Cracks in the Castle Wall

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6

Cracks in the Castle Wall

By MIN ZIN

Loopholes in the new Burmese constitution could be exploited by opposition groups to win influence after next year’s election

In politics, a direct, frontal attack is rarely wise; co-opting the opponent’s game plan for one’s own purposes is a more powerful ploy. Opponents of Burma’s military junta should bear this in mind as they consider their strategy for dealing with next year’s election.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism. A longer version of this article is available onwww.irrawaddy.org

Most mainstream opposition groups, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced that they will not take part in the 2010 election unless the constitution is revised and the political process is made more inclusive. They say they can’t accept the constitution as it stands because it denies fundamental ethnic rights and allows the military to seize power again “if there arises a state of emergency.”

A closer examination of the junta’s constitution reveals, however, that it is not the impregnable fortress that it at first appears to be. There are a number of weaknesses in the castle battlements that opposition groups can exploit if they are prepared to take a multi-pronged approach.

The first vulnerability lies in the fact that after the 2010 election, there will be two power centers, the military and the government, which will inevitably be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. No matter who pulls the strings, this new power arrangement will lead to either a serious internal split or the inefficiency of the ruling body.

Another Achilles’ heel is the constitution’s de facto demotion of regional military commanders. Although the constitution enshrines ultimate power in the commander in chief of the military, it fails to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities. As key pillars in the military regime’s power structure, the regional commanders are like warlords in their domains. However, under the new constitution, they are under the control of the chief ministers of the regions or states, who in many cases may be civilians. This could result in a situation where regional commanders oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw’s control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the 75 percent of seats not reserved for the military, a non-military candidate could become president. Failing this, non-military parties could gain control of the legislative agenda, giving them influence over everything from defense and foreign affairs to the economic and social sectors. Thus Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who leads the ruling junta, appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party based upon the membership of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass organization formed by the junta in September 1993.

Snr-Gen Than Shwe votes in the referundum election on the new constitution.

However, this leads to the fourth problem facing the regime. As a political party, the USDA’s existing nationwide organizational structure (and its thuggish reputation, which could be used to intimidate voters) would give it a great advantage in the 2010 election. The problem is that the new constitution bars parliamentary candidates from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it would run afoul of the regime’s own constitution if it sought to field candidates in the election.

Therefore, if the military wants to create a new political party or parties, it must ensure that they do not bear any resemblance to the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or intimidating power.

Perhaps these concerns are the reason the regime keeps delaying the promulgation of the electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year: Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power. Meanwhile, however, the credibility of the election and the legitimacy of the new power arrangement it is intended to put in place have already been hurt by the likely non-participation of the NLD and the refusal of several ethnic ceasefire groups to disarm or participate.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage by remaining outside the regime’s election process while opening a new proxy front within the regime’s game plan. Even if opposition groups don’t take part in the election using their current organizational identities, they could set up proxy political parties to participate in the 2010 election. Through these proxy parties, the opposition could attempt to maximize civilian control of the post-election parliament.

At the same time, opposition groups such as the NLD, the New Mon State Party and others must stand strong in opposing the “illegitimate” constitution and election and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 election will help prevent a split within the opposition groups. Otherwise, policy disagreements between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. Proxy tactics could also help bring new recruits to the opposition movement.
However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxy parties in the 2010 election will spark a magical power shift to civilian control. That will happen only if there is sufficient public pressure to challenge the military-dominated status quo, forcing the military to negotiate with the opposition, which would then be in a position to push for a genuine transition to democratic rule.

Another factor that could determine the success or failure of the approach outlined here is the ability of non-military MPs to maintain a sense of common purpose. There is a danger that parochial interests will blind non-military MPs to broader issues, or that self-interest will lead them to compromise their reform agenda. Non-military MPs would not necessarily form a monolithic bloc or be unanimous in their approach to the military’s domination. Vote rigging and intimidation in the election could further undermine the chances of a genuine opposition presence in the parliament.

That said, however, the contradictions embedded in the constitution will provide unprecedented opportunities for those who seek to break the military’s hold on power. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. In the event of mass demonstrations on the streets, proxy parties will be well-placed to play a role.

The opposition should be creative in opening a new proxy front as part of a multi-pronged strategy to exploit the cracks in the junta’s fortress.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16678

Will Pressure Work in Suu Kyi Verdict?

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Monday, August 10, 2009

Will Pressure Work in Suu Kyi Verdict?

By MIN ZIN

According to recent news reports, Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has reportedly told the court that her trial is a test of the military-run legal system. Some opposition figures and Burmese media—especially Burmese language foreign broadcasts—toe the line in making this legality issue a big deal.

They are wrong. It is by no means a test case for the rule of law in Burma, which is virtually non-existent.

Without any balance of power in the state institutions, putting faith in the rule of law and expecting justice are at best illusory. The opposition should not pick or prolong the battle within the junta's institutions, including the judicial system, which the regime effectively controls through the appointment of senior judges and direct interventions.

