Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, February 16, 2008
Don't Push NLD into a Corner
By MIN ZIN
The present political crisis in Burma could be a model from William L. Ury and Richard Smoke’s political science thesis, “Anatomy of a Crisis”—a situation of “high stakes, short time, high uncertainty and narrowing options.”
In the pragmatic world of realpolitik, it means the opposition movement in Burma is now facing a serious predicament. When the military regime made the surprise announcement to set a timeline for a referendum in May and a general election in 2010, the opposition groups were caught off guard.
The junta decisively moved ahead with its own “Road Map” and ignored the persistent calls of opposition groups and the UN-led international community to modify the draft constitution and make the political process inclusive.
The political moral ground of the opposition movement, inside the country as well as in exile, has been based on the legitimacy of the 1990 election results in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory that has never been honored.
The opposition activists are now forced to prove the victory of 1990 election remains relevant in upcoming months. The stakes rise, indeed.
Several grassroots opposition groups, including the influential 88 Generation Students group and the Alliance of All Burmese Buddhist Monks, recently vowed to launch a "Vote No” campaign against the regime's constitution. But many activists privately admit that the time crunch makes it difficult for them to mobilize a nationwide movement.
The military government's statement regarding the referendum and subsequent elections was vague and shrouded with uncertainties.
Furthermore, the regime has not revoked Law 5/96 of 1996, which provides for up to 20 years imprisonment for anyone who criticizes the government’s national convention and its constitution drafting effort.
To add to the dilemma, many ordinary people do not understand what a “Vote No” campaign really means—whether they are expected to boycott the referendum by shunning the poll stations or they have to physically vote against the constitution.
At the end of the day, no one knows what the regime will do if the public votes against their draft constitution.
"Will they spend another 20 years rewriting another constitution?” questioned a private tutor in Rangoon. "If so, enough is enough. I would rather just go for the flawed constitution."
The high level of uncertainty appears to weaken the opposition's message and game plan.
Even with such high stakes, the time crunch and all the uncertainties, the crisis would be less severe if the opposition had options.
"People must stand up against the referendum and say no to the regime's constitution," said Aung Thu Nyein, a Burmese analyst in exile. "I support the actions of the grassroots organizations, but they must make it clear that it is not a boycott against the referendum. The public must go to the polling stations and vote ‘No.’”
Several opposition activists and journalists have taken it a step further. They have called on the NLD to announce a clear policy to direct the public on the referendum issue and to take the initiative in the "Vote No” campaign.
Aung Thu Nyein disagrees. “It is not feasible to urge the NLD to lead the public in mobilizing a Vote No” campaign. The NLD must be flexible,” he said.
However, as long as the opposition activists and media view the NLD as the vanguard of the democracy movement, they will continually push the party to lead with a resolution at every turn.
But whether or not the NLD's current leadership—not forgetting the implications of Aung San Suu Kyi's long absence—remains at the forefront of the democracy movement will be called into question. The nature of the September uprising indicated that the NLD was not playing a leading role.
More importantly, it is a time for different political forces to play significant positions with a mature understanding of one another. The NLD should not run the risk of staking their political future on viewing the referendum—step four of the seven-step “Road Map”—as the final battleground.
“We have stated clearly from the beginning that we are against the undemocratic nature of the national convention and the draft constitution," Nyan Win, the NLD spokesman, announced in the wake of the government’s statement. “We will probably release our policy by the end of this month. But we don't think the referendum is the final fight for us.”
The NLD will continue to condemn the regime's draft constitution as unacceptable and to demand a free and fair referendum, but at the same time they want to appear to keep all options open, instead of totally rejecting the government’s Road Map or openly advocating a “Vote No” campaign.
Short of a better alternative, it seems to be the most pragmatic policy the party can adopt.
If the NLD sees the referendum as a final showdown and walks away from the Road Map, the party will very likely be sidelined from mainstream politics in future. If the NLD decide to engage in a “do or die” fight, the regime will gladly get into the ring and work at putting the opposition party out of action for good.
In truth, the NLD seems to be aware of this scenario and are determined to remain on legal ground.
"If the public approves the draft constitution in a credible referendum, we will respect the public's decision," said Nyan Win.
The NLD spokesman even hinted that the party does not reject the possibility of running for a fresh election in 2010, if the public decides to go ahead with the Road Map.
“Burma's road to democracy would be long term, independent of our activists' wishes for radical change," said Tin Maung Than, a well-known Burmese writer and analyst in exile. "The military, as a whole and as an institution, is not in a position to accept such a change. Burma needs some structural adjustment to lure a significant part of the military to cooperate with the people."
Naturally, the public—led by grassroots activists—must push in that direction. A mass movement will always be needed to bring about that change.
The people of Burma should support the “Vote No” campaign against the draft constitution. If the fight is won, it may prompt a shake up in Naypyidaw. The military government would be forced to reconfigure their options. Combined with international pressure, a new opportunity for dialogue might present itself.
Whether this particular fight is won or not, the NLD must prepare to go on. In politics, a crisis can be cleverly managed with a well calculated strategic move.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10427
Saturday, February 16, 2008
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
Ban Kimoon Must Go to Burma
Ban Ki-moon Must Go to Burma
by Min Zin
Posted February 13, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)
Burma's military junta is testing the response of the international community. When world leaders say they are “concerned” about the situation in Burma, then “increasingly concerned,” then “gravely concerned,” and then—inexplicably—just “concerned” again, the generals in the Naypyidaw jungle smile and push forward with their hard-line stance.
It is hardly surprising that the junta is refusing an immediate return of United Nation's Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and defying the U.N.'s calls for an inclusive national reconciliation process, now that the regime feels confident it is bringing the country back under control after its deadly crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations last September.
The generals even rejected the U.N.'s proposal to establish a poverty alleviation commission to address the country's humanitarian crisis, clearly demonstrating the regime's criminal disregard for the Burmese people's welfare.
Indeed, despite U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's repeated warnings that return to the status quo in Burma is not acceptable, that is precisely what is happening. The U.N. and other key international players realize the momentum for international mediation in Burma is fading and are trying to regain it with a swift return visit by Special Envoy Gambari. The Burmese authorities, however, say they will not approve the special envoy's itinerary until mid-April.
Each time the international community bends to the junta's will, the generals are emboldened. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations caved in to the junta's demands by not allowing Special Envoy Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Burma celebrated their victory by stepping up oppression at home and canceling a scheduled visit by Mr. Gambari.
Some Burma lobbyists blame the failure of the special envoy's mission on the weakness of the secretary-general's mandate. “The Burma mandate of Ban Ki-moon, which has now been given by the U.N. General Assembly, must be enhanced and strengthened by the U.N. Security Council,” says Aung Din, executive director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma. But the chances of such an initiative are slim, given China's permanent seat on the Security Council. In other words, the secretary-general may not want to risk a China veto.
Another possible mechanism, apart from a stronger U.N. Security Council mandate, is the “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,” a group of 14 nations—Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Secretary-General Ban convened the first meeting of the group last Dec. 19 to assist him in his efforts to spur change in Burma. The Group is officially described as “a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in support of the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate,” and meets informally as needed.
Many analysts wonder if the Group could evolve into multiparty talks on the North Korea model. Some Burma advocates in the U.S. have suggested that the secretary-general convene the next meeting of the Group in an Asian capital such as Jakarta or Beijing, thus drawing regional leaders into the mediation efforts.
In any event, Secretary-General Ban needs to make a decisive move to strengthen his office's role. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group called for the direct involvement of Mr. Ban, saying: “It would be useful for Ban Ki-moon to get more personally involved, particularly at times when negotiations may appear to be deadlocked.” It even urged the secretary-general to pay a personal visit to Naypyidaw in the near future.
Burma's National League for Democracy said it would like to see such a visit. “If Gambari's attempt continues to fail in bringing results,” says NLD spokesman Nyan Win, “Ban Ki-moon himself should visit Burma and let the military generals know clearly that the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable.”
Diplomatic sources in New York say U.N. officials are concerned about possible embarrassment for the secretary-general if the Burmese junta publicly rejects his entreaties. This week, as NLD members bravely protested outside their headquarters in Yangon, the secretary-general once again urged the junta to allow Special Envoy Gambari to return and move forward with talks with the NLD leadership.
Clearly, this isn't enough. It's time for Ban Ki-moon to call for a new U.N. Security Council mandate on Burma, to mobilize the “Friends of Myanmar,” and lastly to make a personal visit to Naypyidaw. The Burmese people's suffering under the military boot is far greater than any possible discomfiture the secretary-general may experience by being rejected by either the regime or its closest ally, China.
Unless the international community, led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, compels the Burmese junta to feel the cost of rejecting the U.N.'s mediation efforts in Burma, the prospect for reform in the country will remain hopeless.The secretary-general must try his best for Burma.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/2008/february/Ban-Ki-moon-Must-Go-to-Burma
by Min Zin
Posted February 13, 2008 (Far Eastern Economic Review)
Burma's military junta is testing the response of the international community. When world leaders say they are “concerned” about the situation in Burma, then “increasingly concerned,” then “gravely concerned,” and then—inexplicably—just “concerned” again, the generals in the Naypyidaw jungle smile and push forward with their hard-line stance.
It is hardly surprising that the junta is refusing an immediate return of United Nation's Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and defying the U.N.'s calls for an inclusive national reconciliation process, now that the regime feels confident it is bringing the country back under control after its deadly crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations last September.
The generals even rejected the U.N.'s proposal to establish a poverty alleviation commission to address the country's humanitarian crisis, clearly demonstrating the regime's criminal disregard for the Burmese people's welfare.
Indeed, despite U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's repeated warnings that return to the status quo in Burma is not acceptable, that is precisely what is happening. The U.N. and other key international players realize the momentum for international mediation in Burma is fading and are trying to regain it with a swift return visit by Special Envoy Gambari. The Burmese authorities, however, say they will not approve the special envoy's itinerary until mid-April.
Each time the international community bends to the junta's will, the generals are emboldened. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations caved in to the junta's demands by not allowing Special Envoy Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Burma celebrated their victory by stepping up oppression at home and canceling a scheduled visit by Mr. Gambari.
Some Burma lobbyists blame the failure of the special envoy's mission on the weakness of the secretary-general's mandate. “The Burma mandate of Ban Ki-moon, which has now been given by the U.N. General Assembly, must be enhanced and strengthened by the U.N. Security Council,” says Aung Din, executive director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma. But the chances of such an initiative are slim, given China's permanent seat on the Security Council. In other words, the secretary-general may not want to risk a China veto.
Another possible mechanism, apart from a stronger U.N. Security Council mandate, is the “Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar,” a group of 14 nations—Australia, Indonesia, Russia, the United States, China, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand, India, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Secretary-General Ban convened the first meeting of the group last Dec. 19 to assist him in his efforts to spur change in Burma. The Group is officially described as “a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in support of the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate,” and meets informally as needed.
Many analysts wonder if the Group could evolve into multiparty talks on the North Korea model. Some Burma advocates in the U.S. have suggested that the secretary-general convene the next meeting of the Group in an Asian capital such as Jakarta or Beijing, thus drawing regional leaders into the mediation efforts.
In any event, Secretary-General Ban needs to make a decisive move to strengthen his office's role. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group called for the direct involvement of Mr. Ban, saying: “It would be useful for Ban Ki-moon to get more personally involved, particularly at times when negotiations may appear to be deadlocked.” It even urged the secretary-general to pay a personal visit to Naypyidaw in the near future.
Burma's National League for Democracy said it would like to see such a visit. “If Gambari's attempt continues to fail in bringing results,” says NLD spokesman Nyan Win, “Ban Ki-moon himself should visit Burma and let the military generals know clearly that the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable.”
Diplomatic sources in New York say U.N. officials are concerned about possible embarrassment for the secretary-general if the Burmese junta publicly rejects his entreaties. This week, as NLD members bravely protested outside their headquarters in Yangon, the secretary-general once again urged the junta to allow Special Envoy Gambari to return and move forward with talks with the NLD leadership.
Clearly, this isn't enough. It's time for Ban Ki-moon to call for a new U.N. Security Council mandate on Burma, to mobilize the “Friends of Myanmar,” and lastly to make a personal visit to Naypyidaw. The Burmese people's suffering under the military boot is far greater than any possible discomfiture the secretary-general may experience by being rejected by either the regime or its closest ally, China.
Unless the international community, led by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, compels the Burmese junta to feel the cost of rejecting the U.N.'s mediation efforts in Burma, the prospect for reform in the country will remain hopeless.The secretary-general must try his best for Burma.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist.
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/2008/february/Ban-Ki-moon-Must-Go-to-Burma
Saturday, February 2, 2008
The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, February 2, 2008
The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma
By MIN ZIN
When Indonesian dictator Suharto died last Sunday, Burmese-language short-wave radio stations and other Burmese media based abroad gave the news extensive coverage and offered comparative analyses. They attempted to draw similarities and contrasts between Suharto and Burma’s late tyrant Ne Win, and between the different directions the two countries have taken in their development.
Many experts noted that although Suharto was a vicious dictator, he raised the Indonesian economy to “Asian Tiger” status in the 1980s. Ne Win and his successors, on the other hand, have turned Burma into a failed state. All lamented Burma’s slide into its current condition of economic deprivation.
In fact, Burma introduced economic reforms after the military staged a coup in 1988. According to reports, cumulative foreign investment in the period from 1988 through early 1997 reached $6.1 billion. Some optimists even said that investors seeking the next “tiger” economy should set their sights on Burma.
However, despite the country’s opening of its economy to foreign investors, overall economic progress remained slow. Economist David Dapice attributed this to the government’s reluctance to undertake comprehensive reforms, choosing instead to implement reforms in a “half-hearted way”.
Then the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck. At first, Rangoon was unconcerned, as the country was not directly impacted by the plummeting value of a number of key Asian currencies. But when investors from other Asian countries began to shift away from high-risk ventures and started reneging on their investment promises in order to limit their losses in the crisis, Burma also got hit hard. The military regime made matters worse by failing to come up with sound economic policies in response to the crisis. The unreal economic boom went bust.
In fact, the junta has neither the capacity nor the political will to carry out far-reaching economic reforms, because they are afraid that any such move would threaten the interests of military elites, forcing them to turn their economic playground into a level playing field. They worry that allowing technocratic participation, much less public involvement, in the policymaking process would weaken their grip on power and deprive them of the prerogatives they currently enjoy. “Technocrats and experts such as economists and respected bureaucrats need to be viewed as important human resources and [their role should be] enhanced in Myanmar (Burma),” said Khin Maung Nyo, a well-known economist and writer in Burma. “They serve to help formulate economic policies, and the availability of policy choices makes it easy for government to implement reforms to build a modern, developed nation,” the economist added.
However, military involvement in political and economic affairs has from the outset been much deeper in Burma than in Indonesia and other countries in the region, where technocrats have long played a key role in formulating economic policies and guiding subsequent growth.
Broadly speaking, the junta has failed to form a growth coalition involving the military, opposition elites, ethnic ceasefire groups, technocrats, business groups, and the bureaucracy—all of whom need to work together to shape meaningful economic reforms.
In fact, several Burmese economists abroad and inside Burma have attempted to persuade the generals to secure such broad domestic support for economic reforms. In early 2007, a well-known economist inside Burma approached late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win to set up a consultative forum. Although Soe Win was said to have supported the idea, the junta’s supremo, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, shot it down.
Business sources note that other reform plans have stalled or been aborted because of Than Shwe’s preoccupation with ensuring his own survival.
“Than Shwe calls the shots on everything,” said Sein Htay, an economist in exile. “No one dares to initiate major reforms unless Than Shwe gives the final order.”
Since 2005, dozens of business people and economists have reportedly been consulted for their input into the drafting of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law, which will designate six main commercial cities as free-trade zones, with the aim of bringing more foreign investment into the country to revitalize its crippled economy. The much-anticipated and hyped SEZ Law, which was supposed to be enacted in 2007, has yet to come into effect, as Than Shwe continues to drag his heels.
“Than Shwe is afraid of the emergence of the Thilawa SEZ in Rangoon,” said a businessman in Rangoon. “He does not even want to bring limited liberalization to a limited zone. He is too concerned with security issues, especially after the September protests.”
Several economists suggest that the state urgently needs to readjust its role in economic policy formulation and implementation. They say that if the state reduced its over-dominant role and allowed the private sector to play a greater part in the economy, the authoritarian regime would be able to undertake economic reforms.
“Centralization must be relaxed,” said Maw Than, a former vice chancellor of Institute of Economics in Rangoon. “A pro-business attitude should be nurtured and broader consultation should be sought after. Advice must be given serious consideration for the benefit of society.”
However, the strongman who leads the ruling junta with an iron fist cares little about what the experts have to say. The military mindset of the regime means that its decision-making process is strictly top-down. Under the leadership of Than Shwe, the Burmese economy will continue going to dogs.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10128
The Need for a Growth Coalition in Burma
By MIN ZIN
When Indonesian dictator Suharto died last Sunday, Burmese-language short-wave radio stations and other Burmese media based abroad gave the news extensive coverage and offered comparative analyses. They attempted to draw similarities and contrasts between Suharto and Burma’s late tyrant Ne Win, and between the different directions the two countries have taken in their development.
Many experts noted that although Suharto was a vicious dictator, he raised the Indonesian economy to “Asian Tiger” status in the 1980s. Ne Win and his successors, on the other hand, have turned Burma into a failed state. All lamented Burma’s slide into its current condition of economic deprivation.
In fact, Burma introduced economic reforms after the military staged a coup in 1988. According to reports, cumulative foreign investment in the period from 1988 through early 1997 reached $6.1 billion. Some optimists even said that investors seeking the next “tiger” economy should set their sights on Burma.
