so far failed to seize and exploit this opportunity effectively. During the peak of Burma 's "Saffron Revolution", The Washington Post labelled one of its editorials the "Saffron Olympics", highlighting the dynamics of an international campaign against the summer Olympics. But that effort has run out of steam.
"The Burmese opposition in exile cannot accelerate the campaign in a consistent manner," said Nyo Ohn Myint, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area). "Our campaigners are going after ad hoc protests without a focus. We fail to form a wider coalition with other Olympic detractors. Unless we can launch a coordinated international grassroots action, China will not be swayed to our direction."
Beijing plans to start its Olympic festivities on 8/8/08, a date that is surprisingly similar to the 20th anniversary of Burma's "Four Eight ( 8/8/88 ) Democracy Movement."
Whether or not the heirs to the movement can make the most out of this coincidence remains to be seen.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
The China Factor
Diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role in resolving the situation in Burma - action from the global public is needed, writes MIN ZIN
A few weeks after the protests last year in Burma, a Chinese diplomat approached an influential Burmese advocate in New York and asked why the Burmese dubbed their protest the "Saffron Revolution."
"The diplomat was obviously quite uncomfortable with this particular name, which he whispered to me," said the Burmese advocate, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Chinese are very sensitive to the 'colour revolutions'," she added.
In the wake of successful "colour revolutions" such as Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution - victories of nonviolent democracy movements in post-communist countries - Beijing is anxious to prevent similar occurrences at home or among its neighbours.
Then a country in its own backyard triggered the "Saffron Revolution", and the military's subsequent crackdown captured the world's attention. Along with the crisis in Burma, China was drawn into the spotlight with unflattering coverage in international media, and diplomatic pressure increased to withdraw its support of one of the world's most odious regimes. Public outcry across the globe called on China to assume a larger role in helping to resolve the crisis.
However, contrary to common perceptions, China is not a patron that pulls the strings, and the self-isolated, delusive Burmese regime is not a puppet. In fact, China has limited sway with the junta's generals. The relationship runs in both directions. This complicates Burma's problems and their resolution.
Of course, China has more power and influence on the generals than any other country. It also intends to use that leverage to its own benefit.
According to Chinese diplomats, Beijing has been gradually changing its Burma policy since the removal of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2004, and this has accelerated since the recent deadly crackdown in Burma. However, the diplomats warn that the policy shift should not be expected to be quick or dramatic. It will be slow and well-calculated.
"Than Shwe and Maung Aye are more intransigent than former dictator Ne Win, and they often do incredibly silly things," said a Chinese official during a meeting with a Burmese opposition activist. "China knows that Burma will not prosper under their leadership."
China's special envoy, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, was sent to Burma in November. He met with the junta's top leader, Senior-General Than Shwe, and asked the military "to resolve the pending issues through consultation, so as to speed up the democratisation process."
However, the regime responded that it will go at its own pace in the unilateral implementation of its "Seven-Step Road Map," according to a Western diplomat.
"The Chinese keep telling us that the international community is overstating their influence with the Burmese generals," said the diplomat. "Beijing says they don't have ability to tell the regime what to do."
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese analyst living on the China-Burma border, disagrees with that interpretation.
"Persuasion, without power backup, will not work. The soft-soft approach should be changed. China must show the stick part of its diplomacy," said Aung Kyaw Zaw.
Tipping Toward Responsibility
At the present time, Beijing is clearly not ready to apply real pressure to the junta. It still believes that working to resolve Burma's problems is secondary to pursuing its principal economic and strategic interests.
But simultaneously, China would like to solidify an international role as "a responsible stakeholder."
The time has come for concerted international diplomatic pressure on China to tip the balance toward responsibility. China must consider the sentiments of Thucydides: An amoral foreign policy is neither practical nor prudent.
Protesters in Bangkok calling for an end to the brutal use of force by the Burmese military junta against its people during the crackdown last year.
At the same time, it should be obvious that the United States and the European Union cannot outsource Burma's transition to democracy to China, which itself lacks democracy.
The West's most powerful countries should coordinate with China to facilitate a real transition in conflict-ridden Burma.
However, diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role. Public action on a global scale is needed.
"China was very annoyed to see the wave of protests taking place outside its embassies in major cities around the world in the wake of the September protests," said Aung Kyaw Zaw. "More importantly, they were really worried when demonstrators linked Burma's cause with a 2008 Olympic boycott."
China is very anxious to prevent any negative effect on the Olympic games. The vice mayor of Beijing warned in October 2007 that any move to link China's role in Burma to a boycott of the 2008 Olympics would be "inappropriate and unpopular."
China's leadership might even accommodate its Burma policy and give more support to the UN's Burma mediation role if they sensed a possibility of real damage to the much-hyped gala this summer, even though it might be a tactical and temporal accommodation.
However, the Burmese opposition has so far failed to seize and exploit this opportunity effectively. During the peak of Burma 's "Saffron Revolution", The Washington Post labelled one of its editorials the "Saffron Olympics", highlighting the dynamics of an international campaign against the summer Olympics. But that effort has run out of steam.
"The Burmese opposition in exile cannot accelerate the campaign in a consistent manner," said Nyo Ohn Myint, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area). "Our campaigners are going after ad hoc protests without a focus. We fail to form a wider coalition with other Olympic detractors. Unless we can launch a coordinated international grassroots action, China will not be swayed to our direction."
Beijing plans to start its Olympic festivities on 8/8/08, a date that is surprisingly similar to the 20th anniversary of Burma's "Four Eight ( 8/8/88 ) Democracy Movement."
Whether or not the heirs to the movement can make the most out of this coincidence remains to be seen.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
Saturday, January 26, 2008
Burma Under Siege
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, January 26, 2008
Burma Under Siege
By MIN ZIN
After the September uprising, the Burmese junta regained control over opposition groups and activists, but whether it achieved a stronger strategic position remains doubtful.
A series of bomb blasts in the past two weeks demonstrates one of two things: the security issue is still potentially troublesome for the military or, if opposition charges are true, the junta itself was the source of the bomb blasts, which can be used to blame powerful, disruptive organizations.
There were four explosions within one week, killing at least three civilians and injuring five others. The first blast occurred on January 11 at the railway station serving the country's capital, Naypyidaw. It was the first incident of a bombing in the new capital.
As the bombs were going off, the regime and ethnic, armed opposition groups traded allegations.
The junta accused the Karen National Union (KNU) and an unspecified "foreign organization" of sending "terrorist saboteurs with explosives across the border to perpetrate destructive acts inside the country." Many observers believe the "foreign organization" was a reference to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
"They are not making this allegation lightly," said a well-informed source inside Burma. "No matter whether the allegation is true or not, it’s a well-calculated charge that is being interpreted within the military establishment in the context of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman's recent call for the US to use its military capabilities in Burma."
The influential senator wrote an opinion piece in October 2007, suggesting the Bush administration should actively investigate US military and intelligence capabilities could be used to put additional pressure on the regime. Lieberman said, "We should be examining how the junta's ability to command and control its forces throughout the country might itself be disrupted."