The legal system is one of the most corrupted institutions serving the perpetuation of the regime. As a serial liar and rule-breaker, the junta knows well how to manipulate its institutions against Suu Kyi and other opponents. Even if Suu Kyi were freed tomorrow, it would have nothing to do with judicial independence and rule of law in military-ruled Burma. It would be political calculation. This whole affair should be viewed from a political perspective, not through a legal lens.

Thus, the true test in the Suu Kyi trial is whether or not and to what extent the junta is susceptible to international pressure; in other words, whether or not the international pressure yields the intended result. If it does, a close examination should be made to understand when and how it worked.

Some influential Burma experts, foreign diplomats and even increasing numbers of journalists repeatedly claim that coercive diplomacy does not press the isolated and xenophobic Burmese military junta to make any changes. Pressure does not work. The regime is insular, claim these pundits.

The Burmese court that postponed its verdict on Suu Kyi until August 11 may tell a different story. Some sources inside Burma, however, suggest that the junta may delay the verdict again on Tuesday by citing the ill health and hospitalization of John Yettaw, the intruder who is also standing trial.

Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirajuda recently told the media that he hoped the postponement of the verdict was due to the Burmese government’s concern over international reaction, particularly from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).

In fact, before the expected decision on July 31, UN chief Ban Ki-moon had pressed for the immediate release of Suu Kyi during a meeting with Burma's UN ambassador, a UN spokesman said. Ban Ki-moon warned that by sentencing Suu Kyi to another prison term, the Burmese junta would "miss a very important opportunity to engage with the international community, and they will be betraying the expectations and wishes of all the international community who really want to see Myanmar [Burma] fully integrated as a member of the international community."

These pressures appear to have serious effects on the calculation of Sen-Gen Than Shwe, the paramount dictator of the regime, who has shown some indecisiveness in this final episode of the show trial.

However, it is not the first time that the military shows its susceptibility to international pressure. For instance, in 2005 the junta faced mounting pressure from the West and some Asean countries to give up the Asean chairmanship in 2006. The United States and the European Union openly declared that they would boycott all Asean meetings if Burma took chairmanship. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong travelled to Burma and expressed his deep concern about the possible implication of Burma's chairmanship on Asean.

The pressures then affected the regime. Despite the fact that the regime had already established a "Steering Committee for the Preparation of Holding the Asean Summit," chaired by the prime minister, to reap international PR gains, and also enjoyed China's backing to assume the chairmanship, the military eventually decided to give up its entitlement. It would be unthinkable for the presumptuous and overbearing Burmese military to give in to outside pressures and take diplomatic embarrassment. (In fact, the self-righteousness and uncompromising pride is a trait that many Burmese prone to share with the ruling generals.) Most interestingly, the generals who made such concessions were known as "hardliners," since "moderate" Gen Khin Nyunt had already been purged in 2004.

Similar observations could be made in other cases such as Burma's negotiation with the International Labor Organization (ILO) over a resolution of forced labor in Burma.

The tentative lesson could be drawn that when the pressure is employed first with focus— meaning a clear objective with single issue instead of vaguely designed "regime change"— second with coordination, especially getting regional powers such as Asean and China to get on board, and third with persistence.

However, it does not mean that the junta will clear all charges against Suu Kyi and set her free tomorrow or even postpone the verdict again. The military can still sentence Suu Kyi to up to five years. If it wants to pacify the anger of the international community, it could announce a suspended sentence or allow the opposition to make a big deal about an appeal process. At the same time, it can complicate the situation by freeing or being lenient on Yettaw as an act of clemency and a positive overture to the Unites States while anti-sanction US Sen Jim Webb is visiting in Rangoon.

If the Lady was given a prison sentence tomorrow, there will be at least two ways to look at the effectiveness of the pressure. First, the pressure failed. The only option for the international community should be to engage with Burmese junta. However, this prescription is not very convincing in resolving the crisis in Burma. Aside from providing whatever the regime wants— lifting the sanctions, giving aid without or with few conditions, endorsing the 2008 constitution and being quiet on violations of human rights and ethnic rights, and political crisis, the meaningful engagement—even the highest level of engagement from the UN secretary-general —does not seem to yield any sustainable result. In his last visit to Burma, Ban Ki-moon's request to meet Suu Kyi was rejected, and his specific proposal for the reform fell on deaf ears. It does not mean that international community should stop engaging the junta. But the engagement must be exercised with the backup of enforcement.

This leads to a second view. If Suu Kyi was given a prison sentence tomorrow, it indicates that the existing pressure is not high enough to influence the regime's behavior.

This view will argue that there are three factors shaping the focus, coordination and persistence of international pressure. They are consensus, mechanism and political will on the part of international community.

Regarding consensus, UN Security Council statements and Ban Ki-moon's specific proposal to Than Shwe such as the release of all political prisoners including Suu Kyi; resumption of dialogue between the government and opposition; and the need to create conditions conducive to credible elections planned in 2010 are the common framework. Recently, Ban announced that he won support from key nations for his proposal to the Burmese government after chairing a closed-door meeting of the Group of Friends on Myanmar that includes about 15 countries—Burmese neighbors, interested Asian and European nations, and the five permanent UN Security Council members. Ban also announced that a new summit will be held in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss the political crisis in Burma. These are very encouraging signs for the Burmese opposition in terms of consensus building. Of course, the priority has to be sorted out for a sharper focus and effectiveness.