However, despite the country’s opening of its economy to foreign investors, overall economic progress remained slow. Economist David Dapice attributed this to the government’s reluctance to undertake comprehensive reforms, choosing instead to implement reforms in a “half-hearted way”.
Then the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck. At first, Rangoon was unconcerned, as the country was not directly impacted by the plummeting value of a number of key Asian currencies. But when investors from other Asian countries began to shift away from high-risk ventures and started reneging on their investment promises in order to limit their losses in the crisis, Burma also got hit hard. The military regime made matters worse by failing to come up with sound economic policies in response to the crisis. The unreal economic boom went bust.
In fact, the junta has neither the capacity nor the political will to carry out far-reaching economic reforms, because they are afraid that any such move would threaten the interests of military elites, forcing them to turn their economic playground into a level playing field. They worry that allowing technocratic participation, much less public involvement, in the policymaking process would weaken their grip on power and deprive them of the prerogatives they currently enjoy. “Technocrats and experts such as economists and respected bureaucrats need to be viewed as important human resources and [their role should be] enhanced in Myanmar (Burma),” said Khin Maung Nyo, a well-known economist and writer in Burma. “They serve to help formulate economic policies, and the availability of policy choices makes it easy for government to implement reforms to build a modern, developed nation,” the economist added.
However, military involvement in political and economic affairs has from the outset been much deeper in Burma than in Indonesia and other countries in the region, where technocrats have long played a key role in formulating economic policies and guiding subsequent growth.
Broadly speaking, the junta has failed to form a growth coalition involving the military, opposition elites, ethnic ceasefire groups, technocrats, business groups, and the bureaucracy—all of whom need to work together to shape meaningful economic reforms.
In fact, several Burmese economists abroad and inside Burma have attempted to persuade the generals to secure such broad domestic support for economic reforms. In early 2007, a well-known economist inside Burma approached late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win to set up a consultative forum. Although Soe Win was said to have supported the idea, the junta’s supremo, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, shot it down.
Business sources note that other reform plans have stalled or been aborted because of Than Shwe’s preoccupation with ensuring his own survival.
“Than Shwe calls the shots on everything,” said Sein Htay, an economist in exile. “No one dares to initiate major reforms unless Than Shwe gives the final order.”
Since 2005, dozens of business people and economists have reportedly been consulted for their input into the drafting of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law, which will designate six main commercial cities as free-trade zones, with the aim of bringing more foreign investment into the country to revitalize its crippled economy. The much-anticipated and hyped SEZ Law, which was supposed to be enacted in 2007, has yet to come into effect, as Than Shwe continues to drag his heels.
“Than Shwe is afraid of the emergence of the Thilawa SEZ in Rangoon,” said a businessman in Rangoon. “He does not even want to bring limited liberalization to a limited zone. He is too concerned with security issues, especially after the September protests.”
Several economists suggest that the state urgently needs to readjust its role in economic policy formulation and implementation. They say that if the state reduced its over-dominant role and allowed the private sector to play a greater part in the economy, the authoritarian regime would be able to undertake economic reforms.
“Centralization must be relaxed,” said Maw Than, a former vice chancellor of Institute of Economics in Rangoon. “A pro-business attitude should be nurtured and broader consultation should be sought after. Advice must be given serious consideration for the benefit of society.”
However, the strongman who leads the ruling junta with an iron fist cares little about what the experts have to say. The military mindset of the regime means that its decision-making process is strictly top-down. Under the leadership of Than Shwe, the Burmese economy will continue going to dogs.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10128
Sunday, January 27, 2008
The China Factor
Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday January 27, 2008
The China Factor
Diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role in resolving the situation in Burma - action from the global public is needed, writes MIN ZIN
A few weeks after the protests last year in Burma, a Chinese diplomat approached an influential Burmese advocate in New York and asked why the Burmese dubbed their protest the "Saffron Revolution."
"The diplomat was obviously quite uncomfortable with this particular name, which he whispered to me," said the Burmese advocate, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Chinese are very sensitive to the 'colour revolutions'," she added.
In the wake of successful "colour revolutions" such as Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution - victories of nonviolent democracy movements in post-communist countries - Beijing is anxious to prevent similar occurrences at home or among its neighbours.
Then a country in its own backyard triggered the "Saffron Revolution", and the military's subsequent crackdown captured the world's attention. Along with the crisis in Burma, China was drawn into the spotlight with unflattering coverage in international media, and diplomatic pressure increased to withdraw its support of one of the world's most odious regimes. Public outcry across the globe called on China to assume a larger role in helping to resolve the crisis.
However, contrary to common perceptions, China is not a patron that pulls the strings, and the self-isolated, delusive Burmese regime is not a puppet. In fact, China has limited sway with the junta's generals. The relationship runs in both directions. This complicates Burma's problems and their resolution.
Of course, China has more power and influence on the generals than any other country. It also intends to use that leverage to its own benefit.
According to Chinese diplomats, Beijing has been gradually changing its Burma policy since the removal of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2004, and this has accelerated since the recent deadly crackdown in Burma. However, the diplomats warn that the policy shift should not be expected to be quick or dramatic. It will be slow and well-calculated.
"Than Shwe and Maung Aye are more intransigent than former dictator Ne Win, and they often do incredibly silly things," said a Chinese official during a meeting with a Burmese opposition activist. "China knows that Burma will not prosper under their leadership."
China's special envoy, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, was sent to Burma in November. He met with the junta's top leader, Senior-General Than Shwe, and asked the military "to resolve the pending issues through consultation, so as to speed up the democratisation process."
However, the regime responded that it will go at its own pace in the unilateral implementation of its "Seven-Step Road Map," according to a Western diplomat.
"The Chinese keep telling us that the international community is overstating their influence with the Burmese generals," said the diplomat. "Beijing says they don't have ability to tell the regime what to do."
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese analyst living on the China-Burma border, disagrees with that interpretation.
"Persuasion, without power backup, will not work. The soft-soft approach should be changed. China must show the stick part of its diplomacy," said Aung Kyaw Zaw.
Tipping Toward Responsibility
At the present time, Beijing is clearly not ready to apply real pressure to the junta. It still believes that working to resolve Burma's problems is secondary to pursuing its principal economic and strategic interests.
But simultaneously, China would like to solidify an international role as "a responsible stakeholder."
The time has come for concerted international diplomatic pressure on China to tip the balance toward responsibility. China must consider the sentiments of Thucydides: An amoral foreign policy is neither practical nor prudent.
Protesters in Bangkok calling for an end to the brutal use of force by the Burmese military junta against its people during the crackdown last year.
At the same time, it should be obvious that the United States and the European Union cannot outsource Burma's transition to democracy to China, which itself lacks democracy.
The West's most powerful countries should coordinate with China to facilitate a real transition in conflict-ridden Burma.
However, diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role. Public action on a global scale is needed.
"China was very annoyed to see the wave of protests taking place outside its embassies in major cities around the world in the wake of the September protests," said Aung Kyaw Zaw. "More importantly, they were really worried when demonstrators linked Burma's cause with a 2008 Olympic boycott."
China is very anxious to prevent any negative effect on the Olympic games. The vice mayor of Beijing warned in October 2007 that any move to link China's role in Burma to a boycott of the 2008 Olympics would be "inappropriate and unpopular."
China's leadership might even accommodate its Burma policy and give more support to the UN's Burma mediation role if they sensed a possibility of real damage to the much-hyped gala this summer, even though it might be a tactical and temporal accommodation.
However, the Burmese opposition has so far failed to seize and exploit this opportunity effectively. During the peak of Burma 's "Saffron Revolution", The Washington Post labelled one of its editorials the "Saffron Olympics", highlighting the dynamics of an international campaign against the summer Olympics. But that effort has run out of steam.
"The Burmese opposition in exile cannot accelerate the campaign in a consistent manner," said Nyo Ohn Myint, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area). "Our campaigners are going after ad hoc protests without a focus. We fail to form a wider coalition with other Olympic detractors. Unless we can launch a coordinated international grassroots action, China will not be swayed to our direction."
Beijing plans to start its Olympic festivities on 8/8/08, a date that is surprisingly similar to the 20th anniversary of Burma's "Four Eight ( 8/8/88 ) Democracy Movement."
Whether or not the heirs to the movement can make the most out of this coincidence remains to be seen.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
The China Factor
Diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role in resolving the situation in Burma - action from the global public is needed, writes MIN ZIN
A few weeks after the protests last year in Burma, a Chinese diplomat approached an influential Burmese advocate in New York and asked why the Burmese dubbed their protest the "Saffron Revolution."
"The diplomat was obviously quite uncomfortable with this particular name, which he whispered to me," said the Burmese advocate, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Chinese are very sensitive to the 'colour revolutions'," she added.
In the wake of successful "colour revolutions" such as Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution - victories of nonviolent democracy movements in post-communist countries - Beijing is anxious to prevent similar occurrences at home or among its neighbours.
Then a country in its own backyard triggered the "Saffron Revolution", and the military's subsequent crackdown captured the world's attention. Along with the crisis in Burma, China was drawn into the spotlight with unflattering coverage in international media, and diplomatic pressure increased to withdraw its support of one of the world's most odious regimes. Public outcry across the globe called on China to assume a larger role in helping to resolve the crisis.
However, contrary to common perceptions, China is not a patron that pulls the strings, and the self-isolated, delusive Burmese regime is not a puppet. In fact, China has limited sway with the junta's generals. The relationship runs in both directions. This complicates Burma's problems and their resolution.
Of course, China has more power and influence on the generals than any other country. It also intends to use that leverage to its own benefit.
According to Chinese diplomats, Beijing has been gradually changing its Burma policy since the removal of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2004, and this has accelerated since the recent deadly crackdown in Burma. However, the diplomats warn that the policy shift should not be expected to be quick or dramatic. It will be slow and well-calculated.
"Than Shwe and Maung Aye are more intransigent than former dictator Ne Win, and they often do incredibly silly things," said a Chinese official during a meeting with a Burmese opposition activist. "China knows that Burma will not prosper under their leadership."
China's special envoy, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, was sent to Burma in November. He met with the junta's top leader, Senior-General Than Shwe, and asked the military "to resolve the pending issues through consultation, so as to speed up the democratisation process."
However, the regime responded that it will go at its own pace in the unilateral implementation of its "Seven-Step Road Map," according to a Western diplomat.
"The Chinese keep telling us that the international community is overstating their influence with the Burmese generals," said the diplomat. "Beijing says they don't have ability to tell the regime what to do."
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese analyst living on the China-Burma border, disagrees with that interpretation.
"Persuasion, without power backup, will not work. The soft-soft approach should be changed. China must show the stick part of its diplomacy," said Aung Kyaw Zaw.
Tipping Toward Responsibility
At the present time, Beijing is clearly not ready to apply real pressure to the junta. It still believes that working to resolve Burma's problems is secondary to pursuing its principal economic and strategic interests.
But simultaneously, China would like to solidify an international role as "a responsible stakeholder."
The time has come for concerted international diplomatic pressure on China to tip the balance toward responsibility. China must consider the sentiments of Thucydides: An amoral foreign policy is neither practical nor prudent.
Protesters in Bangkok calling for an end to the brutal use of force by the Burmese military junta against its people during the crackdown last year.
At the same time, it should be obvious that the United States and the European Union cannot outsource Burma's transition to democracy to China, which itself lacks democracy.
The West's most powerful countries should coordinate with China to facilitate a real transition in conflict-ridden Burma.
However, diplomacy alone is not enough to compel China to play an effective role. Public action on a global scale is needed.
"China was very annoyed to see the wave of protests taking place outside its embassies in major cities around the world in the wake of the September protests," said Aung Kyaw Zaw. "More importantly, they were really worried when demonstrators linked Burma's cause with a 2008 Olympic boycott."
China is very anxious to prevent any negative effect on the Olympic games. The vice mayor of Beijing warned in October 2007 that any move to link China's role in Burma to a boycott of the 2008 Olympics would be "inappropriate and unpopular."
China's leadership might even accommodate its Burma policy and give more support to the UN's Burma mediation role if they sensed a possibility of real damage to the much-hyped gala this summer, even though it might be a tactical and temporal accommodation.
However, the Burmese opposition has so far failed to seize and exploit this opportunity effectively. During the peak of Burma 's "Saffron Revolution", The Washington Post labelled one of its editorials the "Saffron Olympics", highlighting the dynamics of an international campaign against the summer Olympics. But that effort has run out of steam.
"The Burmese opposition in exile cannot accelerate the campaign in a consistent manner," said Nyo Ohn Myint, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area). "Our campaigners are going after ad hoc protests without a focus. We fail to form a wider coalition with other Olympic detractors. Unless we can launch a coordinated international grassroots action, China will not be swayed to our direction."
Beijing plans to start its Olympic festivities on 8/8/08, a date that is surprisingly similar to the 20th anniversary of Burma's "Four Eight ( 8/8/88 ) Democracy Movement."
Whether or not the heirs to the movement can make the most out of this coincidence remains to be seen.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
Saturday, January 26, 2008
Burma Under Siege
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, January 26, 2008
Burma Under Siege
By MIN ZIN
After the September uprising, the Burmese junta regained control over opposition groups and activists, but whether it achieved a stronger strategic position remains doubtful.
A series of bomb blasts in the past two weeks demonstrates one of two things: the security issue is still potentially troublesome for the military or, if opposition charges are true, the junta itself was the source of the bomb blasts, which can be used to blame powerful, disruptive organizations.
There were four explosions within one week, killing at least three civilians and injuring five others. The first blast occurred on January 11 at the railway station serving the country's capital, Naypyidaw. It was the first incident of a bombing in the new capital.
As the bombs were going off, the regime and ethnic, armed opposition groups traded allegations.
The junta accused the Karen National Union (KNU) and an unspecified "foreign organization" of sending "terrorist saboteurs with explosives across the border to perpetrate destructive acts inside the country." Many observers believe the "foreign organization" was a reference to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
"They are not making this allegation lightly," said a well-informed source inside Burma. "No matter whether the allegation is true or not, it’s a well-calculated charge that is being interpreted within the military establishment in the context of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman's recent call for the US to use its military capabilities in Burma."
The influential senator wrote an opinion piece in October 2007, suggesting the Bush administration should actively investigate US military and intelligence capabilities could be used to put additional pressure on the regime. Lieberman said, "We should be examining how the junta's ability to command and control its forces throughout the country might itself be disrupted."
But opposition groups and the media dismissed the accusation of a "foreign organization" involvement as a ridiculous charge. The KNU also denied carrying out any attacks targeting civilians.
The opposition speculated that the regime itself could be behind the bombings in the hope of raising a perception of threat against the military, offering an excuse to continue its crack down against known democracy activists and the KNU.
Some exiled Burmese analysts even point to bitter military intelligence members who were purged in 2004 for orchestrating the bombings. Theories abound.
Meanwhile, security has been increased in Rangoon, Pegu and other major cities. Local authorities in some cities even reportedly detained and questioned residents who had recently returned from Thailand after working there as migrants.
In fact, the bombings underscore the vulnerability of the junta's leadership, no matter the source.
Even if the regime uses the bombings as a justification to continue its crackdown against opposition groups, it underscores its fear of the opposition. If the bombings were self-inflicted and meant to shore up unity within the Tatmadaw (armed forces), it’s a sign the junta is unsure of the loyalty of officers and soldiers.
"It is less likely that the junta orchestrated the recent explosions," said Win Min, a Burmese analyst who studies civil-military relations in Burma. "I don't think the military would stage an attack in Naypyidaw, the capital they extol and take pride in. In fact, it is not necessary for them to use bombings to justify their crackdowns on the oppositions."
In fact, since 1988 the military’s image, in the eyes of the domestic public as well as abroad, has descended to rock bottom, while the opposition, including the armed ethnic groups, is seen as democratic freedom fighters.
The September demonstrations again allowed Burmese society to witness mindless killing and brutality directed against Buddhist monks and civilians. As result, the morale of the military, including some senior officers, is at its lowest ebb in years.
Moreover, the generals have pushed the limit of the international community including their regional supporters.
Under the current circumstances, the last thing the generals want is to be seen as weak.
An unfortunate consequence of this deep sense of vulnerability is that it hardens Snr-Gen Than Shwe's thinking. Under the spell of a bunker mentality, the military leadership will continue to dig in their heels and new reforms are less likely.
Than Shwe's regime is now determined to entrench its power in non-negotiable terms.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10044
Burma Under Siege
By MIN ZIN
After the September uprising, the Burmese junta regained control over opposition groups and activists, but whether it achieved a stronger strategic position remains doubtful.
A series of bomb blasts in the past two weeks demonstrates one of two things: the security issue is still potentially troublesome for the military or, if opposition charges are true, the junta itself was the source of the bomb blasts, which can be used to blame powerful, disruptive organizations.
There were four explosions within one week, killing at least three civilians and injuring five others. The first blast occurred on January 11 at the railway station serving the country's capital, Naypyidaw. It was the first incident of a bombing in the new capital.
As the bombs were going off, the regime and ethnic, armed opposition groups traded allegations.
The junta accused the Karen National Union (KNU) and an unspecified "foreign organization" of sending "terrorist saboteurs with explosives across the border to perpetrate destructive acts inside the country." Many observers believe the "foreign organization" was a reference to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
"They are not making this allegation lightly," said a well-informed source inside Burma. "No matter whether the allegation is true or not, it’s a well-calculated charge that is being interpreted within the military establishment in the context of U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman's recent call for the US to use its military capabilities in Burma."
The influential senator wrote an opinion piece in October 2007, suggesting the Bush administration should actively investigate US military and intelligence capabilities could be used to put additional pressure on the regime. Lieberman said, "We should be examining how the junta's ability to command and control its forces throughout the country might itself be disrupted."
But opposition groups and the media dismissed the accusation of a "foreign organization" involvement as a ridiculous charge. The KNU also denied carrying out any attacks targeting civilians.