But opposition groups and the media dismissed the accusation of a "foreign organization" involvement as a ridiculous charge. The KNU also denied carrying out any attacks targeting civilians.
The opposition speculated that the regime itself could be behind the bombings in the hope of raising a perception of threat against the military, offering an excuse to continue its crack down against known democracy activists and the KNU.
Some exiled Burmese analysts even point to bitter military intelligence members who were purged in 2004 for orchestrating the bombings. Theories abound.
Meanwhile, security has been increased in Rangoon, Pegu and other major cities. Local authorities in some cities even reportedly detained and questioned residents who had recently returned from Thailand after working there as migrants.
In fact, the bombings underscore the vulnerability of the junta's leadership, no matter the source.
Even if the regime uses the bombings as a justification to continue its crackdown against opposition groups, it underscores its fear of the opposition. If the bombings were self-inflicted and meant to shore up unity within the Tatmadaw (armed forces), it’s a sign the junta is unsure of the loyalty of officers and soldiers.
"It is less likely that the junta orchestrated the recent explosions," said Win Min, a Burmese analyst who studies civil-military relations in Burma. "I don't think the military would stage an attack in Naypyidaw, the capital they extol and take pride in. In fact, it is not necessary for them to use bombings to justify their crackdowns on the oppositions."
In fact, since 1988 the military’s image, in the eyes of the domestic public as well as abroad, has descended to rock bottom, while the opposition, including the armed ethnic groups, is seen as democratic freedom fighters.
The September demonstrations again allowed Burmese society to witness mindless killing and brutality directed against Buddhist monks and civilians. As result, the morale of the military, including some senior officers, is at its lowest ebb in years.
Moreover, the generals have pushed the limit of the international community including their regional supporters.
Under the current circumstances, the last thing the generals want is to be seen as weak.
An unfortunate consequence of this deep sense of vulnerability is that it hardens Snr-Gen Than Shwe's thinking. Under the spell of a bunker mentality, the military leadership will continue to dig in their heels and new reforms are less likely.
Than Shwe's regime is now determined to entrench its power in non-negotiable terms.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10044
Burma Under Siege
By MIN ZIN
After the September uprising, the Burmese junta regained control over opposition groups and activists, but whether it achieved a stronger strategic position remains doubtful.
A series of bomb blasts in the past two weeks demonstrates one of two things: the security issue is still potentially troublesome for the military or, if opposition charges are true, the junta itself was the source of the bomb blasts, which can be used to blame powerful, disruptive organizations.
There were four explosions within one week, killing at least three civilians and injuring five others. The first blast occurred on January 11 at the railway station serving the country's capital, Naypyidaw. It was the first incident of a bombing in the new capital.
As the bombs were going off, the regime and ethnic, armed opposition groups traded allegations.
The junta accused the Karen National Union (KNU) and an unspecified "foreign organization" of sending "terrorist saboteurs with explosives across the border to perpetrate destructive acts inside the country." Many observers believe the "foreign organization" was a reference to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
"They are not making this allegation lightly," said a well-informed source inside Burma. "No matter whether the allegation is true or not, it’s a well-calculated charge that is being interpreted within the military establishment in the context of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman's recent call for the US to use its military capabilities in Burma."
The influential senator wrote an opinion piece in October 2007, suggesting the Bush administration should actively investigate US military and intelligence capabilities could be used to put additional pressure on the regime. Lieberman said, "We should be examining how the junta's ability to command and control its forces throughout the country might itself be disrupted."
But opposition groups and the media dismissed the accusation of a "foreign organization" involvement as a ridiculous charge. The KNU also denied carrying out any attacks targeting civilians.
The opposition speculated that the regime itself could be behind the bombings in the hope of raising a perception of threat against the military, offering an excuse to continue its crack down against known democracy activists and the KNU.
Some exiled Burmese analysts even point to bitter military intelligence members who were purged in 2004 for orchestrating the bombings. Theories abound.
Meanwhile, security has been increased in Rangoon, Pegu and other major cities. Local authorities in some cities even reportedly detained and questioned residents who had recently returned from Thailand after working there as migrants.
In fact, the bombings underscore the vulnerability of the junta's leadership, no matter the source.
Even if the regime uses the bombings as a justification to continue its crackdown against opposition groups, it underscores its fear of the opposition. If the bombings were self-inflicted and meant to shore up unity within the Tatmadaw (armed forces), it’s a sign the junta is unsure of the loyalty of officers and soldiers.
"It is less likely that the junta orchestrated the recent explosions," said Win Min, a Burmese analyst who studies civil-military relations in Burma. "I don't think the military would stage an attack in Naypyidaw, the capital they extol and take pride in. In fact, it is not necessary for them to use bombings to justify their crackdowns on the oppositions."
In fact, since 1988 the military’s image, in the eyes of the domestic public as well as abroad, has descended to rock bottom, while the opposition, including the armed ethnic groups, is seen as democratic freedom fighters.
The September demonstrations again allowed Burmese society to witness mindless killing and brutality directed against Buddhist monks and civilians. As result, the morale of the military, including some senior officers, is at its lowest ebb in years.
Moreover, the generals have pushed the limit of the international community including their regional supporters.
Under the current circumstances, the last thing the generals want is to be seen as weak.
An unfortunate consequence of this deep sense of vulnerability is that it hardens Snr-Gen Than Shwe's thinking. Under the spell of a bunker mentality, the military leadership will continue to dig in their heels and new reforms are less likely.
Than Shwe's regime is now determined to entrench its power in non-negotiable terms.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10044
Sunday, January 13, 2008
Naming the Name
Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday January 13, 2008
Naming the Name
Strategic use of due process will help prompt political transition in Burma, writes MIN ZIN
The political conflict in Burma has long been noted for its intractability. It is intractable not because it is irresolvable, but because it is resisting resolution. Of course, conflict in itself does not resist anything - people do. And the people of Burma know very well who the culprit is.
Buddhist monks and their supporters take part in a protest march in Rangoon on Sept 25, 2007, before the military regime's brutal crackdown.
"In Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe is an autocrat," said a well-known lawyer in Rangoon, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for her safety. "He is not responsible to anyone else for what he does. He alone calls the shots."
Her view is shared by Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) and a human rights activist. "Many foreigners I have met are not sufficiently aware of the real face of Burma's dictatorship," he said. "Than Shwe deserves a name that is loathed in international politics and media."
In this regard, the US government seems to have taken the initiative. A closer reading of the US State Department's latest press statement on Burma revealed a new trend of "naming the name."
"The Burmese regime, led by Than Shwe, continues cracking down on democracy activists for peacefully expressing their political beliefs," opened the statement dated December 21, 2007, regarding the regime's arrest of six 88 Generation Students group activists.
Instead of speaking about Burma's dictatorship in vague and faceless terms, the statement pinpointed the villain: "We deplore the regime's actions and call on Than Shwe to release all political prisoners."