A consensus itself, however, is not enough. It needs coordination. In other words, a mechanism is required to enforce consensus. This has also to do with the level of pressure. Then the question is whether or not the UNSC, the highest enforcement mechanism, is feasible in the Burma case, and when it will be achievable and how. Or, are there other mechanisms such as the Friends of Myanmar where the Burma issue could be effectively dealt with?

This leads to a third factor—the political will of international community. In fact, this could be boiled down to the issue of leadership. Who is going to take the lead in the Burma case? The United States under the Bush administration played a leading role in bringing the Burma issue into every international forum. The Obama team did not bother noting the word Burma even in the margin of his key foreign policy agenda when the president attended a US-EU summit in April, says an EU diplomat who was involved in preliminary preparation for the summit.

Ban Ki-moon's leadership is commendable. But bureaucratic leadership rarely facilitates persistency and the necessary resources for intractable conflicts unless it is backed by the political will of major powers. Otherwise, it will end up in an outsourcing and buck-passing policy.

When it comes to pressure, these are the issues (i.e. focus/consensus, coordination/mechanism and persistence/political will) that the opposition should pay attention to, strategize and advance, instead of expecting and pursuing the trial as legal test case.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=16521&page=2

Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Friday, July 24, 2009

Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight

By MIN ZIN

In politics, direct and frontal attack is rarely wise. Occupying the flank by co-opting the opponent's game plan for one's own purposes is a powerful ploy.

Co-option strategy, however, is a double-edged sword. It presents the risk of being swallowed by the dominant establishment, or at least having one’s reputation damaged, but it also conceals great power and maneuverability.

It depends on how one manages to play it right in a relatively conducive political environment. If well managed, it will become strength. In any case, never rule out this option in exchange for, or fixing solely on, the honor fight when the time is not ripe. To the advantage of oppositions in Burma, a multi-pronged strategy is always called for.

Mainstream oppositions, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and major ethnic ceasefire groups, have announced they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the military allows a constitutional revision and inclusive political process. Instead of bringing about a much-needed state-building process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard, Burma's constitution conceded 25 percent of legislative seats to the armed forces and denied protection of fundamental ethnic rights in a multi-ethnic nation.

More importantly, the constitution allows the military virtually to run the country with the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), and even to stage a coup d’état "if there arises a state of emergency." The opposition's principled stance of refusing to endorse the military's constitution and contest the 2010 elections, therefore, deserves understanding and support.

However, it does not mean that there is no gap in the castle wall. The opposition should also look at the situation from a power perspective. By dissecting the junta’s constitution, the opposition will find the devil lies in the details over which Snr-Gen Than Shwe should lose sleep.

First of all, the new post-2010 election power arrangement will create two power centers—military and government. These two power centers will nonetheless be at loggerheads over the command structure and personal interests. Even within the single power center, the Burmese military has repeatedly mired itself in purges resulting from battalion forces versus the intelligence faction, and other rivalries.

Now, after the elimination of the intelligence faction, various reports confirm that there are serious animosity and tension between the military personnel and the thuggish Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members regarding the latter's interference with the military's administrative mandate and other issues of self-interest.

The election, so long as it demonstrates a relatively competitive nature, can make elite rivalry become public issues. The government's operation with two centers of power—no matter who pull the strings—could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable inefficiency of the ruling body.

Secondly, the constitution carries destructive seed for the military to grow into a center-versus-periphery conflict. Though Than Shwe enshrined ultimate power for the commander-in-chief of the military in the constitution, he failed to provide similar authority to regional commanders in their localities, who are key pillars in the military regime's power structure.

The constitution requires the president to seek approval from the commander-in-chief in all major issues at least via NDSC procedure, but it does not guarantee any special power to regional commanders. Constitutionally, regional commanders are under the control of Chief Ministers of the Regions or States, who could well be civilians in most cases.

Even if the president appoints military Members of Parliament or retired army officials as Chief Minister of the Region or State, the regional commander who is so used to being a warlord in his domain will find it hard to accept constitutionally the prescribed power of the Chief Minister. This may in turn lead the regional commanders to oppose not only local power arrangements but also Naypyidaw's control.

The third loophole in the constitution is that if non-military parties sweep to victory or win a clear majority of the remaining seats (aside from the 25 percent reserved seats for the military), a non-military candidate can become president or at least non-military parties can control the legislative agendas. According to the constitution, parliament has the right to enact a long list of laws ranging from defense and foreign affairs to economic and social sectors. Thus, Than Shwe appears to be determined to fill the remaining parliamentary seats with members of a military-backed political party.

However, this leads to the fourth problem—another self-defeating clause of the constitution.