The opposition speculated that the regime itself could be behind the bombings in the hope of raising a perception of threat against the military, offering an excuse to continue its crack down against known democracy activists and the KNU.
Some exiled Burmese analysts even point to bitter military intelligence members who were purged in 2004 for orchestrating the bombings. Theories abound.
Meanwhile, security has been increased in Rangoon, Pegu and other major cities. Local authorities in some cities even reportedly detained and questioned residents who had recently returned from Thailand after working there as migrants.
In fact, the bombings underscore the vulnerability of the junta's leadership, no matter the source.
Even if the regime uses the bombings as a justification to continue its crackdown against opposition groups, it underscores its fear of the opposition. If the bombings were self-inflicted and meant to shore up unity within the Tatmadaw (armed forces), it’s a sign the junta is unsure of the loyalty of officers and soldiers.
"It is less likely that the junta orchestrated the recent explosions," said Win Min, a Burmese analyst who studies civil-military relations in Burma. "I don't think the military would stage an attack in Naypyidaw, the capital they extol and take pride in. In fact, it is not necessary for them to use bombings to justify their crackdowns on the oppositions."
In fact, since 1988 the military’s image, in the eyes of the domestic public as well as abroad, has descended to rock bottom, while the opposition, including the armed ethnic groups, is seen as democratic freedom fighters.
The September demonstrations again allowed Burmese society to witness mindless killing and brutality directed against Buddhist monks and civilians. As result, the morale of the military, including some senior officers, is at its lowest ebb in years.
Moreover, the generals have pushed the limit of the international community including their regional supporters.
Under the current circumstances, the last thing the generals want is to be seen as weak.
An unfortunate consequence of this deep sense of vulnerability is that it hardens Snr-Gen Than Shwe's thinking. Under the spell of a bunker mentality, the military leadership will continue to dig in their heels and new reforms are less likely.
Than Shwe's regime is now determined to entrench its power in non-negotiable terms.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10044
Sunday, January 13, 2008
Naming the Name
Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday January 13, 2008
Naming the Name
Strategic use of due process will help prompt political transition in Burma, writes MIN ZIN
The political conflict in Burma has long been noted for its intractability. It is intractable not because it is irresolvable, but because it is resisting resolution. Of course, conflict in itself does not resist anything - people do. And the people of Burma know very well who the culprit is.
Buddhist monks and their supporters take part in a protest march in Rangoon on Sept 25, 2007, before the military regime's brutal crackdown.
"In Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe is an autocrat," said a well-known lawyer in Rangoon, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for her safety. "He is not responsible to anyone else for what he does. He alone calls the shots."
Her view is shared by Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) and a human rights activist. "Many foreigners I have met are not sufficiently aware of the real face of Burma's dictatorship," he said. "Than Shwe deserves a name that is loathed in international politics and media."
In this regard, the US government seems to have taken the initiative. A closer reading of the US State Department's latest press statement on Burma revealed a new trend of "naming the name."
"The Burmese regime, led by Than Shwe, continues cracking down on democracy activists for peacefully expressing their political beliefs," opened the statement dated December 21, 2007, regarding the regime's arrest of six 88 Generation Students group activists.
Instead of speaking about Burma's dictatorship in vague and faceless terms, the statement pinpointed the villain: "We deplore the regime's actions and call on Than Shwe to release all political prisoners."
Sources close to the US State Department said that the three-sentence statement was well crafted to isolate Than Shwe as the person solely responsible for what happens in Burma.
It was probably the first time that the State Department has pointed to Than Shwe as a culprit, said a lobbyist in Washington.
Several military analysts in Rangoon as well as abroad have said that there is growing resentment within the military toward the erratic behavior of Than Shwe and his family ever since the uncovering of his daughter's lavish wedding, and the harsh crackdown on the peaceful protests led by Buddhist monks in September.
Meanwhile, some experts have started floating the idea of going a step further- isolating Than Shwe and using the language of "justice and accountability" against him. They estimate that holding Than Shwe personally accountable for the regime's crimes against humanity may have a strategic impact in Burma's political transition. It might even help create a power balance between the junta and other potential partners in dialogue.
"Raising the prospect of justice and accountability for mass violations of human rights, along with corruption, can help to balance out the power difference and weaken the regime ..." said Patrick Pierce, a senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice. "The international community- the UN and Asean in particular- seems to be all carrot and no stick. There needs to be a balance."
However, the validity of the whole calculation will rest mainly on whether or not such strategic moves will encourage other generals to distance themselves from the aging Than Shwe, and facilitate some basic political and economic reforms.
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst living along the Sino-Burmese border, dismisses such prospects. "It will be counterproductive," he said. "Instead of being a positive incentive to other generals, these moves will give Than Shwe a chance to rally his hardliners by pointing out the common threat."
A Rangoon-based lawyer also noted that although Than Shwe is an autocratic supremo, he has plenty of hardline people around him. Any talk of a prosecution against him will deter potential political transition in Burma. Moreover, it will remind the generals of late opposition party leader Kyi Maung's reference to the "Nuremberg-style trial" against former military intelligence chief Khin Nyunt.
However, some activists argue that if there is no chance of political thaw under Than Shwe's autocratic leadership, why bother waiting in vain without accumulating pressure to remove him? They advocate any action that will target Than Shwe and his family.
Jared Genser, president of Freedom Now and co-author of the 2005 "Havel-Tutu Report" that calls for UN Security Council action on Burma, doubts the effectiveness of this strategy.
"Anyone can press for justice and accountability against Than Shwe under international law," said Genser. "But the problem is how seriously he will take such a threat. Ultimately it will only impact his behaviour if he believes there is a risk of being investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Unless that risk is real, we would be issuing an idle threat."
The effectiveness of the threat must be weighed not only in terms of the message, but also in terms of the agent who attempts to speak the language of justice to Than Shwe.
"Right now, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's special envoy to Burma, is the only UN representative getting an ear - if that - and he is a political broker," said Pierce. "We need multivocality in the UN and in the international community. Others can and should play an effective role in raising the issues of justice and accountability if Mr Gambari deems it inappropriate for his role as a negotiator."
Some advocates suggest that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour could bring such messages of justice to the regime. In her recent statements on Burma, the UN human rights chief frequently cited international law and urged the military junta to abide by it. In her statement on Burma dated October 2, 2007, Arbour recalled the international community's "responsibility to protect civilians against serious international crimes," according to the agreement of world leaders at their 2005 summit. She also pressurised the Burmese government "to account publicly for past and on-going violations."
Of course, if a person of high stature such as Louise Arbour was able to engage in a justice and accountability dialogue, it would give more weight and leverage to other UN organs, including Gambari, in dealing with the junta. However, it would still be an uphill struggle in transforming these aspirations of justice into practice within the UN mechanism.
"Unfortunately, in the short to medium term, without any rapid deterioration of the situation in Burma,it is highly unlikely we will see the UN Security Council willing to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court," said Genser. "Beyond China and Russia's opposition, even the US does not currently support the ICC. I do not see any government on the Security Council with the political will and persuasive ability capable of making this happen any time soon."
Some observers are concerned that pressure will offer the Burmese regime an excuse to disengage from the UN. "Than Shwe would even be thinking about stopping all political cooperation with the UN if he felt like he was under siege," said a military source inside Burma.
However, the Burma Lawyers' Council, an exiled group which has persistently called on the international community to hold the military regime's leaders criminally accountable before the ICC for their past atrocities and recent crackdowns, refutes the notion that one may not have both criminal accountability and active engagement with the regime.
In their statement released on October 10, BLC cited the case of Sudan as an example and said "there is no dichotomy between active engagement with the principal parties and seeking accountability for the crimes committed by one or more of those principals."
Of course, any strategy needs to be carefully balanced with the domestic realities of Burma so that it will not become counterproductive. However, as all victims of oppression demand, truth must be sought and justice must be done.
"If justice could be achieved through a strategic ploy to facilitate transition, it would be better," said Bo Kyi.
At a minimum, the international community must make sure that nothing should foreclose the efforts to ensure accountability for gross violations of human rights.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
Naming the Name
Strategic use of due process will help prompt political transition in Burma, writes MIN ZIN
The political conflict in Burma has long been noted for its intractability. It is intractable not because it is irresolvable, but because it is resisting resolution. Of course, conflict in itself does not resist anything - people do. And the people of Burma know very well who the culprit is.
Buddhist monks and their supporters take part in a protest march in Rangoon on Sept 25, 2007, before the military regime's brutal crackdown.
"In Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe is an autocrat," said a well-known lawyer in Rangoon, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for her safety. "He is not responsible to anyone else for what he does. He alone calls the shots."
Her view is shared by Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) and a human rights activist. "Many foreigners I have met are not sufficiently aware of the real face of Burma's dictatorship," he said. "Than Shwe deserves a name that is loathed in international politics and media."
In this regard, the US government seems to have taken the initiative. A closer reading of the US State Department's latest press statement on Burma revealed a new trend of "naming the name."
"The Burmese regime, led by Than Shwe, continues cracking down on democracy activists for peacefully expressing their political beliefs," opened the statement dated December 21, 2007, regarding the regime's arrest of six 88 Generation Students group activists.
Instead of speaking about Burma's dictatorship in vague and faceless terms, the statement pinpointed the villain: "We deplore the regime's actions and call on Than Shwe to release all political prisoners."
Sources close to the US State Department said that the three-sentence statement was well crafted to isolate Than Shwe as the person solely responsible for what happens in Burma.
It was probably the first time that the State Department has pointed to Than Shwe as a culprit, said a lobbyist in Washington.
Several military analysts in Rangoon as well as abroad have said that there is growing resentment within the military toward the erratic behavior of Than Shwe and his family ever since the uncovering of his daughter's lavish wedding, and the harsh crackdown on the peaceful protests led by Buddhist monks in September.
Meanwhile, some experts have started floating the idea of going a step further- isolating Than Shwe and using the language of "justice and accountability" against him. They estimate that holding Than Shwe personally accountable for the regime's crimes against humanity may have a strategic impact in Burma's political transition. It might even help create a power balance between the junta and other potential partners in dialogue.
"Raising the prospect of justice and accountability for mass violations of human rights, along with corruption, can help to balance out the power difference and weaken the regime ..." said Patrick Pierce, a senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice. "The international community- the UN and Asean in particular- seems to be all carrot and no stick. There needs to be a balance."
However, the validity of the whole calculation will rest mainly on whether or not such strategic moves will encourage other generals to distance themselves from the aging Than Shwe, and facilitate some basic political and economic reforms.
Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst living along the Sino-Burmese border, dismisses such prospects. "It will be counterproductive," he said. "Instead of being a positive incentive to other generals, these moves will give Than Shwe a chance to rally his hardliners by pointing out the common threat."
A Rangoon-based lawyer also noted that although Than Shwe is an autocratic supremo, he has plenty of hardline people around him. Any talk of a prosecution against him will deter potential political transition in Burma. Moreover, it will remind the generals of late opposition party leader Kyi Maung's reference to the "Nuremberg-style trial" against former military intelligence chief Khin Nyunt.
However, some activists argue that if there is no chance of political thaw under Than Shwe's autocratic leadership, why bother waiting in vain without accumulating pressure to remove him? They advocate any action that will target Than Shwe and his family.
Jared Genser, president of Freedom Now and co-author of the 2005 "Havel-Tutu Report" that calls for UN Security Council action on Burma, doubts the effectiveness of this strategy.
"Anyone can press for justice and accountability against Than Shwe under international law," said Genser. "But the problem is how seriously he will take such a threat. Ultimately it will only impact his behaviour if he believes there is a risk of being investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Unless that risk is real, we would be issuing an idle threat."
The effectiveness of the threat must be weighed not only in terms of the message, but also in terms of the agent who attempts to speak the language of justice to Than Shwe.
"Right now, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's special envoy to Burma, is the only UN representative getting an ear - if that - and he is a political broker," said Pierce. "We need multivocality in the UN and in the international community. Others can and should play an effective role in raising the issues of justice and accountability if Mr Gambari deems it inappropriate for his role as a negotiator."
Some advocates suggest that UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour could bring such messages of justice to the regime. In her recent statements on Burma, the UN human rights chief frequently cited international law and urged the military junta to abide by it. In her statement on Burma dated October 2, 2007, Arbour recalled the international community's "responsibility to protect civilians against serious international crimes," according to the agreement of world leaders at their 2005 summit. She also pressurised the Burmese government "to account publicly for past and on-going violations."
Of course, if a person of high stature such as Louise Arbour was able to engage in a justice and accountability dialogue, it would give more weight and leverage to other UN organs, including Gambari, in dealing with the junta. However, it would still be an uphill struggle in transforming these aspirations of justice into practice within the UN mechanism.
"Unfortunately, in the short to medium term, without any rapid deterioration of the situation in Burma,it is highly unlikely we will see the UN Security Council willing to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court," said Genser. "Beyond China and Russia's opposition, even the US does not currently support the ICC. I do not see any government on the Security Council with the political will and persuasive ability capable of making this happen any time soon."
Some observers are concerned that pressure will offer the Burmese regime an excuse to disengage from the UN. "Than Shwe would even be thinking about stopping all political cooperation with the UN if he felt like he was under siege," said a military source inside Burma.
However, the Burma Lawyers' Council, an exiled group which has persistently called on the international community to hold the military regime's leaders criminally accountable before the ICC for their past atrocities and recent crackdowns, refutes the notion that one may not have both criminal accountability and active engagement with the regime.
In their statement released on October 10, BLC cited the case of Sudan as an example and said "there is no dichotomy between active engagement with the principal parties and seeking accountability for the crimes committed by one or more of those principals."
Of course, any strategy needs to be carefully balanced with the domestic realities of Burma so that it will not become counterproductive. However, as all victims of oppression demand, truth must be sought and justice must be done.
"If justice could be achieved through a strategic ploy to facilitate transition, it would be better," said Bo Kyi.
At a minimum, the international community must make sure that nothing should foreclose the efforts to ensure accountability for gross violations of human rights.
Min Zin is a freelance journalist.
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Mission Impossible
Irrawaddy Online, Saturday, January 12, 2008
Mission Impossible
By MIN ZIN
To the Burmese generals, accepting international mediation has become just another means of conducting the conflict as opposed to an option for settling it. In other words, it is a tactical maneuver.
In the wake of the protests in September last year, the regime accepted the mediation efforts of the United Nations simply because rejecting them would cause greater harm in the international arena. More importantly, the junta might not have wanted to upset relations with its staunch regional supporters.
It is hardly surprising that the Burmese government is defying the UN's attempts at mediation—it feels confident that it is successfully bringing the country back under control. Despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon repeatedly warning that a return to the status quo that existed before the September crisis is not sustainable, the present situation is heading all the way back to square one.
Ban is trying to revive his Good Offices’ mediation efforts and to dispatch Ibrahim Gambari to China and India before the end of January "to continue further consultations with Burma's neighbors," according to UN officials. At the moment however, the Burmese authorities have not even approved Gambari’s itinerary for Burma.
"As for Myanmar (Burma) itself, we don't have an exact date for Mr Gambari to go back there, although he does have an open invitation to visit the country," said Farhan Haq, a UN spokesman. "The question is about developing the right arrangements. We are keeping in touch with the authorities in Myanmar (Burma) to discuss when Mr Gambari may be able to return."
Burmese opposition party National League for Democracy sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General recently, expressing a readiness to accept Gambari's mediation efforts toward political dialogue and national reconciliation. "Though we cannot ascertain if Mr Gambari will be able to visit Burma during his trip to Asia, we urge the [Burmese] government to accept his visit and the resumption of the stalled political dialogue," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the party.
However, some diplomatic sources within the UN spoke recently to The Irrawaddy and expressed doubts about the possibility of Gambari visiting Burma on this particular trip.
"He is more likely to come back to New York after visiting China and India," said a foreign diplomat at the UN who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Mr Gambari may not be able to give another Burma briefing at the UN Security Council after this trip, even though some council members will be expecting such a briefing in order to keep the Burma issue on board."
In fact, the UN envoy and other key international players realize that the momentum of the international mediation efforts toward Burma is now fading. They must try to reactivate the momentum and to prioritize a return visit by Gambari to Burma as soon as possible.
"The success of Mr Gambari's efforts largely depend on the readiness of China and India to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "China retreated when they really needed to apply pressure on Burma, even though they said they supported Gambari's mission."
After the September uprising and the subsequent military crackdowns, Gambari managed to garner regional consensus on Burma. Those who had kept saying that the Burmese issue was an internal matter—China, India and Asean—came to the consensus that the country really did have a problem, and that the ruling junta should cooperate with UN for the benefit of national reconciliation and democratization. "Mr Gambari has been dealing with a number of neighboring countries to see what contribution they can make in the process toward normalcy and democratization in Myanmar (Burma)," Haq told The Irrawaddy. "In his upcoming Asia trip, he will simply try to continue that process".
Of course, Gambari must hold China and India to their promise that they would ensure the Burmese regime’s full cooperation with the UN Envoy, especially given the situation that his access to the country is so uncertain. Otherwise, Gambari may face a similar fate to his predecessor, Razali Ismail, who ended his mission denied entry to Burma indefinitely.
The international community needs to be "more insistent with the junta that a special representative of the UN Secretary-General cannot be treated the way that the junta has treated Mr. Gambari,'' United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said late last month. "It's simply unacceptable," Rice added, referring to the way the Burmese authorities had undermined his entry to and movements around Burma last time round.
The outgoing US administration must surely realize its diplomatic constraints in pushing Burma at the Security Council in the face of harsh resistance from China. Contrary to a common misconception, Gambari's current mission is a non-binding mediation effort and he does not have any enforcement capacity. From the very beginning, the leverage he has wielded has largely lain at the mercy of military junta and, to a lesser extent, its key ally, China.