Sources close to the US State Department said that the three-sentence statement was well crafted to isolate Than Shwe as the person solely responsible for what happens in Burma.
It was probably the first time that the State Department has pointed to Than Shwe as a culprit, said a lobbyist in Washington.
Several military analysts in Rangoon as well as abroad have said that there is growing resentment within the military toward the erratic behavior of Than Shwe and his family ever since the uncovering of his daughter's lavish wedding, and the harsh crackdown on the peaceful protests led by Buddhist monks in September.
Meanwhile, some experts have started floating the idea of going a step further- isolating Than Shwe and using the language of "justice and accountability" against him. They estimate that holding Than Shwe personally accountable for the regime's crimes against humanity may have a strategic impact in Burma's political transition. It might even help create a power balance between the junta and other potential partners in dialogue.
"Raising the prospect of justice and accountability for mass violations of human rights, along with corruption, can help to balance out the power difference and weaken the regime ..." said Patrick Pierce, a senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice. "The international community- the UN and Asean in particular- seems to be all carrot and no stick. There needs to be a balance."
However, the validity of the whole calculation will rest mainly on whether or not such strategic moves will encourage other generals to distance themselves from the aging Than Shwe, and facilitate some basic political and economic reforms.
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst living along the Sino-Burmese border, dismisses such prospects. "It will be counterproductive," he said. "Instead of being a positive incentive to other generals, these moves will give Than Shwe a chance to rally his hardliners by pointing out the common threat."
A Rangoon-based lawyer also noted that although Than Shwe is an autocratic supremo, he has plenty of hardline people around him. Any talk of a prosecution against him will deter potential political transition in Burma. Moreover, it will remind the generals of late opposition party leader Kyi Maung's reference to the "Nuremberg-style trial" against former military intelligence chief Khin Nyunt.
However, some activists argue that if there is no chance of political thaw under Than Shwe's autocratic leadership, why bother waiting in vain without accumulating pressure to remove him? They advocate any action that will target Than Shwe and his family.
Jared Genser, president of Freedom Now and co-author of the 2005 "Havel-Tutu Report" that calls for UN Security Council action on Burma, doubts the effectiveness of this strategy.
"Anyone can press for justice and accountability against Than Shwe under international law," said Genser. "But the problem is how seriously he will take such a threat. Ultimately it will only impact his behaviour if he believes there is a risk of being investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Unless that risk is real, we would be issuing an idle threat."
The effectiveness of the threat must be weighed not only in terms of the message, but also in terms of the agent who attempts to speak the language of justice to Than Shwe.
"Right now, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's special envoy to Burma, is the only UN representative getting an ear - if that - and he is a political broker," said Pierce. "We need multivocality in the UN and in the international community. Others can and should play an effective role in raising the issues of justice and accountability if Mr Gambari deems it inappropriate for his role as a negotiator."
Some advocates suggest that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour could bring such messages of justice to the regime. In her recent statements on Burma, the UN human rights chief frequently cited international law and urged the military junta to abide by it. In her statement on Burma dated October 2, 2007, Arbour recalled the international community's "responsibility to protect civilians against serious international crimes," according to the agreement of world leaders at their 2005 summit. She also pressurised the Burmese government "to account publicly for past and on-going violations."
Of course, if a person of high stature such as Louise Arbour was able to engage in a justice and accountability dialogue, it would give more weight and leverage to other UN organs, including Gambari, in dealing with the junta. However, it would still be an uphill struggle in transforming these aspirations of justice into practice within the UN mechanism.
"Unfortunately, in the short to medium term, without any rapid deterioration of the situation in Burma,it is highly unlikely we will see the UN Security Council willing to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court," said Genser. "Beyond China and Russia's opposition, even the US does not currently support the ICC. I do not see any government on the Security Council with the political will and persuasive ability capable of making this happen any time soon."
Some observers are concerned that pressure will offer the Burmese regime an excuse to disengage from the UN. "Than Shwe would even be thinking about stopping all political cooperation with the UN if he felt like he was under siege," said a military source inside Burma.
However, the Burma Lawyers' Council, an exiled group which has persistently called on the international community to hold the military regime's leaders criminally accountable before the ICC for their past atrocities and recent crackdowns, refutes the notion that one may not have both criminal accountability and active engagement with the regime.
In their statement released on October 10, BLC cited the case of Sudan as an example and said "there is no dichotomy between active engagement with the principal parties and seeking accountability for the crimes committed by one or more of those principals."
Of course, any strategy needs to be carefully balanced with the domestic realities of Burma so that it will not become counterproductive. However, as all victims of oppression demand, truth must be sought and justice must be done.
"If justice could be achieved through a strategic ploy to facilitate transition, it would be better," said Bo Kyi.
At a minimum, the international community must make sure that nothing should foreclose the efforts to ensure accountability for gross violations of human rights.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
Naming the Name
Strategic use of due process will help prompt political transition in Burma, writes MIN ZIN
The political conflict in Burma has long been noted for its intractability. It is intractable not because it is irresolvable, but because it is resisting resolution. Of course, conflict in itself does not resist anything - people do. And the people of Burma know very well who the culprit is.
Buddhist monks and their supporters take part in a protest march in Rangoon on Sept 25, 2007, before the military regime's brutal crackdown.
"In Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe is an autocrat," said a well-known lawyer in Rangoon, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for her safety. "He is not responsible to anyone else for what he does. He alone calls the shots."
Her view is shared by Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) and a human rights activist. "Many foreigners I have met are not sufficiently aware of the real face of Burma's dictatorship," he said. "Than Shwe deserves a name that is loathed in international politics and media."
In this regard, the US government seems to have taken the initiative. A closer reading of the US State Department's latest press statement on Burma revealed a new trend of "naming the name."
"The Burmese regime, led by Than Shwe, continues cracking down on democracy activists for peacefully expressing their political beliefs," opened the statement dated December 21, 2007, regarding the regime's arrest of six 88 Generation Students group activists.
Instead of speaking about Burma's dictatorship in vague and faceless terms, the statement pinpointed the villain: "We deplore the regime's actions and call on Than Shwe to release all political prisoners."
Sources close to the US State Department said that the three-sentence statement was well crafted to isolate Than Shwe as the person solely responsible for what happens in Burma.
It was probably the first time that the State Department has pointed to Than Shwe as a culprit, said a lobbyist in Washington.
Several military analysts in Rangoon as well as abroad have said that there is growing resentment within the military toward the erratic behavior of Than Shwe and his family ever since the uncovering of his daughter's lavish wedding, and the harsh crackdown on the peaceful protests led by Buddhist monks in September.
Meanwhile, some experts have started floating the idea of going a step further- isolating Than Shwe and using the language of "justice and accountability" against him. They estimate that holding Than Shwe personally accountable for the regime's crimes against humanity may have a strategic impact in Burma's political transition. It might even help create a power balance between the junta and other potential partners in dialogue.