Than Shwe may want to see his USDA members seizing most of the remaining seats. Transforming the USDA into a political party and contesting the 2010 election will give the junta a great advantage because this thuggish group can exploit the existing nationwide organizational structure and also presents a constant reminder that it’s a fearful power that can intimidate the public to vote for its members. But it is not likely to happen because the constitution clearly states that "Civil Services personnel shall be free from party politics." This clause will invalidate a majority of the 24 million USDA members, who are public servants, if the group turns itself into party.

The constitution also forbids political parties and candidates for parliament from receiving any support directly or indirectly from the state, including the use of state property and money. As the USDA currently enjoys such advantages, it runs afoul of the regime's own constitution. If the military wants to create a new political party or parties, they will not carry any resemblance of the USDA in terms of name recognition, resources or and intimidating power.

These are some causes of grave concern for Than Shwe. Perhaps that's why he has kept delaying the promulgation of electoral law, which was reportedly ready to be published early this year. Than Shwe wants more time to secure his bet for more power.

The opposition, for its part, is not likely to take part in the 2010 election unless the regime concedes constitutional reform. However, it is not clear if a political party that does not contest the election will be deregistered. The constitution vaguely states that a party must "accept and practice a genuine and discipline-flourishing multi-party democracy." But if the election law forbids a party such as the NLD to have legal existence for its refusal to participate in the election, the same law will have to impact on ethnic ceasefire parties such as the United Wa State Party, Kachin Independence Organization and New Mon State Party. Most ethnic ceasefire groups have two wings—a political party and the army. It will be a tough choice for Than Shwe to make.

Aside from this principle stance, the practical power implication suggests that the credibility and legitimacy of an election and new power arrangement will be greatly hurt so long as ethnic ceasefire groups refuse to disarm and Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD does not take part in the election. With the new constitution and elections, the military thus cannot expect to minimize the cost of conflict. The most visible costs will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to the country's economy.

In fact, the opposition could create leverage not only by being outside the regime's election process, but also by opening a new proxy front within the regime's game plan. Constitutional reform is still the most important policy demand, but the opposition should not shut their eyes to the 2010 election.

While the opposition does not take part in the elections representing the NLD, UWSP and NMSP, they must set up proxy political parties to engage in the 2010 election. Through proxies, the opposition must attempt to seize the mainstream platform in order to maximize civilian control of the regime's game. At the same time, the opposition groups such as NLD, NMSP and etc must stand strong outside the reins of an "illegitimate" constitution and election, and continue their fight for genuine reconciliation. The opposition must be savvy in combining both inside-out and outside-in strategies to usher in political change.

Just because they loathe the undemocratic constitution, the opposition should not consider total disengagement from mainstream politics. If history were any guide, the total dissociation of the Communist Party of Burma and the Karen National Union from post-independence mainstream politics made the two strongest forces gradually recede from the center stage of politics, and the power of the both groups also dwindled over time. The opposition, including both democracy forces as well as ethnic groups, should not overlook the reality of basic maturity in politics—that you cannot always get your own way, especially when one group in the conflict maintains an asymmetric power advantage.

Thus far, the KIO, other Kachin ceasefire groups and some representatives of civil society set up the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) in June 2008 to contest the 2010 elections and has reportedly already begun campaigning, while the KIO remains determined not to surrender arms. This is a wise and proactive move since it will allow Kachin to control the Kachin State parliament and be represented in the national parliament. NLD and other ethnic groups should follow suit.

In fact, the formation of proxy parties and participation in the 2010 elections will help preventing a split within the opposition groups.

Otherwise, the policy disagreement between moderates and radical activists within the NLD as well as individual ethnic groups might lead to actual and open splits when the election law comes out and the junta plays more rounds of divide and rule. By setting up proxies, the opposition can create dynamic and diverse tasks and responsibilities within its own leadership and the rank and file.

It could also help bring so-called "neutral," "politically non-engaged professionals," “intellectuals, retired civil/military officials and others who believe in Track Two diplomacy" into the given "legally viable" political arena. No matter whether one agrees or disagrees with the prevailing so-called "Third Force" who mostly opposes Western economic sanctions and criticizes Suu Kyi and her party, the best way to compete with them is to create one's own proxy.

However, no one should harbor any illusion that the presence of opposition proxies in the 2010 election will spark a magic power shift to civilian control. It could happen only if the military-dominated status-quo is challenged by public pressure and a negotiated settlement is reached with the military.

The regime's constitution will not lead to a genuine political transition and democratization without broad-based public actions and reconciliation. The aforementioned loopholes in the constitution may not necessarily offer much maneuverability and leverage to the civilian MPs in the first term of the post-2010 power arrangement. Without any balance of power in the state institutions, the military can simply ignore or veto these loopholes.

Moreover, non-military MPs are not necessarily monolithic and unanimous in their approach to the military's domination. They may not necessarily be willing to view their control of majority seats in parliament as a means of determining winners and losers vis-à-vis the military. Parochial interest can also blind non-military MPs to appreciate a broader vision, and self-interest can even corrupt them to compromise their reform agenda. All in all, the election can also be marked by vote rigging, intimidation and bullying attacks orchestrated by the regime and its affiliates against opposing candidates.