There is no other country in the region or within the Security Council that can initiate a credible alternative Burma policy to the current mechanism of the Good Offices’ role. Sadly, Chinese checkers is the only game in town.
The US Secretary of State recently said that Gambari's mission "needs more profile; it needs to have more vigor." However, she did not articulate how this could be done effectively. Unless the international community compels the Burmese junta to feel that the cost of rejecting the mission, the UN envoy will remain toothless.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9916
Mission Impossible
By MIN ZIN
To the Burmese generals, accepting international mediation has become just another means of conducting the conflict as opposed to an option for settling it. In other words, it is a tactical maneuver.
In the wake of the protests in September last year, the regime accepted the mediation efforts of the United Nations simply because rejecting them would cause greater harm in the international arena. More importantly, the junta might not have wanted to upset relations with its staunch regional supporters.
It is hardly surprising that the Burmese government is defying the UN's attempts at mediation—it feels confident that it is successfully bringing the country back under control. Despite UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon repeatedly warning that a return to the status quo that existed before the September crisis is not sustainable, the present situation is heading all the way back to square one.
Ban is trying to revive his Good Offices’ mediation efforts and to dispatch Ibrahim Gambari to China and India before the end of January "to continue further consultations with Burma's neighbors," according to UN officials. At the moment however, the Burmese authorities have not even approved Gambari’s itinerary for Burma.
"As for Myanmar (Burma) itself, we don't have an exact date for Mr Gambari to go back there, although he does have an open invitation to visit the country," said Farhan Haq, a UN spokesman. "The question is about developing the right arrangements. We are keeping in touch with the authorities in Myanmar (Burma) to discuss when Mr Gambari may be able to return."
Burmese opposition party National League for Democracy sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General recently, expressing a readiness to accept Gambari's mediation efforts toward political dialogue and national reconciliation. "Though we cannot ascertain if Mr Gambari will be able to visit Burma during his trip to Asia, we urge the [Burmese] government to accept his visit and the resumption of the stalled political dialogue," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the party.
However, some diplomatic sources within the UN spoke recently to The Irrawaddy and expressed doubts about the possibility of Gambari visiting Burma on this particular trip.
"He is more likely to come back to New York after visiting China and India," said a foreign diplomat at the UN who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Mr Gambari may not be able to give another Burma briefing at the UN Security Council after this trip, even though some council members will be expecting such a briefing in order to keep the Burma issue on board."
In fact, the UN envoy and other key international players realize that the momentum of the international mediation efforts toward Burma is now fading. They must try to reactivate the momentum and to prioritize a return visit by Gambari to Burma as soon as possible.
"The success of Mr Gambari's efforts largely depend on the readiness of China and India to use their leverage over the Burmese junta," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma—effectively the Burmese government in exile. "China retreated when they really needed to apply pressure on Burma, even though they said they supported Gambari's mission."
After the September uprising and the subsequent military crackdowns, Gambari managed to garner regional consensus on Burma. Those who had kept saying that the Burmese issue was an internal matter—China, India and Asean—came to the consensus that the country really did have a problem, and that the ruling junta should cooperate with UN for the benefit of national reconciliation and democratization. "Mr Gambari has been dealing with a number of neighboring countries to see what contribution they can make in the process toward normalcy and democratization in Myanmar (Burma)," Haq told The Irrawaddy. "In his upcoming Asia trip, he will simply try to continue that process".
Of course, Gambari must hold China and India to their promise that they would ensure the Burmese regime’s full cooperation with the UN Envoy, especially given the situation that his access to the country is so uncertain. Otherwise, Gambari may face a similar fate to his predecessor, Razali Ismail, who ended his mission denied entry to Burma indefinitely.
The international community needs to be "more insistent with the junta that a special representative of the UN Secretary-General cannot be treated the way that the junta has treated Mr. Gambari,'' United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said late last month. "It's simply unacceptable," Rice added, referring to the way the Burmese authorities had undermined his entry to and movements around Burma last time round.
The outgoing US administration must surely realize its diplomatic constraints in pushing Burma at the Security Council in the face of harsh resistance from China. Contrary to a common misconception, Gambari's current mission is a non-binding mediation effort and he does not have any enforcement capacity. From the very beginning, the leverage he has wielded has largely lain at the mercy of military junta and, to a lesser extent, its key ally, China.
There is no other country in the region or within the Security Council that can initiate a credible alternative Burma policy to the current mechanism of the Good Offices’ role. Sadly, Chinese checkers is the only game in town.
The US Secretary of State recently said that Gambari's mission "needs more profile; it needs to have more vigor." However, she did not articulate how this could be done effectively. Unless the international community compels the Burmese junta to feel that the cost of rejecting the mission, the UN envoy will remain toothless.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9916
Friday, January 4, 2008
60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?
Irrawaddy Online
60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?
By MIN ZIN
Friday, January 4, 2008
During the struggle against British colonial rule, a young nationalist, Thakin Nu, once told his colleague, Than Tun: "You will be the Lenin of Burma and I'll be your Maxim Gorky."
When Burma achieved independence in January 1948, Thakin Nu (later known as “U Nu”) became prime minister while Than Tun was general secretary of the Communist Party of Burma. Unfortunately, Burma's Lenin and Gorky fell out and became arch-enemies. Then, civil war broke out. The irony of Burma's independence politics is that it started with a failed dream.
"We were all young and passionate then," said Thakin Chan Tun, a veteran politician who knew both U Nu and Than Tun. "As result, many of our key leaders took extreme stances in post-independence politics and, at the same time, weapons were easily available in the wake of WWII."
The CPB leadership declared independence to be a sham and “under cover of this sham, British imperialism would work a stranglehold on the defense and economic life of the country." Consequently, the CPB decided to launch an armed rebellion in March 1948 to achieve "genuine" independence.
"Dichotomous perspectives, such as genuine-versus-sham and right-versus-wrong is a dominant paradigm among the political oppositions of Burma throughout history," said Tin Maung Than, a famous Burmese writer and political analyst. "When they waged arm struggle, the CPB looked at politics not from a power dimension, but from an ideological perspective. They decided to disengage from the political mainstream."
It wasn’t only the communists—some of the ethnic elite also neglected power politics. They overlooked the reality of basic maturity in politics that you cannot always get your own way, especially in fragile and uncertain post-independence Burma.
A series of negotiations took place between Burman leaders and ethnic representatives some time before independence. The general consensus was to create four ethnic states: Shan, Karenni, Karen and Kachin. In the drafted constitution for the new union, a provision was also included for the possible formation of new states in the future. The Shan and Karenni were granted the right to secede after ten years if they were not happy with their status. The hardest nut to crack was the Karen issue. The designation and status of the Karen state boundary remained unresolved as Karen nationalists demanded Tenasserim, Irrawaddy and parts of Pegu Division.
In October 1947, U Nu's cabinet offered the Karen a state that would have included the Karenni State, the substate of Mongpai, Salween District and some of the Thaton, Toungoo and Pyinmana hill tracts. However, the Karen National Union demanded much of the delta as well, including the whole of the Irrawaddy Division and Insein and Hanthawaddy districts. From the perspective of U Nu's government, the controversial demands made further negotiations impossible.
"U Nu failed to carry out Aung San's promises for the Karen people," said David Tharkapaw, a senior Karen leader and chief of the Information Department in the KNU. "U Nu was a Burman chauvinist. While trust between the KNU and U Nu's government was then weakened due to the mutual propagandas and vilifications, Gen Ne Win's private militias started attacking Karen villages. Then the Karen's revolution became inevitable."
As a result, the KNU launched an insurrection in January 1949. The Karen nationalist movement gradually receded from the center stage of Burmese mainstream politics, and the power of the KNU also dwindled over time. Some observers believe that the KNU should have pursued a more careful strategy than opting to compel the Karen people to an armed struggle for greater autonomy.
"The government's offer could then have been considered very generous by today's standards, but the KNU was not willing to compromise, and [became] increasingly militant," said Thakin Chan Tun. "It was a tragic story of missed opportunity."
In fact, idealism compounded with militancy—whether violent or non-violent—has been a major trait of Burmese politics. The concept of legal opposition, in terms of making compromises and enjoying inclusive participation, has never rooted itself in the country. Post-colonial conflicts in Burma proved that when the opposition tended to resort to violent means to achieve their absolute goals, the government moved to eliminate them.
U Nu's government was also unable to resolve the country's multiple crises and was even disparagingly called the "Six-Mile Rangoon Government" because various rebel groups controlled the suburbs of the capital, Rangoon.
U Nu, modeling himself after Burmese kings of the past, attempted to establish himself as a patron of Buddhism, but he never managed to make his ideal compatible with the daily realities of politics. His authoritarian and capricious leadership failed to lay the foundation for sustainable democracy.
"The appreciation and practice of parliamentary democracy in U Nu's era was superficial," said Dr Aung Kin, a Burmese historian and well-known radio pundit. "U Nu's willingness to give up the parliamentary government to Ne Win's caretaker regime in 1958 paved the way for the military to usurp political power forever."
When the military staged a coup in 1962, it nullified parliamentary democracy and vowed "to transform the society to socialism." However, Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party simply fueled an already faltering situation. His idea of mixing Marxist, Buddhist and nationalist principles was an idiosyncratic mess, forcing the country to retreat into international isolation. The abject poverty and political repression of the BSPP eventually broke the tolerance of the Burmese public and a popular uprising calling for democracy broke out in 1988. The army responded with a massive slaughter of protesters and staged another coup d’etat. Gross violations of human rights have continued unabated ever since.
However, democracy as a renewed ideal was born. The opposition National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in 1990’s multi-party elections. The opposition elite aimed for the absolute maximum—the full transfer of power to the elected party. However, perhaps similar to the CPB and KNU before them, they walked away with the absolute minimum of gains—and the continuation of military rule in a failing state.
Instead of treating elections in a post-conflict society as a guide to power-sharing, the opposition leaders, who held lofty confidence in their public support and democratic ideals in the immediate aftermath of the election victory, viewed it as a means of determining winners and losers.
"Political immaturity within the Burmese opposition derives from a lack of appreciation for power asymmetry," said Tin Maung Than. "We could not strike a balance between power and principle."
All these crises—starting with independence and the ethnic autonomy issue—remain unresolved. The socio-economic condition of the country is at its lowest ebb in its post-1948 history. A humanitarian crisis is looming and public discontent is at an all-time high. The prospect of national reconciliation or even a breakthrough in the political deadlock remains unlikely.
Following the 1988 military coup, U Nu—once the hero of independence and first prime minister of the union—cynically voiced his regrets over fighting for Burmese independence. Those bitter words he might have uttered out of frustration and despair, but it in many ways they reflect the 60-year history of post-independence Burma.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9814
60 Years On: Where did it all go wrong?
By MIN ZIN
Friday, January 4, 2008
During the struggle against British colonial rule, a young nationalist, Thakin Nu, once told his colleague, Than Tun: "You will be the Lenin of Burma and I'll be your Maxim Gorky."
When Burma achieved independence in January 1948, Thakin Nu (later known as “U Nu”) became prime minister while Than Tun was general secretary of the Communist Party of Burma. Unfortunately, Burma's Lenin and Gorky fell out and became arch-enemies. Then, civil war broke out. The irony of Burma's independence politics is that it started with a failed dream.
"We were all young and passionate then," said Thakin Chan Tun, a veteran politician who knew both U Nu and Than Tun. "As result, many of our key leaders took extreme stances in post-independence politics and, at the same time, weapons were easily available in the wake of WWII."
The CPB leadership declared independence to be a sham and “under cover of this sham, British imperialism would work a stranglehold on the defense and economic life of the country." Consequently, the CPB decided to launch an armed rebellion in March 1948 to achieve "genuine" independence.
"Dichotomous perspectives, such as genuine-versus-sham and right-versus-wrong is a dominant paradigm among the political oppositions of Burma throughout history," said Tin Maung Than, a famous Burmese writer and political analyst. "When they waged arm struggle, the CPB looked at politics not from a power dimension, but from an ideological perspective. They decided to disengage from the political mainstream."
It wasn’t only the communists—some of the ethnic elite also neglected power politics. They overlooked the reality of basic maturity in politics that you cannot always get your own way, especially in fragile and uncertain post-independence Burma.
A series of negotiations took place between Burman leaders and ethnic representatives some time before independence. The general consensus was to create four ethnic states: Shan, Karenni, Karen and Kachin. In the drafted constitution for the new union, a provision was also included for the possible formation of new states in the future. The Shan and Karenni were granted the right to secede after ten years if they were not happy with their status. The hardest nut to crack was the Karen issue. The designation and status of the Karen state boundary remained unresolved as Karen nationalists demanded Tenasserim, Irrawaddy and parts of Pegu Division.
In October 1947, U Nu's cabinet offered the Karen a state that would have included the Karenni State, the substate of Mongpai, Salween District and some of the Thaton, Toungoo and Pyinmana hill tracts. However, the Karen National Union demanded much of the delta as well, including the whole of the Irrawaddy Division and Insein and Hanthawaddy districts. From the perspective of U Nu's government, the controversial demands made further negotiations impossible.
"U Nu failed to carry out Aung San's promises for the Karen people," said David Tharkapaw, a senior Karen leader and chief of the Information Department in the KNU. "U Nu was a Burman chauvinist. While trust between the KNU and U Nu's government was then weakened due to the mutual propagandas and vilifications, Gen Ne Win's private militias started attacking Karen villages. Then the Karen's revolution became inevitable."
As a result, the KNU launched an insurrection in January 1949. The Karen nationalist movement gradually receded from the center stage of Burmese mainstream politics, and the power of the KNU also dwindled over time. Some observers believe that the KNU should have pursued a more careful strategy than opting to compel the Karen people to an armed struggle for greater autonomy.
"The government's offer could then have been considered very generous by today's standards, but the KNU was not willing to compromise, and [became] increasingly militant," said Thakin Chan Tun. "It was a tragic story of missed opportunity."
In fact, idealism compounded with militancy—whether violent or non-violent—has been a major trait of Burmese politics. The concept of legal opposition, in terms of making compromises and enjoying inclusive participation, has never rooted itself in the country. Post-colonial conflicts in Burma proved that when the opposition tended to resort to violent means to achieve their absolute goals, the government moved to eliminate them.
U Nu's government was also unable to resolve the country's multiple crises and was even disparagingly called the "Six-Mile Rangoon Government" because various rebel groups controlled the suburbs of the capital, Rangoon.
U Nu, modeling himself after Burmese kings of the past, attempted to establish himself as a patron of Buddhism, but he never managed to make his ideal compatible with the daily realities of politics. His authoritarian and capricious leadership failed to lay the foundation for sustainable democracy.
"The appreciation and practice of parliamentary democracy in U Nu's era was superficial," said Dr Aung Kin, a Burmese historian and well-known radio pundit. "U Nu's willingness to give up the parliamentary government to Ne Win's caretaker regime in 1958 paved the way for the military to usurp political power forever."
When the military staged a coup in 1962, it nullified parliamentary democracy and vowed "to transform the society to socialism." However, Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party simply fueled an already faltering situation. His idea of mixing Marxist, Buddhist and nationalist principles was an idiosyncratic mess, forcing the country to retreat into international isolation. The abject poverty and political repression of the BSPP eventually broke the tolerance of the Burmese public and a popular uprising calling for democracy broke out in 1988. The army responded with a massive slaughter of protesters and staged another coup d’etat. Gross violations of human rights have continued unabated ever since.
However, democracy as a renewed ideal was born. The opposition National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in 1990’s multi-party elections. The opposition elite aimed for the absolute maximum—the full transfer of power to the elected party. However, perhaps similar to the CPB and KNU before them, they walked away with the absolute minimum of gains—and the continuation of military rule in a failing state.
Instead of treating elections in a post-conflict society as a guide to power-sharing, the opposition leaders, who held lofty confidence in their public support and democratic ideals in the immediate aftermath of the election victory, viewed it as a means of determining winners and losers.
"Political immaturity within the Burmese opposition derives from a lack of appreciation for power asymmetry," said Tin Maung Than. "We could not strike a balance between power and principle."
All these crises—starting with independence and the ethnic autonomy issue—remain unresolved. The socio-economic condition of the country is at its lowest ebb in its post-1948 history. A humanitarian crisis is looming and public discontent is at an all-time high. The prospect of national reconciliation or even a breakthrough in the political deadlock remains unlikely.
Following the 1988 military coup, U Nu—once the hero of independence and first prime minister of the union—cynically voiced his regrets over fighting for Burmese independence. Those bitter words he might have uttered out of frustration and despair, but it in many ways they reflect the 60-year history of post-independence Burma.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9814
Sunday, December 30, 2007
Facing the end-game
Bangkok Post, Perspective >> Sunday December 30, 2007
Facing the end-game
Unless the international community pushes for modification of the junta's political roadmap, a continuation of the conflict in Burma is a certainty, writes MIN ZIN
Recent weeks have been frustrating for Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's democracy icon. Hope of starting political dialogue with the regime's supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, is now dim.
Although there was an agreement to hold weekly meetings every Monday between Suu Kyi and government liaison minister Aung Kyi, the regime has gone back on its word. No meeting has taken place between Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi since November 19. Moreover, the military's promise of allowing two liaison officials from her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to see her regularly has yet to be realised.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been trying very hard to keep the communication channel open," said a senior party official on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media. "She even plans to give a positive response to the preconditions of junta leader Senior General Than Shwe. But the regime has simply ignored her."
The frustration is now spreading within the international community. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned Burma during his recent trip to Asia that the international community expects to see some productive developments. "I know the international community is very much impatient, and our patience is running out," Ban said in Bangkok.