"Raising the prospect of justice and accountability for mass violations of human rights, along with corruption, can help to balance out the power difference and weaken the regime ..." said Patrick Pierce, a senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice. "The international community- the UN and Asean in particular- seems to be all carrot and no stick. There needs to be a balance."
However, the validity of the whole calculation will rest mainly on whether or not such strategic moves will encourage other generals to distance themselves from the aging Than Shwe, and facilitate some basic political and economic reforms.
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst living along the Sino-Burmese border, dismisses such prospects. "It will be counterproductive," he said. "Instead of being a positive incentive to other generals, these moves will give Than Shwe a chance to rally his hardliners by pointing out the common threat."
A Rangoon-based lawyer also noted that although Than Shwe is an autocratic supremo, he has plenty of hardline people around him. Any talk of a prosecution against him will deter potential political transition in Burma. Moreover, it will remind the generals of late opposition party leader Kyi Maung's reference to the "Nuremberg-style trial" against former military intelligence chief Khin Nyunt.
However, some activists argue that if there is no chance of political thaw under Than Shwe's autocratic leadership, why bother waiting in vain without accumulating pressure to remove him? They advocate any action that will target Than Shwe and his family.
Jared Genser, president of Freedom Now and co-author of the 2005 "Havel-Tutu Report" that calls for UN Security Council action on Burma, doubts the effectiveness of this strategy.
"Anyone can press for justice and accountability against Than Shwe under international law," said Genser. "But the problem is how seriously he will take such a threat. Ultimately it will only impact his behaviour if he believes there is a risk of being investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Unless that risk is real, we would be issuing an idle threat."
The effectiveness of the threat must be weighed not only in terms of the message, but also in terms of the agent who attempts to speak the language of justice to Than Shwe.
"Right now, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's special envoy to Burma, is the only UN representative getting an ear - if that - and he is a political broker," said Pierce. "We need multivocality in the UN and in the international community. Others can and should play an effective role in raising the issues of justice and accountability if Mr Gambari deems it inappropriate for his role as a negotiator."
Some advocates suggest that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour could bring such messages of justice to the regime. In her recent statements on Burma, the UN human rights chief frequently cited international law and urged the military junta to abide by it. In her statement on Burma dated October 2, 2007, Arbour recalled the international community's "responsibility to protect civilians against serious international crimes," according to the agreement of world leaders at their 2005 summit. She also pressurised the Burmese government "to account publicly for past and on-going violations."
Of course, if a person of high stature such as Louise Arbour was able to engage in a justice and accountability dialogue, it would give more weight and leverage to other UN organs, including Gambari, in dealing with the junta. However, it would still be an uphill struggle in transforming these aspirations of justice into practice within the UN mechanism.
"Unfortunately, in the short to medium term, without any rapid deterioration of the situation in Burma,it is highly unlikely we will see the UN Security Council willing to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court," said Genser. "Beyond China and Russia's opposition, even the US does not currently support the ICC. I do not see any government on the Security Council with the political will and persuasive ability capable of making this happen any time soon."
Some observers are concerned that pressure will offer the Burmese regime an excuse to disengage from the UN. "Than Shwe would even be thinking about stopping all political cooperation with the UN if he felt like he was under siege," said a military source inside Burma.
However, the Burma Lawyers' Council, an exiled group which has persistently called on the international community to hold the military regime's leaders criminally accountable before the ICC for their past atrocities and recent crackdowns, refutes the notion that one may not have both criminal accountability and active engagement with the regime.
In their statement released on October 10, BLC cited the case of Sudan as an example and said "there is no dichotomy between active engagement with the principal parties and seeking accountability for the crimes committed by one or more of those principals."
Of course, any strategy needs to be carefully balanced with the domestic realities of Burma so that it will not become counterproductive. However, as all victims of oppression demand, truth must be sought and justice must be done.
"If justice could be achieved through a strategic ploy to facilitate transition, it would be better," said Bo Kyi.
At a minimum, the international community must make sure that nothing should foreclose the efforts to ensure accountability for gross violations of human rights.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Mission Impossible
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, January 12, 2008
Mission Impossible
By MIN ZIN
To the Burmese generals, accepting international mediation has become just another means of conducting the conflict as opposed to an option for settling it. In other words, it is a tactical maneuver.
In the wake of the protests in September last year, the regime accepted the mediation efforts of the United Nations simply because rejecting them would cause greater harm in the international arena. More importantly, the junta might not have wanted to upset relations with its staunch regional supporters.
It is hardly surprising that the Burmese government is defying the UN's attempts at mediation—it feels confident that it is successfully bringing the country back under control. Despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon repeatedly warning that a return to the status quo that existed before the September crisis is not sustainable, the present situation is heading all the way back to square one.
Ban is trying to revive his Good Offices’ mediation efforts and to dispatch Ibrahim Gambari to China and India before the end of January "to continue further consultations with Burma's neighbors," according to UN officials. At the moment however, the Burmese authorities have not even approved Gambari’s itinerary for Burma.
"As for Myanmar (Burma) itself, we don't have an exact date for Mr Gambari to go back there, although he does have an open invitation to visit the country," said Farhan Haq, a UN spokesman. "The question is about developing the right arrangements. We are keeping in touch with the authorities in Myanmar (Burma) to discuss when Mr Gambari may be able to return."
Burmese opposition party National League for Democracy sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General recently, expressing a readiness to accept Gambari's mediation efforts toward political dialogue and national reconciliation. "Though we cannot ascertain if Mr Gambari will be able to visit Burma during his trip to Asia, we urge the [Burmese] government to accept his visit and the resumption of the stalled political dialogue," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the party.
However, some diplomatic sources within the UN spoke recently to The Irrawaddy and expressed doubts about the possibility of Gambari visiting Burma on this particular trip.
"He is more likely to come back to New York after visiting China and India," said a foreign diplomat at the UN who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Mr Gambari may not be able to give another Burma briefing at the UN Security Council after this trip, even though some council members will be expecting such a briefing in order to keep the Burma issue on board."
In fact, the UN envoy and other key international players realize that the momentum of the international mediation efforts toward Burma is now fading. They must try to reactivate the momentum and to prioritize a return visit by Gambari to Burma as soon as possible.
"The success of Mr Gambari's efforts largely depend on the readiness of China and India to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "China retreated when they really needed to apply pressure on Burma, even though they said they supported Gambari's mission."
After the September uprising and the subsequent military crackdowns, Gambari managed to garner regional consensus on Burma. Those who had kept saying that the Burmese issue was an internal matter—China, India and Asean—came to the consensus that the country really did have a problem, and that the ruling junta should cooperate with UN for the benefit of national reconciliation and democratization. "Mr Gambari has been dealing with a number of neighboring countries to see what contribution they can make in the process toward normalcy and democratization in Myanmar (Burma)," Haq told The Irrawaddy. "In his upcoming Asia trip, he will simply try to continue that process".