However, the seeds of foundational contradiction are embedded in the constitution. The gaps in the castle are built-in. If a moderate military leadership emerges in a post-Than Shwe era, those proxy MPs and ministers who are in the mainstream can work with them for gradual reform. Or when mass action takes place on the streets, proxies in the given political process may play a role.

Than Shwe, reportedly a big fan of boxing, must know that strength does not lie in the punches the boxer throws but in the balance and support of the boxer. In other words, it is the legs that matter, the foundation that holds the boxer up can also make him fall. With this loophole-ridden constitution, Than Shwe knows that his opponents could weaken his legs and he could easily reel and stagger.

The opposition should be creative and devious in opening a new proxy front, as a part of their multi-pronged strategy, to exploit the crack in the fortress.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=16396

Choosing the Right Battle Strategy

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Saturday, June 13, 2009

Choosing the Right Battle Strategy

by MIN ZIN


Aung San Suu Kyi should view her trial as a political battle and not a legal one, and take strategic advantage of it.

By picking the right battle strategy, David was able to strike down Goliath with a slingshot and use his powerful sword to slay the giant. The rule of thumb is to choose fighting strength against weakness, and not strength against strength.

The regime's weakness lies on its international flank, especially its regional neighbors. The junta is also sensitive to the opinions of military officers and rank and file. These are the targets the Lady must hit repeatedly and relentlessly.

Aung San Suu Kyi believes that political integrity (i.e. "plain honesty in politics") is one of the most important virtues. She and many others regard the political integrity she upholds persistently as her strength. Perfect armor!

However, she has to comprehend the strength of her captors, too. The Lady cannot pick or prolong the battle within the junta's institutions, including the legal system, which is one of the most corrupted instruments serving the perpetuation of the regime.

As a serial liar and rule-breaker, the junta knows well how to manipulate its institutions against Suu Kyi and other opponents. Force and fraud are their strength.

This strength must be continuously exposed internationally as well as to a domestic public, especially to the military rank and file. But it might not be the battle front the Lady wants to open.

Confronting the strength of the regime straight on, as the opposition has mostly done in past, will end up in another defeat. The asymmetrical power relationship is evidential.

Suu Kyi’s trial is another test of the opposition's strategic caliber. In fact, the trial is widely believed to be a sham. The verdict has already been reached in Snr-Gen Than Shwe's mind.

Although Suu Kyi’s latest, six-year term of house arrest ended in May, the regime's supremo is still afraid of freeing her to the embrace of her supporters and the public at large.

The 63-year-old Nobel laureate faces a maximum prison sentence of five years. She could be condemned to prison or sent home for a further term of house arrest.

Whatever the terms of her incarceration, it is clear that the regime’s aim is to confine her until it has secured victory in the 2010 general election.

This is a political battle ground. That's why the trial has drawn international condemnation, including from the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (Asean). The group warned the regime that "the honor and credibility of the Government of the Union of Myanmar are at stake".

Even Goh Chok Tong, a staunch ally of the regime and a former prime minister of Singapore, told Than Shwe during talks in Naypyidaw earlier this month that the trial has an international dimension.

Thus, the Lady must see the trial as a political battle. Instead of prolonging the trial, she must let the sham process get done and receive the prison sentence. That will intensify political battles in the international arena, including the UN Security Council and regional players.

The regime will no doubt face domestic challenges, too. The opposition National League for Democracy must also lead the political battle, instead of waiting for the result of the show trial.

If Suu Kyi allows the trial to drag on, she will give the regime a chance to project the impression of openness and due legal process. In fact, the junta has already derived advantage from Suu Kyi's appeal for four defense witnesses to be heard.

The lower District Court earlier disqualified all but one defense witness, but the Rangoon Divisional Court later ruled that a second witness could give testimony. With this concession, the junta might be quite satisfied in projecting the impression of a fair and independent legal process, though that will not have any effect on its final script.

More importantly, the protraction of the trial could reduce interest in the international media, as well as diplomatic pressures. Momentum always amasses two important sources of capital, which strategically-minded politicians should not squander—good timing and political good will.

That is why the court’s decision on Friday to postpone the trial until June 26 in order to hear the testimony of a Suu Kyi’s defense witness is not a good sign. In fact, Suu Kyi's lawyers requested the further adjournment since the defense witness has to come to court from southern Shan State, in the northeastern part of Burma.

Suu Kyi instructed her lawyers to continue the appeals process to allow more defense witnesses to be heard in the case as she wants "to see it through to the end as the ruling is legally wrong."

If the High Court upholds the lower courts' decision, the special court in Insein Prison may set a date sometime in July in which to deliver the verdict. The regime could still delay the verdict in order to ride out international pressure.

But the cause of any delay should not rest with the Lady.

If Suu Kyi and the NLD fail to distinguish between a political battle and a legal fight, and unless they focus more on the former, they will lose the momentum. Engaging in a lengthy legal battle will not yield any political outcome except the exhaustion of strategic capital.