Meanwhile, the junta is sending mixed signals to the international community. In his official briefing on November 6, Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, a staunch junta hardliner, told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari that the government's cooperation with the UN could be jeopardised if his performance were viewed to be "unfair and one-sided." Kyaw Hsan told Gambari straight that "your opportunity to play a constructive role in the matter may be in harm's way."
However, when Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein received Gambari on the following day, the general reiterated his government's full confidence in and support for the secretary-general's good offices.
"The prime minister invited me to return to Myanmar - in his words - 'again, again and again'," Gambari said at a briefing to the UN Security Council on November 13.
Moreover, as a gesture in response to the UN's persistent demand for an inclusive constitutional process, Thein Sein told Gambari that the government would allow him to meet with its Constitutional Drafting Commission to discuss ways of broadening the constitutional process.
On the other hand, at his press conference on December 3, Kyaw Hsan said that the government's 54-member commission for drafting the new constitution is sufficient for the task.
"No assistance or advice from other persons is required," he said, adding that "it is not reasonable or fair to amend those principles adopted by the delegates (of the National Convention)." Kyaw Hsan ruled out the possibility of a role for the opposition to play in the constitutional drafting process, which constitutes the highly important first three stages of the regime's "Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy".
In fact, the military is testing the response of the international community by sending out such mixed messages. If the international community, especially China and Asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), takes a passive stand or backs down, the regime will push forward with a hardline stance. When Asean caved in to the demands of the regime by not allowing Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Rangoon celebrated their victory and started scratching the regular scheduled meetings with Suu Kyi.
"Burma's military leadership is just trying to do the absolute minimum transition and reconciliation possible," Priscilla Clapp, a US diplomat who served as chief of mission in Burma from 1999-2002, told this writer. "They will continue with their seven step plan, moving very slowly, and wait for the international community to lose interest and turn the other way."
'Not too late'
However, some analysts and activists believe that the junta's roadmap' could still be a viable option for Burma's transition if it were modified to become inclusive and time-bound. They think that the junta is resisting, not rejecting, the possibility of accommodation.
"It is not too late yet. If the international community could push the regime to open up the constitutional drafting process before a national referendum, the fourth stage of the seven-step plan, we still have time to find common ground for negotiation for Burma's political transition," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Burmese government in exile. In fact, this is just what 92 elected members of Parliament from inside Burma called for in August 2007. They urged the regime to modify the roadmap, which is now aimed at legalising military supremacy in Burma's future.
The elected MPs said that if the regime made it inclusive, they would like to cooperate and find a political solution within the roadmap framework. Almost all major political and ethnic groups in Burma have agreed with the political proposal of the 92 elected MPs.
This is also in line with the UN's persistent demand as Gambari made clear when he said: "The Secretary-General did not reject the seven step roadmap and what he would like to suggest were inclusiveness and a time frame."
However, if the regime refused to modify the roadmap and continued its unilateral plan, the nature of Burma's conflict would become zero-sum. The 92 elected MPs have vowed to oppose the junta's sham constitution and to educate and organise the people of Burma to vote against it in the referendum.
Pro-democracy grassroot activists inside Burma as well as abroad also declare that the regime's planned referendum will be showdown time for Burma if the military fails to modify the roadmap. They say there will be almost no chance to reverse legalisation of military domination after a referendum, since the next three steps will be to "(5) hold free and fair elections; (6) convene elected bodies and (7) create government organs instituted by the legislative body."
"The principles of the constitution drafted by the military are laid out with the premise and concept that the 'military is the master and civilians are slaves',"said Tun Myint Aung, a leader of the 88 Generation Students Group, speaking from his hideout inside Burma. "We are now preparing to educate the people and launch a 'No Vote Campaign' against the referendum."
Some analysts even argue that another mass protest against the junta may break out before the referendum, as a combination of poverty and repression fuels the public's anger. No matter whether or not the opposition activists succeed in derailing the military's roadmap with mass protests, the nature and consequences of the conflict in Burma will be devastating, with more violent crackdowns and human suffering. The international community must be aware of this grim scenario and act resolutely to prevent it.
Min Zin is an independent Burmese journalist.
Facing the end-game
Unless the international community pushes for modification of the junta's political roadmap, a continuation of the conflict in Burma is a certainty, writes MIN ZIN
Recent weeks have been frustrating for Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's democracy icon. Hope of starting political dialogue with the regime's supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, is now dim.
Although there was an agreement to hold weekly meetings every Monday between Suu Kyi and government liaison minister Aung Kyi, the regime has gone back on its word. No meeting has taken place between Suu Kyi and Aung Kyi since November 19. Moreover, the military's promise of allowing two liaison officials from her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to see her regularly has yet to be realised.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been trying very hard to keep the communication channel open," said a senior party official on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media. "She even plans to give a positive response to the preconditions of junta leader Senior General Than Shwe. But the regime has simply ignored her."
The frustration is now spreading within the international community. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned Burma during his recent trip to Asia that the international community expects to see some productive developments. "I know the international community is very much impatient, and our patience is running out," Ban said in Bangkok.
Meanwhile, the junta is sending mixed signals to the international community. In his official briefing on November 6, Information Minister Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, a staunch junta hardliner, told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari that the government's cooperation with the UN could be jeopardised if his performance were viewed to be "unfair and one-sided." Kyaw Hsan told Gambari straight that "your opportunity to play a constructive role in the matter may be in harm's way."
However, when Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein received Gambari on the following day, the general reiterated his government's full confidence in and support for the secretary-general's good offices.
"The prime minister invited me to return to Myanmar - in his words - 'again, again and again'," Gambari said at a briefing to the UN Security Council on November 13.
Moreover, as a gesture in response to the UN's persistent demand for an inclusive constitutional process, Thein Sein told Gambari that the government would allow him to meet with its Constitutional Drafting Commission to discuss ways of broadening the constitutional process.
On the other hand, at his press conference on December 3, Kyaw Hsan said that the government's 54-member commission for drafting the new constitution is sufficient for the task.
"No assistance or advice from other persons is required," he said, adding that "it is not reasonable or fair to amend those principles adopted by the delegates (of the National Convention)." Kyaw Hsan ruled out the possibility of a role for the opposition to play in the constitutional drafting process, which constitutes the highly important first three stages of the regime's "Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy".
In fact, the military is testing the response of the international community by sending out such mixed messages. If the international community, especially China and Asean (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), takes a passive stand or backs down, the regime will push forward with a hardline stance. When Asean caved in to the demands of the regime by not allowing Gambari to give a Burma briefing at the Asean summit in November, hardliners in Rangoon celebrated their victory and started scratching the regular scheduled meetings with Suu Kyi.
"Burma's military leadership is just trying to do the absolute minimum transition and reconciliation possible," Priscilla Clapp, a US diplomat who served as chief of mission in Burma from 1999-2002, told this writer. "They will continue with their seven step plan, moving very slowly, and wait for the international community to lose interest and turn the other way."
'Not too late'
However, some analysts and activists believe that the junta's roadmap' could still be a viable option for Burma's transition if it were modified to become inclusive and time-bound. They think that the junta is resisting, not rejecting, the possibility of accommodation.
"It is not too late yet. If the international community could push the regime to open up the constitutional drafting process before a national referendum, the fourth stage of the seven-step plan, we still have time to find common ground for negotiation for Burma's political transition," said Dr Thaung Tun, UN representative of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the Burmese government in exile. In fact, this is just what 92 elected members of Parliament from inside Burma called for in August 2007. They urged the regime to modify the roadmap, which is now aimed at legalising military supremacy in Burma's future.
The elected MPs said that if the regime made it inclusive, they would like to cooperate and find a political solution within the roadmap framework. Almost all major political and ethnic groups in Burma have agreed with the political proposal of the 92 elected MPs.
This is also in line with the UN's persistent demand as Gambari made clear when he said: "The Secretary-General did not reject the seven step roadmap and what he would like to suggest were inclusiveness and a time frame."
However, if the regime refused to modify the roadmap and continued its unilateral plan, the nature of Burma's conflict would become zero-sum. The 92 elected MPs have vowed to oppose the junta's sham constitution and to educate and organise the people of Burma to vote against it in the referendum.
Pro-democracy grassroot activists inside Burma as well as abroad also declare that the regime's planned referendum will be showdown time for Burma if the military fails to modify the roadmap. They say there will be almost no chance to reverse legalisation of military domination after a referendum, since the next three steps will be to "(5) hold free and fair elections; (6) convene elected bodies and (7) create government organs instituted by the legislative body."
"The principles of the constitution drafted by the military are laid out with the premise and concept that the 'military is the master and civilians are slaves',"said Tun Myint Aung, a leader of the 88 Generation Students Group, speaking from his hideout inside Burma. "We are now preparing to educate the people and launch a 'No Vote Campaign' against the referendum."
Some analysts even argue that another mass protest against the junta may break out before the referendum, as a combination of poverty and repression fuels the public's anger. No matter whether or not the opposition activists succeed in derailing the military's roadmap with mass protests, the nature and consequences of the conflict in Burma will be devastating, with more violent crackdowns and human suffering. The international community must be aware of this grim scenario and act resolutely to prevent it.
Min Zin is an independent Burmese journalist.
Tuesday, February 20, 2007
"Dissidents and the Fight for Freedom"
"Dissidents and the Fight for Freedom"
Featuring Václav Havel, Former President of the Czech Republic
Library of Congress, February 20, 2007
Bio: Min Zin has been involved in Burma's prodemocracy movement since 1988. He joined the movement as a fourteen-year-old high school activist and founded a nationwide high school students union. During his time in the prodemocracy movement, he worked closely with National League for Democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, including delivering speeches with Suu Kyi in various townships around Burma's capital Rangoon. In 1989, Min Zin was forced into hiding and began what was to be a nine-year existence inside Burma's underground movement. Following the December 1996 student demonstrations in Burma, Min Zin's security situation deteriorated to the point where he finally decided it was too dangerous to continue living in Burma and subsequently fled to the Thai-Burma border in September 1997. After working in Thailand for a number of years, including serving as deputy editor of The Irrawaddy magazine, he came to the United States, where he now works as an International Radio Broadcaster in the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia.
Remarks: First, I would like to thank the event organizers for giving me this wonderful opportunity. It is my great honored to be invited to talk about Burma and its democratic struggle-especially its moral connection to President Havel.
Actually, Mr. Havel has been familiar to Burmese people since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK) in her speeches repeatedly elaborated Mr. Havel's teachings-the idea of the power of powerless. But I would say that Mr. Havel has gained nationwide respect in Burma, not because of DASSK, but- ironically -because of military dictators.
It happened when Mr. Havel and Bishop Desmond Tutu jointly published a report entitled "Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma". The report provided a powerful new direction in international effort to bring democracy in Burma.
We all know that there have been 16 consecutive resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and 13 consecutive resolutions by the Commission on Human Rights on Burma, as well as several UN Special Envoys calling for national reconciliation in Burma. Moreover, Secretary General Kofi Annan has said he was "concerned," then "increasingly concerned," then "gravely concerned" about the situation in Burma. But these efforts and voices fell on the regime's deaf ear. The military regime continues its catalogue of crimes against humanity: imprisonments of over 1,200 political prisoners including DASSK, thousands of civilians being pushed into forced labor, more child soldiers than any other country in the world, about 3,000 villages destroyed in ethnic minority areas of eastern Burma since 1996, the use of rape as a weapon in the ethnic conflicts throughout the country, millions of refugees and internally displaced people within the country and across the borders of neighboring countries-to name but a few.
That's why the Havel-Tutu report proposed a UN Security Council resolution that would compel the regime to work with the Secretary General towards national reconciliation - beginning with the release of political prisoners, stop atrocities in ethnic minority areas and start political dialogue with democratic oppositions. Havel and Tutu did not call for sanctions and just called for the effective multi-lateral engagement to be applied through the council. In one word, the report proposes a practical alternative between inaction and sanctions.
When the report came out in Sept 2005, the regime made a series of desperate reactions. You can imagine that the State-run media was flooded with government statements, speeches, articles denouncing the report of Mr. Havel and Bishop Tutu. But when the government made these statements public, they also made public almost all of the details of the report. In other words, the public had the opportunity to read and listen to a translation of the report. That's why I said the regime has made Mr. Havel highly respected and popular among Burmese people.
We, the outside media such as Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and BBC, broadcast the news about how DASSK's election winning party, ethnic minority parties, and ethnic resistance groups all welcome the Havel-Tutu initiative. We run stories of how ordinary people inside Burma would like to see the UN Security Council (UNSC)'s constructive involvement in Burma.
As we all know, the U.S. translated the Havel-Tutu report into action. The U.S. managed to put Burma in the UNSC's agenda in September 2006. But when it called for a vote in January 2007 on a non-punitive Burma resolution, China and Russia vetoed against it. This setback has shattered the hopes of Burmese people for a smooth, and over due, democratic transition in their country with the help of the UNSC. Recently, the leader of the Karen ethnic women group, which has just issued a report about widespread rape in their villages committed by the Burmese military, told us (the media) that the Chinese and Russian vetoes encourage the regime to rape more women in their villages. One prominent activist also says that the vetoes grant the regime "a license to kill" people of Burma.
But don't get them wrong-they don't dwell on being victimized. They have shown tremendous courage and unyielding determination to fight for their freedom. DASSK is a shinning example. And not only DASSK, but also Min Ko Naing and other student leaders who, having spent over 16 years in military gulags, were released in the past two years and have re-engaged in nonviolent resistance against the regime inside Burma. There are also labor activists, lawyers, and Buddhist monks working together to fight against enormous injustice and to bring a political solution to the country's crisis. They all have done these things facing the threat of imprisonment, torture, and the loss of their livelihoods.
Burmese people know that they have to rely on themselves to free their country. But they also appreciate the importance of international solidarity. They feel gratitude to people like Mr. Havel for their moral leadership in the struggle for freedom, and they are also very thankful to countries like the U.S. for mobilizing international consensus and action to bring democracy in Burma. They expect that with the leadership of U.S. and the persistent moral support from Mr. Havel, Burma's resolution will be passed by the UNSC. This would give the Burmese people a great moral boost as well as political space for their courageous drive for democracy.
Before I came here for this speech, I contacted several political leaders as well as ordinary people alike asking what message they want to convey to this respectful audience. They answered by repeating what DASSK has said:
Please use your liberty to promote ours.
Thank you!
http://www.ned.org/events/feb2007.html
http://www.ned.org/events/feb2007/zin.html
Featuring Václav Havel, Former President of the Czech Republic
Library of Congress, February 20, 2007
Bio: Min Zin has been involved in Burma's prodemocracy movement since 1988. He joined the movement as a fourteen-year-old high school activist and founded a nationwide high school students union. During his time in the prodemocracy movement, he worked closely with National League for Democracy leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, including delivering speeches with Suu Kyi in various townships around Burma's capital Rangoon. In 1989, Min Zin was forced into hiding and began what was to be a nine-year existence inside Burma's underground movement. Following the December 1996 student demonstrations in Burma, Min Zin's security situation deteriorated to the point where he finally decided it was too dangerous to continue living in Burma and subsequently fled to the Thai-Burma border in September 1997. After working in Thailand for a number of years, including serving as deputy editor of The Irrawaddy magazine, he came to the United States, where he now works as an International Radio Broadcaster in the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia.
Remarks: First, I would like to thank the event organizers for giving me this wonderful opportunity. It is my great honored to be invited to talk about Burma and its democratic struggle-especially its moral connection to President Havel.
Actually, Mr. Havel has been familiar to Burmese people since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK) in her speeches repeatedly elaborated Mr. Havel's teachings-the idea of the power of powerless. But I would say that Mr. Havel has gained nationwide respect in Burma, not because of DASSK, but- ironically -because of military dictators.
It happened when Mr. Havel and Bishop Desmond Tutu jointly published a report entitled "Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma". The report provided a powerful new direction in international effort to bring democracy in Burma.
We all know that there have been 16 consecutive resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly and 13 consecutive resolutions by the Commission on Human Rights on Burma, as well as several UN Special Envoys calling for national reconciliation in Burma. Moreover, Secretary General Kofi Annan has said he was "concerned," then "increasingly concerned," then "gravely concerned" about the situation in Burma. But these efforts and voices fell on the regime's deaf ear. The military regime continues its catalogue of crimes against humanity: imprisonments of over 1,200 political prisoners including DASSK, thousands of civilians being pushed into forced labor, more child soldiers than any other country in the world, about 3,000 villages destroyed in ethnic minority areas of eastern Burma since 1996, the use of rape as a weapon in the ethnic conflicts throughout the country, millions of refugees and internally displaced people within the country and across the borders of neighboring countries-to name but a few.
That's why the Havel-Tutu report proposed a UN Security Council resolution that would compel the regime to work with the Secretary General towards national reconciliation - beginning with the release of political prisoners, stop atrocities in ethnic minority areas and start political dialogue with democratic oppositions. Havel and Tutu did not call for sanctions and just called for the effective multi-lateral engagement to be applied through the council. In one word, the report proposes a practical alternative between inaction and sanctions.
When the report came out in Sept 2005, the regime made a series of desperate reactions. You can imagine that the State-run media was flooded with government statements, speeches, articles denouncing the report of Mr. Havel and Bishop Tutu. But when the government made these statements public, they also made public almost all of the details of the report. In other words, the public had the opportunity to read and listen to a translation of the report. That's why I said the regime has made Mr. Havel highly respected and popular among Burmese people.
We, the outside media such as Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, and BBC, broadcast the news about how DASSK's election winning party, ethnic minority parties, and ethnic resistance groups all welcome the Havel-Tutu initiative. We run stories of how ordinary people inside Burma would like to see the UN Security Council (UNSC)'s constructive involvement in Burma.