Of course, Gambari must hold China and India to their promise that they would ensure the Burmese regime’s full cooperation with the UN Envoy, especially given the situation that his access to the country is so uncertain. Otherwise, Gambari may face a similar fate to his predecessor, Razali Ismail, who ended his mission denied entry to Burma indefinitely.
The international community needs to be "more insistent with the junta that a special representative of the UN Secretary-General cannot be treated the way that the junta has treated Mr. Gambari,'' United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said late last month. "It's simply unacceptable," Rice added, referring to the way the Burmese authorities had undermined his entry to and movements around Burma last time round.
The outgoing US administration must surely realize its diplomatic constraints in pushing Burma at the Security Council in the face of harsh resistance from China. Contrary to a common misconception, Gambari's current mission is a non-binding mediation effort and he does not have any enforcement capacity. From the very beginning, the leverage he has wielded has largely lain at the mercy of military junta and, to a lesser extent, its key ally, China.
There is no other country in the region or within the Security Council that can initiate a credible alternative Burma policy to the current mechanism of the Good Offices’ role. Sadly, Chinese checkers is the only game in town.
The US Secretary of State recently said that Gambari's mission "needs more profile; it needs to have more vigor." However, she did not articulate how this could be done effectively. Unless the international community compels the Burmese junta to feel that the cost of rejecting the mission, the UN envoy will remain toothless.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9916
Mission Impossible
By MIN ZIN
To the Burmese generals, accepting international mediation has become just another means of conducting the conflict as opposed to an option for settling it. In other words, it is a tactical maneuver.
In the wake of the protests in September last year, the regime accepted the mediation efforts of the United Nations simply because rejecting them would cause greater harm in the international arena. More importantly, the junta might not have wanted to upset relations with its staunch regional supporters.
It is hardly surprising that the Burmese government is defying the UN's attempts at mediation—it feels confident that it is successfully bringing the country back under control. Despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon repeatedly warning that a return to the status quo that existed before the September crisis is not sustainable, the present situation is heading all the way back to square one.
Ban is trying to revive his Good Offices’ mediation efforts and to dispatch Ibrahim Gambari to China and India before the end of January "to continue further consultations with Burma's neighbors," according to UN officials. At the moment however, the Burmese authorities have not even approved Gambari’s itinerary for Burma.
"As for Myanmar (Burma) itself, we don't have an exact date for Mr Gambari to go back there, although he does have an open invitation to visit the country," said Farhan Haq, a UN spokesman. "The question is about developing the right arrangements. We are keeping in touch with the authorities in Myanmar (Burma) to discuss when Mr Gambari may be able to return."
Burmese opposition party National League for Democracy sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General recently, expressing a readiness to accept Gambari's mediation efforts toward political dialogue and national reconciliation. "Though we cannot ascertain if Mr Gambari will be able to visit Burma during his trip to Asia, we urge the [Burmese] government to accept his visit and the resumption of the stalled political dialogue," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the party.
However, some diplomatic sources within the UN spoke recently to The Irrawaddy and expressed doubts about the possibility of Gambari visiting Burma on this particular trip.
"He is more likely to come back to New York after visiting China and India," said a foreign diplomat at the UN who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Mr Gambari may not be able to give another Burma briefing at the UN Security Council after this trip, even though some council members will be expecting such a briefing in order to keep the Burma issue on board."
In fact, the UN envoy and other key international players realize that the momentum of the international mediation efforts toward Burma is now fading. They must try to reactivate the momentum and to prioritize a return visit by Gambari to Burma as soon as possible.
"The success of Mr Gambari's efforts largely depend on the readiness of China and India to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "China retreated when they really needed to apply pressure on Burma, even though they said they supported Gambari's mission."
After the September uprising and the subsequent military crackdowns, Gambari managed to garner regional consensus on Burma. Those who had kept saying that the Burmese issue was an internal matter—China, India and Asean—came to the consensus that the country really did have a problem, and that the ruling junta should cooperate with UN for the benefit of national reconciliation and democratization. "Mr Gambari has been dealing with a number of neighboring countries to see what contribution they can make in the process toward normalcy and democratization in Myanmar (Burma)," Haq told The Irrawaddy. "In his upcoming Asia trip, he will simply try to continue that process".
Of course, Gambari must hold China and India to their promise that they would ensure the Burmese regime’s full cooperation with the UN Envoy, especially given the situation that his access to the country is so uncertain. Otherwise, Gambari may face a similar fate to his predecessor, Razali Ismail, who ended his mission denied entry to Burma indefinitely.
The international community needs to be "more insistent with the junta that a special representative of the UN Secretary-General cannot be treated the way that the junta has treated Mr. Gambari,'' United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said late last month. "It's simply unacceptable," Rice added, referring to the way the Burmese authorities had undermined his entry to and movements around Burma last time round.
The outgoing US administration must surely realize its diplomatic constraints in pushing Burma at the Security Council in the face of harsh resistance from China. Contrary to a common misconception, Gambari's current mission is a non-binding mediation effort and he does not have any enforcement capacity. From the very beginning, the leverage he has wielded has largely lain at the mercy of military junta and, to a lesser extent, its key ally, China.
There is no other country in the region or within the Security Council that can initiate a credible alternative Burma policy to the current mechanism of the Good Offices’ role. Sadly, Chinese checkers is the only game in town.
The US Secretary of State recently said that Gambari's mission "needs more profile; it needs to have more vigor." However, she did not articulate how this could be done effectively. Unless the international community compels the Burmese junta to feel that the cost of rejecting the mission, the UN envoy will remain toothless.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9916
Friday, January 4, 2008
60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?
Irrawaddy Online
60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?
By MIN ZIN
Friday, January 4, 2008
During the struggle against British colonial rule, a young nationalist, Thakin Nu, once told his colleague, Than Tun: "You will be the Lenin of Burma and I'll be your Maxim Gorky."
When Burma achieved independence in January 1948, Thakin Nu (later known as “U Nu”) became prime minister while Than Tun was general secretary of the Communist Party of Burma. Unfortunately, Burma's Lenin and Gorky fell out and became arch-enemies. Then, civil war broke out. The irony of Burma's independence politics is that it started with a failed dream.
"We were all young and passionate then," said Thakin Chan Tun, a veteran politician who knew both U Nu and Than Tun. "As result, many of our key leaders took extreme stances in post-independence politics and, at the same time, weapons were easily available in the wake of WWII."
The CPB leadership declared independence to be a sham and “under cover of this sham, British imperialism would work a stranglehold on the defense and economic life of the country." Consequently, the CPB decided to launch an armed rebellion in March 1948 to achieve "genuine" independence.
"Dichotomous perspectives, such as genuine-versus-sham and right-versus-wrong is a dominant paradigm among the political oppositions of Burma throughout history," said Tin Maung Than, a famous Burmese writer and political analyst. "When they waged arm struggle, the CPB looked at politics not from a power dimension, but from an ideological perspective. They decided to disengage from the political mainstream."