In a clever move, Suu Kyi told diplomats who attended one session of her trial: "There could be many opportunities for national reconciliation if all parties so wished," according to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, whose ambassador was among those who met her on May 20.

The statement said that she also "expressed the view that it was not too late for something good to come out of this unfortunate incident," referring to her trial. "She did not wish to use the intrusion into her home as a way to get at the Burma authorities," read the statement.

The statement represented a political offensive and displayed her strength, something the NLD should exploit. The NLD party should, for instance, have released an official statement supporting Goh's recent comments and Asean's "grave concern," and citing Suu Kyi's words to demonstrate the opposition's readiness for national reconciliation.

The goal must be to amass international and domestic public support and materialize it in the UN Security Council, Asean, China, and on the streets of Burma.

Suu Kyi can, of course, continue her legal battle, even after she is sentenced. But the focus must be to reap political advantage. The momentum should not be diminished.

The political battle must be renewed and the regime’s Achilles' heel must be located and attacked.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=15967

Ethnic Minorities Hold the Key to Burma’s Future

Op-ed, The Irrawaddy, Friday, January 23, 2009

Ethnic Minorities Hold the Key to Burma’s Future

by MIN ZIN

Ceasefires that cannot be transformed into political settlements and a lasting peace are typical examples of protracted deadlocks. When neither party seems willing or able to resolve this situation, the deadlocks have the potential to trigger an escalation strategy in conflict. This is the point that the Burmese military and ceasefire ethnic groups have now reached. The question is what strategy options are available for both parties.

The Burmese military has initiated ceasefire agreements with no less than 17 ethnic rebel groups since 1989 and has allowed the groups to retain their arms and control somewhat extensive blocks of territory over the past twenty years. This shows uncharacteristic tolerance on the part of the military, which, like the whole Burman population to some extent, has a chauvinistic and patronizing attitude toward ethnic minorities.

The Burmese junta has accepted this situation for at least three reasons. First, the ceasefire accords have allowed the military to avoid multiple enemy fronts in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and to focus mainly on suppressing political opposition in central Burma.

Secondly, the ceasefire condition that prevails in the border areas has enabled the Burmese military to make unprecedented advances in its relations with neighboring countries¬ especially China and Thailand ¬in both security and economic terms. The neighbors that once supported Burma’s ethnic rebels along their borders as a key part of their buffer policy or because of an ideological affinity have now shifted to the policy of full economic cooperation with the Burmese junta through massive investment and border trade.

Lastly, the ceasefire accords give the military regime the much-needed political legitimacy that they have lost since the bloody crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The regime constantly points to the ethnic ceasefire groups as the most defining feature of its “national reconsolidation” policy and as evidence of its claims to legitimacy.

However, the success of the military’s strategic tolerance is now about to be put to the test, as the regime must do two things before the 2010 elections to ensure that the progress it has made toward establishing a so-called “disciplined democracy” is meaningful.

First of all, the military needs to redraw the map of Burma under its new constitution. The basic state structure, consisting of seven centrally located regions surrounded by seven ethnic states, will remain the same. This favors the continuing dominance of the Burman majority, who live mostly in the seven regions. Some states, however, will see their maps being redrawn, with five Self-Administered Zones (for Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Pa Laung and Kokang ethnic groups) and one Self-Administered Division (for Wa ethnic group) designated by the military. The seventeen “special regions” established in the ethnic ceasefire areas are due to expire when the military redraws the map in accordance with the new constitution. Re-mapping must also be done soon so that the junta can establish new electoral constituencies in the country, especially in the ethnic areas. However, there is still no consensus among all parties concerned with regard to the drawing up of a new map, and this issue remains contentious.

Secondly, and more importantly, the military needs to disarm the ceasefire groups, reclaim territory from them, and push them to transform themselves into political parties ready to contest the 2010 election. This will be a major test of the military’s “contained Balkanization” of the ethnic areas; failure to achieve these goals could trigger an outright conflict and, in the worst case scenario, initiate another era of regional instability.

The question is how ethnic ceasefire groups will respond to the regime’s plans for their future. The indications so far suggest that ethnic groups will not likely give in to the junta’s demands. The United Wa State Party (UWSP), for example, now refers to itself as the “Government of Wa State, Special Autonomous Region, Union of Myanmar” in official documents. The UWSP, which has long pressed the regime to designate the Wa territory as a “state” in the constitution, has refused to call the area under its control “Shan State Special Region 2” in accordance with the terms of their ceasefire agreement or “Shan State Self-Administered Division” in accordance with the military’s new constitution.

Two other strong ceasefire groups, ¬the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP), ¬have already officially stated that they will not contest the 2010 election. The NMSP even went so far as to say that it does not accept the military’s constitution.

There are two things the ceasefire groups can and should do. The first would be to resist the regime’s forced disarmament under the current conditions.

Some groups may take part in the 2010 election through their proxy ethnic parties, but they must not give in to the regime’s demands for the disarmament of their troops or the loss of territories under their control.