As we all know, the U.S. translated the Havel-Tutu report into action. The U.S. managed to put Burma in the UNSC's agenda in September 2006. But when it called for a vote in January 2007 on a non-punitive Burma resolution, China and Russia vetoed against it. This setback has shattered the hopes of Burmese people for a smooth, and over due, democratic transition in their country with the help of the UNSC. Recently, the leader of the Karen ethnic women group, which has just issued a report about widespread rape in their villages committed by the Burmese military, told us (the media) that the Chinese and Russian vetoes encourage the regime to rape more women in their villages. One prominent activist also says that the vetoes grant the regime "a license to kill" people of Burma.
But don't get them wrong-they don't dwell on being victimized. They have shown tremendous courage and unyielding determination to fight for their freedom. DASSK is a shinning example. And not only DASSK, but also Min Ko Naing and other student leaders who, having spent over 16 years in military gulags, were released in the past two years and have re-engaged in nonviolent resistance against the regime inside Burma. There are also labor activists, lawyers, and Buddhist monks working together to fight against enormous injustice and to bring a political solution to the country's crisis. They all have done these things facing the threat of imprisonment, torture, and the loss of their livelihoods.
Burmese people know that they have to rely on themselves to free their country. But they also appreciate the importance of international solidarity. They feel gratitude to people like Mr. Havel for their moral leadership in the struggle for freedom, and they are also very thankful to countries like the U.S. for mobilizing international consensus and action to bring democracy in Burma. They expect that with the leadership of U.S. and the persistent moral support from Mr. Havel, Burma's resolution will be passed by the UNSC. This would give the Burmese people a great moral boost as well as political space for their courageous drive for democracy.
Before I came here for this speech, I contacted several political leaders as well as ordinary people alike asking what message they want to convey to this respectful audience. They answered by repeating what DASSK has said:
Please use your liberty to promote ours.
Thank you!
http://www.ned.org/events/feb2007.html
http://www.ned.org/events/feb2007/zin.html
Thursday, July 1, 2004
Meeting Mandela (July 2003)
Meeting Mandela (July 2003)
A special programme produced in honor of Nelson Mandela’s 85th birthday, celebrating his life and moral leadership. Offering viewers a historical look at Mr. Mandela’s life, the special also profiles four young people from diverse backgrounds, who traveled to Johannesburg to meet Mr. Mandela and discuss topical issues such as HIV/AIDS, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the fight for democracy in Burma.
Hosted by Beyoncé Knowles, Meeting Mandela showcases not only the impact Nelson Mandela has on our world, it also provides inspiration for future generations to raise their voices and become actively involved in the issues they care. In 2008 the program has been updated and introduced by Kelly Rowland to honor Mandela 90th birthday.
http://www.staying-alive.org/video_player/player_uk.php?id=023
A special programme produced in honor of Nelson Mandela’s 85th birthday, celebrating his life and moral leadership. Offering viewers a historical look at Mr. Mandela’s life, the special also profiles four young people from diverse backgrounds, who traveled to Johannesburg to meet Mr. Mandela and discuss topical issues such as HIV/AIDS, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the fight for democracy in Burma.
Hosted by Beyoncé Knowles, Meeting Mandela showcases not only the impact Nelson Mandela has on our world, it also provides inspiration for future generations to raise their voices and become actively involved in the issues they care. In 2008 the program has been updated and introduced by Kelly Rowland to honor Mandela 90th birthday.
http://www.staying-alive.org/video_player/player_uk.php?id=023
Friday, April 9, 2004
Min Zin : "BURMESE OPPOSITION DOES NOT HAVE WINNING STRATEGY"
New Era Journal, April 2004
Interview
MIN ZIN “BURMESE OPPOSITION DOES NOT HAVE WINNING STRATEGY”
Maxmilian Wechsler
Min Zin is a well-known and well-respected Burmese pro-democracy activist and also a freedom fighter who spends most of his exile life in Thailand.His opinions, ideas and views on problems and solutions in Burma are highly regarded, not only by Burmese, but also by the international community.Min Zin wrote a number of articles on various subjects, including how to achieve democracy in Burma and gave “Khit Pyiang” the following interview:
· Give us yours background.
I was born and raised in Rangoon, the capital of Burma. Yes, my family does have a political background, since my dad was a student union activist in 1950s and 60s. He and his colleagues, who were like my extended family members when I was young, were life-long dissidents against the ruling military and for that they suffered tremendous persecution from the military. Then my childhood years were filled with all these thrilling stories of dissident heroes. I vaguely realized then that there was always something larger than oneself in life. When I did (or even had the intention of doing) something good to my siblings or friends or society at large, I could be certain that my parents would appreciate me. When I finished reading something, whether children’s poems or longer tales, and talked to them about my readings, I knew my dad and his friends would love me.
As for politics, the greatest lesson I learned from my parent was about standing on principle. I would say that this theme of my upbringing was quite strong and powerful, so much so that it has become “second nature” for me, when it comes to politics.
· When and why did you join the anti-government movement?
When the 1988 pro-democracy uprising broke out, I was 14 years old and attending 10th standard (final year in high school). During the March 1988 students’ movement against the government, my eldest brother and sister were arrested on their university campus for their political activities. Another brother was expelled from school. That is when I started my political activism as a high school student. Later on I became one of the founding members of the nation-wide high school student union. Then, I was also on the Central Executive Committee of the All Burma Federation of Students’ Union (ABFSU), an umbrella organization comprised of high school and university student unions.
· When and why did you decide to leave Burma?
In July 1989, the military came to my house and tried to arrest me, but I was not at home, and they arrested my Dad instead of me. So, I was forced to go into hiding and began a nearly nine-year existence in Burma’s underground. During that period I managed to develop an activist-cum-writer life, although I was dismissed from school and constantly chased by military intelligence. Because of my political activism, almost every member of my family and most of my colleagues would endure arrest and detention. Following the December 1996 student demonstration, my security situation deteriorated more seriously than ever before and I finally decided it was too dangerous to continue living in Burma. I subsequently fled to the Thai-Burma border in August 1997.
· What are your present activities?
Since I have arrived Thailand, I have mainly devoted myself to writing. I am currently a deputy editor of the Irrawaddy magazine (www.irrawaddy.org) where, aside from editorial duties, I have done several political writings as well as stories that examine the relationship between culture and power in Burmese society. Of course, I have written on ethnic identity issues from this perspective. Now I also write two weekly programs for Radio Free Asia (RFA) Burmese Service. One is on youth and education, and the other about questions of ethic in politics. Occasionally, I travel abroad for conferences and seminars. I also spent one year as a visiting scholar at the Journalism School of the University of California Berkeley in 2001.
· What is the current status of the opposition movement inside and outside Burma?
The opposition movement is now in deep water, I would say. The junta has recovered from the outcry or public relation fiasco following the May 30 nightmare in Depayin and managed to launch a counterattack against the pro-democracy movement. To me, the regime’s moves ring of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.
The Burmese opposition movement is always being weakened and divided, not by naked military power (i.e. harsh crackdowns) but by political offensives that the junta throws into the battle field. In other words, the regime has perfected the art of combining naked force with political maneuvers to defeat the opposition movement.
The regime has now succeeded in persuading almost all the ethnic groups—ceasefire and non-ceasefire – to climb aboard the road map bandwagon. With the legitimacy these groups will add to the National Convention, the junta can undermine Aung San Suu Kyi’s election-winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party, since the opposition also depends on its alliance with ethnic groups.Moreover, in this most recent push for legitimacy the regime has been trying to market its scheme to regional powers (such as Thailand, China …), particularly to so-called “Bangkok Process”. If successful, the maneuvers could sideline the opposition movement’s international allies, such as the U.S. and U.N.
· Are you satisfied with the activities of the Burmese opposition?
I said that I learned from my father’s generation, who were mostly left-leaning activists, that it is important to stand up for one’s principles in politics. However, from my own experiences during these many years in the opposition movement, I realized that principle alone doesn’t guarantee political victory. Political activists need to understand what distinguishes those who succeed by standing on principle from those who fail. Then you have to think about the importance of strategy. Without having a sound and pragmatic strategy, sticking to principle alone will make you quixotic and leave you stranded in irrelevance.
To my eyes, the Burmese opposition does not have a winning strategy. Or their strategic approach is linear.
· You have been closely associated with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Give us some insight on your relationship.
I met her several times in 1988 and ‘89. Alongside her, I gave public speeches on some occasions. She was the first person I met in our hierarchically structured society who treats younger people with respect. She listened to, argued against, and laughed with a fifteen-year-old high school activist, who was the same age of her son. She did all these things with wise observations and of course authenticity. As a citizen of Burma, I always feel that the country is very lucky to have such leader.
· Certain people describe ASSK as “stubborn, not flexible and uncompromising.” What do you think?
It often sounds sexist to my ears. When a man is tough, people praise him as a hero. But about a woman, some tend to say she is “stubborn, not flexible and uncompromising”. I don’t think it would be fair to take her out of the context, in which she faces tremendous pressures and repressions, altering from moment to moment. Under the given situation, A person like her who values integrity and wants to uphold it as ultimately important in politics can have a tendency to get stuck in moral paradigm. While she doesn’t need to devote herself to manipulative “warrior politics” (if I could borrow Robert Kaplan’s concept), she can be more proactive in her strategy.
· Do you support armed or political struggle to achieve the regime-change in Burma?
The rhetoric of “regime change” carries a scary weight these days, whether or not it implies military intervention. But I doubt this goal is realistic. The superpower has no compelling strategic interest when it comes to Burma. And China cannot allow a radical power shift to take place on its southern flank.This doesn’t mean that the oppressed people should give up their struggle and pin their hopes on the military’s good will. More importantly, we should always keep in mind that those who play hardball dominate the political game in Burma.
· Your view on the peace talks between the Karen National Union Defense Minister, Gen. Bo Mya, and the Burmese government?
I think the truce deal is a good start. But the KNU should understand that the talk or dialogue is in itself an “art of war” or political gamesmanship, and this requires A sophisticated approach. You cannot enter it with the attitude of, “Okay, if it works out, we’ll go ahead. If not, we resume fighting.)” As I said earlier, you cannot succeed in political war with a linear strategy.I want to point out another important thing with ethnic politics. Since learning about the recent Kachin purge and seeing obvious power plays among KNU leaders regarding the truce, I am getting more worried about the lack of democratization and decentralized processes in ethnic armed groups. When those who hold arms are not accountable to their people or become dictatorial, it can be devastating, wherever it happens.
· If Bo Mya finally agrees to the cease-fire, how will it affect the opposition movement, since many of which depend on the KNU?
Alliance politics has its limits since self-interest dominates politics, in the final analysis. Political graveyards are filled with the people as well as movements who do not learn this lesson.
· There has not been any reaction from the international community on the cease-fire talks between the KNU and the SPDC. Do you think it is supporting the idea of peaceful solution to the conflict?
I think Rangoon really wants the international community to appreciate its cease-fire deals with several ethnic groups including the latest one with the KNU. This is what the regime hopes to put at the center of attention in Burmese politics or “national reconciliation”. In principle, the world would agree with a peaceful solution. But I think the West does not want to let the regime to win another cheap victory at democracy’s expense.
· You met with Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel. On what occasions? And what is their suggestion to solve the conflict in Burma?
I met Havel in 2001 and Mandela in 2003. I had wonderful opportunities to talk to them individually. Both struck me as great strategists who define politics and policy not just by their excellence but by their outcomes.
· Do you support the economic sanction against Burma imposed by the international community?
There is a myth that surrounds the sanctions debate on Burma. People talk about the country as if a wall of comprehensive sanctions has been imposed on it. In fact, economic sanctions are, so far, not multi-lateral. The U.S. alone has imposed sanctions on Burma. Regional countries and the E.U remain a big loophole, allowing Rangoon to go around U.S. sanctions and re-channel its exports to these countries. We also should remember that sanctions alone can’t resolve the problem. It is just one option or form of international intervention to make change.
We can’t hide the fact that sanctions do hurt people as in every other case around the world, in addition to hurting the regime. Here the question is whether the ends justify the means. That again depends on what are the ends. Then it will be a long debate.Now some countries have started talking about targeted economic sanctions against military-owned or joint-venture companies in Burma. Some would call them “smart sanctions.” All in all, I think the sanctions tactic is a ”necessary evil” regarding Burmese politics.
· Some Burmese dissidents criticize the Thai government the way the refugees, illegal workers and the exiles are treated in Thailand. Any comment?
Not only Burmese dissidents but also watch-groups have raised concerns about the way Thailand treats downtrodden people from neighboring countries. I share their concerns.· Is there any chance that the Burmese people will rise-up against the government on their-own?Frustration among ordinary public is mounting. No doubt, economic problems can trigger people’s anger. But what kind of street movement will ensue is a matter of concern.The most likely scenario is spontaneous and possibly sporadic uprisings out of sheer frustration and desperation. This can turn into an outraged crowd unless the political leadership takes quick initiative. The masses can easily be swayed by the junta’s incitement or even by the provocative nature of the crowd mentality, and they can become chaotic, violent and bloody. Then, the regime will subdue any assemblage harshly, with its usual justification of a Leviathan call.
The scenario many activists are inclined to fancy, on the other hand, is a well-organized mass demonstration calling for peaceful change in the country or overthrowing the regime. However, unless NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in particular come up with leadership for such street protests, none of the inside or outside-based political groups has the capacity to initiate it.Even if the NLD took the initiative, the chances for victory are not yet secure. Activists must account for the vital role of the regime’s population control mechanisms such as armies, spies, etc. All in all, the positive prospects for a peaceful mass mobilization are dim.Under the current situation, I’m worried that Burma is heading toward a repetition of the 1967 rice lootings and communal riots, instead of the 8888 movement, which activists are nostalgic for.I wish my insight was wrong and an unexpectedly handsome solution popped up, as is characteristic of Burmese politics.
· What do the “silent majority” of the Burmese people think about the government, the NLD, and the exiles?
I think the late President Doctor Maung Maung said he wants to hear the voice of “silent majority” including housewives in the kitchens (as the only educated senior leader of the regime, he borrowed it from Richard Nixon) during the peak of the 1988 mass demonstration. The next day, housewives, elementary school kids and gays took to the streets and showed that they, too, did not like the government and wanted democracy. I believe that those voices of our “moral majority” (let me use Jerry Falwell’s term) remain more or less the same (perhaps, even stronger) with regard to military rule and pro-democracy supporters.
· With such diversity of ethnic groups, some of them armed, demanding for independence or autonomy, and most of them generally distrust the Burmans, do you think Burma can have a civilian government?
I am not sure about a radical change. But we can start political liberalization that will gradually develop political infrastructures, institutional capacity and social capital. The resulting environment will be conducive to a smooth transition. But at the current speed of no-reform-at-all, or an unrealistic speed of change-everything-overnight, the outcome will be a crash landing.
· Give us yours background.
I was born and raised in Rangoon, the capital of Burma. Yes, my family does have a political background, since my dad was a student union activist in 1950s and 60s. He and his colleagues, who were like my extended family members when I was young, were life-long dissidents against the ruling military and for that they suffered tremendous persecution from the military. Then my childhood years were filled with all these thrilling stories of dissident heroes. I vaguely realized then that there was always something larger than oneself in life. When I did (or even had the intention of doing) something good to my siblings or friends or society at large, I could be certain that my parents would appreciate me. When I finished reading something, whether children’s poems or longer tales, and talked to them about my readings, I knew my dad and his friends would love me.
As for politics, the greatest lesson I learned from my parent was about standing on principle. I would say that this theme of my upbringing was quite strong and powerful, so much so that it has become “second nature” for me, when it comes to politics.
· When and why did you join the anti-government movement?
When the 1988 pro-democracy uprising broke out, I was 14 years old and attending 10th standard (final year in high school). During the March 1988 students’ movement against the government, my eldest brother and sister were arrested on their university campus for their political activities. Another brother was expelled from school. That is when I started my political activism as a high school student. Later on I became one of the founding members of the nation-wide high school student union. Then, I was also on the Central Executive Committee of the All Burma Federation of Students’ Union (ABFSU), an umbrella organization comprised of high school and university student unions.
· When and why did you decide to leave Burma?
In July 1989, the military came to my house and tried to arrest me, but I was not at home, and they arrested my Dad instead of me. So, I was forced to go into hiding and began a nearly nine-year existence in Burma’s underground. During that period I managed to develop an activist-cum-writer life, although I was dismissed from school and constantly chased by military intelligence. Because of my political activism, almost every member of my family and most of my colleagues would endure arrest and detention. Following the December 1996 student demonstration, my security situation deteriorated more seriously than ever before and I finally decided it was too dangerous to continue living in Burma. I subsequently fled to the Thai-Burma border in August 1997.
· What are your present activities?
Since I have arrived Thailand, I have mainly devoted myself to writing. I am currently a deputy editor of the Irrawaddy magazine (www.irrawaddy.org) where, aside from editorial duties, I have done several political writings as well as stories that examine the relationship between culture and power in Burmese society. Of course, I have written on ethnic identity issues from this perspective. Now I also write two weekly programs for Radio Free Asia (RFA) Burmese Service. One is on youth and education, and the other about questions of ethic in politics. Occasionally, I travel abroad for conferences and seminars. I also spent one year as a visiting scholar at the Journalism School of the University of California Berkeley in 2001.
· What is the current status of the opposition movement inside and outside Burma?
The opposition movement is now in deep water, I would say. The junta has recovered from the outcry or public relation fiasco following the May 30 nightmare in Depayin and managed to launch a counterattack against the pro-democracy movement. To me, the regime’s moves ring of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.
The Burmese opposition movement is always being weakened and divided, not by naked military power (i.e. harsh crackdowns) but by political offensives that the junta throws into the battle field. In other words, the regime has perfected the art of combining naked force with political maneuvers to defeat the opposition movement.