It wasn’t only the communists—some of the ethnic elite also neglected power politics. They overlooked the reality of basic maturity in politics that you cannot always get your own way, especially in fragile and uncertain post-independence Burma.
A series of negotiations took place between Burman leaders and ethnic representatives some time before independence. The general consensus was to create four ethnic states: Shan, Karenni, Karen and Kachin. In the drafted constitution for the new union, a provision was also included for the possible formation of new states in the future. The Shan and Karenni were granted the right to secede after ten years if they were not happy with their status. The hardest nut to crack was the Karen issue. The designation and status of the Karen state boundary remained unresolved as Karen nationalists demanded Tenasserim, Irrawaddy and parts of Pegu Division.
In October 1947, U Nu's cabinet offered the Karen a state that would have included the Karenni State, the substate of Mongpai, Salween District and some of the Thaton, Toungoo and Pyinmana hill tracts. However, the Karen National Union demanded much of the delta as well, including the whole of the Irrawaddy Division and Insein and Hanthawaddy districts. From the perspective of U Nu's government, the controversial demands made further negotiations impossible.
"U Nu failed to carry out Aung San's promises for the Karen people," said David Tharkapaw, a senior Karen leader and chief of the Information Department in the KNU. "U Nu was a Burman chauvinist. While trust between the KNU and U Nu's government was then weakened due to the mutual propagandas and vilifications, Gen Ne Win's private militias started attacking Karen villages. Then the Karen's revolution became inevitable."
As a result, the KNU launched an insurrection in January 1949. The Karen nationalist movement gradually receded from the center stage of Burmese mainstream politics, and the power of the KNU also dwindled over time. Some observers believe that the KNU should have pursued a more careful strategy than opting to compel the Karen people to an armed struggle for greater autonomy.
"The government's offer could then have been considered very generous by today's standards, but the KNU was not willing to compromise, and [became] increasingly militant," said Thakin Chan Tun. "It was a tragic story of missed opportunity."
In fact, idealism compounded with militancy—whether violent or non-violent—has been a major trait of Burmese politics. The concept of legal opposition, in terms of making compromises and enjoying inclusive participation, has never rooted itself in the country. Post-colonial conflicts in Burma proved that when the opposition tended to resort to violent means to achieve their absolute goals, the government moved to eliminate them.
U Nu's government was also unable to resolve the country's multiple crises and was even disparagingly called the "Six-Mile Rangoon Government" because various rebel groups controlled the suburbs of the capital, Rangoon.
U Nu, modeling himself after Burmese kings of the past, attempted to establish himself as a patron of Buddhism, but he never managed to make his ideal compatible with the daily realities of politics. His authoritarian and capricious leadership failed to lay the foundation for sustainable democracy.
"The appreciation and practice of parliamentary democracy in U Nu's era was superficial," said Dr Aung Kin, a Burmese historian and well-known radio pundit. "U Nu's willingness to give up the parliamentary government to Ne Win's caretaker regime in 1958 paved the way for the military to usurp political power forever."
When the military staged a coup in 1962, it nullified parliamentary democracy and vowed "to transform the society to socialism." However, Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party simply fueled an already faltering situation. His idea of mixing Marxist, Buddhist and nationalist principles was an idiosyncratic mess, forcing the country to retreat into international isolation. The abject poverty and political repression of the BSPP eventually broke the tolerance of the Burmese public and a popular uprising calling for democracy broke out in 1988. The army responded with a massive slaughter of protesters and staged another coup d’etat. Gross violations of human rights have continued unabated ever since.
However, democracy as a renewed ideal was born. The opposition National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in 1990’s multi-party elections. The opposition elite aimed for the absolute maximum—the full transfer of power to the elected party. However, perhaps similar to the CPB and KNU before them, they walked away with the absolute minimum of gains—and the continuation of military rule in a failing state.
Instead of treating elections in a post-conflict society as a guide to power-sharing, the opposition leaders, who held lofty confidence in their public support and democratic ideals in the immediate aftermath of the election victory, viewed it as a means of determining winners and losers.
"Political immaturity within the Burmese opposition derives from a lack of appreciation for power asymmetry," said Tin Maung Than. "We could not strike a balance between power and principle."
All these crises—starting with independence and the ethnic autonomy issue—remain unresolved. The socio-economic condition of the country is at its lowest ebb in its post-1948 history. A humanitarian crisis is looming and public discontent is at an all-time high. The prospect of national reconciliation or even a breakthrough in the political deadlock remains unlikely.
Following the 1988 military coup, U Nu—once the hero of independence and first prime minister of the union—cynically voiced his regrets over fighting for Burmese independence. Those bitter words he might have uttered out of frustration and despair, but it in many ways they reflect the 60-year history of post-independence Burma.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9814
60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?
By MIN ZIN
Friday, January 4, 2008
During the struggle against British colonial rule, a young nationalist, Thakin Nu, once told his colleague, Than Tun: "You will be the Lenin of Burma and I'll be your Maxim Gorky."
When Burma achieved independence in January 1948, Thakin Nu (later known as “U Nu”) became prime minister while Than Tun was general secretary of the Communist Party of Burma. Unfortunately, Burma's Lenin and Gorky fell out and became arch-enemies. Then, civil war broke out. The irony of Burma's independence politics is that it started with a failed dream.
"We were all young and passionate then," said Thakin Chan Tun, a veteran politician who knew both U Nu and Than Tun. "As result, many of our key leaders took extreme stances in post-independence politics and, at the same time, weapons were easily available in the wake of WWII."
The CPB leadership declared independence to be a sham and “under cover of this sham, British imperialism would work a stranglehold on the defense and economic life of the country." Consequently, the CPB decided to launch an armed rebellion in March 1948 to achieve "genuine" independence.
"Dichotomous perspectives, such as genuine-versus-sham and right-versus-wrong is a dominant paradigm among the political oppositions of Burma throughout history," said Tin Maung Than, a famous Burmese writer and political analyst. "When they waged arm struggle, the CPB looked at politics not from a power dimension, but from an ideological perspective. They decided to disengage from the political mainstream."
It wasn’t only the communists—some of the ethnic elite also neglected power politics. They overlooked the reality of basic maturity in politics that you cannot always get your own way, especially in fragile and uncertain post-independence Burma.
A series of negotiations took place between Burman leaders and ethnic representatives some time before independence. The general consensus was to create four ethnic states: Shan, Karenni, Karen and Kachin. In the drafted constitution for the new union, a provision was also included for the possible formation of new states in the future. The Shan and Karenni were granted the right to secede after ten years if they were not happy with their status. The hardest nut to crack was the Karen issue. The designation and status of the Karen state boundary remained unresolved as Karen nationalists demanded Tenasserim, Irrawaddy and parts of Pegu Division.
In October 1947, U Nu's cabinet offered the Karen a state that would have included the Karenni State, the substate of Mongpai, Salween District and some of the Thaton, Toungoo and Pyinmana hill tracts. However, the Karen National Union demanded much of the delta as well, including the whole of the Irrawaddy Division and Insein and Hanthawaddy districts. From the perspective of U Nu's government, the controversial demands made further negotiations impossible.