Secondly, they should convey the message to neighboring countries, ¬particularly China and Thailand, and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations¬, that the 2010 election, which will be held under the military’s constitution, will in no way contribute to stability or a smooth political transition to democracy and ethnic autonomy.

Genuine national reconciliation and nation-building must precede the restructuring of the state. The neighboring countries and the regional group should, therefore, be reminded that the situation of “contained Balkanization” in Burma could easily lead to a resumption of localized arm conflicts between certain ethnic ceasefire groups and the Burmese army unless the latter negotiates an acceptable political resolution with fourteen major ceasefire groups whose strength reaches over 40,000 armed troops. Such a situation would particularly alarm China, since the most volatile areas are around the Sino-Burmese border, where formidable Wa and Kachin ethnic groups are based.

The aforementioned resistance and warnings should be accompanied by two political demands: a review of the constitution, and the release of political prisoners, including Shan ceasefire leader Hso Ten and Shan MP-elect Khun Htun Oo. These demands are largely in line with those of the mainstream opposition in central Burma and the international community.

However, the ceasefire groups must be strategic and coordinated in their action. Otherwise, they will face inter-group divisions¬ with some groups giving in and others resisting against disarmament ¬as well as intra-group splits ¬with one part of a group surrendering and another part resuming fighting.

Many ceasefire groups have, in fact, issued collective statements in the past to raise their political demands with the junta. When the military resumed the National Convention in 2004, collective demands were issued to the regime on two occasions ¬by eight groups the first time, and by 13 the second (with the KIO and the NMSP joining in both efforts). Their demands included the right to discuss and revise the undemocratic principles and procedures of the convention, the right of elected representatives from the 1990 election to participate in the convention, and the clear distribution of power to the states.

Similar collective efforts should now be used to achieve the two key political goals of a constitutional review and the release of political prisoners. A broad, well-coordinated effort must be strategically articulated not only to consolidate the domestic power bases of ethnic groups, but also to persuade neighboring countries to engage in and facilitate an acceptable political resolution in Burma.

If the ceasefire groups fail to stand together and be strategic at this critical historical juncture, they will lose their ground and eventually succumb to the junta’s “divide and conquer” tactics.

In the long run, ethnic minorities will be the ultimate losers under the military’s constitution. Burma will remain a highly centralized state in the post-2010 era. The undemocratic power of the president and the brooding presence of the military at every level of government in the ethnic states will not produce anything approaching the level of autonomy desired by ethnic minorities.

While military-owned businesses, junta cronies, foreign investors and traders, and ethnic drug lords and elites plunder the natural resources of the ethnic states, local ethnic populations will continue to be denied economic opportunities. This situation is already common in many areas. For example, logging companies from China bring their own cutters, drivers and laborers to work their concession in the Wa ethnic area, leaving locals impoverished and susceptible to social ills such as drug abuse, prostitution and diseases.

In the post-2010 era, ethnic states will also see their environment further destroyed by greedy businesses and bad governance.

The preservation of ethnic identity will be at serious risk as states or self-administered communities will have almost no authority over the issues of language or cultural and religious rights.

Moreover, since a military chief will independently administer military affairs in the post-2010 era, including the recruitment of troops and the deployment of military forces, the issues of child soldiers, forced relocations, forced labor, landmines, internally displaced persons, the flow of refugees to neighboring countries, and rape and other rights violations – all of which are associated with the military’s unchecked interests and behavior¬ – will remain unresolved, especially in ethnic minority areas.

Relentless repression and the darkest side of economic globalization will continue to cause lives in the ethnic states to be, as Hobbes described, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

It is now up to the leaders of ceasefire groups to decide whether they will betray the 60-year long struggle for their ethnic people or stand together with an effective strategy to fight for equal ethnic rights. The rest will be history.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=14979&page=1

New Year’s Resolutions for the NLD

Op-ed, Irrawaddy Online, January 2, 2009

New Year’s Resolutions for the NLD

By MIN ZIN

Over the past 20 years, the opposition parties in Burma have shown an unyielding faith in the power of principles. Now it is time for them to learn the principles of power.