The regime has now succeeded in persuading almost all the ethnic groups—ceasefire and non-ceasefire – to climb aboard the road map bandwagon. With the legitimacy these groups will add to the National Convention, the junta can undermine Aung San Suu Kyi’s election-winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party, since the opposition also depends on its alliance with ethnic groups.Moreover, in this most recent push for legitimacy the regime has been trying to market its scheme to regional powers (such as Thailand, China …), particularly to so-called “Bangkok Process”. If successful, the maneuvers could sideline the opposition movement’s international allies, such as the U.S. and U.N.
· Are you satisfied with the activities of the Burmese opposition?
I said that I learned from my father’s generation, who were mostly left-leaning activists, that it is important to stand up for one’s principles in politics. However, from my own experiences during these many years in the opposition movement, I realized that principle alone doesn’t guarantee political victory. Political activists need to understand what distinguishes those who succeed by standing on principle from those who fail. Then you have to think about the importance of strategy. Without having a sound and pragmatic strategy, sticking to principle alone will make you quixotic and leave you stranded in irrelevance.
To my eyes, the Burmese opposition does not have a winning strategy. Or their strategic approach is linear.
· You have been closely associated with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Give us some insight on your relationship.
I met her several times in 1988 and ‘89. Alongside her, I gave public speeches on some occasions. She was the first person I met in our hierarchically structured society who treats younger people with respect. She listened to, argued against, and laughed with a fifteen-year-old high school activist, who was the same age of her son. She did all these things with wise observations and of course authenticity. As a citizen of Burma, I always feel that the country is very lucky to have such leader.
· Certain people describe ASSK as “stubborn, not flexible and uncompromising.” What do you think?
It often sounds sexist to my ears. When a man is tough, people praise him as a hero. But about a woman, some tend to say she is “stubborn, not flexible and uncompromising”. I don’t think it would be fair to take her out of the context, in which she faces tremendous pressures and repressions, altering from moment to moment. Under the given situation, A person like her who values integrity and wants to uphold it as ultimately important in politics can have a tendency to get stuck in moral paradigm. While she doesn’t need to devote herself to manipulative “warrior politics” (if I could borrow Robert Kaplan’s concept), she can be more proactive in her strategy.
· Do you support armed or political struggle to achieve the regime-change in Burma?
The rhetoric of “regime change” carries a scary weight these days, whether or not it implies military intervention. But I doubt this goal is realistic. The superpower has no compelling strategic interest when it comes to Burma. And China cannot allow a radical power shift to take place on its southern flank.This doesn’t mean that the oppressed people should give up their struggle and pin their hopes on the military’s good will. More importantly, we should always keep in mind that those who play hardball dominate the political game in Burma.
· Your view on the peace talks between the Karen National Union Defense Minister, Gen. Bo Mya, and the Burmese government?
I think the truce deal is a good start. But the KNU should understand that the talk or dialogue is in itself an “art of war” or political gamesmanship, and this requires A sophisticated approach. You cannot enter it with the attitude of, “Okay, if it works out, we’ll go ahead. If not, we resume fighting.)” As I said earlier, you cannot succeed in political war with a linear strategy.I want to point out another important thing with ethnic politics. Since learning about the recent Kachin purge and seeing obvious power plays among KNU leaders regarding the truce, I am getting more worried about the lack of democratization and decentralized processes in ethnic armed groups. When those who hold arms are not accountable to their people or become dictatorial, it can be devastating, wherever it happens.
· If Bo Mya finally agrees to the cease-fire, how will it affect the opposition movement, since many of which depend on the KNU?
Alliance politics has its limits since self-interest dominates politics, in the final analysis. Political graveyards are filled with the people as well as movements who do not learn this lesson.
· There has not been any reaction from the international community on the cease-fire talks between the KNU and the SPDC. Do you think it is supporting the idea of peaceful solution to the conflict?
I think Rangoon really wants the international community to appreciate its cease-fire deals with several ethnic groups including the latest one with the KNU. This is what the regime hopes to put at the center of attention in Burmese politics or “national reconciliation”. In principle, the world would agree with a peaceful solution. But I think the West does not want to let the regime to win another cheap victory at democracy’s expense.
· You met with Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel. On what occasions? And what is their suggestion to solve the conflict in Burma?
I met Havel in 2001 and Mandela in 2003. I had wonderful opportunities to talk to them individually. Both struck me as great strategists who define politics and policy not just by their excellence but by their outcomes.
· Do you support the economic sanction against Burma imposed by the international community?
There is a myth that surrounds the sanctions debate on Burma. People talk about the country as if a wall of comprehensive sanctions has been imposed on it. In fact, economic sanctions are, so far, not multi-lateral. The U.S. alone has imposed sanctions on Burma. Regional countries and the E.U remain a big loophole, allowing Rangoon to go around U.S. sanctions and re-channel its exports to these countries. We also should remember that sanctions alone can’t resolve the problem. It is just one option or form of international intervention to make change.
We can’t hide the fact that sanctions do hurt people as in every other case around the world, in addition to hurting the regime. Here the question is whether the ends justify the means. That again depends on what are the ends. Then it will be a long debate.Now some countries have started talking about targeted economic sanctions against military-owned or joint-venture companies in Burma. Some would call them “smart sanctions.” All in all, I think the sanctions tactic is a ”necessary evil” regarding Burmese politics.
· Some Burmese dissidents criticize the Thai government the way the refugees, illegal workers and the exiles are treated in Thailand. Any comment?
Not only Burmese dissidents but also watch-groups have raised concerns about the way Thailand treats downtrodden people from neighboring countries. I share their concerns.· Is there any chance that the Burmese people will rise-up against the government on their-own?Frustration among ordinary public is mounting. No doubt, economic problems can trigger people’s anger. But what kind of street movement will ensue is a matter of concern.The most likely scenario is spontaneous and possibly sporadic uprisings out of sheer frustration and desperation. This can turn into an outraged crowd unless the political leadership takes quick initiative. The masses can easily be swayed by the junta’s incitement or even by the provocative nature of the crowd mentality, and they can become chaotic, violent and bloody. Then, the regime will subdue any assemblage harshly, with its usual justification of a Leviathan call.
The scenario many activists are inclined to fancy, on the other hand, is a well-organized mass demonstration calling for peaceful change in the country or overthrowing the regime. However, unless NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi in particular come up with leadership for such street protests, none of the inside or outside-based political groups has the capacity to initiate it.Even if the NLD took the initiative, the chances for victory are not yet secure. Activists must account for the vital role of the regime’s population control mechanisms such as armies, spies, etc. All in all, the positive prospects for a peaceful mass mobilization are dim.Under the current situation, I’m worried that Burma is heading toward a repetition of the 1967 rice lootings and communal riots, instead of the 8888 movement, which activists are nostalgic for.I wish my insight was wrong and an unexpectedly handsome solution popped up, as is characteristic of Burmese politics.
· What do the “silent majority” of the Burmese people think about the government, the NLD, and the exiles?
I think the late President Doctor Maung Maung said he wants to hear the voice of “silent majority” including housewives in the kitchens (as the only educated senior leader of the regime, he borrowed it from Richard Nixon) during the peak of the 1988 mass demonstration. The next day, housewives, elementary school kids and gays took to the streets and showed that they, too, did not like the government and wanted democracy. I believe that those voices of our “moral majority” (let me use Jerry Falwell’s term) remain more or less the same (perhaps, even stronger) with regard to military rule and pro-democracy supporters.
· With such diversity of ethnic groups, some of them armed, demanding for independence or autonomy, and most of them generally distrust the Burmans, do you think Burma can have a civilian government?
I am not sure about a radical change. But we can start political liberalization that will gradually develop political infrastructures, institutional capacity and social capital. The resulting environment will be conducive to a smooth transition. But at the current speed of no-reform-at-all, or an unrealistic speed of change-everything-overnight, the outcome will be a crash landing.
Wednesday, November 26, 2003
Life in limbo for a Myanmar exile
Asia Time Southeast Asia, Nov 26, 2003
Life in limbo for a Myanmar exile
By A Lin Neumann
CHIANG MAI, Thailand - When Min Zin was 14, he and his friends were making newspapers by hand, literally. They etched characters into inked wax paper and rolled fluorescent-light tubes over the impressions in a crude homemade duplicating process. The results, distributed free of charge on the streets of Rangoon (now Yangon), were the only independent publications in the country.
This was not a school handicraft project. The year was 1988 and Min Zin was involved in the deadly serious business of revolution against a dictatorship in Burma. As one of the youngest and most prominent leaders of the pro-democracy rebellion, Min Zin was making speeches, organizing students, printing underground political broadsheets and risking his life for democratic change.
"Of course, we were naive," Min Zin says now of his days as a street-corner propagandist. "All we knew was that these were bad guys and we wanted new leaders."
During those heady months of the 1988 uprising, the country was shaken to its foundations by students, some even younger than Min Zin, who took to the streets daily bringing dictator Ne Win's tottering regime to the point of collapse. But the broadly popular movement was brutally suppressed in September of that year when a military junta took power and thousands of people were killed.
Fast-forward to 2003 and Min Zin is still at it, only he is anything but naive.
Now a veteran journalist, the lanky, good-humored Min Zin is one of a handful of exiled Myanmar (Burma was officially renamed in 1989) journalists pointing the way toward an eventual future in which the press might one day thrive again in his home country.
He is a regular correspondent for Radio Free Asia and a staff editor for The Irrawaddy, a respected exile publication and website (www.Irrawaddy.org) covering Myanmar issues from Chiang Mai, Thailand. He has been a visiting fellow at the journalism school at the University of California at Berkeley and his essays on topics ranging from political strategy to popular culture in his homeland are thoughtful, independent and influential.
His work as a writer, scholar and journalist is an inspiration to many. Christina Fink, an American expert on Myanmar affairs, credits Min Zin with being a key strategist of the student movement during his years in exile and says that his commentaries and articles are followed closely inside Myanmar through Radio Free Asia and through smuggled copies of his writing. "Min Zin focuses on the role of youth in society and seeks to inspire young people to develop themselves outside the regime's tightly controlled, top-down education," Fink wrote recently.
The path that Min Zin took to become a journalist has been arduous and threatening, sad and inspiring. After the suppression of 1988, Min Zin left school and went underground for nine years, dodging the efforts of the military regime to track him down and toss him into prison, along with thousands of others.
Throughout his years of hiding and exile - he narrowly escaped from Myanmar to seek refuge in neighboring Thailand in 1997 - he was never sure what would happen to him. "I saw friends, girls and boys 12 years old and even younger, killed by soldiers in front of my eyes," he said. His immediate family members were all arrested at one time or another, usually on suspicion that they were aiding Min Zin.
During his odyssey, he taught himself to speak and read English fluently and even contributed essays on political issues to underground samizdat journals that circulated among students and dissidents.
"I had a lot of time to read, in those days," he said with a laugh. While hiding in Myanmar, friends brought him books from the libraries of the US and British embassies in Yangon, and he began expanding the horizons of his political thinking. "At first, we had no idea what was democracy, he said. "In our schools we were only taught about Marxist thinking" during the regime of Ne Win, whose peculiar brand of "Burmese socialism" brought the country isolation and ruin.
It was life on the run, oddly enough, that gave Min Zin the time to deepen his thinking and begin writing seriously about change, even contributing scholarly non-political articles under a pen name to the few legal magazines published in Yangon.
His exposure to fresh ideas has not diminished his outrage at the junta that rules his country, but he jealously guards his independence and his credibility as a journalist. Neither Min Zin nor any of the staff of The Irrawaddy are members of any political organization.
"We are independent and free to think and criticize anyone," said the magazine's founder and editor, Aung Zaw, himself a political dissident in exile. "It is important for our future that we develop independent journalism for Burma."
When asked if he is an activist or a journalist, Min Zin bristles and insists that it is not an either/or proposition. "We need to define, first, the word 'activist'," he told Asia Times Online at The Irrawaddy office on a quiet street in Chiang Mai. "In the West you can take for granted that your rights are established. But here, the immediate goal is to remove the repression. So in terms of our values you can say we are activists. But in terms of affiliation, I am not an activist. I have never joined any political party."
Min Zin and his Irrawaddy colleagues constantly work the phones and networks of sources and friends inside Myanmar, searching for information on one of the most closed regimes in the world. When pro-government thugs, for example, attacked opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters in a remote part of the country on May 30, The Irrawaddy was among the first to get the news.
Using sources inside Myanmar, they pieced together the events that most observers say were staged by the ruling State Peace and Development Council to tarnish Suu Kyi's image and justify her arrest and continuing detention.
Min Zin, however, does not confine himself to writing about the intricate twists and turns of Myanmar's long struggle for change. He is equally at home writing about popular singers in his homeland or discussing the country's literature. He has interviewed by phone one of Myanmar's few hip-hop stars for the magazine and recently wrote about a popular film actress who is also a devout Buddhist. "It is not all about politics," he explained. "The society is changing and I want to see how our culture can adapt to new realities."
His work is noticed in seemingly odd places. This year, Min Zin appeared on an MTV-produced documentary celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela. The music channel sent him to South Africa for a taped dialogue with Mandela, an experience of a lifetime, he said, even though he admits that friends kidded him about appearing on MTV. Pop idol Beyonce Knowles hosted the special.
He was deeply impressed by Mandela and compared his effectiveness with that of Suu Kyi, a fellow Nobel laureate and Myanmar's roughly comparable leader. "Suu Kyi is a moral figure, she is a saint, a moral person in an immoral society," he said. "But she appeals too much to the conscience, on telling people to do the right thing. Unlike Mandela and Vaclav Havel [whom Min Zin also met and interviewed on a trip to the Czech Republic] - these guys knew how to maneuver. She is not pragmatic," he said. "Suu Kyi doesn't believe in maneuvering."
He is realistic about what it may take to change Myanmar's dictatorship, which has been in power in one form or another since 1962. He praises US efforts to boycott the regime and bring sanctions against Myanmar. "The United States is the hegemonic power in the world," he said. "They can make things happen if they will be serious about change." Min Zin wants to see the US twist the arms of China, Japan and Thailand - regional powers that have all done business with the dictatorship for decades - to force change on the generals in Yangon.
Eventually, he believes, change will come and his long sojourn will end. "Being in exile builds a rift between reality and your own life," he said. "Literally my dreams are still confined to my neighborhood in Rangoon." His father, a political activist and teacher from an earlier generation who also suffered and was jailed for his beliefs, died a few years ago, he said, but he cannot accept the reality because he cannot go home.
His dream is to return home and help establish The Irrawaddy as an independent newsmagazine in a free country. "We are not immigrants - we are refugees, forced to resettle somewhere foreign. I think about my life in Burma because I lost it all when I was 14. My mind is always back home."
Life in limbo for a Myanmar exile
By A Lin Neumann
CHIANG MAI, Thailand - When Min Zin was 14, he and his friends were making newspapers by hand, literally. They etched characters into inked wax paper and rolled fluorescent-light tubes over the impressions in a crude homemade duplicating process. The results, distributed free of charge on the streets of Rangoon (now Yangon), were the only independent publications in the country.
This was not a school handicraft project. The year was 1988 and Min Zin was involved in the deadly serious business of revolution against a dictatorship in Burma. As one of the youngest and most prominent leaders of the pro-democracy rebellion, Min Zin was making speeches, organizing students, printing underground political broadsheets and risking his life for democratic change.
"Of course, we were naive," Min Zin says now of his days as a street-corner propagandist. "All we knew was that these were bad guys and we wanted new leaders."
During those heady months of the 1988 uprising, the country was shaken to its foundations by students, some even younger than Min Zin, who took to the streets daily bringing dictator Ne Win's tottering regime to the point of collapse. But the broadly popular movement was brutally suppressed in September of that year when a military junta took power and thousands of people were killed.
Fast-forward to 2003 and Min Zin is still at it, only he is anything but naive.
Now a veteran journalist, the lanky, good-humored Min Zin is one of a handful of exiled Myanmar (Burma was officially renamed in 1989) journalists pointing the way toward an eventual future in which the press might one day thrive again in his home country.
He is a regular correspondent for Radio Free Asia and a staff editor for The Irrawaddy, a respected exile publication and website (www.Irrawaddy.org) covering Myanmar issues from Chiang Mai, Thailand. He has been a visiting fellow at the journalism school at the University of California at Berkeley and his essays on topics ranging from political strategy to popular culture in his homeland are thoughtful, independent and influential.
His work as a writer, scholar and journalist is an inspiration to many. Christina Fink, an American expert on Myanmar affairs, credits Min Zin with being a key strategist of the student movement during his years in exile and says that his commentaries and articles are followed closely inside Myanmar through Radio Free Asia and through smuggled copies of his writing. "Min Zin focuses on the role of youth in society and seeks to inspire young people to develop themselves outside the regime's tightly controlled, top-down education," Fink wrote recently.
The path that Min Zin took to become a journalist has been arduous and threatening, sad and inspiring. After the suppression of 1988, Min Zin left school and went underground for nine years, dodging the efforts of the military regime to track him down and toss him into prison, along with thousands of others.
Throughout his years of hiding and exile - he narrowly escaped from Myanmar to seek refuge in neighboring Thailand in 1997 - he was never sure what would happen to him. "I saw friends, girls and boys 12 years old and even younger, killed by soldiers in front of my eyes," he said. His immediate family members were all arrested at one time or another, usually on suspicion that they were aiding Min Zin.
During his odyssey, he taught himself to speak and read English fluently and even contributed essays on political issues to underground samizdat journals that circulated among students and dissidents.
"I had a lot of time to read, in those days," he said with a laugh. While hiding in Myanmar, friends brought him books from the libraries of the US and British embassies in Yangon, and he began expanding the horizons of his political thinking. "At first, we had no idea what was democracy, he said. "In our schools we were only taught about Marxist thinking" during the regime of Ne Win, whose peculiar brand of "Burmese socialism" brought the country isolation and ruin.