"U Nu failed to carry out Aung San's promises for the Karen people," said David Tharkapaw, a senior Karen leader and chief of the Information Department in the KNU. "U Nu was a Burman chauvinist. While trust between the KNU and U Nu's government was then weakened due to the mutual propagandas and vilifications, Gen Ne Win's private militias started attacking Karen villages. Then the Karen's revolution became inevitable."
As a result, the KNU launched an insurrection in January 1949. The Karen nationalist movement gradually receded from the center stage of Burmese mainstream politics, and the power of the KNU also dwindled over time. Some observers believe that the KNU should have pursued a more careful strategy than opting to compel the Karen people to an armed struggle for greater autonomy.
"The government's offer could then have been considered very generous by today's standards, but the KNU was not willing to compromise, and [became] increasingly militant," said Thakin Chan Tun. "It was a tragic story of missed opportunity."
In fact, idealism compounded with militancy—whether violent or non-violent—has been a major trait of Burmese politics. The concept of legal opposition, in terms of making compromises and enjoying inclusive participation, has never rooted itself in the country. Post-colonial conflicts in Burma proved that when the opposition tended to resort to violent means to achieve their absolute goals, the government moved to eliminate them.
U Nu's government was also unable to resolve the country's multiple crises and was even disparagingly called the "Six-Mile Rangoon Government" because various rebel groups controlled the suburbs of the capital, Rangoon.
U Nu, modeling himself after Burmese kings of the past, attempted to establish himself as a patron of Buddhism, but he never managed to make his ideal compatible with the daily realities of politics. His authoritarian and capricious leadership failed to lay the foundation for sustainable democracy.
"The appreciation and practice of parliamentary democracy in U Nu's era was superficial," said Dr Aung Kin, a Burmese historian and well-known radio pundit. "U Nu's willingness to give up the parliamentary government to Ne Win's caretaker regime in 1958 paved the way for the military to usurp political power forever."
When the military staged a coup in 1962, it nullified parliamentary democracy and vowed "to transform the society to socialism." However, Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party simply fueled an already faltering situation. His idea of mixing Marxist, Buddhist and nationalist principles was an idiosyncratic mess, forcing the country to retreat into international isolation. The abject poverty and political repression of the BSPP eventually broke the tolerance of the Burmese public and a popular uprising calling for democracy broke out in 1988. The army responded with a massive slaughter of protesters and staged another coup d’etat. Gross violations of human rights have continued unabated ever since.
However, democracy as a renewed ideal was born. The opposition National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in 1990’s multi-party elections. The opposition elite aimed for the absolute maximum—the full transfer of power to the elected party. However, perhaps similar to the CPB and KNU before them, they walked away with the absolute minimum of gains—and the continuation of military rule in a failing state.
Instead of treating elections in a post-conflict society as a guide to power-sharing, the opposition leaders, who held lofty confidence in their public support and democratic ideals in the immediate aftermath of the election victory, viewed it as a means of determining winners and losers.
"Political immaturity within the Burmese opposition derives from a lack of appreciation for power asymmetry," said Tin Maung Than. "We could not strike a balance between power and principle."
All these crises—starting with independence and the ethnic autonomy issue—remain unresolved. The socio-economic condition of the country is at its lowest ebb in its post-1948 history. A humanitarian crisis is looming and public discontent is at an all-time high. The prospect of national reconciliation or even a breakthrough in the political deadlock remains unlikely.
Following the 1988 military coup, U Nu—once the hero of independence and first prime minister of the union—cynically voiced his regrets over fighting for Burmese independence. Those bitter words he might have uttered out of frustration and despair, but it in many ways they reflect the 60-year history of post-independence Burma.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9814
Sunday, December 30, 2007
Facing the end-game
Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday December 30, 2007
Facing the end-game
Unless the international community pushes for modification of the junta's political roadmap, a continuation of the conflict in Burma is a certainty, writes MIN ZIN
Recent weeks have been frustrating for Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's democracy icon. Hope of starting political dialogue with the regime's supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, is now dim.
Although there was an agreement to hold weekly meetings every Monday between Suu Kyi and government liaison minister Aung Kyi, the regime has gone back on its word. No meeting has taken place between Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi since November 19. Moreover, the military's promise of allowing two liaison officials from her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to see her regularly has yet to be realised.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been trying very hard to keep the communication channel open," said a senior party official on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media. "She even plans to give a positive response to the preconditions of junta leader Senior General Than Shwe. But the regime has simply ignored her."
The frustration is now spreading within the international community. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned Burma during his recent trip to Asia that the international community expects to see some productive developments. "I know the international community is very much impatient, and our patience is running out," Ban said in Bangkok.
Meanwhile, the junta is sending mixed signals to the international community. In his official briefing on November 6, Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, a staunch junta hardliner, told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari that the government's cooperation with the UN could be jeopardised if his performance were viewed to be "unfair and one-sided." Kyaw Hsan told Gambari straight that "your opportunity to play a constructive role in the matter may be in harm's way."
However, when Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein received Gambari on the following day, the general reiterated his government's full confidence in and support for the secretary-general's good offices.
"The prime minister invited me to return to Myanmar - in his words - 'again, again and again'," Gambari said at a briefing to the UN Security Council on November 13.
Moreover, as a gesture in response to the UN's persistent demand for an inclusive constitutional process, Thein Sein told Gambari that the government would allow him to meet with its Constitutional Drafting Commission to discuss ways of broadening the constitutional process.
On the other hand, at his press conference on December 3, Kyaw Hsan said that the government's 54-member commission for drafting the new constitution is sufficient for the task.
"No assistance or advice from other persons is required," he said, adding that "it is not reasonable or fair to amend those principles adopted by the delegates (of the National Convention)." Kyaw Hsan ruled out the possibility of a role for the opposition to play in the constitutional drafting process, which constitutes the highly important first three stages of the regime's "Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy".
In fact, the military is testing the response of the international community by sending out such mixed messages. If the international community, especially China and Asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), takes a passive stand or backs down, the regime will push forward with a hardline stance. When Asean caved in to the demands of the regime by not allowing Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Rangoon celebrated their victory and started scratching the regular scheduled meetings with Suu Kyi.
"Burma's military leadership is just trying to do the absolute minimum transition and reconciliation possible," Priscilla Clapp, a US diplomat who served as chief of mission in Burma from 1999-2002, told this writer. "They will continue with their seven step plan, moving very slowly, and wait for the international community to lose interest and turn the other way."
'Not too late'
However, some analysts and activists believe that the junta's roadmap' could still be a viable option for Burma's transition if it were modified to become inclusive and time-bound. They think that the junta is resisting, not rejecting, the possibility of accommodation.