The Burmese military junta is at its happiest when history repeats itself. Under the leadership of Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the regime replays its old maneuvers—content that its strategy has for so long been unbreakable.
A recognizable play in the regime's game plan has long been the tactic of combining brute force and naked aggression through harsh crackdowns with political offensives aimed at weakening the opposition and defusing international pressure.
But if the regime’s policymakers are so predictable, surely the question is what the opposition will do to counter their plans and achieve the two most important results for political transition— constitutional reform and the release of political prisoners.
Take, for starters, the case of the 2,100 political prisoners languishing in Burma’s jails—234 of whom were arrested during or after the nationwide protests in September 2007 and have received sentences of up to 68 years imprisonment each since November 2008.
The goal of the harsh sentencing is clear—to eliminate potential opposition in the run-up to the 2010 election, which is the fifth step in the regime's master-plan known as the “Seven-Step Roadmap to Democracy.”
The intended effect of the brutality is a "shock and awe" campaign—terrorizing the public and creating an environment of fear ahead of the election. The junta hopes the Burmese population will become depoliticized and will meekly allow the military to steal the election.
International outcry has pronounced loud again. Sources in United Nations said that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is even considering the option for "temporary suspension of his good offices mission on Burma". Some sources close to Burmese Foreign Ministry confirmed that China and Russia are pressing the generals in Naypyidaw to cooperate with Secretary-General's good office and show a "positive gesture" to calm down mounting international criticism before the scheduled 2010 election in Burma.
As history has its proof, it is now time for Than Shwe to pull out a card and play magic with his international supporters. One possible prospect will be the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader and the only imprisoned Noble Peace Prize winner, in near future – as earliest as by May or as latest as November 2009 – which in itself presents what the junta considers to be several favorable conditions.
First, the junta knows that releasing Suu Kyi could be well enough to relieve the concerns of China, Russia, Asean and other apologists for the junta that have found it hard recently to defend the Burmese regime in the international arena.
If the military rulers were sublimely tactful, they could even invite either UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari or Secretary-General, and allow the Good Offices to take credit for Suu Kyi’s release.
In this manner, the junta could use the release of Suu Kyi to fend off international criticism against the systematic crackdowns, forcibly ratified constitution and scheduled election for 2010.
In fact, the military generals believe they can afford to release the opposition leader without compromising with her. Indeed, in accepting her freedom Suu Kyi could find herself in a Catch-22 situation where she cannot criticize the government without finding herself back in a cage.
No political transition is likely to take place within the framework of the current constitution. Even amendments made to the constitution in the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within a military-dominated parliament and the junta’s foreseeable power arrangement in a post-2010 Burma.
The question, therefore, is what the opposition can do to counter military's strategy and achieve two most important results needed for political transition—constitutional reform and the release of political prisoners.
Over the past 20 years, the opposition parties in Burma have shown an unyielding faith in the power of principles. Now it is time for them to learn the principles of power.
Paradoxically, the first principle of power that the opposition should pursue is a moral strategy.
The National League for Democracy (NLD) and other opposition parties should declare that they will not take part in the 2010 elections unless the junta agrees to engage in political dialogue with the opposition to negotiate a constitutional review and to release the political prisoners.
This is not only a righteous strategy that will create a feel-good factor among opposition members, but it can be used as a playing card to achieve three concrete political gains.
First of all, it could motivate the opposition's own bases—NLD organizers throughout the country and its supporters, as well as legitimate ethnic political parties—most of whom have taken back seats in recent political debates due to the NLD's defensive, reactive and passive policy.
NLD Chairman Aung Shwe, who has always avoided public communication, should make himself available to Burmese-language shortwave radio stations abroad to address the public to articulate why the NLD has decided not to take part in the 2010 election and what the NLD demands are.
The party leadership should not take for granted that their cause is self-evident. They must publicize their agenda and promote it with clarity as a moral offensive.
Second, an election boycott could narrow the regime's bases—in particular, the full participation of ethnic minority groups that reached ceasefire deals with the military over the past 20 years.
All ethnic groups know the military's constitution is far below their acceptable thresholds.
Although groups such as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) may be planning to take part in the 2010 election through their proxy ethnic parties, they will be afforded the chance NOT to throw their weight behind the regime's terms and conditions, especially it involves the disarmament of their troops.
The opposition’s rejection of the 2010 election will, therefore, lend ceasefire groups political justification and strategic space (as the regime will be busy dealing with the NLD) to resist the regime's disarmament plan.
This will complicate the junta's political ploy or, in a worst case scenario, lead to a resumption of localized arm conflicts between certain ethnic ceasefire groups and the Burmese army. Such a situation would alarm China since the most volatile areas are around the Sino-Burmese border where formidable Wa and Kachin ethnic groups are based.
The third political gain the opposition could muster from a moral boycott strategy is that it will force the international community—particularly those who want to expedite the junta’s "road map"—to side with opposition's reasonable demands.
However, before all that comes into play, the opposition parties must show flexibility and articulate that it is not rejecting outright the regime's road map.
If the junta accepts a constitutional review and the release of political prisoners, the opposition can consider lending legitimacy to the road map. The opposition should also make it clear that it welcomes international humanitarian assistance to Burma, which is severely impoverished and falling into deeper humanitarian crises.
All in all, this is high time for the opposition to occupy the moral high ground and translate it into power and advantage. Of course, the route will not be an easy one as the regime will impose its nastiest crackdown on the opposition.
Some skeptics might also argue that it is nothing new for the Burmese opposition to take up a righteous policy and yet still lose the game.
However, what the opposition has so far adopted is a reflexive and ungainly position. What the opposition needs now to use the moral high ground wisely and publicly, and transform it into strategy, well-timed and coordinated toward achieving well-defined political gains.
This is the first principle of power the opposition should pursue and should constitute its New Year resolution for 2009.

Min Zin, a Burmese journalist in exile, is a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=14868