It was life on the run, oddly enough, that gave Min Zin the time to deepen his thinking and begin writing seriously about change, even contributing scholarly non-political articles under a pen name to the few legal magazines published in Yangon.
His exposure to fresh ideas has not diminished his outrage at the junta that rules his country, but he jealously guards his independence and his credibility as a journalist. Neither Min Zin nor any of the staff of The Irrawaddy are members of any political organization.
"We are independent and free to think and criticize anyone," said the magazine's founder and editor, Aung Zaw, himself a political dissident in exile. "It is important for our future that we develop independent journalism for Burma."
When asked if he is an activist or a journalist, Min Zin bristles and insists that it is not an either/or proposition. "We need to define, first, the word 'activist'," he told Asia Times Online at The Irrawaddy office on a quiet street in Chiang Mai. "In the West you can take for granted that your rights are established. But here, the immediate goal is to remove the repression. So in terms of our values you can say we are activists. But in terms of affiliation, I am not an activist. I have never joined any political party."
Min Zin and his Irrawaddy colleagues constantly work the phones and networks of sources and friends inside Myanmar, searching for information on one of the most closed regimes in the world. When pro-government thugs, for example, attacked opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters in a remote part of the country on May 30, The Irrawaddy was among the first to get the news.
Using sources inside Myanmar, they pieced together the events that most observers say were staged by the ruling State Peace and Development Council to tarnish Suu Kyi's image and justify her arrest and continuing detention.
Min Zin, however, does not confine himself to writing about the intricate twists and turns of Myanmar's long struggle for change. He is equally at home writing about popular singers in his homeland or discussing the country's literature. He has interviewed by phone one of Myanmar's few hip-hop stars for the magazine and recently wrote about a popular film actress who is also a devout Buddhist. "It is not all about politics," he explained. "The society is changing and I want to see how our culture can adapt to new realities."
His work is noticed in seemingly odd places. This year, Min Zin appeared on an MTV-produced documentary celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela. The music channel sent him to South Africa for a taped dialogue with Mandela, an experience of a lifetime, he said, even though he admits that friends kidded him about appearing on MTV. Pop idol Beyonce Knowles hosted the special.
He was deeply impressed by Mandela and compared his effectiveness with that of Suu Kyi, a fellow Nobel laureate and Myanmar's roughly comparable leader. "Suu Kyi is a moral figure, she is a saint, a moral person in an immoral society," he said. "But she appeals too much to the conscience, on telling people to do the right thing. Unlike Mandela and Vaclav Havel [whom Min Zin also met and interviewed on a trip to the Czech Republic] - these guys knew how to maneuver. She is not pragmatic," he said. "Suu Kyi doesn't believe in maneuvering."
He is realistic about what it may take to change Myanmar's dictatorship, which has been in power in one form or another since 1962. He praises US efforts to boycott the regime and bring sanctions against Myanmar. "The United States is the hegemonic power in the world," he said. "They can make things happen if they will be serious about change." Min Zin wants to see the US twist the arms of China, Japan and Thailand - regional powers that have all done business with the dictatorship for decades - to force change on the generals in Yangon.
Eventually, he believes, change will come and his long sojourn will end. "Being in exile builds a rift between reality and your own life," he said. "Literally my dreams are still confined to my neighborhood in Rangoon." His father, a political activist and teacher from an earlier generation who also suffered and was jailed for his beliefs, died a few years ago, he said, but he cannot accept the reality because he cannot go home.
His dream is to return home and help establish The Irrawaddy as an independent newsmagazine in a free country. "We are not immigrants - we are refugees, forced to resettle somewhere foreign. I think about my life in Burma because I lost it all when I was 14. My mind is always back home."
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EK26Ae01.html
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Tuesday, October 1, 2002
Ludu Daw Amar: Speaking Truth to Power
Culture, The Irrawaddy Magazine, OCTOBER, 2002 - VOLUME 10 NO.8
Ludu Daw Amar: Speaking Truth to Power
by Min ZinA brief look into the life of Ludu Daw Amar, Burma’s best known female journalist and social critic.
The Burmese word amar translates as "the strong" or "the hard". It is an apt description of one of Burma’s most respected female figures, Ludu Daw Amar (she prefers the spelling, Amah), who turned 87 in November. An energetic political dissenter and left-leaning journalist with a faculty for articulating messages to and for the public, Ludu Daw Amar and her family have had more than their fair share of troubles with the authorities. Even now, Daw Amar is under constant surveillance, but she has never been one to bow down to power. As the prefix of her name Ludu or "the people" suggests, Daw Amar’s raison d’etre is to speak truth to power on behalf of the people without compromise.
"I’ll never forget my first impression," recalls Dutch journalist Minka Nijhuis, who has met Daw Amar four times since 1995. "At first she looked so fragile that even her wristwatch seemed too heavy for her arm. But that impression disappeared as soon as she started speaking."
When asked to comment on her unwavering commitment and strength, Daw Amar told The Irrawaddy: "I do not give up easily. Besides, I cannot tolerate injustice. This is my mindset."
An anecdote about her childhood in her autobiography reveals the roots of this strong-mindedness and illustrates her oft-overlooked humble side as well: "When our mother would cane us, she would say, ‘stop crying’, and all the siblings would stop except me. I cried because I felt hurt, but the more I cried the more whippings I received. How can she force me not to feel pain? Actually it was stubbornness; my mother and I were engaged in a conflict of endurance."
This tough personality was first drawn into politics after she enrolled at Rangoon University in 1936. During the independence movement against the British, she was applauded by the daily papers for her courage and beauty, and by 1938 she made her first and lasting mark on Burma’s literary landscape. U Razart, then the headmaster of the National School and later assassinated alongside Burma’s independence hero Aung San in 1947, suggested that Daw Amar translate Maurice Collis’s book, "Trial in Burma", into Burmese. The publisher was U Hla, who ran the monthly youth magazine Kyipwa Yay (Progress for Youth) as well as a publishing house in Rangoon. With the assistance of U Hla, who became Daw Amar’s husband the following year, the translation became an instant success and quickly required multiple printing runs as the first edition of three thousand copies sold out within two months.
After U Hla relocated to Mandalay to be with his wife, Daw Amar’s literary output accelerated. Most of these works were translations of English language novels, but her real passion was journalism. After the conclusion of the Second World War, U Hla launched the fortnightly journal, Ludu ("The People"), with Daw Amar as assistant editor. By 1946, the couple had founded the Ludu Daily News; its political commentaries and analyses became a significant voice for the aspirations and struggles against colonial rule. Thus, Daw Amar earned the name Ludu Daw Amar.
But only a year after Burma gained independence in 1948, the Ludu publication house in Mandalay was reduced to rubble by bombs. "Mandalay was under frequent regime changes at that time," Daw Amar explains. "The army saw the Ludu paper as sympathetic to the Communists so government troops blew up the building." They also surrounded her residence and forced the entire household—including children and two pregnant women—out into the street. Then the soldiers raised their guns. "It was in the morning. They aimed their machine guns at us threatening to kill us all," Daw Amar recalls. Bravely, she stood firm and demanded an explanation from the soldiers. Local monks and others lobbied for their release and the troops left without inflicting any harm.
The civil war that broke out in the wake of independence intensified rapidly and abuse of power became rampant. Ludu re-opened in a new office and Daw Amar resumed her active opposition to injustices. Her articles calling for internal peace and analyses on world affairs were well received, particularly with young progressives. Nyi Se Min, a writer in his fifties, remembers: "Daw Amar’s robust analyses on international politics opened our eyes and ears. Her political views earned our admiration."
In 1953, she took her political activism to the international stage, attending the World Democratic Women’s Conference in Copenhagen, the World Peace Conference in Budapest, and the International Youth Festival in Bucharest. In the same year, shortly after the birth of the youngest of her five children, her husband was detained and imprisoned by the government for three and a half years. With Daw Amar’s editorial responsibilities now doubled, she was forced to leave the children with an aunt.Though unable to raise her children personally, Daw Amar still managed to fundamentally influence their lives. "The Autobiography of Charlie Chaplin", "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", and the seminal work that heightened environmental consciousness internationally, "Silent Spring", were among the selections on the recommended reading lists she gave to her children. She also included Burmese classics such as the works of Thakin Kodawhmaing and the innovations of Khitsan (the modernization of Burmese literature in the first half of the 20th century).
"She rarely said, ‘you must do this’, or ‘you must not do that’, but let her actions do the talking," says Daw Amar’s second son Po Than Joung. "None of the three brothers drink or smoke; not because our parents told us not to, but rather because their own deeds convinced us that these things are not good."
By the late 1950s, her eldest son, Soe Win, began to follow his mother’s example by becoming politically active in the students’ union, and by 1963 he went underground to take up armed struggle with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). And after Po Than Joung was expelled from Mandalay University for his political activities the military regime set their sights on the entire family, each member now deemed a political subversive. Naturally, with her sons’ welfare in jeopardy Daw Amar became worried but not regretful.
"My parents never questioned our beliefs. They only told us to be careful when they learned of the government agents’ plans," says Po Than Joung, who began serving a six-year jail sentence in 1966 for his clandestine political involvement. In 1967, the government closed the Ludu newspaper for good and another year later, while Po Than Joung was imprisoned, Soe Win was killed during the CPB purges in the jungle. These internecine purges were used as the military’s most powerful propaganda offensive against the CPB and its sympathizers. After Po Than Joung was released, he received a letter from a CPB leader for Daw Amar explaining what happened to Soe Win and apologizing for the purge. "When I handed the letter to my mother, tears fell from her eyes," he says. "She said to me, ‘Your father and I have never discussed this matter. We just pretended it never happened.’" A few years later, Po Than Joung followed in his brother’s footsteps and joined the CPB. The military responded by arresting his parents and youngest brother, Ko Nyein Chan, in 1978, but Daw Amar’s defiant spirit remained unshaken.
But even throughout the family’s political turbulence, Daw Amar produced a prolific literary output, devoting most of her time researching the biographies of author Thakin Kodawhmaing, cartoonist Shwe Yo Ba Kalay, performance artist Shwe Mahn Tin Maung and others for "The Artists who People Love", her award-winning book that is now celebrated as a modern classic. She also penned "Burmese Non-dramatic Performance (Anyein)", "Contemporary Dramatic Art (Thabin)", and other books about Burmese classical music and painting that address issues of cultural identity.
But Daw Amar is not merely a nostalgic traditionalist. Although she enjoys cooking and has a fondness for flowers and countryside markets, she also likes Hollywood films and Disney cartoons. And not all of her writings chronicle the achievements of Burma’s historical cultural treasures; she was a forerunner of the innovative spoken style that distinguished modern Burmese literature from its predecessors. She was also a pioneer for advocating sex education and for voicing complaints against the unpaid labor contributions of women in modern Burmese society.
Although Ludu U Hla passed away in 1982, Daw Amar was not left a lonely widow. Her friends and admirers gathered around her unwavering integrity and inspiring writings. Beginning with her 70th birthday in 1985, writers and supporters from all over the country have traveled to Mandalay each year to assemble and pay their respects. Despite, or probably because of, Daw Amar’s popularity, her family endured continual political hardship. Ko Nyein Chan, a famous short story author who wrote under the pen name Nyi Pu Lay, was arrested and given a ten-year jail term by the regime. Though charged for having alleged contact with illegal organizations, many believe his family’s political pedigree and his satirical writings led to his detention.
Since 1994, Daw Amar’s writings turned to the disintegration of community cohesion, social responsibilities, and the negative impact of cultural decadence in Burma—something she attributes to the distorted economy and massive Chinese migration to the cities after the military coup in 1988. Her series of articles, Amay Shay Sagaa ("Mother’s Old Sayings"), criticized the changing lifestyles of young people who discarded their traditional attire, adopted heavy drinking habits and a taste for gambling, and chased the latest trends promoted by advertising.
"We proudly publish Daw Amar’s pieces regularly in our magazine since her well-intended writings represent the essence of Burmese culture," says Daw Kalaya, publisher of Kalaya magazine. Daw Amar also tried to stimulate progressive public debate on sensitive issues such as HIV/AIDS, but Daw Kalaya laments, "The censorship board didn’t allow her AIDS articles to appear in print." Nonetheless, her later writings, which mourn the loosening of traditional social and cultural values, are tinged with a conservative slant, particularly when reiterating Victorian moral teachings for Burmese women.
"We admire her as a great woman of Burma," says Ma Sue Pwint, leader of the exile-based Women’s League of Burma. "But as a woman activist working for the women’s rights movement, sometimes we have a few complaints about her strict dictums."
Daw Amar’s responses to the repressive regime and ruthless market iniquities are generally framed in a nationalistic, ethno- and religious-centric perspective. In her calls for the restoration of traditional cultural identities, she often fails to acknowledge the citizen-based politics and civic responsibilities that are essential for fostering a democratic polity in multi-ethnic Burma.
To interpret Daw Amar’s recent writings only in a context of progressive politics and contemporary liberal trends, however, can be misleading. Since she first put pen to paper more than 60 years ago, she has worked tirelessly in an environment of steadily declining socio-economic conditions and constant political repression. She is a defender of the history and culture of the former royal capital and symbol of Burmese independence, Mandalay. In broader terms, according to the veteran journalist in his sixties, Ludu U Sein Win, Daw Amar is a staunch defender of traditional Burmese cultural identity and sovereignty. Above all, Daw Amar’s lifetime commitment to fighting injustice and her refusal to be cowed into silence have made her a living symbol of resistance.
"Don’t Dance to the Tune of the Authorities"
An Interview with Ludu Daw Amar
The Irrawaddy's Assistant Editor Min Zin recently spoke to Ludu Daw Amar, 87, about her life experiences and her perspective on the current situation of the Burmese press. She also discussed social and political issues such as Chinese migration, women’s rights and the entitlements of ethnic nationalities. Below are some excerpts:
QUESTION: You have said that you prefer life as a journalist, but since you have been disallowed from working in that capacity your focus has turned to biographical works and other articles. Young people today see you as a social critic or a moral leader. How do you prefer to identify yourself?
ANSWER: When I was writing for the newspaper I could focus my proper attention on socio-political matters. Then the ban on newspapers was imposed [1967] and I had to stop after working in the business for 20 years. Though I can no longer write for newspapers, when particular social ills and news stories catch my eye I still write about them. My news instincts have influenced my work elsewhere. But I was much more contented as a newspaper journalist because we were able to write freely then.
Q: As an experienced newspaper editor, what is your evaluation of the current situation of the Burmese press?
A: The situation is like this: we cannot write anything the way we did before, there is no press freedom, and the Press Scrutiny Board is very restrictive. This means we cannot write what we want. That’s why I have begun writing about national culture—something that will not incriminate me.
Q: As journal publications are mushrooming in Burma right now, what do you think of the prospects for encouraging good journalism in the long run?
A: The prospects are not good. Journalism’s edge in Burma has become blunted. I believe that a new corps of good journalists will emerge only when we can publish newspapers freely. Right now, I don’t think any of the journalists are genuine newspaper journalists.
Q: You have translated several Thai and African short stories with the intention of fostering friendship between nations. The recent war of words between Thailand and Burma was attributed by many to the anti-Thai monarchy articles from irresponsible writers in the state-run Burmese newspapers. As a writer who has worked to facilitate goodwill among nations, what are your thoughts?
A: This is a breach of obligation for a journalist. Not only that, this group of journalists is at the beck and call of the generals; however, this is only one breed of journalists in Burma today. There is also another group who writes freely and expresses original ideas and opinions. But nowadays, journalists cannot write their opinions freely. For those of us who don’t dance to the tune of the authorities we must be creative in what we write to get the message across. It is very difficult.
Q: In one of your articles, you termed the present the Lawpang [wealthy Chinese businessmen] era. What do you think about the extensive Chinese migration in recent years in Mandalay?
A: I feel as if we are an undeclared colony of Yunnan [Province], not the People’s Republic of China. Yunnan is right on our doorstep and as soon as we opened that door, people from Yunnan started pouring in as if Mandalay was their own country.
Q: Women’s rights movements are gaining strength around the world. In some countries, governments implement Affirmative Action policies to redress the imbalances of unjust social systems and to support and empower women. Is such a model relevant for Burma?
A: We, the women of Burma have not gotten that far. We cannot even aim that far. There is no such thing as human rights in our country let alone women’s rights. That is the real situation.
Q: You have previously written some articles about Burma’s ethnic nationalities, so what are your concerns about their current situation.
A: They should enjoy equality with us.
Q: You think that the ethnic nationalities have not enjoyed equal status since Burma gained independence?
A: No. There has never been any equality [between ethnic nationalities and Burmans].
Q: All of your sons have been involved in politics, have made great sacrifices, and continue to pay a heavy price for expressing what they believe. Have you ever discouraged them from taking part in politics, or felt any regrets for not doing so?
A: I have no regrets. People get involved in politics as the situation of the country demands. My children got involved during their time because they thought they should. We had to fight for our independence and have endured civil war for more than half a century. Under these circumstances, it is the response to the government that produces politicians and political activists. Humans are humans and when they see injustice, they react by speaking out against it. So when they are beaten or arrested for speaking out they become politicians or political activists. This is how I see it. The government has forced you to become a political activist in your time as well—I saw it happen. Therefore, I neither feel remorse nor happiness for my children, but have accepted it as something that was bound to happen.
Q: On a personal note, I have heard that Gen Khin Nyunt once sent you a ballpoint pen for as a birthday present and that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also paid her respects to you. Are these rumors true?
A: Yes. Khin Nyunt has given me presents such as money and ballpoint pens to pay respect. I think he has done it a few times. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also sends her emissaries.
Q: How do you feel about the admiration shown to you from all corners of the country?
A: I don’t feel anything out of the ordinary. This interview was conducted in Burmese and translated into English.
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