"It is not too late yet. If the international community could push the regime to open up the constitutional drafting process before a national referendum, the fourth stage of the seven-step plan, we still have time to find common ground for negotiation for Burma's political transition," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Burmese government in exile. In fact, this is just what 92 elected members of Parliament from inside Burma called for in August 2007. They urged the regime to modify the roadmap, which is now aimed at legalising military supremacy in Burma's future.
The elected MPs said that if the regime made it inclusive, they would like to cooperate and find a political solution within the roadmap framework. Almost all major political and ethnic groups in Burma have agreed with the political proposal of the 92 elected MPs.
This is also in line with the UN's persistent demand as Gambari made clear when he said: "The Secretary-General did not reject the seven step roadmap and what he would like to suggest were inclusiveness and a time frame."
However, if the regime refused to modify the roadmap and continued its unilateral plan, the nature of Burma's conflict would become zero-sum. The 92 elected MPs have vowed to oppose the junta's sham constitution and to educate and organise the people of Burma to vote against it in the referendum.
Pro-democracy grassroot activists inside Burma as well as abroad also declare that the regime's planned referendum will be showdown time for Burma if the military fails to modify the roadmap. They say there will be almost no chance to reverse legalisation of military domination after a referendum, since the next three steps will be to "(5) hold free and fair elections; (6) convene elected bodies and (7) create government organs instituted by the legislative body."
"The principles of the constitution drafted by the military are laid out with the premise and concept that the 'military is the master and civilians are slaves',"said Tun Myint Aung, a leader of the 88 Generation Students Group, speaking from his hideout inside Burma. "We are now preparing to educate the people and launch a 'No Vote Campaign' against the referendum."
Some analysts even argue that another mass protest against the junta may break out before the referendum, as a combination of poverty and repression fuels the public's anger. No matter whether or not the opposition activists succeed in derailing the military's roadmap with mass protests, the nature and consequences of the conflict in Burma will be devastating, with more violent crackdowns and human suffering. The international community must be aware of this grim scenario and act resolutely to prevent it.
Min Zin is an independent Burmese journalist.
Facing the end-game
Unless the international community pushes for modification of the junta's political roadmap, a continuation of the conflict in Burma is a certainty, writes MIN ZIN
Recent weeks have been frustrating for Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's democracy icon. Hope of starting political dialogue with the regime's supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, is now dim.
Although there was an agreement to hold weekly meetings every Monday between Suu Kyi and government liaison minister Aung Kyi, the regime has gone back on its word. No meeting has taken place between Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi since November 19. Moreover, the military's promise of allowing two liaison officials from her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to see her regularly has yet to be realised.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been trying very hard to keep the communication channel open," said a senior party official on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media. "She even plans to give a positive response to the preconditions of junta leader Senior General Than Shwe. But the regime has simply ignored her."
The frustration is now spreading within the international community. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned Burma during his recent trip to Asia that the international community expects to see some productive developments. "I know the international community is very much impatient, and our patience is running out," Ban said in Bangkok.
Meanwhile, the junta is sending mixed signals to the international community. In his official briefing on November 6, Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, a staunch junta hardliner, told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari that the government's cooperation with the UN could be jeopardised if his performance were viewed to be "unfair and one-sided." Kyaw Hsan told Gambari straight that "your opportunity to play a constructive role in the matter may be in harm's way."
However, when Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein received Gambari on the following day, the general reiterated his government's full confidence in and support for the secretary-general's good offices.
"The prime minister invited me to return to Myanmar - in his words - 'again, again and again'," Gambari said at a briefing to the UN Security Council on November 13.
Moreover, as a gesture in response to the UN's persistent demand for an inclusive constitutional process, Thein Sein told Gambari that the government would allow him to meet with its Constitutional Drafting Commission to discuss ways of broadening the constitutional process.
On the other hand, at his press conference on December 3, Kyaw Hsan said that the government's 54-member commission for drafting the new constitution is sufficient for the task.
"No assistance or advice from other persons is required," he said, adding that "it is not reasonable or fair to amend those principles adopted by the delegates (of the National Convention)." Kyaw Hsan ruled out the possibility of a role for the opposition to play in the constitutional drafting process, which constitutes the highly important first three stages of the regime's "Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy".
In fact, the military is testing the response of the international community by sending out such mixed messages. If the international community, especially China and Asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), takes a passive stand or backs down, the regime will push forward with a hardline stance. When Asean caved in to the demands of the regime by not allowing Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Rangoon celebrated their victory and started scratching the regular scheduled meetings with Suu Kyi.
"Burma's military leadership is just trying to do the absolute minimum transition and reconciliation possible," Priscilla Clapp, a US diplomat who served as chief of mission in Burma from 1999-2002, told this writer. "They will continue with their seven step plan, moving very slowly, and wait for the international community to lose interest and turn the other way."
'Not too late'
However, some analysts and activists believe that the junta's roadmap' could still be a viable option for Burma's transition if it were modified to become inclusive and time-bound. They think that the junta is resisting, not rejecting, the possibility of accommodation.
"It is not too late yet. If the international community could push the regime to open up the constitutional drafting process before a national referendum, the fourth stage of the seven-step plan, we still have time to find common ground for negotiation for Burma's political transition," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Burmese government in exile. In fact, this is just what 92 elected members of Parliament from inside Burma called for in August 2007. They urged the regime to modify the roadmap, which is now aimed at legalising military supremacy in Burma's future.
The elected MPs said that if the regime made it inclusive, they would like to cooperate and find a political solution within the roadmap framework. Almost all major political and ethnic groups in Burma have agreed with the political proposal of the 92 elected MPs.
This is also in line with the UN's persistent demand as Gambari made clear when he said: "The Secretary-General did not reject the seven step roadmap and what he would like to suggest were inclusiveness and a time frame."
However, if the regime refused to modify the roadmap and continued its unilateral plan, the nature of Burma's conflict would become zero-sum. The 92 elected MPs have vowed to oppose the junta's sham constitution and to educate and organise the people of Burma to vote against it in the referendum.
Pro-democracy grassroot activists inside Burma as well as abroad also declare that the regime's planned referendum will be showdown time for Burma if the military fails to modify the roadmap. They say there will be almost no chance to reverse legalisation of military domination after a referendum, since the next three steps will be to "(5) hold free and fair elections; (6) convene elected bodies and (7) create government organs instituted by the legislative body."
"The principles of the constitution drafted by the military are laid out with the premise and concept that the 'military is the master and civilians are slaves',"said Tun Myint Aung, a leader of the 88 Generation Students Group, speaking from his hideout inside Burma. "We are now preparing to educate the people and launch a 'No Vote Campaign' against the referendum."
Some analysts even argue that another mass protest against the junta may break out before the referendum, as a combination of poverty and repression fuels the public's anger. No matter whether or not the opposition activists succeed in derailing the military's roadmap with mass protests, the nature and consequences of the conflict in Burma will be devastating, with more violent crackdowns and human suffering. The international community must be aware of this grim scenario and act resolutely to prevent it.
Min Zin is an independent Burmese journalist.
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